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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. International Law and the Environment
1.1.1. The Evolution of Environmental Information
Environmental information is everywhere around us: on milk-cartons and detergents, in 
newspapers and scientific journals, on television and internet bulletins. Most o f the 
information comes from private interest and initiative, and some is required by national 
legislation or regulation. Yet another source of environmental information is provided by 
states for the benefit of other states as part of their efforts to cooperate in global or regional 
environmental protection. States have, mainly through environmental treaties, created 
various systems o f information exchange to notify each other of accidents and potential 
risks and to supervise each other’s environmental deeds and omissions. Although still fully 
in use, most -  though not all - o f these methods of sharing information represent the “past” 
in that they perpetuate an ex post facto -approach to environmental problems, and this 
notwithstanding the availability of advanced information and surveillance technology, and 
a more general trend towards precaution.
Information arrangements in international environmental law have hitherto largely been 
overlooked, being either only very briefly discussed, or even dismissed altogether as 
uninteresting, although they are central at least in terms o f abundance. At a guess, the 
reasons underlying such quick dismissals are probably related to a general perception of 
the vacuous nature of the arrangements. This attitude has been unfortunate, because -  even 
if such an assessment would be justified- it fails not only to consider the “power” o f and 
demand for information and knowledge, especially in the internet age, but it also perceives 
frequency as nonsense rather than a noteworthy pattern or structural element of the whole 
of international environmental law, or even a reflection of the state of international law at 
large. The first aim of this study is therefore to challenge that dismissal by tracing the 
evolution and understanding the possible functions o f inter-state environmental 
information as it is manifested in public international law today.
1
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But a new era may be evolving both temporally and materially as the focus of legal 
development -  at least in the Liberal West - is put on the rights of individuals to access 
environmental information. This study will therefore, also, discuss the potential merits and 
problems alike of developing a right to environmental information, and its meaning for 
! international environmental law. Rights are precisely human rights, not nature’s, and they 
; may just lead to a continuing preference for procedure over substantive norm-development 
that earlier inter-state information schemes have involved. Interesting questions o f  
legitimacy also follow if openness leads to public participation in environmental decision­
making, be it national or international. The development from state-to-state information 
exchanges to individual access to information seems to be part of a larger societal trend 
towards more openness, one that involves pressure on states and other actors to more 
immediate and voluntary openness outside o f all legal arrangements. The role o f  
international law is intriguing however, because it may still have some role (this study will 
discuss whether these are modest or considerable) in such a  process, and some meaning for 
environmental protection, even in view of the many complex and contradictory 
? considerations presented by environmental degradation and sustainable development. This 
could come to mean that openness as it is now developing in international law can also be  
a vehicle for a fundamental conceptual shift towards better environmental protection, but it 
is a prospect whose outcome may be fraught with the risk of bitter disappointment, in  
terms of wisdom, farsightedness and sense o f responsibility -  also of individuals.
When the global environmental debate took off seriously both in academia and among the 
public in the late 1960s,1 that debate was itself dependent on general access to new and 
relevant information on the environment. The debate and ensuing actions between states 
led to the development o f a novel area of public international law: “international 
environmental law” 2- an indication of a perception o f some uniqueness and coherence. 
This new legal area started to show an impressive record of both norm-creation and
1 Pictures of the Earth taken from space made a great impact on the 1960s television viewing public all over 
the world. Seminal for the ecology debate was Carson, R. 1962. See also ’A Blueprint for Survival’, The 
Ecologist, 1972. The early ecology debate has later been discussed esp. in philosophy - and ethics - related 
literature, but also in historical studies, see e.g. Ponting, C., 1992.
2 Compare e.g. Bimie, P. & A. Boyle, 1992/2002 with Sands, P., 1993, pp. xv-xxvi for references to 
international law relating to the environment and international environmental law, respectively. On this 
distinction, see further Kuokkanen, T., 2000, p. vii et seq.
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institutional development,3 and it was this legal surrounding, this modem spirit o f progress, 
that initially fostered norms on openness and information. There were some international 
environmental treaties and policy considerations well before the ecological and scarcity4 
debates o f the 1960s and 1970s respectively, but public discussions had not reached the 
same magnitude and were mostly the domain of smaller groups, well exemplified by the 
early philanthropic efforts o f regulating, and later preventing, trade in trophies.5 Legal 
practice relating to exchange of information between states had not explicitly dealt with 
environmental information, but, as in the Corfu Channel case, was concerned with other 
classical areas o f public international law.6 But from the 1970s on, besides scarcity, the 
pollution o f air and watercourses and other media, a renewed interest in overpopulation, 
and a new sense o f the inherent value o f nature for its own sake - even rights o f nature7 - 
became topical, as did the issue o f the limits, ecological and other, of endless economic
3 See e.g. Lyster, S., 1985; Hurrell, A. & B. Kingsbury, 1991. Here the aim is to use "organization" for 
material entities with physically existing seats, personnel, budgets etc., such as the WTO or various 
secretariats, expert committees and so forth set up as bodies under specific treaties. The term “institutional” is 
used either in the everyday sense o f an organizational structure's internal modes of functioning, working 
habits, procedural rules and so forth or in the more abstract sense of a social construct, such as the global 
economy. On the distinction between the concepts of “organization” and “institution”, see, e.g., Young, O., 
1989, chapter 2.
4 The ecological debate was strongly fuelled by the 1973 world oil crisis, resulting, inter alia, from the OPEC 
turning off oil supply in response to the Arab-Israeli conflict, leading to prices increasing radically. This led 
to a worldwide discussion about scarcity, a “new" phenomenon argued to be a result of ever-growing 
consumption by industry of various minerals and other natural resources. The resulting media coverage on 
resource scarcity, although questioned by some, such as Maddock, 1974, caught on strongly among 
politicians. With some hindsight, the predicted ecological "doomsday” due at the end of the century has not 
come about, as its prophets neglected to consider at least the impact o f changes in patterns of consumption 
and the ingenuity of people in situations of scarcity. Interestingly enough, the 1973 oil crisis led to great 
exploration activity and the consequent extraction of oil from sources earlier considered too laborious or 
expensive. The idea o f scarcity was overcome, later also for minerals other than oil. However, ecological 
awareness was raised - at times through exaggeration (see esp. The Economist, 20.12.1997, pp. 21-23), - and, 
slowly, a decade or so later, the realization that lower prices on resources like oil did not contain any social or 
environmental costs led to a new debate. Generally, see Achterhuis, H., 1993.
3 As opposed to international law relating to natural resources, see e.g. Higgins, R., 1995, pp. 129-145 and 
Kuokkanen, T., 2000. On trade in trophies see Ogundere, J.D., 1972, pp. 256-257 and Lyster, S., 1985, p. 
239. For an example, see Art. 9 of the Convention Relative to the Preservation of Fauna and Flora in their 
Natural State, London, 8.11.1933, in force 14.1.1936. See also its predecessor, the Convention for the 
Preservation of Wild Animals, Birds and Fish in Africa, London, 19.5.1900.
6 In which the ICJ held that it is "...every State's obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for 
acts contrary to the rights of other States". Corfu Channel case, Judgment o f 9 April, 1949, ICJ Reports 1949, 
p. 22; On ICJ jurisprudence and environmental protection, see Fitzmaurice, M., 1996, pp. 293-315.
7 The seminal classic on this issue is Stone, C.D., 1972; See also Stone, C.D., 1985.
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growth.8 The 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm9 
has come to be considered as the watershed in the development o f international law on the  
environment. The Stockholm Declaration10 advanced the legal evolution o f inter-state 
environmental information duties, as did the Rio Declaration,11 the other classical 
milestone which resulted from the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development 
(UNCED) at Rio de Janeiro. The latter added some valuable references to access to  
environmental information. This study considers legal development up until the Spring o f  
2002, covering particularly the three decades which have passed since the Stockholm 
Conference. The outcome of the World Summit on Sustainable Development a t 
Johannesburg in August/September 2002 will therefore here be limited to some tentative 
remarks.
Between the 1972 and 1992 UN Conferences, international law relating to the environment 
developed with formidable intensity. Hundreds o f bilateral and dozens o f multilateral, both 
global and regional, treaties were concluded on diverse subjects ranging from the 
protection o f the air, international rivers and watercourses, regional seas, and single 
endangered species and responses to nuclear and other accidents, to, as a “second 
generation”, the management o f trade in hazardous substances, protection o f the ozone 
layer, and protection of biodiversity.12 Some treaties, especially in marine pollution and 
nuclear law, developed rather quickly as a result of catastrophes -  and those are very
8 On the Club of Rome and the discussion it initiated, see esp. Meadows, D. et a l s 1974; See also Meadows, 
D., 1992.
9 The Stockholm Conference faced the enormous task of trying to reconcile the wishes of both developed and 
developing countries. The fear of the latter was that environmental concerns would be used as arguments 
against the further economic growth of poor countries, a threat which seemed highly unfair - even a new 
form o f colonialism -, and a topic which has by no means left the global environmental debate, but which is 
still very much at the heart of it. For the original 1970s to late 1980s debate on "green imperialism", "toxic 
colonialism" and other notions o f new forms of outside dominance, see Dembo, D., 1987, Pambou 
Tchivounda, G., 1988, p. 710. Cock, J. and Koch, E., 1991, p. 173. Peter, C.M., 1990, p. 64.
10 The Conference managed to reach consensus on its final - and rather optimistic - document, the United 
Nations Declaration on the Human Environment, Stockholm, 16.6.1972 (with China present but not 
participating), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14/Rev. 1, 3 (1973); U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14, 2-65 and Corr. 1 
(1972); 11 IL M 1416 (1972); See Sohn, L.B., 1973, pp. 423-515.
11 UNCED, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, 13.6.1992, UN Doc. 
A/CONF.151/26 (vol. I)(1992); 31 ILM  874 (1992).
12 Generally on the development o f international treaties and other documents of international environmental 
law, see e.g. Kiss, A.C., 1976; Lyster, S., 1985; Bimie, P. & A. Boyle, 1992/2002; Kiss, A. & D. Shelton,
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relevant for the evolution of environmental information13 Others, like the United Nations 
Law of the Sea Convention, were the result o f years of deliberation. What never 
materialized in those years was a single global treaty to deal with general principles 
elaborating the rights and duties of states with respect to the environment. Besides sector- 
based treaties, instruments o f a soft-law14 character, like the 1982 World Charter for 
Nature, proliferated through United Nations organs,15 regional governmental 
organizations16 and various non-governmental bodies and groups of experts.17 
Organizational creation followed this general development, well exemplified by 
secretariats for the conventions scattered in many countries, and the setting up o f the 
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) by a General Assembly Resolution after 
the Stockholm Conference.18 In 1992 great expectations and global preparations gathered 
momentum for the Rio Conference. Nevertheless, political and economic friction was of 
such magnitude that the material outcome of the Conference was -  relative to popular 
hopes - substantively meagre: two Conventions - the Biodiversity Convention19 and a
1993; ibid., 2000; Nordstrom, N., E. Pirjatanniemi, A. Rosas et alt 1994; Sands, P., 1995; and on the 
developmental process, see esp. Kuokkanen, T., 2000.
13 E.g. the 1969 Torrey Canyon and the 1986 Chernobyl accidents respectively played roles in the negotiation 
of some marine pollution and nuclear accident related treaties: the International Convention Relating to 
Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Damage, Brussels, 29.11.1969, in force 6.5.1975; 
Protocol Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Marine Pollution by Substances Other than 
Oil, London, 2.11.1973, in force 30.3.1983; Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, Vienna, 
26.9.1986, in force 27.10.1986; Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological 
Emergency, Vienna, 26.9,1986, in force 26.2.1987.
14 Literature on the role o f soft law in international law, as well as environmental law, is extensive. See e.g. 
Hillenberg, H., 1999; and see several contributions in Shelton, D,, 2000; Bimie, P. & A. Boyle, 2002, pp. 24- 
27.
15 E.g., UN GA, World Charter for Nature, Resolution 37/7,28.10.1982, 37 GAOR, Supp. No. 15, p. 17; UN 
Doc, A/37/51; ILM 455 (1983); UNEP, Governing Council Decision on Draft Principles o f Conduct in the 
Field of the Environment for the Guidance o f States in the Conservation and Harmonious Utilization of 
Natural Resources Shared by Two or More States, 6/14(1978), 33 GAOR, Supp. 25, Annex 1, A/33/25(1978).
16 E.g., European Community, Council Regulation of 7 May 1990 on the Establishment of the European 
Environment Agency and the European Environment Information and Observation Network, 90/1210/EEC. 
O.J. L120/1 (1990); Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Council Recommendation 
for the Implementation of a Regime of Equal Right of Access and Non-Discrimination in Relation to 
Transfrontier Pollution, 17.5.1977, C(77)28(Final).
17 E.g. various Declarations and Resolutions by the Institut de Droit International, the International Law 
Association; See also World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED), Experts Group on 
Environmental Law, Environmental Protection and Sustainable Development, 1987.
IS Institutional and Financial Arrangements for International Environmental Co-operation, G A Res. 2997, 27 
UN GAOR Supp. (No. 30), p. 43, UN Doc. A/8730(1972).
19 United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity, Rio de Janeiro, 5.6.1992, in force 29.12.1993.
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framework Convention on Global Climate Change,20 the non-binding Rio Declaration, 
Agenda 21,21 and a statement of Forest Principles.22 Nothing came o f  earlier hopes for a  
broad "Earth Charter",23 or on issues of population control, and very little materialized in  
the area o f  organizational co-ordination and development.24 The Commission o n  
Sustainable Development (CSD) 25 which is mainly a governmental discussion forum o n  
future policy, was created as a follow-up body to assess national reports under Agenda 2 1 . 
Apart from the Commission, no global environmental organization was created, as h a d  
been hoped for by some,26 though not all. O f significance was the establishment o f  th e  
Global Environment Facility (GEF),27 although in the long run it has yet to achieve its fu ll 
potential as a financing body. However, given the near universal adoption o f the R io  
Declaration, and the balancing that led to its adoption by consensus,28 the outcome o f th e
20 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Rio de Janeiro, 4.6.1992, in force 21.3.1994.
21 UNCED, Agenda 21, Rio de Janeiro, 13.6.1992. UN Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (vols. I, II, III)(1992).
22 UNCED, Non-legally Binding Authoritative Statement of Principles for a Global Consensus on th e  
Management, Conservation and Sustainable Development o f all Types of Forests, Rio de Janeiro, 13.6.1992, 
31 IL M %81 (1992).
23 A global convention on environmental protection had been envisaged, inter alia, by the Brundtland 
Commission in: World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED), Our Common Future , 
1987, p. 333; and by its Expert Group which drafted a set of legal principles which then went largely 
unconsidered by the Rio Conference.
24 For the mandate of the UNCED, see UN GA Resolution 44/228 o f 22 December 1989, and UN G A  
Resolution 45/211 of 21 December 1990. In fact, the mandate did not even extend beyond the examination 
by the UNCED of the "feasibility" of elaborating a binding global instrument setting out the rights an d  
obligations o f states, thus considerably circumscribing any potential outcome of the Conference.
25 A functional commission of the UN ECOSOC, 53 member states in 3-year terms; Mandate based on UNG 
Res. 47/191, 1992, and which does not include assessing whether single actions are in compliance w ith 
“sustainable development”; Generally, see http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/csd.htm. and for documents on the 
Rio +5 Conference in 1997 and the 10-year follow-up meeting in Johannesburg in 2002. And see C SD  
Update, Newsletter of the Secretariat o f the CSD at http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/csdup.htm: See further 
Mensah, C., 1996, pp. 21-37; and see Boyle, A., & D. Freestone, 1999, p. 6; and Fox, H. & D. Freestone, 
2001. And see World Summit on Sustainable Development, Plan o f Implementation, para. 127-132, 
Johannesburg, September 2002, http://www.johannesburgsummit.org.
26 See e.g. Palmer, G., 1992, pp. 259-283; And for later calls for one international environmental 
organization, and its hoped-for characteristics and roles, see Ayling, J., 1997, pp. 243-269.
27 http://www.gefweb.org: Generally, see Boisson de Chazoumes, L., ‘Le Fonds...’, 1995, pp. 612-632; 
Sands, P., 1995, pp. 736-741; Sjoberg, H., 1996, pp. 148-162; and esp. Sand, P.H., 1999, pp, 217, 299-311, 
343. And see World Summit on Sustainable Development, Plan of Implementation, Section X, Johannesburg, 
September 2002.
28 E.g.Handl, G., 2001, p. 31, writes o f “ ... the well-nigh universal endorsement of the fundamental 
importance o f sustainable development”; Also Boyle, A. & D. Freestone, 1999, mention the meaningfulness 
and weight o f the concept due to its global support.
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Conference was overall significant for the development o f international law on the 
environment, as shall be discussed below.
Although varied in scope and content, and dependent on various complex social, political, 
economic and developmental factors for their implementation and further development, 
this host o f  international instruments, and subsequent ones, have consolidated some of the 
central tenets of environmental protection,29 inclduing the duty to inform and the seeds to 
rights of access to environmental information. But before considering these, a brief 
discussion on those legal principles that are jelated to environmental information and that 
have developed mostly in the decades after the Stockholm Conference is necessary as a 
means o f introduction to the topic o f this study. In particular, there are four principles of 
“international environmental law” that are of particular relevance in relation to 
environmental information: prevention, cooperation, precaution and sustainable
development. Information is most closely related to cooperation, and both can be tools to 
achieve prevention or precaution. The last principle, sustainable development, is relevant 
to this study because it is fundamental to the present understanding o f the nature of 
international “environmental” law, and conceptually related to other anthropocentric 
developments, particularly the discussion on environmental “rights” which began in the 
1990s and continues today.
29 Others, such as the polluter pays principle are perhaps less relevant in relation to environmental 
information duties. The principle, which is found i.a. in the Rio Declaration (Principle 16) ), but not in the 
Stockholm Declaration, is central to the economic ramifications o f pollution, see Boyle, A., 1991 b, pp. 363- 
379. See also e.g. Article 2(2)(b) o f the 1992 North East Atlantic Convention. No mention of the polluter 
pays principle is to be found in the Baltic Convention on the Protection o f the Marine Environment o f the 
Baltic Sea Area, Helsinki, 22.3. 1974, in force 3.5.1980. Its 1992 successor, however, mentions the polluter 
pays principle in Article 3(4). The primarily economic nature of the principle has not prevented references to 
it as even a "general principle o f international environmental law", see Preamble to the International 
Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-operation, London, 30.11.1990, in force 
13.5.1995. In essence, different economic instruments are to be used in order for the costs of pollution 
prevention, control and reduction to be borne by the polluter. In view of the different levels of economic 
development between countries and regions, it remains doubtful whether the principle's practical application 
can be universally successful. A case in point is the foreign technical and monetary help received by Russia 
and Lithuania for the maintenance and improvement of nuclear reactor safety. Recently, some treaties have 
resorted to qualifying wording such as “the polluter should, in principle, bear the cost of pollution”, see e.g. 
Article 3, Protocol to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and 
Other Matter, 7.11.1996, not in force. The Protocol is intended to replace the Convention with the same 
name, done at London, 13.11.1972, in force 30.8.1975. Amended 12.10.1978, in force 11.3.1979; amended 
24.9.1980, in force 11.3.1981; amended 3.11.1989, in force 19.5.1990; amended 12.11.1993, in force 
20.2.1994.
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The most fundamental tenet of international law on the environment, and the one on w hich 
—' '  for instance information duties rest, is still the duty to prevent, reduce and control 
environmental harm to the natural environment o f  another state, global common, or, in an  
ecosystems approach, of any part o f the global environment.30 According to Bimie and  
Boyle, "[i]t is beyond serious argument that states are required by international law to tak e  
adequate steps to control and regulate sources o f serious global environmental pollution o r  
transboundary harm within their territory or subject to their jurisdiction. This is a principle 
o f harm prevention, not merely a basis for reparation after the event..."31 The legal m axim  
sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, an expression of the duty o f good neighbourliness,32 
and akin to the principle of abuse o f rights,33 had been accepted as a rule of general 
international law34 well before the Stockholm Declaration and numerous consequent
30 Further on the no harm-principle, see e.g., Kiss, A.C., 1976, pp. 57-; Boyle, A., 1985, pp. 353-357; !
Goldie, L.F.E., 1985, pp. 215-217; Pinto, M.C.W., 1985, p. 39; Sands, P., 1988, pp. 6-22; Ebbesson, J, 1993, 
pp. 40-41; Nordstrom, N., E. Piijatanniemi, A. Rosasetal, 1994, p. 21-23; Sands, P., 1995, p. 186-197; K iss, ! 
A. & D Shelton, 2000; Kuokkanen, T., 2000, ch. I; Bimie, P. & A. Boyle, 2002.
Bimie, P. & A. Boyle, 1992, p. 89; and see ICJ judgment in the case o f the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project 
(Hungary v. Slovakia), ICJ Reports, 1997, which in para. 140 mentions that “vigilance and prevention a re  
required...”, see further Soljan, L., 1998, p. 210.
32The sic utere principle is notorious for its generality; on its origin and domestic v. international character, 
see Lammers, J., 1984, pp. 570-571. According to one writer it is ’’evident that the maxim can provide o n ly  
little guidance for the verification of specific state obligations”, Hakapàà, K., 1981, p. 137; The notion o f  
good neighbourliness, equally vague, is by some connected to substantive harm and the notion of equitable 
use, see e.g. Lammers, J., 1984, p., 546. Further see Handl, G., 1978-79, p. 61; Equitable use has been 
developed in international law mainly within the areas o f maritime delimitation and the use o f international 
watercourses, see, e.g., North Sea Continental Shelf cases, ICJ Reports, 1969, p. 46; Tunisia-Libya 
Continental Shelf case, ICJ Reports, 1982, p. 59; Gulf o f  Maine case, ICJ Reports, 1984, p. 312; Helsinki 
Rules o f the Uses o f the Waters o f International Rivers, ILA, Report o f  the Fifty-Second Conference, held a t 
Helsinki, 1966, pp. 485-532, Article IV; Generally, see Sands, P., 1995, pp. 197-198.
33 On its relationship to the sic utere maxim, see Oppenheim, L.F.L, ed. H. Lauterpacht, 1955, pp. 346-347;
For a further definition of the concept see Iluyomade, B.O., 1975, p. 48; And see further Kuokkanen, T ., 
2000, pp. 46-54. Abuse of rights may further connect to the notion o f unjust enrichment, see Fisheries 
Jurisdiction (United Kingdom v. Iceland) and Fisheries Jurisdiction (Federal Republic o f  Germany v. 
Iceland) cases, ICJ Reports, 1974, see p. 30. On risk-creation as a form of expropriation, see Goldie, L.F.E., 
1985, pp. 212-213.
34 The Supreme Court of the United States first made reference to this principle in the Georgia vs. Tennessee 
Copper Co. case, 206 U.S. 230 (1906), and it was restated in the often cited Trail Smelter case between the 
United States and Canada, where the Arbitral Tribunal held that: "...under the principles of international law , 
as well as o f the law of the United States, no State has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such 
a manner as to cause injury by fumes on or to the territory o f another or the properties or persons therein, 
when the case is o f serious consequence and the injury is established by clear and convincing evidence". 
Trail Smelter arbitration, 1938, 1941 (United States of America v. Canada), 3 UNRIAA, 1941, pp. 1938, 
1962; See also the Corfu Channel case, Judgment of April 9th, 1949, (quoted supra) ICJ Reports, 1949, p.
[22; See further e.g. Kuokkanen, T., 2000, pp. 55-58; As these and some other landmark cases contained 
j elements which circumscribe their applicability to international environmental law, the duty of prevention 
j was most importantly expressed in the Stockholm Declaration and subsequent treaties.
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legally-binding agreements35 further consolidated it within the context of environmental 
protection. Despite being of a soft-law character the Declaration, and especially its 
Principle 21,36 which has been widely reiterated in subsequent treaties, has nonetheless 
become part of general international law:37
States have, in accordance with the Charter o f the United Nations and the principles 
of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to 
their own environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities 
within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment o f other 
States or of areas beyond the limits o f national jurisdiction.38
The Principle is two-fold: on the one hand it reaffirms the concept o f transfrontier 
pollution prevention; on the other hand it refers to the sovereign right of states to exploit 
their resources. The principle o f pollution prevention is widely considered to be an integral 
part of the concept of state sovereignty and the corresponding concept of territorial 
integrity.39 There is a built-in tension in Principle 21, although some would see it as only 
an element of balancing of interests rather than a detraction from the legal force o f the 
principle o f responsibility.40
Principle 21 does not mention any threshold for environmental harm, an issue that in 
subsequent decades became widely discussed, and which has not been satisfactorily
35 E.g. Articles 192-194 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Montego Bay, 10.12 1982, 
in force 16.11 1994.
36 For an argument against the legally binding nature of Principle 21, see Knox, J.H., 2002, p. 292.
37 See esp. ICJ Advisory Opinion on the Legality o f the Threat or Use o f  Nuclear Weapons, ICJ Reports
(1996) , para. 29 (see Judgment para. 53 and 112): “the environment is not an abstraction but represents the 
living space, the quality of life and the very health of human beings, including generations unborn. The 
existence of the general obligation of States to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction and control 
respect the environment of other States or of areas beyond national control is now part of the corpus of 
international law relating to the environment”; C f  esp. Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Dam
(1997) , ICJ Reports 7; References in literature to the binding character of the principle are vast, see e.g. Kiss, 
A-C, 1992, p. 12; Pallemaerts, M., 1988, pp. 205-206; Palmer, G., 1992, pp. 268; Bimie, P. & A. Boyle, 
1992, pp. 90-91 and ibid. 2002; Pallemaerts, M., 1993, p. 2; See also Sands, P., 1995, pp. 194-197; Soljan, 
L., 1998, p, 210; but see Koskenniemi, M., 1990, pp. 309-331.
38 Stockholm Declaration, Principle 21.
j9 See e.g., Lammers, J.G., 1984, pp. 557-563; Sands, P., 1989, p. 404; Sands, P., 1995, pp. 188-190; and see 
Kuokkanen, T., 2000, pp. 6-20.
40 See e.g. Pallemaerts, M.f 1988, p. 206.
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resolved on the level o f general international law.41 Perhaps the most convincing argum ent 
is that the threshold should be understood as a standard o f  due care or due diligence42 - a s  
manifested for instance by legal and administrative controls by states although there a re  
expressions in treaty law o f more stringent standards, especially in relation to u ltra - 
hazardous activities.43
ƒ
ƒ Principle 21 includes damage not only to states' environments but also to the g lobalj
i commons, a  step that was crucial to the development o f the area of law towards a m o re
*
j inclusive, global approach.44 Earlier concepts such as obligations erga omnes45 or th e  
common heritage o f m ankind46 *along with the later and weaker "common concern o f
41 C f  the Trail Smelter case, which mentions "when the case is o f  serious consequence and the injury is  
established by clear and convincing evidence"; The ILC first referred to "appreciable injury", s e e  
International Law Commission, 1990. Special Rapporteur Julio Barboza; Sixth Report on International 
Liability fo r  Injurious Consequences Arising Out o f  Acts Not Prohibited by International Law (cited as IL C : 
Barboza, Sixth Report), A/CN.4/428 and A/CN.4/428/Add.l; Later, the ILC has referred to the “risk o f  
causing significant transboundary harm”, see Report o f  the International Law Commission on the Work o f  I t s  
Fiftieth Session, 1998, GAOR A/53/10, p. 18; The ECE Watercourses Convention mentions "any significant 
adverse effect on the environment", Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses 
and International Lakes, Helsinki, 17.3 1992, entry into force 6.10.1996, Article 1(2); Generally on harm in  
international law and in relation to ILC work, see Jacqmotte, B., 1998 and Urstadt, J., 1998.
42 See e.g. Report o f  the International Law Commission on the Work o f Its Fiftieth Session, 1998, G A O R  
A/53/10, pp. 34-37; But contra for an argument in favour of absolute standards, see Vessey, J., 1989, p p . 
200-202, who writes relative standards off by saying that they emanate from Stockholm Principle 7 to tak e  
“all possible steps” to prevent pollution, p. 202 et seq.
43 A concept used to point out that certain human activities, like nuclear weapons or nuclear power, could  
contain such elements of risk (low probabilities of harm but enormous consequences if they occur) that th ey  
should be subject to stronger legal controls. Generally, Bimie, P. & A. Boyle, 1992, pp. 367-368; but see  
Brownlie, I., 1990, pp. 475-476; See work of ILC, e.g. reports by the Special Rapporteurs on International 
Liability fo r  Injurious Consequences Arising Out o f  Acts Not Prohibited by International Law (e.g. R . 
Quentin Quentin-Baxter, 1982, A/CN.4/360; J. Barboza, 1995, A/CN.4/468), but c f  later work by ILC, e .g . 
Report o f  the International Law Commission on the Work o f  Its Fiftieth Session, 1998, GAOR A/53/10.
44 Also, "environment" as opposed to damage to health and property only; For earlier legal practice, see  
Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France), Judgment o f 20th December 1974, ICJ Reports 1974, p. 253; Nuclear 
Tests (New Zealand v. France), Judgment o f  20th December 1994, ICJ Reports 1974, p. 457; Affaire du L a c  
Lenoux (Espagne v. France), 1957, XII UNRIAA, p. 281; Claim fo r  damage Caused by Soviet Cosmos 954 , 
18ILM  (1978), 902.
45 On obligations erga omnes, see Barcelona Traction Light and Power Company Limited, ICJ Reports 1970, 
p. 3. Further, see Ragazzi, M., 1997.
46 Applies to the deep sea-bed and the moon. See the 1992 LOSC, Article 136; and the Agreement Governing
the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, New York, 5.12 1979, in force 11.7.1984; 
Generally see Dupuy, R-J, 1984; Sands, P., 1995, p. 441, 750; Kiss, A. & D. Shelton, 2000; and on common 
heritage and Antarctica, see Rothwell, D., 2000, p. 613.
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humankind”47 have only marginally served to extend legal concerns to truly global 
environmental protection. “Inter-national environmental law” is very much a matter 
between states, although later inclusions o f ecosystems approaches and a gradual lessening 
of solely anthropocentric viewpoints have been a welcome development. The later 
inclusion o f  developmental concerns through the Rio Declaration again radically alters this 
picture, as does human rights of access to environmental information, the topic o f  Chapter 
4.
Significantly, the Rio Declaration in Principle 2 reiterates Stockholm Principle 21, adding 
two words:
States have, in accordance with the Charter o f the United Nations and the principles 
o f international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to 
their own environmental and developmental policies, and the responsibility to 
ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the 
environment o f other States or o f areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.48 
(emphasis added)
What is it that makes the Rio addition o f the words "and developmental" so significant? 
The basic tension, or, if preferred, the fragile balance, seen in Principle 21 between 
environmental responsibility and national sovereignty remains untouched in Principle 2, 
but instead a new paradox, equally fundamental, was created by combining environment 
and development. The new paradox also functions to disturb the "original" balance 
between responsibility and sovereignty. This fundamental shift is briefly discussed below 
as it is part of the political and legal “setting” in which norms on environmental 
information have evolved, and in particular, it is conceptually related to the most recent 
anthropocentric developments towards individual rights o f access to environmental 
information.
47 See e.g. the Preambles to the Climate Change Convention, and the Biodiversity Convention; Generally, see 
Sands, P, 1995, p. 218.
48 Rio Declaration, Principle 2.
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1.1.2. The Related Principles and Paradoxes
Thus the concept that crystallizes the outcome of the Rio Conference is sustainable 
development.49 Its origins are inseparably linked to earlier recognitions, for instance in th e  
Stockholm Declaration, of the inevitable need to reconcile environmental protection w ith  
the developmental needs o f Third World countries in particular.50 Sustainable developm ent 
was most notably elaborated by the World Commission on Environment and D evelopm ent 
(WCED),51 and consequently established as a concept in international law, politics a n d  
economics by the Rio Conference and its five above-mentioned documents. The w e ll-  
known WCED definition of the concept ("development that meets the needs o f  the p re sen t 
without compromising the ability o f  future generations to meet their own needs"), as w e ll 
as other definitions, 52 leaves much clarity to be wished for; and yet the notion is frequently  
used53 and has, in the decade between Rio and Johannesburg, become a central element o f  
international law.54 Opinions are dramatically divided on the legal strength o f  th e  
concept,55 on its applicability to domestic and/or international law, on its substantive
49 Generally in international law see Lang, W., 1995; Beyerlin, U., 1996, pp. 95-12; Boisson de Chazoum es, 
L., 1996, pp. 285-300; Boyle, A. & D. Freestone, 1999; On the EU and sustainable development, s e e  
Commission web-site: http://europa.eu.int/.comm/environment/law/sustlaw.htm
50 But see UNGA: Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, Resolution 3281 (XXIX) (1974). 2 9  
GAOR, Supp. 31; UNGA: Co-operation in the Field of the Environment concerning Natural Resources 
Shared by Two or More States, Resolution 3129 (XXVIII)(1973), 13.12 1973,28 GAOR Supp. 30, p. 48; 13 
ILM  232 (1974). The efforts in the 1970s to create a New Economic World Order did not to any great ex ten t 
address problems relating to environmental consequences of development.
51 The so-called Brundtland Commission: World Commission on Environment and Development (W CED), 
Our Common Future, 1987.
52 See also UNEP definition in Governing Council Decision 15/2 of May 1989, Annex II, GAOR, 4 4 th  
Session Suppl. No. 25, UN Doc. A/44/25(1989).
53 Typically, under a sectoral environmental agreements or regional cooperation arrangements, the issue is 
dealt with in a working group, framework document, special committee or the like, see e.g. the A rctic 
Council’s Sustainable Development Programme (SDP) and Sustainable Development Working G roup 
(SDWG) started in 1998 and its Sustainable Development Framework Document, 2000, accessible a t 
http://www.arctic-council.org/sdwg.asp
j 54 "Sustainable development is a seductively simple concept, basic to human survival and though it cannot 
yet be said to be a norm of international law", Bimie, P. & Boyle, A., 1992, p. 5, and see pp. 122-124, and cf. 
Boyle, A. & D. Freestone, 1999, pp. 16-17, who make a balancing argument where the concept as such is not 
to be considered general international law, but where its component parts (EIAs, public participation, 
integrating environmental and developmental aspects in decision-making, and intra- and inter-generational 
equity) need be promoted in a process of decision-making that promotes sustainable development.
f55See Lowe, V., 1999, who makes an interesting argument for the concepts’ application and normativity 
despite it falling short of traditional tests o f general international law (representing neither hard law nor soft
12
components and justiciability, and above all on its repercussions for environmental 
protection.56
Turning first to arguments on the Rio process as a failure for environmental protection, the 
first question relates to the relationship between environmental responsibility and national 
sovereignty, the latter of which was earlier in the Stockholm Declaration conditioned on 
states' own environmental policies. However, in one interpretation, "[ajfter Rio, a  State's 
responsibility in the exercise o f its sovereign right to exploit its natural resources will no 
longer be measured first and foremost in terms o f its environmental policy obligations, 
which are now explicitly subordinated to the dictates o f its economic development 
policy.1'57 Secondly, the central weakness of the concept lies in its general vagueness. The 
adjective, "sustainable", should serve to clarify the noun, "development". The verb sustain, 
from which the adjective derives, means "hold up, bear the weight of, be able to bear 
(strain, suffering etc) without collapse, strengthen, uphold, maintain, ...;"58 It remains 
difficult to ascertain whether sustainable development is a moral or a practical concept, or 
if at all it could combine both these elements. Most writers would agree that the concept’s 
lack of concrete standards also means that it is not directly justiciable, although the 
argument has been presented that courts can, and should, as was done by the ICJ in the 
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case, make some use of the concept in their argumentation, and that 
this will influence the development also o f international environmental law.59 As seen in
law), e.g. “fundamentally nonn-creating character” (as in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, 1969), state 
practice, opinio juris, or compliance; and see further Separate Opinion o f Judge Weeramantry to the ICJ 
judgment in the Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Dam (Hungary v. Slovakia), ICJ Reports, 7, 
1997, where he writes that sustainable development combines the “needs o f development and the necessity to 
protect the environment” (and c f  Judgment, para. 140) and is “more than a mere concept, but a principle with 
normative value...” and that it “rests on a basis o f worldwide acceptance” .
56 Sentiments range from utter disappointment and disillusionment with the future of “international 
environmental law” since the introduction of the "challenging” developmental element into it; to some 
satisfaction with the inclusion of environmental concerns into international economic law; to great 
contentment with the perceived acknowledgement of developmental concerns and even economic growth as 
preconditions for environmental protection; Generally, see Symposium: ‘Environment 2000 -  New Issues for 
a New Century’ in 27(4) Ecology Law Quarterly 2001.
57 Pallemaerts, M., 1993, p. 6.
stThe Penguin English Dictionary. Harmondsworth, Penguin Books Ltd., 1982, p. 730.
59 See Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Dam (1997), ICJ Reports 7, esp. para. 140; See further, 
e.g. on the role of “a state of necessity” as a reason, based on customary international law, for producing (vs. 
sometimes precluding) wrongfulness, on “grave and imminent peril” as a test for necessity, and on risk, as 
well as on the role of the case for the development of international law, see Higgins, R., 1999, pp. 104-111; 
See further Lowe, V., 1999; and Sands, P., 1999, pp. 59-60.
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the above-cited WCED definition, the notion o f the rights o f future generations60 is o f te n  
included in attempts to put some flesh on the bones of sustainability. Yet we do not k n o w  
what the needs of future generations are: the classical dilemmas are that we cannot know  i f  
they will be richer or poorer than we are, what their technological capacity will be, w h a t  
they wish and long for, etc. A total conservation o f the status quo is not only im possible, 
but may not be what future generations want. They may wish for less (nature, clean a ir ,  
and so on) than we have now, or they may wish for an amelioration o f the present state o f  
the environment. The integration o f  both environmental and developmental aspects in  
decision-making has been advanced as the most obvious -  and most difficult - requisite fo r  
sustainability. And finally, EIAs and public participation have been put forward a s  
elements o f sustainable development especially by those arguing for a procedural approach  
to its realization.61 This would be the main link between information duties, supervisory 
methods and access rights to sustainable development, as this study will further discuss.
In the end, the goals of sustainable development remain open to interpretation, debate a n d  
political decision-making, if  those are encouraged, and especially on the national level.62 
The introduction o f sustainable development could perhaps be said to have strengthened 
the argumentation of some developing countries: there is now a rhetoric which so u n d s 
good, but which can be used to m ean almost anything. For the same reason of norm ative
60 Or “inter-generational equity” along with “intra-generational equity”; See e.g. Stockholm Declaration 
Preamble and Principle 2; Rio Declaration Principle 3 states that "The right to development must be fulfilled 
so as to equitably meet developmental and environmental needs o f present and future generations"; See a lso  
1CJ Advisory Opinion on the Legality o f  the Threat or Use o f  Nuclear Weapons, ICJ Reports 1996, pp. 2 4 1 - 
242; and see Declaration on the Responsibilities of the Present Generations Towards Future Generations, 
UNESCO General Conference, 12.11 1997; Fora seminal work see Brown Weiss, E., 1989; See also B row n 
Weiss, E., 1990, pp. 198-207 and ibid., 'Environmental Equity...’, 1995, pp. 17-33; ibid., ‘Opening...’, 1999, 
pp. 338-353; D’Amato, A., 1990, pp. 190-198; Gtindling, L., 'Our Responsibility 1990a, pp. 207-212; 
Conable, B.B., 1990, p. 235; and for practice under the 1987 Philippine Constitution, see the 1993 M inors  
Oposa v. Factoran case, 33 ILM 173 (1994); on the case and recognition of the rights of future generations, 
see La Vifia, A., 1994; Generally, see Sands, P., 1995, pp. 199-200; and further on the relationship between 
the “emerging customary international environmental law principle” of intergenerational equity an d  
precaution, McIntyre, O., 1998, p. 91; and on the same, see Granet, M-B, 2001, p. 795.
61 See esp. Boyle, A. & D. Freestone, 1999, p. 17; and c f  to Lowe, V., 1999, p. 36: *... seem to be more o f  a  
procedural than o f a substantive character’.
< 62 One writer on the European Commission’s web-pages says that “ ... despite the initial enthusiasm, we have 
come to realize that the road to sustainability is more difficult than we anticipated. One of the obstacles, 
among many identified, since the Rio Conference is the lack of a specific methodology for incorporating the 
criteria o f sustainability into the policies o f the European Union” , 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/environment/law/sustlaw.htm
vagueness, big industry63 everywhere embraces the notion as more attractive to business 
and industry than environmental protection, which might actually imply some duties 64 
This is where the concept of precaution, returned to below, is supposed to come in: lack of 
evidence about future risks is reason for action, not inaction.65 Where the Stockholm 
Declaration mentions only "economic and social development",66 its Rio counterpart 
actually goes beyond the vagueness o f sustainable development in laying down, in 
Principle 12, the need to promote an international economic system which would lead to 
"economic growth" and sustainable development in all countries. This is clearly reinforced 
in the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation, which (in Article 77) speaks of "our common
pursuit o f growth". O- ‘ ~ ^  ^  .•>
Is there then a need to call a spade a spade, to separate what is environmental law and 
what is sustainable development law in order to preserve the integrity of at least the 
former? Or can there be any meaningful integration of these two branches? If the point of 
departure is non-anthropocentric, as in an ecosystems or other nature-oriented approach, 
then one might recognize Rio as a legal step backwards, that is, one where the integration 
of environmental and economic or developmental issues might function to the detriment of 
the interests of nature itself.67 Within the (very anthropocentric indeed) logical confines of
63 According to Pallemaerts, a strong critic o f the whole Rio process, "[political leaders from industrial 
countries, as well as the leaders of transnational business and financial institutions, are no doubt just as 
delighted as their counterparts in the Southern elites to see the mythology of economic growth restored, not 
only for Third World countries but for the entire planet. This has been achieved in one fell swoop, and this 
under the pretext that growth is not actually harmful to the environment but, to the contrary, essential to its 
very protection", Pallemaerts, M., 1993, p. 16.
64 At one extreme end of arguments are thus those who first and foremost want to stress developmental 
needs, many of whom with great consequence only talk about "sustainable development law", as opposed to 
any "environmental law” and responsibilities; Completely growth-centred rhetoric has of course also not 
disappeared, see e.g. Beckerman, W., 1992, pp. 481-496. Someone may even argue that in face of the 
enormous difficulties in finding a meaningful moral and practical understanding of sustainability, this growth
language has the benefit of being straightforward where, at least, no-one can be fooled by hidden agendas!✓
65 Further see e.g. Beckerman, W., 1992, p. 492, who argues that environmental protection must be 
implemented right now in poor countries, not in relation to potential future problems, such as the effects of 
global warming. His argument for environmental protection in the developing countries is compelling, but it 
wholly neglects the precautionary principle, and it supposes that different kinds of environmental efforts 
cannot be done simultaneously.
66 Stockholm Declaration, see Principles 8 and 9.
67 Rio Declaration, Principle 1 reads: "Human beings are at the centre of concerns for sustainable 
development. They are entitled to a healthy and productive life in harmony with nature." Cf. the Stockholm 
Declaration and especially the World Charter for Nature, which is clearly more nature oriented.
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sustainable development, the answer could be more balanced. One o f the main problems in  
wholesale dismissals o f the Rio outcome, or now, in the outcome of the Johannesburg 
Summit, is that such arguments are reluctant to acknowledge that poverty itself may c a u se
/Q
pollution. Growth-induced pollution versus poverty-induced pollution is an inexhaustible 
theme,68 9 70not without ideological convictions, and right at the essence of the concept o f  
sustainable development. The Rio Declaration makes this point clear in mentioning " th e  
essential task of eradicating poverty as an indispensable requirement for sustainable 
development”.71 And indeed a great majority o f legal scholars seem willing to give th e  
concept a positive connotation, apart from, in any case, a central role in the development o f  
international (“environmental”) law.
According to Lowe, “[n] either development nor environmental protection can be p u rsu ed  
to its logical conclusion. Neither, alone, is a sustainable goal; but both must find a place in  
the international system” .72 Above all, interpretations o f the concept highlight differences 
in view between "environmentalists" o f the industrialized, polluted North and defenders o f  
the need and right of people in the less developed South to economic development b e fo re
68 Like that o f Pallemaerts', M., 1993, e.g., p. 16 (see supra); But contra "(¡Industrialization, urbanization a n d  
population growth all help to explain the developing world's growing environmental problems, but they a re  
not the only reasons. Poverty itself makes things worse. And the biggest culprit of all is the failure o f  
governments and institutions to pursue sensible policies. Water pollution ... is a case in point”, T h e  
Economist, Special Survey on 'Development and Environment’, March 21st 1998, p. 5; and see C onable, 
B.B., 1990; Okonmah, P.D., 1997, p. 60.
69 Literature on this topic is vast in several fields o f the social sciences. In relation to international 
, environmental law, see e.g. Sinjela, M., 1984; Handl, G., 1988, p. 607; Beckerman, W., 1992, pp. 481-496;
; Okonmah, P.D., 1997; Generally, see Redclift, M., 1987; Already in the run-up to the Stockholm Conference, 
the so-called Founex Report had acknowledged that environmental problems in developing countries a re  
l "predominantly problems that reflect poverty and the very lack of development of their societies...” whereas 
| the environmental problems of developed countries were seen "very largely" as "the outcome of a high level 
of economic development". The Founex Report was the outcome of a panel of experts convened by the  
Chairman of the Stockholm Conference, Maurice Strong, on 4-12 June 1971. Reprinted in Annex 1 U.14. D oc. 
A/CONF.48/10, 22 Dec. 1971; see ch. A para. 2-4; On IMF and WHO references to the cause-effect 
relationship between environment and development, see Fabra, A., 2002,
httn://.unhchr.ch/environment/bp3.html.
70 See e.g. French governmental study proposing that *‘[l]a preservation de l’environnement s’affirme de p lus 
en plus comme un objectif politique essentiel, parfaitement compatible avec la croissance économique. Le 
Conseil économique et social définit, dans cette perspective, les voies et moyens d’un développement 
durable’, Billet, J., 1998.
71 Rio Declaration, Principle 5; Also see Boyle, A. 1994, pp. 173-188.
72 Lowe, V., 1999, p. 37; See generally also Redclift, M., 1987 on contradictions built into the concept o f  
sustainable development.
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or alongside environmental protection.73 In domestic situations, the analogy could be that 
of urban fury with plans for further polluting roads, while the same construction of 
infrastructure is welcomed as bringing new opportunities in rural areas where pollution is 
but a marginal problem. This kind o f  dichotomy was fully alive throughout the Rio 
negotiations, reflecting that "[i]n a world constructed on the basis of binary oppositions, 
logic dictated that to be pro-development was necessarily to be anti-environment and vice- 
versa", and states "found themselves aligned across a single divide and were made to 
repress most of the other possible dichotomies and available alignments, if  those did not fit 
in with the primary North-South divide".74
The only hope o f reconciling the juxtaposed, and seemingly irreconcilable concepts75 of 
environment and development lies in a “complex balancing act”76, including the 
possibility, firstly for developing countries, o f realizing that there is no longer only 
economic law or development law, but that environmental aspects have come to stay in the 
form of legal restraints. This holds the potential for building societies which consider both 
present and future needs, and which at best, where it is not already too late, could avoid 
some of the environmental problems created earlier by unbridled industrial activities in
73 In the early 2000s, South-North issues, as well as polluter-lesser polluter divides, are only too well 
demonstrated by the efforts to develop legally-binding commitments under the Global Warming Convention. 
There are great elements of polarization baked into this complicated dough, and the strong divide o f interests 
comes in clear-cut groups of states with different economic standards, and, most notably, different records of 
polluting. Real polluters do not want to take responsibility unless smaller ones pitch in; lesser polluters are 
equally reluctant, although they may on some basis of fairness be right in refusing. On the other hand, some 
of the worst environmental problems today are to be found in developing countries: See e.g. The Economist 
special survey on 'Development and the Environment', March 21st 1998; "Poor countries have the world's 
worst environmental problems. They cannot afford to put up with them...". "... [T]he environmental problems 
that developing countries should worry about are different from those that western pundits have fashionable 
arguments over. They are not about potential problems in the next century, but about indisputable harm being 
caused today by, above all, contaminated water and polluted air. ... [Cjontrary to conventional wisdom, 
solving such problems need not hurt economic growth; indeed dealing with them now will generally be 
cheaper than leaving them to cause further harm", p. 3. This highlights the dilemma (C f Beckerman, W., 
1992, pp. 481-496) that all of international law on the environment may suffer if local and immediate 
problems are juxtaposed to long-term global problems, when, in fact, both need simultaneous action.
74 Porras, I.M., 1993, p. 22.
75 C f discussion on “a human rights approach to development”, e.g. Hamm, B.I., 2001.
76 Boyle, A., 1996, p. 64; and c f  Boyle, A. & D. Freestone, 1999. On balancing or reconciling different 
interests, see also e.g. Conable, B.B, 1990; Shelton, D., 1991, p. 117; and Redgewell, C., 1996, p. 87; And 
see Redclift, M,, 1987, who writes that “[s]ustainable development, if it is not to be devoid of analytical 
content, means more than seeking a compromise between the natural environment and the pursuit of 
economic growth. It means a definition of development which recognizes that the limits of sustainability 
have structural as well as natural origins”, p. 199.
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developed countries.77 The other side o f this coin is for developed countries, alone a n d  
through key international institutions, especially financing institutions,78 to bear th e i r  
responsibility in economically realizing such an aim. "Common but differentiated  
responsibilities", a phrase bom out o f the Rio process, to be found in several m ultila teral 
treaties,79 80and reiterated in the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation, is often seen a s  
fundamental to any successful realization of sustainable development. The notion is b a s e d  
on the acknowledgement by developed countries that they bear a responsibility "in t h e  
international pursuit of sustainable development in view o f the pressures their so c ie tie s  
place on the global environment and of the technological and financial resources th e y
QA
command". It thus presupposes financial assistance and technology transfers f r o m  
developed to developing countries.81 Its implication is also to give countries e i th e r  
different time frames within which to implement concrete obligations, or to give th e m  
different aims or reduction targets depending on their resources and on how much th e y  
contribute to pollution or other degradation.
However, international environmental law today does not rest solely on a strong y e t  
circumscribed pollution prevention duty, nor does it depend wholly on the paradoxes a n d  
contradictions created by the idea o f sustainable development. The Stockholm and R io  
Declarations, along with other soft law documents and, most importantly, many trea tie s , 
have consolidated some other environmental rules and principles of great relevance. T h is i s  
where norms on information may -  or may not - come to play their role. Information d o e s  
not exist in a legal vacuum, but is dependent on several other rules and principles, 
traditional co-operation and forward-looking precaution being the foremost.
77 On early examples of differences in attitudes between developed and developing countries to  
environmental protection, see Doud, A.L., 1972, pp. 520-529; Sinjela, A.M., 1984; and more recently, see  
Okonmah, P.D., 1997, p. 60, who claims that “the continued degradation of the human environment h as  
become a major concern in all parts of the world”, but that “most developing countries pay only lip-service to  
this concern”.
78 On multilateral development banks’ affirmative duty to act towards the goals of sustainable development 
(as opposed to avoiding causing harm only), see Handl, G., 2001, pp. 31-34.
79 See e.g. Rio Declaration, Principle 7; 1992 Global Climate Change Convention, Preamble; 1992 Biological 
Diversity Convention, Preamble.
80 Rio Declaration, Principle 7; On “capacity-building”, see Ponce-Nava, D., 1995, pp. 131-140.
81 Stockholm Declaration, Principles 9 and 20; Rio Declaration, Principles 7 and 9. See further Handl, G-, 
2001, pp. 170- 172.
The main thrust o f most environmental treaties relates to cooperation between the 
contracting parties. The duty o f states to co-operate can be argued to be a well-established 
legal duty in its own right,82 aiming, in its environmental context, at prevention o f  harm 
and drawing validity from such underlying principles as good neighbourliness.83 
According to Boyle, "...co-operation is at the heart o f  contemporary international 
environmental law, and represents perhaps the key strategy for its implementation".84 
Despite its fundamental character, or maybe because o f  it, most formulations o f the 
obligation o f states to cooperate are only general exhortations, such as the Draft Article on 
cooperation adopted by the International Law Commission under the recently finished 
prevention heading o f its liability topic.85 Draft Article 4 reads:
States concerned shall cooperate in good faith and, as necessary, seek the assistance 
of one or more competent international organizations in preventing significant 
transboundary harm or at any event in minimizing the risk thereof.
This is very much a traditional inter-state cooperation provision, which does not provide 
for a legal obligation of cooperation for third states not affected by transboundary harm or 
risk thereof. It acknowledges the possibility of seeking assistance from international 
organizations when such exist or can be of help, and is actually needed, but it does not 
create any new obligations for organizations. On the other hand, the fact that all states 
concerned do not ask for assistance in a given situation “does not free individual States 
from the obligation to seek assistance”.86 More specific forms o f cooperation then appear
82 On related duties to consult and negotiate, see esp. the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. 
Slovakia), ICJReports, 1997, p. 7 et seq.
83 See chapter 1.2.1. above. See Bothe, M., 1980, p. 394; See also ILC: Barboza, Sixth Report A/CN.4/428 
and A/CN.4/428/Add.l, Article 7; and see draft articles on prevention in Report o f the International Law 
Commission on the Work o f  Its Fiftieth Session, 1998, GAOR A/53/10, p. 19, Article 4 on cooperation.
84 Boyle, A., 1994, The Principle of Co-operation...’, p. 133; On co-operation as a rule o f customary law, see 
Kiss, A-C, 1992, p. 11; But on the recently reawakened discussion on the role o f unilateral actions in 
international law, esp. in environmental protection, see Boisson de Chazoumes, 2000, pp. 315-338 and 
Bodansky, D., 2000, pp. 339-347.
85 Report of the International Law Commission, Fifty-third session, 23 April-1 June and 2 July-10 August, 
2001, GAOR, Fifty-sixth, Suppl. No 10, A/56/10, see Commentary to Article 4 at pp. 396-398 (at I 
http://www.un.org/law/ilc/reports/2001 /2001 report.htm): C f with earlier draft version in Report o f  the 
International Law Commission on the Work o f  Its Fiftieth Session, 1998, GAOR A/53/10, p. 37.
86 Ibid., Commentary, p. 398.
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later in Draft, often taking the form of procedural duties, such as establishing r is k  
assessments, notifications, entering into negotiations and consultations, and finally dispute 
resolution. As treaty compliance is one o f the central concerns manifested in treaty te x ts  
themselves, a great number of provisions deal with different kinds of environmental 
information sharing, reporting and other methods o f supervision and compliance control, 
all o f  which will be dealt with in greater detail below. In this sense, there is a strong c ase  
for simply considering information sharing a subcategory or pronouncement o f  the perhaps 
even more fundamental idea of cooperation. In the end, the nature o f the relationship 
between these principles is not as important as the fact that they are related and have a  
common aim. The limits of another set o f very traditional legal principles, s ta te  
responsibility and liability, and particularly their relationship to procedural obligations, a re  
examined below, in Chapter 2.5.
There have been, since the principle first appeared in the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
numerous ways of defining the so-called precautionary principle.87 The most o fte n  
reiterated understanding o f it is that "lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as  a  
reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation". 
Another frequent definition is “even when there is no conclusive evidence of a causal 
relationship between the inputs and the effects".88 In most cases, precaution is referred to  
very much as a forward-looking principle, one o f early prevention o f environmental harm , 
related but not equal to the earlier developed duty to prevent, reduce and control harm, a n d  
thus completely different from responsibility, which, although also potentially preventive 
in nature, has legal consequences that include after-the-fact liability.89 There are also som e
87 For some seminal works see first Rehbinder, E., 1987; and see Gündling, L., 1990, pp. 23-30; Cameron, J. 
& J. Abouchar, 1991, pp. 1-27; Freestone, D,, 1991, Ch. 2; Nollkaemper, A., 1991; Cameron, J. & W. W ade- 
Gery, 1992; Hey, E., 1992, pp. 303-318; O'Riordan, T. & J. Cameron, eds., 1994; Krämer, L., 2000, pp. 16- 
17; Granet, M-B, 2001; Swedish Government Official Reports, On the General Principles o f  Environmental 
Protection, 1994:69, pp. 45-51; further ‘Final Statement from the Lowell International Summit on Science 
and the Precautionary Principle’, 20-22, 9 2001, at http://www.biotech-info.net/fmal statement.html.
88 In the first case, for instance, Rio Declaration, Principle 15; In the second case, for instance, the 1992 
Baltic Sea Convention (Article 3(2)) and in the 1992 North East Atlantic Convention (Article 2(2)(a)).
89 The introduction of the precautionary principle has, in one argument, worked towards a lowering o f the 
threshold level of proof. But reference to the precautionary principle could also be analysed according to the 
severity o f harm foreseen. For instance, the 1992 Rio Declaration and the 1992 Climate Change Convention 
set the level at "threats of serious or irreversible damage..."; the Convention on Biological Diversity, uses the 
wording "...threat of significant reduction or loss of biological diversity..." (Preamble only); Agenda 21, UN 
Doc. A/CONF.151/26, sets the level (in so far as radioactive waste storage) at "...no unacceptable risk..."; and 
the ECE Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes,
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other ways of understanding the principle: as unqualified references to the reduction of 
risk, to the maintenance of the status quo, and perhaps least convincing, to the amelioration 
o f the state of the environment.* 90
On a common-sense level the relationship between precaution and openness seems self- 
evident: without knowledge o f a certain activity or problem one cannot deal with it at all. 
Knowledge about a problem is o f course quite different from scientific evidence on the 
same, and just that is the heart o f the relationship between the principles: “mere” 
information may activate precaution. This was the case in the experience in Europe on 
BSE or “mad cow disease”, where even countries with no recorded cases of cattle with the 
disease decided to forbid the use o f all cattle feed containing bone marrow and other 
potentially infection carrying material already before further investigations into either the 
feed or the health o f the animals.91 However, the main thrust of the debate around the 
precautionary principle now connects it to risk assessments92 and risk management,93 thus 
giving science and administrative measures, respectively, the main roles in judging when
Helsinki, 17.3.1992, in force 6.10.1996, sets the threshold as low as "... potential transboundary impact..."; 
Further on precaution in relation to nuclear activities, see Granet, M-B, 2001.
90 Also, seeking to restore harm which has already been done, but without being the same as “precaution”, 
some multilateral treaties have formulated expressions of environmental protection that go well beyond the 
basic rule to prevent, reduce and control environmental harm: For instance, Article 3(1) of the 1992 Baltic 
Sea Convention, lays down that u[t]he Contracting Parties shall individually or jointly take all appropriate 
legislative, administrative or other relevant measures to prevent and eliminate pollution in order to promote 
the ecological restoration of the Baltic Sea Area and the preservation o f  its ecological balance” (emphasis 
added). See also the somewhat less radical wording in Article 2(1 )(a) o f  the 1992 North East Atlantic 
Convention: “...when practicable restore marine areas which have been adversely affected” (emphasis 
added).
91 Finland and Sweden both declared such feed forbidden in the autumn o f 2000, shortly after the outbreak of
the scare in other EU countries; Generally, see Groth, E, 2000; And generally on the BSE affair, see i.a. 
speech by J. Santer, president o f the European Commission, 18.2.1997, at
http://europa.ei.int/en/comm/is/isl80297en.htm: On the WTO, precaution and trade in foodstuffs, see 
Noiville, C., 2000.
92 Generally, on the large debate on risk as an element of modem society, see e.g. Beck, U., 1995 for seminal 
piece; and e.g. Lofstedt, R. & L. Frewer, 1998, for discussions both on the concept as elaborated by Beck, 
Giddens, etc., and on concrete and theoretical issues in diverse fields o f science; More specifically on 
scientific evidence of risk, see Beef Hormones case, WTO Appellate Body, EC Measures Concerning Meat 
and Meat Products (Hormones), 16 Jan. 1998, WT/DS26/AB/R, para. 197; and in relation to the veterinary 
product bovine somatotrophin, see Court of First Instance, case T-382/00, Monsanto Co. against the Council 
o f  the European Uniony 22.12.2000.
93 See OECD, Joint Session of Trade and Environment Experts, Environmental Principles and Concepts, 
COM/RNV/TD(93)117/REV2, 1994, pp. 16-17. The report refers to the definition by the US National 
Academy of Sciences o f risk management as a “process of regulatory action, integrating the results o f risk 
assessment with engineering data, with social, economic, and political concerns to reach a decision”.
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precaution should be resorted to. It is of course ironic that although lack of “scientific 
evidence” -  the original idea - should not prevent good environmental decisions, the ro le  
of science has in many cases been reinforced rather than properly questioned,94 and o th er 
bases for decision-making (such as public participation and other than science-based 
values) may, in the course of the process which has led the precautionary principle to  
become part o f the mainstream discourse on international law and the environment, n o t 
have gained as much argumentative power as one might assume.95
The European Commission adds risk communication to risk assessments and r isk  
management as a further step in realizing precaution.96 The idea of risk communication a s  
part of precaution is crucial to the topic of this study: it suggests that information is c learly  
preventive in nature, although this is a statement with some modifications, as will b e  
argued below in relation to accident information. Risk communication as an element o f  
precaution brings in one further issue of great relevance: legitimacy. The Commission in  
its Communication on precaution warns against resorting to precaution as a disguised fo rm  
of protectionism,97 and, most interestingly, as a basis for arbitrary action. This latter p o in t 
inevitably highlights issues o f decision-making and institutional structures in the EU98 a n d , 
considering also the former point o f  protectionism, more generally in a globalized setting . 
Thus openness and precaution are connected and this connection has some relation o r  
relevance to accountability and the legitimacy o f  decision-making.99 The missing link, o n
94 See Fisher, E., 2000, p, 404-405 on relationship between EU and WTO regimes, scientific evidence and
precaution; and see Science, 12.5.2000, pp. 979-981; c f  Groth, E., 2000; and see ‘Final Statement from th e  
Lowell International Summit on Science and the Precautionary Principle1, 20-22. 9 2001, at 
http://www.biotech-info.net/final statement.html; But contra for the argument that science is often  
disregarded in environmental decision-making and that better procedures should be found to integrate it, see 
Robinson, N., 2001, pp. 1077-1161; and on problems between scientific advice and environmental policy, see 
Fritz, J-S., 2001 and see UN System-Wide Earthwatch Coordination Office Second Report on International 
Scientific Advisory Processes on the Environment and Sustainable Development, a t
www.unep.ch/earthe/sciadv2.html
95 Generally, see Testart, J., in Le Monde Diplomatique, (English version) September 2000.
96 Communication from the Commission on the precautionary principle, Brussels, 2.2.2000, COM(2000)I 
final.
97 On WTO and precaution in relation to trade in foodstuffs, see also Noiville, C., 2000, pp. 263-297.
98 See e.g. Lodge, J., 1994; generally Andersen, S. & K. Eliassen, 1996; and see Joerges, Ch. & E. Vos, eds., 
1999 on comitology and administrative procedure in the EU, also in other areas than environmental law, and 
which may have points in common with this broader issue of precaution and accountability or legitimacy o f  
decision-making; See also de Sadeleer, N., 2001, pp. 91-132; and issue 2(1) European Union Politics 2001 
for a range o f discussions on institutional change, democracy etc. in the EU.
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the national and perhaps also on the EU-level, is public participation, an issue mentioned in 
the Commission’s communication mainly by reference to the Aarhus Convention, but 
which becomes, as a consequence of the somewhat confusing view on the role o f science, 
less emphasised.
All in all, this makes for a troubling circle, where the relationship between openness and 
precaution would seem understandable, but the role of science less clear. However, the 
threesome o f risk assessment, management and communication function as good examples 
o f a “managerial ethic” - an idea that will be examined in the next chapters. These three 
factors emphasise the functionalistic rather than any “confrontational/political” or “purely” 
science-based value bases for environmental decision-making. Not surprisingly therefore, 
precaution finds concrete expression9 100 mainly in a number of technology-based 
methods,101 and only seldom in the rather radical understanding o f reversals in the burden 
o f proof: For instance in connection to prior authorisation procedures (that is that an 
activity is prohibited unless those responsible for the undertaking [producers, 
manufacturers, importers, shippers, etc.) can show that the activity would cause no/no 
unacceptable environmental harm),102 or most unusually in the complete prohibition of 
certain activities.103 Some writers have criticized pronunciations of the principle for not 
allowing enough room for weighing the possible benefits o f an activity against the risks it
99 On expert and scientists’ power in the sector-based EC environmental law, see de Sadeleer, N., 2001, p. 
132: “Devenu l’apanage des experts, le droit qui en résulte contredit l’idéal démocratique de participation et 
de transparence de ceux qui entendent protéger l’environnement et la santé humaine”; And on the politics of 
experts and professionals in human rights, see Kennedy, D., 2001, ‘The Politics of...’.
100 See ‘Late Lessons from Early Warnings -  the Precautionary Principle 1896-2000’, the European
Environment Agency (EEA), Copenhagen, 10.1 2002 at
http://reports.eea.eu.int/environmental issue report 2001 22/en..
101 Such as Environmentally Sound Management, Best Environmental Practice (BEP); Best Available 
Technology (BAT); Best Practicable Means; State o f the Art; Life-cycle Assessment; Cradle-to-grave; 
Critical Loads; Sustainable Yield; etc., see generally on some of these concepts, Handl, G., 2001.
102 Under Oslo Commission Decision 89/1 of 14 June 1989 on the Reduction and Cessation of Dumping 
Industrial Wastes at Sea such industrial wastes which were not completely prohibited to dump could only be 
dumped into the North Sea by special permission o f the Oslo Commission if the potential dumper showed 
that there were no alternative disposal sites available on land and that the activity would not cause 
environmental harm; And see Communication from the Commission on the precautionary principle, Brussels, 
2.2.2000, COM(2000)1, p. 4, which states that reversals in the burden of proof cannot be made a general rule 
although some Member States have prior authorisation procedures for some activities or products.
103 Such as the unusual 1982 whaling moratorium adopted by the International Whaling Commission, 
established under Article 3 of the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Washington, 
2.12.1946, in force 10.11.1948. See Lyster, S., 1985, pp. 19-21; See also above on the 2000-2001 BSE 
outbreak and forbidden cattle feed; and see Kiss, A. & J-P Beurier, 2000.
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poses.104 Environmental impact assessment (ElA) requirements have however b e c o m e  
unusually clear manifestations of precaution (in the risk assessm ent-m anagem ent- 
communication sense)105 and amount to a situation where ignorance can no lo n g e r  
diminish responsibility. This makes for an interesting situation where the "p rim ary" 
principle - precaution - which is still marred by many possible interpretations -  may n o t  
have as strong a position in general international law as does one of its c o n c re te  
expressions, prior EIAs.106 By way of an example, the ILC Draft Articles on p rev en tio n  
under the liability topic do not make any mention o f precaution (although discussed by  t h e  
Special Rapporteur, Mr. Rao) but they include Article 8 on impact assessment before t h e  
authorization of an activity that could cause transboundary harm.107 Environmental im p a c t  
assessments are also very important means o f gathering environmental information,108 a n d  
they represent one o f the primary techniques in which public participation at the local le v e l  
is often possible.109
104 E.g. Katz, D., 2001, argues that in relation to evaluating risks and benefits of genetic engineering, th e  
precautionary principle under the Biosafety Protocol does not acknowledge the benefits of g en e tic  
engineering, and that the principle is too strictly defined to address agricultural biotechnology, and “fu rther, 
that the principle may not be appropriate at all”.
105 See e.g. Kuwait Regional Convention for Co-operation on the Protection of the Marine Environment f ro m  
Pollution, Kuwait, 24.4.1978, in force 1.7.1979, Article 11; LOSC, Art, 206; Convention on Environmental 
Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, Espoo, 25.2.1991, in force 10.9.1997; Convention for th e  
Protection of the Natural Resources and Environment of the South Pacific Region, Noumea, 25.11.1986, in  
force 22.8.1990; Convention on Biological Diversity, Article 14(1); For a relatively weak expression o f E IA , 
see the Rio Declaration, Principle 17, which refers to EIA as a "national instrument" only; For an example o f  
concrete measures for conducting EIAs, see Arctic Council’s Guidelines for Environmental Im pact 
Assessment in the Arctic, look under http://www.arctic-counciI.org/
106 See esp. Boyle, A., ’The Principle of Co-operation...’, 1994, p. 133, and Bimie, P. & A. Boyle, 1992, p. 
97, and c f  ibid., 2002, p. ...; and c f  McIntyre, O & T. Mosedale, 1997, pp. 221-241; but see McIntyre, O ., 
1998, p. 89, who writes that “[f]ew would challenge the view that the precautionary principle has n o w  
crystallised into an ergo omnes norm of customary international law. Though few would argue that it 
amounts to a new rule having jus cogens s t a t u s , S e e  also Handl, G., 2001, p. 94, who refers to EIAs as  
“general international legal requirement”, and at pp. 146-147, to the precautionary principle as an  
“established public policy principle and sector specific legal concept”, i.e. customary vis-à-vis some activities 
such as those affecting the global commons, the marine environment generally, high seas fisheries, the ozone 
layer and climate change. Contra see Knox, J.H., 2002, who argues that EIAs are manifestations o f  
nondiscrimination, not prevention.
107 Report o f  the International Law Commission on the Work o f  Its Fiftieth Session, 1998, GAOR A/53/10, p. 
20. See also commentary, pp. 43-46. And see First Report by Special Rapporteur P.S. Rao where he 
discusses i.a. the precautionary principle, A/CN.4/487 and Add. 1.
108 See McIntyre, O., 1998, p. 89, n. 59; and, by way o f example, see also NGO case studies on 
environmental impacts of IMF programmes, at http://www.foe.org/intemational/imf/: see e.g. Finnish NGO 
campaign in 2002 for greater insight into EIA documents related to governmental export guarantees to non- 
OECD countries, e.g., at http://kepa.fi/ or http://www.luontoliitto.fi/.
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1.2. On the Role of Environmental Information in International Law
1.2.1. The Current Managerial Ethic
Having discussed those principles of international law -  prevention, cooperation, 
precaution and sustainable development - that are perhaps most relevant to information 
duties, it is necessary to turn briefly to some other factors that constitute the legal and 
historical or social “home” of environmental information. A number of factors coincided in 
the late 1980s and 1990s to create circumstances where information and transparency 
began to thrive and that eventually made openness a key issue also in environmental law.
Although the formidable changes in political structures in Eastern Europe must not be 
overused as explanations to all changes in recent political atmosphere,109 10 it would be odd 
not to consider these changes as, if  not reasons, then “final drops” for more than the 
rhetoric of openness and diminished suspicion between countries. After all, glasnosU a 
policy on transparency, was seminal to the fall of both the Berlin Wall and the Soviet 
Union, and the catastrophe at Chernobyl led to the adoption at record-breaking pace of the 
Convention on Early Notification on a Nuclear Accident.111 12As shown by the slow and 
conflicting news given by Russian authorities during the humanitarian and potentially 
environmental catastrophe caused by the sinking o f the Kursk submarine in August 
2000, a decade or two is too short a timeframe to erase a well-rooted culture o f secrecy. 
Yet it may be assumed that something new is taking shape. A culture of openness is slowly 
developing in key institutions around the world, such as the World Bank, which in its
109 On environmental assessments in a EU and comparative context see, Ladeur, K-H & R. Prella, 2001, pp.
185-198; and on “substantial compliance” with the EC El A Directive in the UK see Berkeley v. Secretary of 
State for the Environment and Others and case law analyses in 10(2) JEL 1998, pp. 368-397, and 13(1) JEL 
2001, pp. 89-105: the EIA regime is distinctive, within the context of EC law, in the strength that it
attaches to the role of the public. ‘Substantial compliance’ with the EIA Directive means more than the 
decision-maker considering the relevant environmental information. That information must be presented in 
the form and manner required by the Directive, and at the stage that it is required.”, p. 105; But c f  for an 
emphasis on EIA as a means o f integrating scientific information in decision-making, see Robinson, N., 
2001, p. 1056.
110 On the impact o f the end of Cold War on e.g. human rights development, see MQllerson, R., 1997, pp. 102 
etsec.; MUlIerson, R , 1999, pp. 234-235.
111 Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, Vienna, 26.9.1986, in force 27.10.1986
112 See e.g. The Economist, 26.8.-1.9.2000, p. 11; and Time, 28.8.2000, pp. 10-17.
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Policy on Information Disclosure states that the sharing o f information stimulates debate , 
broadens understanding o f development issues, facilitates cooperation among the parties 
involved, and serves to strengthen public support for efforts to improve the lives o f peop le  
in developing countries.113 Debates on the merits o f openness are blooming in several fo ra , 
not least in the European Union, and recent environmental treaties contain language th a t 
indicates a greater understanding o f the need to promote openness.114
Secondly, the great political upheavals of the late 1980s and early 1990s coincided with th e  
coming o f the Information Age.115 Nothing less than a technological revolution, th e  
explosion o f all forms of instant electronic surveillance, including the Terra and E nvisa t 
satellites for gathering environmental data,116 and communication, including the Internet, 
can be assumed to have raised popular expectations o f the availability o f all types o f  
information. Great amounts of information that used to be available only if states or o th e r 
big actors provided it, are now accessible to all on the Internet due to private initiative, an d  
states are following suit. Despite the enormous potential for receiving environmental da ta , 
the new technology is not unproblematic: it is “mere” technology, not directly decision­
making, but indirectly value- creating, especially given the belief in the supremacy o f  
technology (as in Western solutions to global problems);117 it can be difficult to establish 
what is relevant among too much material, and the new technology and information is s till
113 Draft Review o f World Bank Policy on Information Disclosure, 1994, Foreword by L.T. Preston, 
President. The World Bank Group, Information Disclosure Consultation Home Page, accessed in September 
2000 at htto://www.worldbank.org/html/oic/disclosure/index.htm: See also revised WB Disclosure Policy o f  
September 2001, effective in early 2002, at same address.
114 But contra for some relatively cautious language in a recent treaty, see Convention on the Prior Informed 
Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade, Rotterdam, 
11.10.1998, not in force. UNEP/FAO/PIC/CONF/5. Art. 15(2): “Each Party shall ensure, to the extent 
practicable, that the public has appropriate access to information on chemical handling and accident 
management and on alternatives that are safer for human health or the environment than the chemicals listen 
in Annex III.” (emphasis added)
115 Cf. generally on human rights in the “Information Age”, Walters, G., 2001.
1,6 Especially NASA’s Terra satellite, launched 18.12.1999 and part of NASA’a Earth Observing System 
(EOS), from which images are available to large numbers of researchers worldwide, look at http://eos- 
am.ssfc.nasa.gov/'. and also the European Space Agency’s (ESA) Envisat launched 1.3.2002 to gather 
environmental data, including data on stratospheric ozone, temperature and climate change, the state of the 
oceans and coastal regions, etc., look at http://www.esa.int/export/esaCP/index.html.
117 Technology is seldom “neutral”: fostering “belief’ in or reliance on technology may itself be as much a 
“value” as anything else. Cf. below on internet code.
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far from being available to all.118 Information poverty in the developing world is the other 
side of the coin o f  information over-load in the affluent and technology-believing W est.119 1203
The role of the internet for dissemination of environmental information worldwide is a
massive issue, and one where only future research can give any reliable results. At present
we are left guessing, and relatively few social scientists have so far tried to tackle the basic
issues o f whether the internet can be presumed to change human political or other, for
example environmental, behavior. There is cyber-optimism and cyber-pessimism alike,
and both seem to be too simplified to offer comfortable bases for research. Some see the
possibilities of the internet as nearly unlimited for education and democratic participation,
whereas others do not believe the internet will change anything, and that management and
« *% «
politics, including international politics and law, will be done as always before. The 
Malmö Ministerial Declaration o f May 2000 phrases the challenge by information 
technology this way: “To confront the underlying causes o f environmental degradation and 
poverty... We must also intensify our efforts in developing preventive action and a 
concerted response, including national environmental governance and the international rule 
of law, awareness-raising and education, and harness the power o f information technology 
to this enct\U2 One argument in this direction is related to bringing the issue o f internet 
code regulation into the domain of public international law, thus helping to ensure that
118 For several discussions on information technology, infrastructure, poverty, corruption etc. and developing 
countries, see Kehitys-Utveckling 4/2001. On UN ICT efforts to bridge the “digital gap”, see ibid pp. 14-15.
119 Norris, P., 2000, and ibidem, 2001.
120 See work of e.g. the Norwegian Research Center for Computers and Law, University of Oslo; And see 
Keskinen, A., 1999 on decision-making and development of democratic processes in the future information 
society and in present administration; Mayer, P.G., 1999, on internet and public law (in Germany).
121 For discussions covering several disciplines from law to anthropology, see Symposium at Indiana 
University School of Law: ‘The Internet and the Sovereign State: The Role of Cyberspace on National and 
Global Governance’, 5(2) Global Legal Studies Journal, Spring 1998. See esp. Perritt, H.H, pp. 423-442, on 
the internet in relation to sovereignty and national and international governance in liberal international 
relations theory (and cf. Perritt, H.H., 1998, ‘The Internet is Changing International Law’) The Symposium 
offers several discussions pro et contra and on subjects closely related, see F idler, D.P, 1998, p. 415-. 
Further, in relation to international law, see Wedgwood, 2000.
122 Emphasis added. Para. 7, Malmö Ministerial Declaration, First Global Ministerial Environment Forum, 
31.5 2000, at http://www.unep.org/malmo/malmo ministerial.htm
123 See esp. discussions by UNESCO, Les dimensions internationales du droit du cyberespace, 2000. See 
further on WIPO and internet regulation, at http://wiDo2.wipo.int/Drocess.
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shared interests, as opposed to private actors’ or the richest or technologically m o s t 
advanced states’ values and interests only, become prevalent.124
A third factor of relevance for the birth of a new culture of openness in environmental la w  
is the simple assumption that an increased environmental consciousness and sense o f  
urgency has developed globally.125 Environmental issues at large have gained widespread 
interest in many political groups and in most countries. Even if much is mere lip service, 
public attention has been awakened. The 1992 Rio Conference on Environment an d  
Development was a highpoint in political attention being paid to environmental issues. 
Despite something of a slump in international environmental activity after the Conference, 
environment-related law and institutions developed considerably during the 1990s. 
Traditional consent-based treaties flourished, but some new institutional set-ups w ith  
majority voting or expertise-led standard setting also evolved. A major political concern 
and common theme for researchers o f international environmental cooperation in the 1990s 
was, and still is, compliance with and the “effectiveness” of existing treaty regimes.126 
Different accountability-methods, whether called peer review, supervision, monitoring o r  
verification have been topical,127 as well as the first steps taken towards more flexible and
124 Lessig, L., 1999; and see Mayer, F.C., 2001, pp. 617-622.
135 Ibid, Malmii Declaration, para. 25, optimistically claims that “the unprecedented developments in 
production and information technologies, the emergence of a younger generation with a clear sense o f  
optimism, solidarity and values, women increasingly aware and with an enhanced and active role in society — 
all point to the emergence of a new consiousness” .
126 See e.g. Fisher, R., 1981; Young, O., 1989; Chayes, A. & A.H, Chayes, 1991, pp. 280-308; Chayes, A. & 
A.H. Chayes, 'Compliance without..., 1991, pp. 311-330; Young, O., 1991; Baker, B., 1992, pp. 333-365; 
Greene, O., 1992, pp. 265-274; Koskenniemi, M., 1992, pp. 123-162; Wettestad, J., 1992, pp. 101-121; Haas, 
P.M, R.O. Keohane & M.A. Levy (eds),1993; Keohane, R.O., P.M. Haas & M.A. Levy, 1993, pp. 3-24; 
Levy, M.A., R.O. Keohane & P.M. Haas, 1993, pp. 397-426; Skjaerseth, J.B., 1993, pp. 313-334; Mitchell, 
R.B., 1993, pp. 327-339; Mitchell, R.B., 1994; Haas, P.M., 1994; Handl, G., 1994, pp. 305-331; Jacobson, H. 
& E. Brown Weiss, 1994; Underdal, A., 1994, pp. 92-123; Szell, P., 1995; Jacobson, H. & E. Brown Weiss,
1995, pp. 119-148; Brown Weiss, E., 1995; The Effectiveness o f  Multilateral Environmental Agreements - A 
Report from a Nordic Project, Copenhagen: Nordic Council of Ministers, TemaNord 1996:513; Wolfrum, R.,
1996, pp. 373-393; Victor, D. 1996; Victor, D.G., 1997; Victor, D.G., K. Raustiala & E.B Skolnikoff, 1997; 
And see the American Society o f International Law, Annual Meeting, Washington D.C., April 1997 theme on 
“Implementation, Compliance and Effectiveness”; Further Victor, D.G., 1998; Jacobson, H. &. E. Brown 
Weiss, 1998; Brown Weiss, E., 1999; Young, O., 1999; Haas, P.M., 2000; Shelton, D., 2000; Alvarez, J.E., 
2001, pp. 183-246.
127 See e.g. Voelckel, M., 1976, pp. 223-246; Kiss, A-C., 1980, pp. 99-112; Charpentier, J., pp. 147-245; 
Grossman, C., 1984, pp. 489-514; Butler, W.E., 1991; Churchill, R., 1991, pp. 147-163; Vinogradov, S.V., 
1991, pp. 97-105; Fischer, W., 1991; Sachariev, K., 1991, pp. 31-52; Timoshenko, A.S., 1991, pp. 51-59; di 
Primio, J.C., G. Stein, H.F. Wagner, 1992, pp. 4-5,45; International Environment: International Agreements 
Are Not Well Monitored, United States General Accounting Office Report to Congressional Requesters, 
January 1992, GAO/RCED-92-43; International Environment: Strengthening the Implementation o f
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“effective” decision-making.* 128 Most recently, the latter has given rise to a new debate -  j  
only just taking shape -  related to legitimacy in international environmental decision- f 
making.129
Factors, such as political change, the new information technology and environmental 
consciousness, have probably come together with other less easily discernible ones to 
create the present “assumption in favor of disclosure”, to cite the World Bank. The task set 
out for this study is not, and could not be, to prove the causal relationship between the 
above-mentioned factors that may have helped create more openness; they are but 
background assumptions. Neither could this study aim to “prove” the causal relationship 
between more information and a better environment, as suggested in the rhetorical question 
of the topic. A study in law cannot explain a phenomenon in the sense possible in the 
natural sciences, but it can attempt to trace a developmental process and try to understand 
or sketch its limits and possible - or even imaginable - functions. Thus the challenge is to 
outline the very topical process by which norms on environmental information and 
openness have gained such a curiously central position in international environmental law, 
and to indicate the roles, the strengths and limits, o f these norms in the evolution of 
international law on the environment as a whole.
Environmental information is no longer only state-centred and exclusive, but is more and 
more inclusive, that is, accessible to the public. Yet the process started from a very j 
traditional public international -  state-to-state -  setting: from information to neighbouring 
states on planned activities, to accident notifications and various supervisory methods of 
finding out how states have fulfilled their duties under environmental treaties. Some 
information duties may have hardened into customary law, others are strictly treaty-based.
Environmental Agreements, United States General Accounting Office Report to Congressional Requesters, 
August 1992, GAO/RCED-92-188; Fischer, W., 1992, pp. 283-285; Ausubel, J.H. & D.G. Victor, 1992, pp. 
1-43; Donlon, N., 1992, pp. 257-164; Ferreira, V., 1992, pp. 275-282; He, Quizhe, 1992, pp. 111-116; 
Boisson de Chazoumes, L , April 1993; Boisson de Chazoumes, L., 1995, pp. 37-76; Litfin, K.T, 1995; Szell, 
P., 1995, pp. 97-113; Werksman, J.D., 1996, p. 55-; Koskenniemi, M., 1996, pp. 236-248; Szasz, P.C., 1999; 
Knox, J.H., 2001, pp. 1-122.
128 See esp. Lavranos, N., 2002, who writes about decision-making, sometimes by majority voting, in 
Conferences or Meetings of Parties under international environmental treaties, and which he argues are 
dynamic examples o f something less than classical international organizations, but still more than traditional 
international agreements.
129 For a seminal piece within international environmental law, see Bodansky, D., 1999; and see Schweitz, 
M.L., 1995, pp. 415-420; and Anderson, K., 2000, pp. 91-120.
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Perhaps obviously, the common denominator of these information duties, as well as o f th e  
most recent developments away from state duties towards individual rights o f access, is th e  
logic o f a need to know more in order to preserve and protect the environment better. A n  
unusually clear example o f  such a conviction is presented by some prominent NGOs in th e  
biodiversity field (e.g. the IUCN), who, under the mottos “Knowledge Serving 
Biodiversity” and “Better Data for Better Decisions” express the idea that building 
information management capacity, both technological and substantive, can improve 
decision-making.130
The first step in the evolution o f explicitly environmental information in international la w  
was taken, at least symbolically, with the 1986 Chernobyl accident and the adoption in th e  
same year o f  the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident.131 The state du ty  
to inform on transboundary environmental accidents has in recent decades further 
developed through many treaties and soft law documents, and this study will, in detail, 
examine its position in general international law. Accident notifications have also become 
very technology-centred methods o f “communication” : sensors read results processed b y  
computers and relayed by equally technical warning systems. But the Chernobyl accident 
also highlighted some o f the problems inherent in international law thus far, not least w ith  
regard to the weakness o f state responsibility in relation to environmental problems. N o t 
surprisingly therefore, in the 1990s, one theme overshadowed all others in the debate on  
international law and the environment: the cry for compliance with existing norms. W hile 
the 1980s, and up until the Rio Conference of 1992, were characterized by a surge in treaty 
negotiation and other forms o f norm creation,132 *the subsequent demand was for better 
monitoring o f state behaviour, more effective management of treaties and better methods 
of inducing compliance.
130 The BCIS Consortium, see www.biodiversitv.org for examples o f handbooks that the Consortium has 
produced to this end.
131 As compared to other relevant information to another state, such as in the above-cited Corfu Channel 
case; See Nordstrom, N., 1996.
132 The number of international instruments dealing with the environment had already reached over 1000 in 
the early 1990s. See B. Rilster, B. Simma & M. Bock, eds., International Protection... 1970-1983; Kiss, A., 
1983; UNEP Register o f International Treaties and Other Agreements in the Field o f  the Environment, 1989; 
Hahn, R.W. & K.R. Richards, 1989, pp. 421-446; Sand, P.H., 1992; On the ensuing debate and notion o f  
"treaty congestion", see Brown Weiss, E., ’New Directions...’, 1995, pp. 4-7.
Despite many signs of adolescence rather than coming of age, accepted orthodoxy in the 
1990s had it that a sufficient body o f international environmental norms existed for them to 
be able to address the major global environmental problems, and that the main challenge 
was to ensure that states honour their promises,133 and be made accountable, not via 
adjudication, enforcement, or sanctions,134 but with the help o f non-intrusive managerial 
control methods. In want of a functioning system of state responsibility, and as an answer 
to the perceived shortcomings o f different economic, use-of-force or membership-based 
enforcement mechanisms,135 softer non-compliance procedures (NCPs) were developed to 
deal with state commitments under environmental treaties. Among the proponents of 
managerial methods of inducing state compliance with international law, especially 
environmental law,136 the most frequently used arguments against traditional enforcement 
mechanisms seem to have been that they are unnecessary because states usually comply 
with their obligations; that enforcement mechanisms are too political and not cost-effective 
enough; or that they are ineffective tools for dealing with state non-compliance, which 
normally stems from “ambiguous treaty language” 137 and inability rather than
13 J According to some scholars most states comply with most of their treaty obligations most of the time. See 
Henkin, L., 1979, 2nd. ed., p. 47; Henkin, L., 1989, p. 69; Chayes, A. & A.H. Chayes, 1991, p. 311; Chayes, 
A. & A.H. Chayes, 1995, p. 3, 8; See also D’Amato, A., pp. 1-10; but contra see Handl, G., 1994, pp. 305- 
331; and Koskenniemi, M., 1996, pp. 236-248. This study proposes to start from the opposite, problem- 
focusing, view. States are assumed not to comply with either some or many of their international 
environmental treaty obligations.
b4 “The effort to devise and incorporate such sanctions in treaties is largely a waste of time”, Chayes, A. & 
A.H. Chayes, 1995, p. 2; Generally on the traditional bases of enforcement in international law, see e.g. 
Fitzmaurice, G.G., 1956.
135 See book review (on Chayes, A. & A.H. Chayes, 1995 ) by Koh, H.H., 1997 for the argument that it is a 
misimpression that a management model would be an alternative to an enforcement model, the two 
complement each other; Generally on enforcement in international environmental law, see Bothe, M., 1996; 
and see Boyle, A., ’Saving the World?...’, 1991; O'Connell, M.E., 1992; and on trade restrictions as 
compliance enforcement, see Lang, W,, 1996.
b6 See especially Chayes, A. & A.H. Chayes, 1995 for their understanding of a “management model”, esp. 
pp. 1-28; Further on regime theory, international environmental treaties and management-related issues, see 
e.g. Chayes, A. & A.H. Chayes, 1990, pp. 147-164; Chayes, A. & A.H. Chayes, 'Adjustment and 
Compliance... 1991, pp. 280-308; Chayes, A. & A.H. Chayes, 'Compliance without Enforcement..., 1991, 
pp. 311-330; Gehring, T., 1990, p. 35-56; Gehring, T., 1994; Spector, B.I. et a!., 1994; Young, O., 1989; 
Young, O., 1990, pp. 337-346; Young, O., On the Effectiveness o f International Regimes..., 1991; Young, O., 
'The Effectiveness o f ..., 1991; Young, O., 1993, pp. 431-451; Young, O., 1994; Victor, D. & A. Chayes & 
E.B. Skolnikoff, 1993, pp. 453-474.
137 Chayes, A. & A.H. Chayes, 1995, in writing about “review and assessment” in international law, say that, 
in the course of such process, “[differences about the content and applicability of the governing norms are 
resolved”, p. 230, yet they give very little indication as to how that would happen: “ normative powers 
derives from a much more complicated dialogic process of interpretation and application, extending over 
time. It is closely linked to the pervasive demand of the international legal and political systems, that states 
and other international actors be prepared to justify their actions when challenged. The new sovereignty puts
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unwillingness to fulfil international legal obligations. Regardless o f the possible 
weaknesses o f  these arguments, 138 13940and ensuing pejorative language, the model has becom e 
influential in the sense that it accurately characterizes the approach clearly favoured b y  
states to agree under most environmental treaties to soft, managerial persuasion, co ­
operation and capacity-building rather than to enforcement.'^Co-operation, Boyle notes, 
“represents perhaps the key strategy” for the implementation o f  international 
environmental law,141 and the creation under NCPs o f systems of information exchange, 
mostly reporting under treaties (as well as the forerunning accident information schemes), 
have been central not only to co-operation, but to a management model, where even th e  
whole o f  prevention has been referred to as “essentially a question o f  the management o f  
risk”.142 In the words o f one writer, “ [transparency -  the generation and dissemination o f
the normative force o f the treaty rules at the heart of the compliance process”, p. 134; But the writers fail to  
discuss that review mechanisms, such as reporting and assessment, could well continue for a long tim e 
without coherence being achieved on norm content, which may be saturated with contradictory (rather than  
“merely” ambiguous) goals. In some instances the fear of conflict, rather than inability, may also be the 
reason for non-compliance with -  contradictory -  norms.
138 Knox, J.H., 2001, pp. 24-26, mentions the following frequent criticisms: the model pays little attention to  
how states translate international norms into domestic law; it may underestimate the role of sanctions for 
making managerial methods more effective; non-confrontational and non-binding methods may actually 
provide states with opportunities to avoid compliance; and the same reasons that lead to reluctance to resort 
to adjudication may apply for reluctance to draw attention under non-confrontational mechanisms to other 
states’ non-compliance. Knox also discusses Chayes & Chayes’ lack of reference to the formal grounds for 
NGO, and expertise, participation in managerial methods, p. 26.
139 As an example of classical realist reaction against institutional measures, one writer has said that 
"[¡Institutional proliferation still prevails and proliferation will solve nothing" and that "it is a well-known 
phenomenon that institutionalizing a problem may as well serve as a means of cloaking inactivity or giving 
an illusion of action, as it may lead to action itself (a phenomenon known in Britain as the 'Royal 
Commission syndrome')" Baker, R., 1989, Part I, p. 40, 37. Baker also notes that some institutions can do 
direct damage to a process of remedying a particular environmental problem. He mentions the UNEP
1 Desertification Branch as an example, p. 40. Baker also quotes the former Secretary-General of the United 
Nations, Kurt Waldheim, as having said that "it is often easier to call a conference, or even fund a new 
j agency, than to confront a problem directly", p. 37, with reference to Myers, N. & D. Myers, 1983, p. 22.
I
140 See e.g. Bimie, A. & P. Boyle, 1992, p. 162, write that “[regulation and supervision by international 
institutions has been identified as part of a general trend away from the solution of problems by strictly 
judicial means and towards the resolution of conflicts through an equitable balancing of interests and ad hoc 
political compromise”; and see Gehring, T., 1990, p. 35-56; Koskenniemi, M., 1996, p. 237; Knox, J.H., 
2001, p. 25.
141 Boyle, A., 1994, The Principle o f Co-operation...’, p. 133; See supra on co-operation in general 
international law.
142 ILC, Special Rapporteur P.S. Rao, Third Report on International Liability for Injurious Consequences 
Arising out o f  Acts Not Prohibited by International Law (Prevention o f Transboundary Damage from  
Hazardous Activities). A/CN.4/510 (cited as ILC: Rao, Third Report); see Report o f  the International Law  
Commission on the Work o f its Fifty-second Session, GAOR A/55/10, p. 275.
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information about the requirements of the regulatory regime and the parties’ performance 
under it -  is probably the most important managerial method”.143
The managerial model thus embraces a host of treaty-based systems, which are very 
pragmatic in nature and in which, in a functionalist manner, states use, for instance, 
information exchange systems to communicate, to work, to cooperate and to persuade each 
other towards compliance144 with norms and incremental changes in environmental 
protection. But there may be at least one further way of using the term “managerial”.145 It 
is to treat this whole trend in international environmental law as part of a larger “culture” 
or “ethic”: A “managerial ethic” is a pragmatic and functionalist ethic of very short and 
soft steps towards large, and often unpronounced goals. The 1990s “managerial ethic” is 
still clearly prevalent despite, or perhaps precisely because of, its flagrant disregard of 
contradictory goals146 and the need for states to “fight” (despite fear to do so) over those 
goals147 rather than to give that task to experts. This could be phrased differently: by 
embracing contradictory or empty norms without actually discussing their meaning or the 
values or goals attached to them, the “managerial ethic” in environmental law is part of the 
larger and often discussed trend to move from the substantive to the procedural.148 Such a
143 Knox, J.H., 2001, p. 23.
144 Further on arguments on the utility of managerial methods for compliance enhancement, esp. through 
public shame and political pressure, see e.g. Young, 0., The Effectiveness of . . . \  1991, p. 176; And see 
Jacobson, H. & E. Brown Weiss, 1998, e.g. p. 543, on what they call “sunshine methods” of compliance 
enhancement, including those methods that promote transparency and therefore scrutiny in the open.
145 Yet another use of the term appears in the notion “knowledge management”, a euphemism for education 
and training, used i.a. by the IAEA to promote training of nuclear scientists in the face of ever fewer places 
of and falling interest in higher education in nuclear science, see further 
http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/Press/News/nuclear knowledge.shtml.
146 Such as environment and development discussed above, but several other juxtaposed concepts are equally 
difficult to reconcile, e.g. human-animal; economic value-inherent value; etc; On codification of international 
environmental law and the diversity of goals in that enterprise, see e.g. Arsanjani, M.H., 1990, pp. 170-178; 
see also supra on the discussion on sustainable development and further infra on environmental rights.
147 See Kennedy, D., 2001, on how a managerial and technocratic approach to international affairs, bom from 
a sense of reduction of the political sphere of international government, ignores and conceals real political 
choices, and on need to deal with and debate such political, social or other differences.
148 And thus avoid the complexities of different irreconcilable values (and value-void?) and contradictory 
expectations on norms, as well exemplified by the environment-development juxtaposition; The general 
discussion on the proceduralization of law finds its roots with esp. Max Weber, see e.g. Whimster, M.S. & S. 
Lash, eds. 1987; Lassman, P. & R. Speirs, eds., 1994; Weber, M. (Baier, H. et al), 1998; and see Habermaas, 
J., 2001, who creates the idea of procedural rationality on a very abstract level; see Tuori, K., 1988; and see 
Kennedy, D., 1999, esp. p. 469 on formalism and process in modem international law; Specifically on the
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trend has developed - in the face of uncertainty, risk, unease with complexity a n d  
conflicting values -  not only in, for instance, administrative law149 but also in in ternational 
law in recent decades. Concretely, this has often happened through the development f i r s t ,  
o f framework conventions, through which so-called environmental regimes later ev o lv ed  
with some substantive norms and many procedural arrangements.150 Inter-state inform ation  
exchanges seem to be one o f the main methods o f realizing a managerial trend i n  
international environmental law, and the aim o f the present study is to discuss and o u tlin e  
the features of this assumption on the role o f information, how it relates to norms o n  
environmental protection and to the legitimacy of their making.
There is room for unease with what appears to be the current information trend. W h ile  
society at large is undergoing an "information revolution", comparable in magnitude a n d  
effect only to the industrial revolution, some types o f state information exchanges are s t i l l  
often rather vacuous and circumscribed by states’ own discretion, and others com pletely  
technology-dependent and create no situations of real exchange o f views in a political o r  
ethical sense. If the assumption is correct that information provisions play a major role i n  
the prevailing managerial way o f constructing international environmental law, then th e y , 
along with other procedures, acquire a role, which is related to the use o f  power and to  
legitimacy. Also, as to growing openness in global institutions at large, there may be so m e  
cause o f concern. One possible worry is that when institutions such as the World B a n k  
claim a “presumption in favor o f disclosure”151 of i.a. environmental data, this is a p o lic y
change of paradigm in international environmental law from protection of environmental elements to th e  
management of ecological processes, see Kuokkanen, T., 2000, pp. 221-236.
149 Relating not only to environmental matters but also to stability vs. unrest in law and decision-making in  
other rapidly developing fields, e.g. telecommunications, biotechnology and other areas of technological 
innovation. For seminal works in this area where discussion started in the 1980s, and esp. on risk, knowledge 
utilization and expert power, see e.g. Stewart, R.B., 1981; Yellin, J., 1983; Joerges, C. & D.M. Trubek, eds. 
1989; Ladeur, K-H, 1989; Beck, U., 1992; ibid. 1995; Further on risk, see Luhmann, N., 1993; an d  
environmental risk and uncertainty, Ladeur, K-H, 1994; Giddens, A., 1999; and on move from  
instrumentalism to reflexive law, see Teubner, G., 1985, pp. 299-325; Further on environmental assessment 
and procedural law, Ladeur, K-H & R. Prella, 2001.
150 For seminal literature on regime theory, see e.g. Krasner, S.D., ed., 1983; Haas, P.M., 1989; Chayes, A. &  
A.H. Chayes, 1990, pp. 147-164; Chayes, A. & A.H. Chayes, 'Adjustment and Compliance... 1991, pp. 280- 
308; Chayes, A. & A.H. Chayes, ’Compliance without Enforcement..., 1991, pp. 311-330; Gehring, T., 1990, 
p. 35-56; List, M. & V. Rittberger, 1992; Gehring, T., 1994; Spector, B.I. et al., 1994; Young, O., 1989; 
Young, O., 1990, pp. 337-346; Young, O., On the Effectiveness o f  International Regimes.... 1991; Young, O ., 
'The Effectiveness o f ..., 1991; Young, O., 1993, pp. 431-451; Young, 0 „  1994; Victor, D. & A. Chayes &  
E.B. Skolnikoff, 1993, pp. 453-474; Keohane, R., 1994; Sjfistedt, G., B.I. Spector & W. Zartman, 1994; 
Werksman, J., ed., 1996.
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that still does not necessarily hold any qualitative promise. .The amount - and contents - o f 
pertinent information that can still be withheld under various treaties is considerable, and a 
factor that may undermine the relevance of the data that can be made public. Furthermore, 
wider access to environmental information is not necessarily only a blessing; there is the 
fear that access creates new problems, and that those problems may be counter-productive 
to environmental protection. Instant communication also means pressure to make instant 
decisions. This in turn means less time for reflection and the consideration o f alternatives, 
and may mean that the quality o f decisions goes down. This is particularly dangerous in, 
say, humanitarian or environmental catastrophes where the cost, both human and other, of 
hasty decisions may be high.
The last chapter of this study acknowledges these worries and briefly tries to explore 
whether some trends in the latest international law on the environment may hold the 
potential o f transcending “mere” reliance on technology and a “managerial ethic” and 
evolve to create some other, new, different or even better ethic for environmental 
protection and law. When the 1998 Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public 
Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters was 
concluded, this regional multilateral treaty meant a new step in the development of the 
whole of international law on the environment. The development towards greater openness 
in environmental matters now also has a human rights dimension, a shift that not only 
marries two areas of international law - with the conceptual doubts and practical problems 
that may entail -, but that may, in the best case, offer some potential for renewed 
responsibility for the environment. A “new ethic”, bom out o f public access to 
environmental information, could come to add to or even change the way international 
environmental matters are perceived and dealt with. At the same time, however, anything 
pretentiously called “a new ethic” would have to involve renewed responsibility, for the 
state, certainly, but for other actors just as well. 152
151 The World Bank, Directive on Disclosure of Information, July 1989; This citation also appears e.g. in the 
Draft Review of World Bank Policy on Information Disclosure, 1994, Para. 4.; and see Para. 56, Information 
Disclosure Consultation Home Page (as it was accessible at least until September 2000) at 
http://www.worldbank.org/html/pic/disclosure/index.htm: and in subsequent documents, see below ch. 4.
152 Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in 
Environmental Matters, Aarhus, 25.6.1998, in force 30.10.2001. ECE/CEP/43.
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1.2.2. The S tructure of this Study
This study proposes to treat its top ic - to trace the evolution and find the possible roles a n d  
limits o f the current stress on information and openness in international environmental la w
-  in the following way: Firstly, by tracing the evolutionary153 phases by which the is su e  
has developed, giving thereby the study its main structure in three substantive chapters; 
secondly, by discussing within each o f the phases the evolution, contents, including 
exceptions, and functions o f the relevant treaties, giving also each chapter some com m on 
structure; and thirdly, by assessing, to different degrees, some elements o f each p h ase  
against the same three key principles o f  international law: prevention, precaution a n d  
responsibility, (either for states or more generally understood individual responsibility). 
This third point is thematic, not a concrete structural element, and it meshes both with th e  
discussions on dogmatic evolution and potential functions of environmental information.
Despite the burlesque of classical juxtapositions, the extreme poles o f potential arguments
-  never directly employed in this study -  ought to be pointed out as they indicate the sca le  
along which the topic could move: either the role o f information provisions would be see n  
to hold formidable value, they would be crucial, the sine qua non, for all environmental 
protection and the main building block -  itself substantive - of international environmental 
law; or they would be seen as ludicrous procedure,154 mere padding on the shoulders o f  
international law. They would augment the bulk of the law, provide simple norms o n  
which the illusion can be built that something vital is taking shape, that progress has been  
made, but with little or no real value to international law at large or let alone to  
environmental protection. In between these two poles there is room for considerable detail 
and nuance.
In order to search for such detail and nuance, the study attempts to find traces o f answers to  
the role o f  norms on environmental information in international law on the basis of three 
distinctive topics/chapters and, under those, three in-depth treaty studies. The three
I5i Kiss, A.C., 1976, p. 58: "...the international rules on various subjects are frequently in different stages o f  
evolution. This is certainly the case for environmental law...".
154 For an argument against outright cynicism, see Bodansky, D., 2000, pp. 365-366.
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chapters represent the main ways in which states have gone about creating information- 
sharing arrangements: first, state duties to inform other states; second, supervisory 
information/peer review systems; and, third, rights o f access to information. The 
developmental steps are here referred to as “phases”, that is “first phase”, “second phase” 
and “third phase” environmental information provisions^This structure in itself represents 
one o f the contributions o f this study to the state of present research, and it is possible that 
the way in which this topic’s development has been traced could come to serve as a
relevant method for other current topics of international law as well> Another main
/
contribution o f this study to the research of international environmental law lies in the 
combination o f the three topics represented by the three “phases”. They have not usually 
been treated as strains of the same theme, but especially peer review and supervision issues 
have been seen as something separate from “mere” information sharing.155 The issue of a 
right o f access to information again is about to experience a boom also in research, but not 
necessarily contrasting it in this way with state duties. The three phases overlap in many 
ways, they are all “in use”, despite representing different temporal aspects and needs in 
international law and environmental protection. And, finally, they certainly do not cover all 
possible ways o f exchanging information, for instance, eco-auditing and accounting, eco­
labelling and other consumer information issues, as well as some types of consultations 
and unofficial meetings and discussions are left out. Nevertheless, the collective term 
“environmental information” is used at times, either for the sake of expediency, or more 
importantly, to express the idea that all the different and overwhelming numbers of ways 
of sharing environmental information together form a central theme in international 
environmental law today.
The second chapter deals with the earliest developed part of environmental information, 
that is, the duty o f a state to inform other states o f planned undertakings and particularly of 
accidents or imminent dangers o f a trans-boundary nature. This “first phase” duty exists in
155 But see Sands, P, 1995, pp. 596-628, who combines different issues of environmental information, 
including eco-labelling and eco-auditing, into one chapter in his textbook. In contrast to this study, which 
begins with the Corfu Channel case, Sands mentions, but gives no examples of, early treaty provisions on 
information about implementation o f the treaty to the depository or other parties as the basis on which 
environmental information has since “gradually emerged as a central issue of international environmental 
law” (p. 596). He separates nine techniques concerning the provision and dissemination of environmental 
information: information exchange; reporting and the provision of information; consultation; monitoring and 
surveillance; notificatipii^qf ^ mergency sim public righriof access to environmental information; public 
education and awareness; eco-labelling; and eco-auditing and accounting; On eco-auditing, see further Sand, 
P.H., 1999, pp. 39-40,363 etseq.
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numerous multilateral and bilateral treaties, and it is very much an everyday part o f  
international environmental cooperation, but nonetheless an “old” issue in that very l i t t l e  
has been written about it since the after-math of Chernobyl. But despite the relative ease o r  
straightforwardness o f this, by now, well-developed duty, it raises some troub ling  
questions. It can be admired as a comer stone of environmental law, especially t r e a ty  
achievement; but it can also be argued to represent vacuous procedure and technocratic 
exercise with limited environmental importance. The chapter aims, first, at placing th e  
legal development of environmental information into its right historical context, first v i a  
treaty law and then in general international law. It is therefore also physically the lo n g est 
chapter as it covers the historic detail of the coming chapters as well. Secondly, i n  
discussing the contents, exceptions and possible functions of states’ information duties, th e  
chapter also aims at finding the relationship between accident information and prevention 
and precaution. Thirdly, the chapter (2.3.) contains a study on the possible function or r o le  
o f accident information vis-à-vis attribution of responsibility, and more specifically on th e  
consequences of a failure to inform in the light o f the experience o f the Chernobyl 
accident. This is meant to cast some light on one of the central weaknesses o f international 
law, namely that of how states have avoided developing state responsibility. Not only d id  
the accident and ensuing discussions on the role o f information for responsibility o n ly  
marginally strengthen the principle, but it is argued that this weakness in the practice o f  
resorting to state responsibility was the breeding ground for softer forms o f checks on s ta te  
behaviour. Section 2.3. is thus meant to function as the first breaking-point or mile-stone in  
tracing the legal development o f environmental information.
In the next “phase”, some of the main efforts on the normative level have by states b e en  
put into creating procedural norms for international environmental management a n d  
accountability through peer review and supervision/control/monitoring/verification. These 
are often part of so-called non-compliance procedures, which may be seen as concrete 
answers to the need to find alternatives to state responsibility. Different supervisory 
procedures, and more specifically the most abundant form of those, namely reporting 
procedures found in treaties, are the object of study in Chapter 3. The chapter discusses th e  
contents and possible functions (exceptions do not appear to treaty-specific and p re ­
determined reporting obligations in the sense that they do to more general state duties o r  
individual rights) to reporting obligations, and aims at assessing their relationship to
prevention and precaution. Reporting under environmental treaties seems to be the 
practical backbone of a managerial approach to environmental protection. The compilation 
of reports is the everyday work o f thousands of civil servants around the globe, and the 
reports are dealt with by treaty bodies and sometimes made available to the general public. 
They may bring valuable knowledge about state behaviour and the environment, they may 
function as checks on state accountability, but just as well it seems, the argument could be 
that reporting obligations are the epitome of lame motions of “control” over complex and 
contradictory issues.
In order to trace some arguments for this discussion on the value of supervisory 
mechanisms for the compilation o f environmental information, Chapter 3 incorporates a 
more detailed study dealing with one area o f environmental law that offers a good 
“average” example of how most treaties deal with the issue of self-imposed peer control. 
The study Information and the Waste Trade: An African Success Story? outlines the 
evolution o f trans-boundary waste trade from an issue o f control and management to one of 
total ban. In doing so, it also attempts to shed some light on the role of information sharing 
and supervision in the process of this legal development, and to give some indications as to 
whether the information provisions have been o f real importance. The study is meant to 
function as a second breaking-point or mile-stone on the road to openness: it points 
towards the indirect instrumental value of information provisions but also their weakness 
as guarantors o f stronger environmental protection measures and the risks such soft 
methods present for responsibility.
Chapter 4 moves on to the “third phase”, the most recent development in the area of 
environmental information, namely that of access by individuals and groups o f individuals 
to environmental information and public participation. This moves the subject away from 
environmental law and partly into human rights law. Since the advent of this topic in the 
early 1990s it has been an issue of principled debate between environmentalists and human 
rights activists whether this development is beneficial or even detrimental to the cause of 
environmental protection, i.e., whether it opens new windows of opportunities or whether 
it is an inherently anthropocentric and therefore counterproductive way of confusing the 
aim of environmental protection. Rather than venturing into the underlying philosophical 
questions connected to this debate, the issue will be examined with the same tools that
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have guided the chapters on information duties and supervisory procedures. The contents, 
“functions” and exceptions to rights o f  access are treated with a view to finding out how, i f  
at all, access to information relates to the principles o f prevention, precaution and  
ultimately some broadened notion o f responsibility. Juxtaposed are the questions w hether 
the recent trend towards better access to environmental information influences the w hole 
area towards something o f a new culture of openness or whether it creates new problem s 
that could come to make the development a disappointment for environmental protection. 
Again a more detailed treaty study is included here to deal with efforts under the E C E  
Aarhus Convention and within European Community law to create international legal too ls 
for the enhancement o f access at a national and regional level to environmental 
information and decision-making. But this time the whole chapter, not only the treaty- 
study, points towards a new mile-stone: the present is a breaking-point, a new phase w hose 
outcome is yet unknown.
The first two detailed treaty studies cut across different environmental media, acting as a n  
illustration o f  how traditional international environmental law has been both constructed 
and studied. The first study covers industrial and nuclear accidents, and their possible 
repercussions for, inter alia, the global atmosphere and long-range trans-boundary a ir  
pollution. The second study, which deals with waste trade, has bearings on both soil an d  
water protection and protection of the marine environment. Where the first case study deals 
with issues that still to some extent bear witness of an old East-West divide, the second 
study strongly emphasises the South-North dimensions o f environmental law. These 
divides are meant to be recognitions of, rather than exhaustive accounts for, the num erous 
economic, cultural and other factors that make global environmental protection such a  
delicate matter. The third study moves beyond traditional environmental media as such, b u t 
it brings out another great divide, namely the role o f regional rather than global 
arrangements in international law. The studies deal with treaty-law, but the chapters 
introducing the role of the various types o f environmental information obviously also draw  
on other sources o f international law, including instruments of soft law, and the possible 
binding character of specific norms, rules and principles, play a major role in an overall 
assessment o f the role of information in environmental law. Questions common to each o f  
the in-depth treaty studies include whether the contracting parties have fulfilled their self- 
imposed procedural obligations o f information sharing and mutual control and what some
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of the success stories and failures may be. Under the first and third phases o f legal 
development, this includes searching for exceptions and limits to information duties and 
rights, be they related to security, defence, personal data, intellectual property or some 
other factor.
The final Chapter 5 attempts to draw, on the basis of Chapters 2, 3 and 4, some concluding 
remarks about the current state o f environmental information in international law. The 
treaty studies and discussions surrounding them are used to try to show whether the 
massive development of different information sharing schemes are indications of a 
marginalized role of international law today or whether, on the contrary, international legal 
norms on more openness may have a constructive role to play for better environmental 
protection. The overall question whether the various technocratic (e.g. accident 
notifications) and managerial methods (e.g. both accident notifications and reporting) show 
any evidence o f  being at "the cutting edge" of international environmental law is assessed 
and contrasted to the potential offered by rights o f accessJojenvironmental information. 
This study is limited in time: it mainly covers the legal development o f environmental 
information provisions in the last three decades. The actual writing o f this thesis was 
concluded in the Spring of 2002. This means that the outcome of the World Summit on 
Sustainable Development at Johannesburg is not part of the study; it only receives some 
tentative reference.
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2. FROM STATE DUTIES TO INFORM...
2.1. Introduction
Preventing the occurrence o f serious environmental accidents is a priority issue for most 
states, as evidenced by the massive and successful efforts to prevent accidents related to the 
so-called “Y2K” or “millennium bug” problem.156 Yet accidents continue to happen.157 
Risk158 as an element of technological activity will not disappear; therefore, it is frequently 
argued, it must be managed.159 It is especially in those areas o f technological activity where 
the probability o f a transboundary accident may be low, but where the effects are of 
enormous consequence to the environment if an accident occurs,160 that the strongest
156 This chapter is based on and partly coincidental with Nordstrom, N., 2001, and see also ibid, 1996; On the 
millennium bug, see e.g. OECD Working Group on Chemical Accidents meeting in Paris 2.12 1998 to 
discuss prevention o f the Y2K problem, on chemical installations, http://www.oecd.org/ehs/v2k/index.htrn: 
the WHO international chemical safety advisory on Y2K at http://www.who.int/ifcs/v2k-advisorv.htm: 41(2) 
IAEA Bulletin, 1999; and in the EU context, from a wider economic system point of view, see 
http ://www. i sdo .cec.be/v2keuro/index.html.
157 References are abundant. On occurrences o f industrial and other human-made accidents see first e.g. Ellis,
D., 1989; Woodliffe, J., 1990, p. 107-109; Myers B. & P. Read, 1992, pp. 197-200; and see Institute for 
Systems Engineering and Informatics, Community Documentation Centre on Industrial Risk: Review o f 
Environmental Accidents and Incidents, 1992, CDCIR 776-Dkbl-IV.3; United Nations Environment 
Programme, United Nations Centre for Urgent Environmental Assistance, Report: Environmental 
Emergencies: a Review o f  Emergencies & Disasters Involving Hazardous Substances over the Past Ten 
Years, volumes I, II, 1.10.1993 (reports after 1994 under UNEP-OCHA Joint Environment Unit); and see 
http://www.diesis.com/cemec/emerchem/industrial accidents of the past.htm. (1998) for a list o f chemical 
accidents in the 20th century; and for links to various reports on accidents or near-misses up to 2002 see the 
United States Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board, http://www.chemsafetv.gov/chem1inks: and 
on accidents see also the Technical Secretariat of the OPCW at http://www.opcw.nl/chemhaz/chemacci.htrn: 
and see the European Commission Major Accident Hazards Bureau (MAHB) and the continuously up-dated 
Major Accident Reporting System (MARS) of the EU Member States at http://mahvsrv.irc.it/mars: On recent 
chemical safety issues related to the ILO look at
http://www.ilo.org/public/engiish/protection/safework/chemsftv/index.
158 On the complex notion of risk and related concepts, see Shrader-Frechette, K.S., 1991, pp. 3-13, 66-74; 
Renn, O., 1992, pp. 53-79; Luhmann, N., 1993; Beck, U,, 1995; Risk essentially denotes a certain probability 
of a hazard, see Handl, G., 1989, p. 106. See also the World Commission on Environment and Development 
(WCED), Our Common Future, 1987, p. 323; Ellis, D., 1989; See Charbonneau, S., 1989, pp. 269-284; And 
see OECD’s Chemical Accident Risk Assessment Thesaurus (CARAT) at 
http://www.oecd.org/EHS/CARAT. 2002; For a practical example o f how widely the notion of risk may be 
understood, see http://www.riskworld.com/ , and on concrete risk assessments see e.g. 
http://www.esd.oml.gov/programs/ecorisk/ecorisk.html.
159 See Yokohama Conference Report 1994, p. 41; see also ILC: Rao, Third Report; On risk and its 
management, see Liberatore, A., 1999; see also Malmfi Ministerial Declaration, First Global Ministerial 
Environment Forum, 31.5.2000, at http://www.unep.org/malmo/malmo ministerial.htm: u[W]e can ensure 
environmental security through early warning” .
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possible safeguards of communication and co-operation are argued to be needed. T h e  
generic term "hazard management",160 61 and particularly its implications, prevention a n d  
control, or preparedness and response, is considered central in the context o f acciden t 
information. While pollution162 or harm163 prevention is the main objective o f traditional 
international environmental concerns, response includes the mitigation and minimization o f  
the consequences o f an accident that has already occurred. Thus, information on a particu lar 
potentially - or factually - polluting event is perceived as one initial form of response to a n d  
mitigation o f the situation that the event might create or has already created. A ccident 
information includes both environmental aspects and humanitarian considerations.
This chapter addresses the current position in international law of the state duty to notify164 
or inform165 with regard to human-made166 technological accidents167 of a potentially
160 On the relationship between international environmental and nuclear law, and risk and precaution, see  
Granet, M-B, 2001.
161 For seminal writing in public international law, see Handl, G., 1989, p. 108; see also Bothe, M., 1980, p p . 
395-396.
162 For one of the most frequently used definitions of pollution, see e.g. Art. I(l)(4) of the LOSC.
163 For one understanding of “significant transboundary harm”, see draft articles 1-3 on prevention in Report 
- o f the International Law Commission on the Work o f Its Fiftieth Session, 1998, GAOR A/53/10, p. 18-19.
(
164 See Dominick, M. F., 'Notification' in Encyclopedia o f Public International Law 9, p. 288. In the law o f  
war the term, refers, i.a, to the declaration of war or neutrality or the laying of submarine contact mines, th a t 
is, in confirmation of an already existing situation, see Second Hague Peace Conference, 18.10 1907, 
Conventions III and VIII; in the law of the sea the coastal state has, for example, the duty to notify a ll 
potential hazards to navigation o f which it is aware in its territorial waters, see Article 24, United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC), Montego Bay 10.12. 1982, in force 16.11.1994 and see the C orfu  
Channel case (1949), JCJ Reports, p. 4; in human rights law the term often refers to situations where a  
contracting party has a right to derogate from its treaty obligations in times of emergency, see Article 15 o f  
the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Rome 4.11.1950, in force 
3.9.1953; and see Rosas, A., 1993, p. 170.
165 In the context o f transboundary environmental accident information (post-accident as opposed to p re­
accident or pre-pollution information) several terms are used to express the same or closely related concepts: 
early-warning, notification and information. For instance, in nuclear law, the terms are used to denote 
separate temporal aspects of risk communication. Notification is understood as a more initial means o f  
communication (or warning), whereas information follows upon notification providing further data. Yet som e 
other treaties confusingly use the term "report" for accident information. For the purposes of this study, the 
generic term will be information, and the other terms are understood as forming part, both temporally and  
substantially, of the larger process of accident information.
166 Despite the difficulties inherent in finding a meaningful delimitation of the concepts “human-made” and 
“natural”, natural catastrophes remain primarily outside of the scope o f this study. Further on "Na-techs” see 
Report o f  the World Conference on Natural Disaster Reduction, Yokohama, 27.5.1994, A/CONF. 172/9 (cited 
as Yokohama Conference Report, 1994), p. 36-37; see also The International Aspects o f  Natural a n d  
Industrial Catastrophes, The Centre for Studies and Research in International Law and International 
Relations, 1995, Hague Academy of International Law.
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transboundary character. In doing so, other types of state duties to inform will be discussed 
and contrasted, particularly the duty of states to inform on planned undertakings. This issue 
is examined in the context of the a) evolution of treaty law, and perhaps more importantly, 
in general international law. The central questions are do states owe each other an accident 
information duty, and if they do, what are its b) contents, its qualitative and quantitative 
criteria? Which states are under the information duty, in which situations, and to whom do 
states owe the duty? What exceptions apply to the duty to inform? What c) functions could 
environmental accident information have for environmental protection and/or law? How, if 
at all, does it relate to prevention and precaution? And finally, also in relation to possible 
functions, if states are bound by a duty to inform of accidents, what are the legal 
consequences o f a failure to inform?
2.2. The Duty to Inform in Treaty Law and Genera] International Law
2.2.1. Treaty Provisions
It is first necessary to turn to treaty law before a discussion on customary law, not least 
because o f the implications that the treaty provisions might have for the existence of the 
duty in general international law. The treaty law pertaining to nuclear energy and marine 
pollution seem to be the two areas with the most far-reaching provisions on accident 
information, and they therefore merit closer examination. Neither of these areas were quite 
the first to develop accident information schemes, however. Among the earliest 
internationally-regulated accident response fields, the prevention o f forest fires is 
noteworthy.167 68 *17Forest fires, which often fall into both the category o f human-made and
167 The terminological and consequent legal problems relating to nearby concepts, such as “catastrophe”, 
“emergency” and “disaster”, are acknowledged. In order to avoid undue complexity the generic term in this 
study is "accident”. It is meant to include such sudden technological incidents of large proportions which 
entail loss or damage to human life or health, property or the environment, and which at least potentially have 
transboundary effects. The risk of an occurrence of an accident may be either high or low, but it must reach 
certain amplitude. "Emergencies" may result from "accidents" and are in many documents referred to as the 
object of the information duty. Other writers and many international documents may use the terms in different 
ways; On the theory o f “normal accidents”, see Perrow, Ch., 1984; On this and on so-called “high-reliability” 
theory, see Liberatore,A. 1999, pp. 21-23.
168 Today the prevention of forest fires is also largely connected to the prevention of the so called 'greenhouse
effect'. For an early document making this connection see, e.g., EC Council Resolution o f June 21, 1989 on
the Greenhouse Effect and the Community (Article 8). See further Bourrinet, J., 1992, see especially pp. 167-
171 for the Charter o f Aix-en-Provence, World Conference on Wildland Fires, 14.12.1991.
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natural disasters, are usually regulated by bilateral agreements to protect frontier areas.169 
Such agreements usually contain provisions on information, both preventive and accident- 
related.170
Areas o f international environmental law where accident information is particularly 
important are transport o f hazardous wastes, which will be returned to in a treaty study in  
Chapter Three,171 industrial accidents,169 *772 and international watercourses.173 In th e
169 France-Spain: Agreement on French and Spanish Fire Emergency Services, 14.7.1959; Argentina-Chile: 
Agreement concerning the Protection of Frontier Forests Against Fire, 29.12.1961; Canada-United States: 
Agreement Governing Mutual Co-operation in the Detection and Suppression of Forest Fires, 1.6.1971; 
Canada-United States: Arrangement on Mutual Assistance in Fighting Forest Fires, Ottawa, exchange o f  
notes 4.5.1982, in force 7.5.1982; See further Brown Weiss, E., 1986, p. 146; and Brown Weiss, E., 1989, pp . 
76-79, 229.
1 170 The environmental information duty has developed considerably more slowly in the area o f humanitarian 
law. Although information on the location o f mines anti other explosive devices certainly has the side-effect
\ of also preventing environmental damage, an express environmental accident information duty does not y e t 
exist within the treaty-based law o f war or humanitarian law; See the Hague Convention VIII Relative to th e  
Laying o f Automatic Submarine Contact Mines, the Hague, 18.10.1907, in force 26.1.1910 (Article 5). See 
also the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which M ay  
Be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects, New York, 10.4.1980, in force 
2.12.1983 (Protocol II, Article 7) (but see later Protocol negotiations); See the Convention on the Prohibition 
of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, Paris, 
14.2.1993, in force 29.4.1997; See also Goldblat, J., 1985, pp. 77-83. The earlier envisaged development o f  a  
so-called "Fifth Geneva Convention" did, however, include a provision on information about damage to the  
environment o f neutral states or global commons, see Plant, G., 1992, pp. 3-36,43-62.
171 The United Nations Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and  
Their Disposal, Basle, 22.3.1989, in force 24.5.1992; Fourth A.C.P.-E.E.C. Convention, Lomé, 15.12.1989, 
in force 1.9.1991; Convention on the Ban of the Import into Africa and the Control of Transboundary 
Movement and Management of Hazardous Wastes Within Africa, Bamako, 29,1.1991, in force 22.4.1998.
172 See OECD, Council Decision on the Exchange of Information concerning Accidents Capable of Causing 
Transfrontier Damage, 687th session, 8.7.1988. C(88)84(Final); See the Convention on the Organization fo r 
Economic Co-operation and Development, Paris, 14.12.1960, in force 30.9.1961. See Article 5(a) 
establishing the binding character of OECD decisions. Members can abstain from voting and thus avoid the 
binding character of a certain decision (Article 6). Generally, see Smets, H., 1991, pp. 459-460; And in the 
EC see Major-accident Hazards Bureau (MAHB), Major-accident Reporting System (MARS) and the 
Community Documentation Centre on Industrial Risk (CDCIR): Seveso Directive: Council Directive o f  24  
June 1982 on the Major Accident Hazards o f Certain Industrial Activities, 82/501/EEC, amended b y  
Directives 87/216/EEC; 88/610/EEC and 91/692/EEC, and replaced by new “Seveso II” Directive o f 9  
December 1996, 96/82/EC, in force 3.2.1997, replaced the original Directive and was mandatory at the latest 
as o f 3.2.1999; generally see Prieur, M., 1989, pp. 261-268; Barrait, R. and H. Enmarch-Williams, 1994, pp. 
195-199; Nordic Convention on Transfrontier Co-operation in Cases o f Accidents for the Prevention o r  
Limitation of Damage to Human Life, Property or the Environment, Stockholm, 20.1.1989, in force 1.3. 
1992; further on Seveso Directive and Nordic Convention, see infra ch. 4.2.A.c; Convention on the 
Transboundary Effects o f Industrial Accidents, Helsinki, 17.3.1992, in force 19.4.2000; ILO Convention 174: 
Convention concerning the Prevention of Major Industrial Accidents, Geneva, 22.6.1993, in force.
173 See e.g. Convention on the Protection o f  the Rhine against Chemical Pollution, Bonn, 3.12.1976, in force 
1.2.1979; Convention Concerning the Protection of the Rhine against Pollution by Chlorides, Bonn, 
3.12.1976, in force 5.7.1985; both to be superseded by the new Convention on the Protection o f the Rhine, 
Beme, 12.4.1999 (Art 5(6)); Convention on the Protection and Use o f Transboundary Watercourses and
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prevention o f transboundary air pollution174 and pollution of the global atmosphere,175 
however, the accident information duty plays a less central role.176
a) Nuclear energy
The area of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy has seen the most dramatic development of 
treaty law and practice pertaining to accident information and response. The Chernobyl 
accident in 1986 gave rise to rapid international co-operation for the legal regulation of 
future large-scale accidents, most notably through the 1986 IAEA Conventions on 
Notification and Assistance.177 In accordance with Article 1, which together with Article 2 
includes the main contents o f the Notification Convention, the Convention applies:
International Lakes, Helsinki, 17.3 1992, entry into force 6.10.1996; Belgium-France-Netherlands: 
Agreements on the Protection of the Rivers Meuse and Scheldt, Charleville Mezieres, 26.4.1994, not in force; 
Cambodia-Laos-Thailand-Vietnam: Agreement on the Co-operation for the Sustainable Development of the 
Mekong River Basin, Chiang Rai, 5.4.1995, entry into force 5.4.1995; United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Non-Navigationa! Uses of International Watercourses, New York, 21.5.1997, not in force. See also ILC 
Draft Articles on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses, 1994, A/CN.4/L.489; 
Report o f the International Law Commission on the Work o f Its Forty-sixth Session, 1994, GAOR A749/10, 
pp. 195-326; See McCaffrey, S. & M. Sinjela, 1998.
174 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air-Pollution, Geneva, 13.11.1979, in force 16.3.1983; 
Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution on the Reduction o f Sulphur 
Emissions or their Transboundary Fluxes by at least 30 per cent, Helsinki, 8.7,1985, in force 2.9.1987; 
Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution concerning the Control of 
Emissions o f Nitrogen Oxides or their Transboundary Fluxes, Sofia, 31.10.1988, in force 14.2.1991; Protocol 
to the 1979 Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution on the Control of Emissions of Volatile 
Organic Compunds or their Transboundary Fluxes, Geneva, 18.11.1991, in force 29.9.1997; Protocol to the 
Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution on the Further Reduction of Sulphur Emissions, 
Oslo, 14.6.1994, in force 5.8.1998; Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air 
Pollution on Persistent Organic Pollutants, Aarhus, 24.6.1998, not in force; Protocol to the 1979 Convention 
on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution on Heavy Metals, Aarhus, 24.6.1998, not in force; Protocol to 
the 1979 Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution to Abate Acidification, Eutrophication and 
Ground-level Ozone, Göteborg, 30.11.1999, not in force.
175 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Vienna, 2.5.1985, in force 22.9.1988; Montreal 
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Montreal, 16.9.1987, in force 1.1.1989; amended, by 
Decision II/2 at the Second Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol, London, 29.6.1990, entry into 
force 10.8.1992; amended and adjusted, Copenhagen, 25.11.1992, in force 22.9.1993 amended, Montreal, 
1997; amended, Beijing, 1999; United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Rio de Janeiro, 
4.6.1992, in force 21.3.1994.
176 See also Article II of the Agreement Concerning Co-operation in the Quarantine of Plants and their 
Protection against Pests and Diseases, Sofia, 14.12.1959, in force 19.10.1960; Article 14(l)(d) of the United 
Nations Convention on Biological Diversity, Rio de Janeiro, 5.6.1992, in force 29.12.1993.
177 Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, Vienna, 26.9.1986, in force 27.10.1986; 
Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, Vienna, 26.9.1986, 
in force 26.2.1987; As of June 2001, the Notification Convention has 83 states Parties and the Assistance 
Convention has 79 Parties. The FAO, WMO, and WHO are also Parties to both Conventions. On the drafting 
history of the two IAEA Conventions see e.g., Kiss, A.C., 1986, pp. 146-147; Adede, A.O., 1987, pp. 1-13,
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in the event of any accident involving facilities or activities of a State Party or o f  
persons or legal entities under its jurisdiction or control, [...] from which a release o f  
radioactive material occurs or is likely to occur and which has resulted or may resu lt 
in an international transboundary release that could be of radiological safety  
significance for another State.
The Notification Convention is broad in scope in that it applies to both private and state 
owned nuclear activities. Article 1, which refers to "persons or legal entities under th e  
jurisdiction or control" of a state party, reflects the realization that strong supervision o f  
private activity is a prerequisite for the safe use o f nuclear energy. Left open by the w ording 
of Article 1 are the criteria that should determine when a situation is of "radiological safety  
significance". No objective thresholds have been agreed upon; any reaction to a  
radiological release is left to the discretion of the source state - and international guidelines. 
A 2001 IAEA meeting under the Notification and Assistance Conventions noted th a t 
“determining what an accident is in the sense used in the Convention is left to th e  
precautionary judgment o f the State in their exercise of due diligence”.178
Without giving a clear definition o f a "nuclear accident", the Notification Convention 
covers a wide array of activities related to the use o f nuclear energy. These are dealt with in  
Article 1(2) and include nuclear reactors, fuel cycle facilities, waste management facilities, 
transport and storage of nuclear materials, the various uses of nuclear materials fo r 
agriculture, industry, medicine or science and research, and the use o f radio-isotopes fo r 
power generation in space objects. Article 3 further stipulates that:
with a view to minimizing the radiological consequences, States Parties may notify 
in the event of nuclear accidents other than those specified in article 1.
During treaty negotiations, political opposition to the inclusion in the text of any reference 
to military uses of nuclear energy was strong among some of the major nuclear weapon 
powers.179 Some other states, on the other hand, expressly demanded the inclusion in the
130-135; Cameron, P., 1988, pp. 19-22; Sands, P., 1988, pp. 3-4; Stuckey, D.C., 1988, pp. 699-700; Lang, 
W., 1988, pp. 9-18; and see Granet, M-B, 2001, pp. 790-795.
178 See Report o f  the First Meeting o f the Competent Authorities Identified under the Convention on Early 
Notification o f  a Nuclear Accident and Convention on Assistance in the Case o f  a Nuclear Accident or 
Radiological Emergency, IAEA, Vienna, 18-22.6.2001, para. II.
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text o f military uses of nuclear power.179 80 Article 3 was a compromise, followed by 
unilateral declarations by five nuclear weapon states to voluntarily notify of any accidents 
due to military uses of nuclear materials,181 and later statements by the Parties have 
affirmatively expressed the idea that accidents due to military nuclear testing and nuclear 
weapons could be covered under Article 3.182
The major substantive content of the Notification Convention lies in Article 2, which, 
notably using the word "shall", establishes the clear duty for the Parties to the Convention 
to provide other states with information in the case of a nuclear accident with actual or 
potential transboundary repercussions. Here it is interesting to note that the Convention 
separates between "notification" and "information":
In the event of an accident in article 1 [...], the State Party referred to in that article 
shall:
(a) forthwith notify, directly or through the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(hereinafter referred to as the 'Agency'), those States which are or may be physically 
affected as specified in article 1 and the Agency o f the nuclear accident, its nature, 
the time o f its occurrence and its exact location where appropriate; and
(b) promptly provide the States referred to in subparagraph (a), directly or through 
the Agency, and the Agency with such available information relevant to minimizing 
the radiological consequences in those States, as specified in article 5.
Thus, in the context of this Convention, to "notify" means to let someone know that an 
accident has occurred, and to "inform" means to provide further data. The greatest strength
179 Particularly the United States; On opposition to the inclusion of military installations, see e.g., McBryer, 
S., 1986, p. 314; Stuckey, 1988, pp. 704-705; Moser, B., 1989, p. 13; But contra, in the opinion of the 
Chairman of the Group of Governmental Experts that drafted the Convention, van Gorkom, the list implicitly 
also included military nuclear facilities; H[t]he remarkable fact that all five nuclear power States have 
accepted the legal obligation to notify and to give detailed information on all accidents within the broad 
framework of the nuclear fuel cycle, implicitly including military nuclear facilities, and the fact that on 
account o f its article 3 and subsequent formal statements by the nuclear weapon States the convention also 
covers, for all practicable purposes, accidents resulting from nuclear weapons and nuclear testing, constitute a 
breakthrough in the field of arms control and disarmament doctrine which may be of great significance for 
future negotiations", see van Gorkom, L.H.J.B., p. xiv, in Preface to Adede, A.O., 1987; C f Articles 34-35 of 
the Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, Rome, 25.3.1957, in force 1.1.1958.
180 Kiss, A.C., 1986, p. 149, n. 44: E.g., Finland, France, Ireland and Luxembourg.
181 McBryer, S., 1986, p. 318.
182 Report o f  the First Meeting o f the Competent Authorities..., IAEA, Vienna, 18-22.6 2001, para. 12, see 
supra.
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of the Notification Convention seems to He in its relative specificity. The information to be 
given in case o f a nuclear accident is enumerated in Article 5(1):
(a) the time, exact location where appropriate, and the nature of the nuclear 
accident; (b) the facility or activity involved; (c) the assumed or established cause 
and the foreseeable development of the nuclear accident relevant to the 
transboundary release of the radioactive materials; (d) the general characteristics o f  
the radioactive release, including, as far as is practicable and appropriate, the nature, 
probable physical and chemical form and the quantity, composition and effective 
height o f the radioactive release; (e) information on current and forecast 
meteorological and hydrological conditions, necessary for forecasting the 
transboundary release o f the radioactive materials; (f) the results of environmental 
monitoring relevant to the transboundary release o f  the radioactive materials; (g) the 
off-site protective measures taken or planned; (h) the predicted behaviour over time 
of the radioactive release.
The list is comprehensive, and further strengthened by a  provision in Section 2 on 
supplementary information at appropriate intervals. However, the information obligation is 
also followed by a weakening restriction in Section 3 o f Article 5:
Information received pursuant to sub-paragraph (b) of article 2 may be used 
without restriction, except when such information is provided in confidence 
by the notifying State Party.
Arguably, this does not affect the initial notification obligation, but only further 
information. The clause allows a notifying state to restrict the use of classified information, 
for instance concerning national security or defence, and it provides for a way o f escaping 
the central purpose of the treaty, that is, to minimize the transboundary consequences o f a 
radiological release. Some other flaws can also be found in the Convention, particularly 
ones connected to vagueness in the text. One ambiguity lies in what might also be 
understood as a point of strength, namely the reference, in Article 1, to a release that occurs 
or is likely to occur. This wording leaves open the question when, that is, at which 
threshold, an accident must be notified internationally, a fact which leaves room for misuse. 
In the most positive scenario, this uncertainty works towards the rapid notification also o f  
smaller incidents, bringing the Convention as close to the notion of precaution as it, given 
the post yhc/o-character o f the entire notion of accident notification and information, can *
IS3 According to Stuckey, who sees a limitation only to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, "... the 
Convention's value will be measured in direct proportion to the nonuse of the confidential information 
exception in Article 5, Section 3", Stuckey, D.C., 1988, p. 709; Cf. to Article 6 in the Assistance Convention.
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possibly come. State practice under the Convention appears to follow compliance with this 
stricter interpretation of the threshold level for notifications.184
The use o f the word "forthwith" in Article 2 leaves room for varying interpretations as to 
the timeframe within which a notification must be made. Information technology today 
allows for virtually instantaneous communications all over the world, but "forthwith" could 
be interpreted to mean a reaction only within several days. The International Commission 
on Radiological Protection (ICRP) has defined three different time phases of a nuclear 
accident.185 186The early phase relates to the very first few hours after an accident, the 
intermediate phase begins after a few hours and lasts for a few days, and the recovery phase 
may last for many years depending on the substances released. Any measures in protection 
of the health o f the affected population can only be taken during the first and second 
phases, and this is why the wording o f  Article 2 may be criticized for lack of precision.
Another example o f  a possible weakness in the Convention is the false assumption that 
may rise from the enumeration in Article 5 of the contents o f accident information: Stuckey 
has pointed out that it might be wrong to conclude that the specificity of information given 
guarantees adequate emergency response. Many developing countries and other countries 
with limited know-how about nuclear technology would not necessarily benefit even from 
the most elaborate information.187 The successful implementation of the Convention
184 See e.g. Lessons Learned from Accidents in Industrial Irradiation Facilities, IAEA, STI/PUB/1015, 1996; 
Lessons Learned from Accidents in Industrial Radiography, Safety Reports Series No. 7, IAEA, 
STI/PUB/1058, 1998; and for reports on radiological accidents at Nezvizh, 1991 (death due to fault-clearance 
at sterilisation facility); Hanoi, 1992 (personal injury at electron accelerator facility); Tammiku, 1994 (theft of 
radioactive waste resulting in death and injury); San José, 1996 (overexposure of radiotherapy patients 
resulting in death and injury); and in relation to the major accident at Tomsk, 1993 (widespread 
contamination after accident at plutonium extraction facility), see further at 
http://iaea.or.at/worldatom/publications/98pubs/nrsar98.htm 1 : Contra, on the other hand, there does not seem 
to be public information readily available on examples of failures to notify o f smaller accidents.
185 Protection of the Public in the Event of Major Radiation Accidents: Principles for Planning, 40 Annals o f 
the ICRP, No. 2(1984), p. 3.
186 Stuckey, D.C., 1988, pp. 707-708.
187 Article 8 of the Convention pertains to situations where a non-nuclear state party to the Convention 
borders a nuclear state not party to the Convention. Article 8 reads:
The Agency shall, in accordance with its Statute and upon a request of a State Party which does not 
have nuclear activities itself and borders on a State having an active nuclear programme but not 
Party, conduct investigations into the feasibility and establishment of an appropriate radiation 
monitoring system in order to facilitate the achievement of the objectives of this Convention.
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continues to be dependent on the funds allocated for the purpose of helping those states th a t 
do not have the necessary means for emergency response.188 On the other hand, it is a lso  
dependent on the success o f  those ongoing common efforts that aim at strengthening the  
practical functioning of the notification and assistance system. The Emergency Notification 
and Assistance Technical Operations Manual (ENATOM), which was initiated in 1987, has 
to this purpose been up-dated, with the 2000-version in use and a 2002-version under 
revision. ENATOM functions on a voluntary basis, and it endorses, besides the tw o 
Conventions’ obligations, also the International Basic Safety Standards for Protection 
against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety or Sources (BSS) and a draft Safety 
Requirement for Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency. 
Integrating these standards is seen as a step towards greater harmonization o f emergency 
preparedness and response on the international level.
The Notification Convention is intended to function on a firm institutional basis, with the 
IAEA at the centre of the system. The obligation to notify and inform also clearly lies w ith  
the IAEA, not only the states. According to Article 4, the IAEA is to relay the receipt o f  a  
notification o f a nuclear accident to any state affected or potentially affected. Concerning 
further information, however, it is to be conveyed by the IAEA only upon request, thus 
shrinking the obligations imposed on the Agency. The reference in Article 8 to aid to non­
nuclear states also assigns further tasks to the IAEA, as the prime responsibility for such 
assistance would lie with the organization.
Article 7 lays out the obligation o f the states parties to have a national authority on 
continuous alert for the possible communication o f risk information, and to keep the IAEA 
and the other Parties up-to-date on any changes in such domestic response mechanisms. 
The burden o f this obligation is shared with the IAEA in that it is the Authority’s 
responsibility to keep a list of all national authorities and points of contact and to 
disseminate information about these arrangements among its member states and relevant 
international organizations. In this respect the implemention of the Convention is 
continuous and on-going, involving aspects of co-ordination and co-operation between
188 E.g. on capacity building in Africa, see under the African Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, 
Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology, 1990, in force, http://www.afra- 
iaea.org/: Cf. to technical and expert assistance given by the IAEA under the Nuclear Safety Convention in 
2002 to e.g. Georgia to locate and recover sources o f “lost” radioactive material in the country, 
http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/Press/News/georgia radsources03.shtml.
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organizations, communications systems, including updating technology, exercises between 
national authorities, continuous evaluations and improvements o f the systems in use, and so
The Notification Convention must be read in conjunction with the Assistance Convention, 
as well as regional and bilateral agreements, as the two IAEA Conventions go hand-in- 
hand: no assistance is possible without the prior notification of and information about a 
potentially dangerous situation.189 90
Although the Notification Convention in Article 6 lays down the duty of the informing state 
to respond to any requests for consultations that an affected state might make, any 
substantive action towards the minimization of adverse effects would be taken under the 
Assistance Convention. This happened in connection with the radiological emergency 
caused by Caesium-137 in Goiania, Brazil on September 19, 1987. The IAEA was notified 
by Brazil about the situation, and subsequently Brazil received help from other countries 
under the Assistance Convention.191 One weakness of the Assistance Convention is, 
however, that it does not impose a duty on the states parties to render or accept assistance, it 
merely obliges made by to ’’react promptly" to any request for assistance that another 
country in need. The Convention, which aims at minimizing administrative hurdles in 
assistance situations, also creates some confusion as to responsibility for harm borne during 
assistance efforts: it has been criticized for protecting too strongly the assisting state, which 
might in some cases be the same state that originally caused the accident. Reimbursement
189 See Report o f the First Meeting o f  the Competent Authorities IAEA, Vienna, 18-22.6.2001.
190 One particularly interesting question arises from the Assistance Convention, which applies not only to 
nuclear accidents but also to radiological emergencies. While the term nuclear accident is understood in the 
same way as in the Notification Convention, lack of clarity surrounds the notion "radiological emergency". It 
can be understood to refer to a situation that is less critical than an accident in that it would not have caused or 
would probably not cause damage or injury, see Moser, B., 1989, p. 14; In contrast to an accident, it could 
perhaps also be seen as a situation that is caused knowingly or with substantial risk-taking involved. In such a 
case a radiological emergency might have its reasons in military activity connected to nuclear weapons or the 
testing of nuclear weapons, see Kiss, A.C., 1986, p. 150 (Cf also to radiological weapons’ use in international 
law). If interpreted in this way, the Assistance Convention highlights the above-discussed issue o f the scope 
of application of the Notification Convention. The implication would be that indeed only accidents, as 
opposed to "radiological emergencies”, are covered by the obligation o f states to notify affected Parties. 
There is however no public information readily available on evidence that states would have interpreted the 
Assistance Convention as a limitation o f the scope of the Notification Convention.
191 Brown Weiss, E., 1989, p. 187; But, it is not entirely clear whether the help offered to Brazil in 1987 was 
“voluntary“ rather than based on the express treaty obligation.
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of assistance costs to the accident-creating state has been considered to be problematic.192 
Efforts at improving the working methods and functioning the IAEA’s Emergency 
Response Centre (ERC) as a focal point for the Emergency Response Network (ERNET), 
as well as co-operation with national authorities show, despite some continuing 
harmonization and co-ordination problems, that the parties to the Convention have a degree 
of commitment to assistance.193
The Nuclear Safety Convention, concluded in 1994 under the auspices o f the IAEA, is not 
primarily intended to further the information duty, but rather to promote other larger 
preventive and mitigating issues related to nuclear safety.194 In direct relation to  
information, the Convention provides however for the establishment of national regulatory 
bodies charged with, inter alia , the establishment o f safety requirements and regulations. 
Article 19(vi) refers to the duty of the holder of a licence to report to the regulatory body in  
a timely manner on incidents significant to safety.195
Regional, mostly bilateral, agreements on prevention o f pollution from nuclear installations 
can roughly be divided into agreements on exchange of accident information or radiation 
monitoring data; emergency assistance treaties;196 treaties on installations in border
192 Sands, P., 1995, p. 476.
,9j See Report o f  the First Meeting o f  the Competent Authorities..., IAEA, Vienna, 18-22.6.2001, para. 39-41.
194 Nuclear Safety Convention, Vienna, 20.9.1994, in force 24.10.1996; As o f 15.4.2002 53 states and the EU 
are Parties to the Convention, representing 428 out of 448 nuclear reactors worldwide. Generally on the 
Convention and for documents from e.g. review meetings, see at http://www.iaea.org/ns/nusafe/safeconv.htm. 
Cf also to the IAEA Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety o f  
Radioactive Waste Management, Vienna, 29.9.1997, in force 18.6.2001, which relates i.a. to siting, in 
Articles 6 and 13, and to public information on safety issues, in the Preamble.
195 See further Szasz, P.C., 1994; Generally on nuclear safety and international environmental law, de La 
Fayette, 1993, pp. 31-69.
196 In 1963, the Nordic countries were the first to conclude a multilateral agreement on emergency assistance 
in connection with radiation accidents, see Nordic Mutual Emergency Assistance Agreement in Connection 
with Radiation Accidents, Vienna, 17.10.1963, in force 19.6.1964. Vfliile the Nordic Assistance Agreement 
specifically deals with co-operation in combating the damage from ionizing radiation, it does not expressly 
establish an obligation for the states parties to give accident notification. However, Article 2(2) on the special 
functions of the IAEA states:
At any time after he has been notified by a Contracting State o f the existence of an emergency within 
its territory, the Director General o f  the Agency may designate, in consultation with that State, an 
observer, who may enter its territory for the purpose of investigating the nature and extent of the 
emergency and reporting to him thereon. [...]
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areas;197 and general treaties on co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The 
latter kind represents the largest body o f international treaties on nuclear energy,198 but 
these treaties usually do not make any express mention of accident or emergency 
information. In contrast, some regional cooperation arrangements, which are not based on 
environmental treaties per se , have programmes, working groups or other institutional 
systems for emergency response in relation to nuclear accidents. A case in point is the 
Barents Euro-Arctic Council, whose Environment Action Programme includes nuclear 
safety and preparedness for nuclear accidents.199
Another reference to accident information is made under Article 7, which forbids an assisting Party to 
disseminate any information about a radiological incident taking place in the territory of the state requesting 
assistance. Thus, the power to inform other states on a radiological accident is meant to lie in the hands of the 
state under whose jurisdiction the accident occurs; Similar emergency assistance agreements have been 
concluded between, e.g., the Federal Republic of Germany-France: Agreement on Mutual Assistance in the 
Event of Catastrophes and Grave Disasters, 3.2.1977, in force 1.12.1980; The Federal Republic of Germany- 
Switzerland: Agreement on Radiation Protection in Case of Emergency, 31.5.1978, in force 10.1.1979; The 
Federal Republic of Germany-Belgium: Agreement on Mutual Emergency Assistance, 6.11.1980, in force 
1.5.1984.
197 E.g. the Agreement between Portugal and Spain on Co-operation in Matters Affecting the Safety of 
Nuclear Installations in the Vicinity of the Frontier, Lisbon, 31.3.1980, in force 13.7.1981. Although the main 
thrust of the treaty lies in preventive action at the siting stage of a nuclear plant, the treaty also makes 
reference to information about danger from radioactivity. Article 5 reads:
The competent authorities of the two countries agree to set up on their respective territories the 
systems necessary to detect any signs of danger from radioactivity and mutually inform each other in 
cases where such danger could have repercussions in the other country.
In addition to this information obligation, the Parties are bound to negotiate in the case of complaints about 
radiological protection in the neighbouring country (Article 6) and they are to observe any restrictions to the 
confidentiality of information given (Article 7). In Article 9 die information obligation is further widened to 
the competent authorities of the constructor country, which “shall keep the competent authorities of the 
neighbouring country informed of significant incidents affecting other nuclear installations which might 
affect its territory”. Thus, the information obligation seems to cover incidents that are, at least initially, 
domestic in scope; similar provisions can be found in several other bilateral agreements between states 
dealing with the issue of nuclear installations in border areas: see, e.g., Belgium-France: Convention on 
Radiological Protection Relating to the Installations at the Ardennes Nuclear Power Station, 23.9.1966; 
Federal Republic of Germany-Netherlands: Memorandum on Exchange of Information and Consultation on 
Nuclear Installations in Border Areas, 27.9.1977; Federal Republic of Germany-Switzerland: Agreement on 
Mutual Information on Construction and Operation of Nuclear Installations in Border Areas, 10.8.1982.
198 See, e.g., treaties between Finland-United Kingdom: Collaboration Agreement on the Peaceful Uses of 
Nuclear Energy, 24.5,1968, in force 20.2.1969; Finland-Sweden: Collaboration Agreement on the Peaceful 
Uses of Nuclear Energy, 15.10.1968, in force 5.9.1970; Finland-Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: 
Collaboration Agreement on the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, 14.5.1969, in force 28.9.1969; Finland- 
United States: Agreement for Co-operation Concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy, 8.4.1970, in force 
7.7.1979; Argentina-India: Agreement on Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, 28.5.1974; 
Austria-United States: Co-operation Agreement Concerning Civil Uses o f Atomic Energy, 14.6.1974; Federal 
Republic of Germany-Iran: Agreement on Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, 4.7.1976; 
Federal Republic of Germany-United States: Agreement on Exchange o f Technical Information and Co­
operation in Nuclear Safety, 6.7.1981; China-Federal Republic of Germany: Agreement on Co-operation in 
the Field of Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, 9.5.1984; China-United States: Agreement for Co-operation 
Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, Washington, D.C., 23.7.1985, in force 30.12.1985.
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Although some bilateral notification agreements existed pre-Chernobyl,19 200 201the wave o f  
reaction that was set off by the accident led to several new bilateral treaties on information 
exchange. As an example, Finland and Russia (then the Soviet Union) concluded a  
treaty, which in its Preamble refers to the binding character of the IAEA Notification 
Convention.202 The treaty applies to all civil nuclear installations within 300 kilometres o f  
the common border or the limit o f the territorial sea in the Gulf o f Finland. The treaty 
obligation to give information is two-fold: on the one hand, Article 2 establishes the (prior)
199 Look further at http://www.wh.fi/eng/intcooD/regional/barents/barents.htm: See also the Arctic CounciFs 
programme on Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response, at http://epDr.arctic-council.org.
200 See e.g. Exchange of Notes between the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the 
French Republic Concerning Exchanges of Information in the Event o f Emergencies Occurring in One of the 
Two States which could have Radiological Consequences for the Other State, 18.7.1983, in force 18.7.1983. 
.Article 1 of the note affirms that
[e]ach State-Party shall inform the other without delay o f any emergency which occurs in its
State as a result of civil activities which may have radiological consequences liable to affect
the other State.
The information is to be communicated through reciprocal warning centres, as set up under Article 2 o f the 
agreement. The warning centres are to operate 24 hours a day and they are to communicate directly with each 
other alongside diplomatic channels. The agreement gives fairly detailed requirements for the contents of the 
emergency information. According to Article 8 particularly the date, time, place and nature of the occurrence 
are important, as are the chemical and physical form and quantity o f the substance emitted. In addition to 
meteorological and hydrological data, the states are also obliged to give information on plans for measures to 
be taken or already carried out in response to the emergency. The agreement only refers to civil use o f nuclear 
energy; under Article 13 military secrets are expressly left out o f the scope o f the agreement. The equivalent 
exceptions concerning information subject to secrecy for military reasons is found in several other bilateral 
treaties; see further, e.g,, France-Switzerland: Agreement on the Exchange o f Information in Case o f  
Radiation Emergency, 18.10,1979, in force 13.12.1979; France-The Federal Republic o f Germany: 
Supplementary Agreement on Mutual Information in the Event of Radiological Incidents, 28.1.1981, in force 
6.8.1981; Luxembourg-France: Agreement on Exchange of Information in Case of Radiological Emergencies, 
11.4.1983, in force 27.4.1984.
201 See, e.g., Norway-Sweden: Agreement on Exchange of Information and Early Notification Relating to 
Nuclear Facilities, 21.10.1986; Argentina-Brazil: Protocol o f Co-operation concerning Prompt Notification 
and Mutual Assistance in the Event o f Nuclear Accidents and Radiological Emergencies, 29.7.1986.
202 Finland-Soviet Union: Agreement on Early Notification of Nuclear Accidents and Exchange o f 
Information concerning Nuclear Installations, Helsinki, 7.1.1987, in force 18.7.1987; Finland also concluded 
similar agreements with Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Germany and the Ukraine. The contents of the 
agreements are very similar to the Finnish-Soviet agreement. Finland-Denmark: Agreement on Exchange o f 
Information and Notification concerning Danish and Finnish Nuclear Installations, Helsinki, 23.5.1987, in 
force 14.5.1987. Finland-Sweden: Agreement on Exchange o f Information and Notification concerning 
Finnish and Swedish Nuclear Installations, Helsinki, 25.2.1987, in force 23.5.1987. Finland-Norway: 
Agreement on Exchange of Information and Notification concerning Finnish and Norwegian Nuclear 
Installations, Helsinki, 25.2.1987, in force 20.8 1987; Agreement between the Government of Finland and the 
Government o f the Federal Republic of Germany on Immediate Notification of Nuclear Accidents and 
Exchange of Information and Experience on Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection, Helsinki, 21.12.1992, 
in force 28.5.1993; Finland-Ukraine: Agreement between the Government o f Finland and the Government o f  
the Ukraine on Immediate Notification of Nuclear Accidents and Exchange o f Information and Experience on 
Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection, Helsinki, 8.2.1996, in force 7.9.1997.
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duty of the parties to exchange data on the technical particulars of the nuclear installations 
in question in order to facilitate the evaluation of potential effects in the receiving country 
in case of an accident and in order for the receiving country to be able to elaborate public 
safety schemes; Article 4, on the other hand, establishes the duty to provide nuclear 
emergency information in the case of an accident with potential transboundary effects. The 
source state is immediately to notify the affected state and it is to provide the affected state 
with all available information in accordance with Article 5 o f the IAEA Notification 
Convention. Article 9 states that the duty to give information is subject to the limitations of 
the national legislation of the parties. Thus the Finnish-Russian treaty leaves the same 
loophole of national security or military or other secrecy as most other bilateral treaties.
The scope of the Finnish-Russian treaty goes beyond the IAEA Notification Convention in 
that it refers in Articles 5 and 6 respectively to notification about all other nuclear accidents 
not mentioned in Article 1 to the IAEA Convention and to any detected radioactivity which 
might have radiological consequences in the other state even if  such a radioactive release 
did not originate in the notifying country. The treaty does not provide for the establishment 
o f any new co-operative bodies, but refers to the responsibilities of the already existing 
highest national authorities in the field o f nuclear safety (Article 3). In practice, bilateral 
cooperation between the two countries developed substantially in the 1990s, and it is an 
ongoing process. For example, the nuclear power plant at Sosnovyi Bor near St. Petersburg 
now includes many Finnish safety devices, including a direct telecommunications line - a 
small “phone box”- for immediate reporting of safety problems at the plant to Finnish 
authorities.
Finally, one of the most recent regional treaties on the exchange of radiation monitoring 
data was agreed within the Council o f the Baltic Sea States (CBSS) in June 2001.203 The 
agreement is meant to establish cooperation on the exchange o f radiological information 
both in normal situations and during accidents, in order to “provide an improved basis for 
situation assessments, decisions and public information” (Article 1). The basis for the 
information exchange is the data that parties gather in their national radiation monitoring 
networks, and it is to be exchanged “without delay”, i.e. presumably continuously, and
203 Agreement on the Exchange of Radiation Monitoring Data, Hamburg, 7.6.2001, not in force.
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without compensation. This new regional Agreement is weakened by the fact that Russia is 
not a signatory.
b) Marine pollution
The great majority of the world’s coastal states are bound by some marine pollution 
prevention treaties.204 Usually states are required to have established national emergency 
response systems before entering into treaty obligations.205 In some cases, however, the 
treaty obligations may function as incentives for the development o f national response 
systems. Apart from direct physical action taken in order to minimize the damage o f a 
pollution incident, most treaty obligations pertain to the communication between states, 
their respective authorities, and often also the private operators of ships, oil-platforms,206 
etc. Some marine pollution prevention treaties also set up very detailed guidelines on jo in t 
operations in cases of pollution incidents. These are to function on the basis o f agreed 
command structures, detailed reporting formats and standardized communications 
systems.207 Although most treaty systems have joint pollution combating operations as their 
aim, the practical economic and political capabilities may render even the less detailed 
systems unrealistic.
At the level o f global marine pollution prevention at best a mere indirect reference to an 
accident information duty is found in the 1969 Brussels Convention relating to Intervention 
on the High Seas in Cases o f Oil Pollution Damage 208 A considerably more elaborate
204 See generally, Edwards, D., 1988, pp. 234-237; Lammers, J.G., 1984, pp. 78-85; On compliance with 
marine pollution prevention treaties, see Mitchell, R.B., 1994.
205 But emergency preparedness measures also exist under cooperative arrangements other than marine 
pollution treaties proper, see e.g. the Arctic Council’s programme on Emergency Prevention, Preparedness 
and Response (EPPR) under the Environmental Protection Strategy, at http://eDpr.arctic-council.org and see 
also its programme on Protection o f the Arctic Marine Environment.
206See further Gavouneli, M., 1995.
207For all o f the above see, for example, the International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, 
Response and Co-operation, London, 30.11.1990, in force 13.5.1995.
208 International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Damage, 
Brussels, 29.11.1969, in force 6.5.1975. The Protocol Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases o f 
Marine Pollution by Substances Other than Oil, London, 2.11.1973, in force 30.3.1983, amended 4.7.1991, in 
force 30.3.1993; amended 10.7.1996, in force 19.12.1997, does not add anything relevant to the indirect
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example o f accident information requirements is provided by the International Convention 
for the Prevention o f Pollution from Ships, the MARPOL Convention of 1973/78209 which 
relates to all forms o f marine pollution from operational wastes, but not from dumping*210 
Article 8 on reports about incidents involving harmful substances reads:
1. A report o f an incident shall be made without delay to the fullest extent possible 
in accordance with the provisions of Protocol I to the present Convention.
2. Each Party to the Convention shall:
(a) make all arrangements necessary for an appropriate officer or agency to receive 
and process all reports on incidents; and
(b) notify the Organization with complete details o f such arrangements for 
circulation to other Parties and Member States o f the Organization.
3. Whenever a Party receives a report under the provisions of the present Article, 
that Party shall relay the report without delay to:
(a) the Administration o f the ship involved; and
(b) any other State which may be affected.
The MARPOL Convention thus lays down the duty of the parties to the Convention to 
inform, not only other parties that may be affected, but any state that runs a risk o f being 
affected because o f the incident. Three specifications follow the duty to report incidents: 
that they be made without delay, to the fullest extent possible, and inaccordance with to 
Protocol I, which lays down the detailed provisions for the reporting mechanism of Article 
8. The initial duty to report belongs to the master of a ship, or in special circumstances, to 
the owner, charterer, manager, operator or his agent. The method of reporting must be by 
the fastest available means, with highest possible priority given to reports transmitted by 
radio. The initial report must be made to the officer or agency o f a state party as referred to
provisions o f the Brussels Convention. The Protocol refers to the binding character of Articles II to VIII of 
the Convention as applicable to substances other than oil.
209Intemational Convention for the Prevention o f Pollution from Ships, London, 2.11.1973; Protocol of 
1978 Relating to the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, London, 
17.2.1978, in force 2.10.1983; amended 7.9.1984, in force 7.1.1986; amended 5.12.1985, in force 
6.4.1987; amended Dec. 1987, in force 1.4.1989; amended March 1989, in force 13.10.1990; amended 
17.10.1989, in force 18.2.1991; amended March 1990, in force 3.2.2000; amended Nov. 1990, in force 
17.2.1992; amended 4.7.1991, in force 4.4.1993; amended 6 March 1992, in force 6.7.1993; amended 
13.11.1994, in force 3.3.1996; amended 14.9.1995, in force 1.7.1997; amended 10.7.1996, in force 
1.1.1998; amended 23.9.1997, in force 1.2.1999; 1997 Protocol adding new Annex VI on Regulations for 
the Prevention of Air Pollution from Ships, 26.9.1997, not in force. The 1978 Protocol incorporates the 
1973 Convention with some modifications; Between Parties the MARPOL Convention supersedes the 
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, London, 12.5.1954, in force 
26.7.1958, amended in 1962, 1969 and 1980; See also IMO: Provisions Concerning the Reporting o f  
Incidents Involving Harmful Substances under MARPOL, London, 1990, (516 90.08.E).
210 Further on the MARPOL Convention see Kwiatkowska, B, 1988, pp. 118 et seq; Drel, M.I., 1988, pp. 297 
et seq; Baur & Iudicello, 1990, pp. 84-88; Bimie, P. & A. Boyle, 1992, pp. 267-273; and see further for IMO
material at www.imo.org.
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in paragraph 2(a) o f Article 8. Whether this means any state party or the coastal state o r 
some other state is not entirely clear.211 This (unclear) state must then send the report on to 
the flag state and any other state likely to be affected.
The circumstances that call for a report are the discharge o f non-permitted substances, the 
discharge of permitted substances if safety or life is at stake, if  the ship has been damaged 
or if  there is discharge of a harmful substance from combating a pollution incident, or from  
scientific research. Also, the mere probability o f one of the above-mentioned discharges 
constitutes a threshold for reporting. Protocol I specifies the contents o f the report o f  a 
pollution incident, particularly on the chemical properties of the released harm ful 
substance.
Article V o f Protocol I further develops the established information mechanism by 
requiring that:
Any person who is obliged under the provisions o f this Protocol to send a report 
shall, when possible:
a) supplement the initial report, as necessary, with information concerning further 
developments, and
b) comply as fully as possible with requests from affected States for additional 
information concerning the incident.
According to this provision, affected states may also request additional information, thus 
providing for an information scheme, which, in theory, should satisfy even strong demands 
of efficiency.
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC)212 clearly establishes a state 
information duty, although the relevant provisions are technically general in content. 
Article 198 provides for notification o f imminent or actual damage:
When a  State becomes aware o f cases in which the marine environment is in 
imminent danger of being damaged or has been damaged by pollution, it shall 
immediately notify other States it deems likely to be affected by such damage, as 
well as the competent international organizations.
211 See Churchill, R.R. & A.V. Lowe, 1988, p. 263; Bimie, P. & A. Boyle, 1992, p. 288.
2,2United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC), Montego Bay 10.12.1982, in force 16.11.1994. 
See generally at www.imo.org.
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The duty to provide accident or emergency information here also has the time determinant 
"immediately" included. It is interesting to note that in the LOSC, as in several other marine 
pollution conventions, the state duty to provide accident information also applies vis-à-vis 
certain international organizations, here the International Maritime Organization (IMO). 
Successful co-operation, including information transmission, is also dependent on prior 
contingency planning by participating states. In the LOSC international organizations are 
also expressly mentioned as participants in the co-operation o f contingency planning 
(Article 199). Article 198 does not mention state territory or jurisdiction as a prerequisite 
for the information duty, but rather awareness of a situation.
In respect to information about pollution incidents from vessels, Article 211(7) o f the 
LOSC requires that:
The international rules and standards referred to in this article should include inter 
alia those relating to prompt notification to coastal States, whose coastline or related 
interests may be affected by incidents, including maritime casualties, which involve 
discharges or probability of discharges.
It is not entirely clear what those "international rules and standards" may be, but the above- 
mentioned MARPOL Protocol 1 is likely to offer the best example.213 Unfortunately, the 
merely hortatory wording of Article 211(7), together with the reference to prompt 
notification only to coastal states (rather than any states potentially affected), appears to 
weaken rather than strengthen the MARPOL provisions. However, it appears safe to 
conclude that the duty of states to provide accident information is well grounded in the 
LOSC.214
The 1990 Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-operation Convention (OPRC), 
which deals with pollution incidents caused by oil, provides for a comprehensive 
information scheme for such incidents, as does the 1996 Protocol on Hazardous and 
Noxious Liquid Substances (OPRC-HNS Protocol).215 Article 4 o f  the OPRC refers to the
213 See Bimie, P & A. Boyle, 1992, p. 288; On the test of "general acceptance", see further Kwiatkowska, B., 
1988, pp. 118-119.
214 See also Boyle, A., 1985, pp. 368-369; Kwiatkowska, B., 1988, p. 113.
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nearest coastal state as the recipient o f information. This may not always be sufficient, and 
the requirement is clearly weaker than its MARPOL equivalent which refers to "any other 
State that may be affected". However, when an incident is assessed to be severe enough it is 
justified to report about it directly to the IMO. The above treaties highlight the function o f  
individuals as the implemented of the accident information duty. The MARPOL and the 
OPRC lay duties on the flag states to require masters of ships, persons having charge over 
sea ports, oil handling facilities or offshore units, and pilots o f civil aircraft to inform o f  
pollution incidents.215 16 Future treaties could come to use the requirement o f criminalization 
of acts o f masters of ships as a tool towards making the accident information flow more 
reliable.217
The accident information duty is one of the central provisions of the 1983 Agreement for 
Co-operation in Dealing with Pollution of the North Sea by Oil and Other Harmful 
Substances.218 Also in this regional treaty the initial duty lies with the masters o f ships or 
pilots o f aircraft to provide their flag state with accident information. The North Sea area, 
which includes the English Channel, is divided into zones among the parties. When a 
pollution incident occurs in the zone o f a party, it is the responsibility o f that party to assess 
the situation and to inform other parties o f its findings. Under Article 6, the party must also 
report any action that it has taken to deal with the situation. The scheme has developed a 
relatively detailed pollution reporting form (POLREP) to be used between the parties in 
case o f  a pollution incident. In addition to this, there are agreements on a common
215 On the OPRC Convention and its background, see Doerffer, J.W., 1992, pp. 322-323; Protocol on 
Preparedness, Response and Co-operation to Pollution Incidents by Hazardous and Noxious Substances 
(OPRC-HNS Protocol), London, 15.3.2000, not in force; See 4 JMO News 1998, pp. 8-11 on background to 
the Protocol.
2)6 See Brown Weiss, E., 1989, p. 145 for the necessity to ensure that private operators implement safety 
measures. Cf. Seveso Directive: Council Directive of 24 June 1982 on the Major Accident Hazards of Certain 
Industrial Activités, 82/501/EEC. O.J. L230/25 (1982); Amendment 88/610/EEC; Amendment 91/692/EEC; 
Commission Proposal of 4 March 1994 for amendment (94/C 106/04), COM{94) 4 finaI-94/0014(SYN); 
amended Proposal of 19 June 1995, COM(95) 240 final - 94/0014 (SYN).
217 According to Bimie, P. & A. Boyle, 1992, p. 207, criminalization may entail an incentive to refrain from 
harmful conduct and the imposing of more stringent enforcement measures or penalties. For examples of 
other criminal penalties in some treaties dealt with here, see MARPOL Article 4(2), 4(4); LOSC Articles 
217(8), 230; and the 1989 Basel Convention, Article 4(3), 4(4); the 1991 Bamako Convention,, Article 9(2).
218 Agreement for Co-operation in Dealing with Pollution of the North Sea by Oil and Other Harmful 
Substances, Bonn, 13.9.1983, in force 1,9.1989. It supersedes the earlier Agreement for Co-operation in 
Dealing with Pollution of the North Sea by Oil, Bonn, 9.6.1969, in force 9.8.1969.
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command structure and radio communications procedures to be used in joint combating 
operations.
An agreement which is very similar in content to the North Sea Agreement was done by 
the Nordic states in 1971.219 20 The so-called Copenhagen Agreement, however, only covers 
pollution by oil and it does not establish zones o f responsibility. As the parties to the 
Copenhagen Agreement are all also parties to the North Sea Agreement or the Helsinki 
Convention to be discussed next, or to both, a great deal o f over-lapping has resulted in 
harmonization o f the systems. Thus the Copenhagen Agreement follows the same pollution 
reporting system (POLREP) as the North Sea Agreement.
In respect to accident information, the Baltic Sea Convention of 1992, just as its 
predecessor of 1974, is interesting, and somewhat confusing, in that it refers to the binding 
character o f the MARPOL Convention.221 2The duty to provide information is set out in 
Article 13, which provides, inter aiiay that accident information is to be given also when a 
contracting Party has sustained such pollution from the territory of a third state. Annex VII 
on response to pollution incidents is based on the same reliance on the MARPOL 73/78 as 
the 1974 Convention, also concerning dumping. The Annex provides for strengthened 
measures o f co-operation in surveillance and emergency response in the coastal areas and 
response areas of the contracting parties, using, i.a., remote sensing systems. In addition, 
Article 17 o f the 1992 Helsinki Convention deals with information to the public and Article 
18 mentions the criteria for protection of information, i.e., industrial and commercial 
secrecy, national security and the confidentiality o f personal data. Thus, the Helsinki
219 Edwards, D., 1988, p. 239.
220 Nordic Agreement Concerning Co-operation in Measures to Deal with Pollution of the Sea by Oil, 
Copenhagen, 16.9.1971, in force 16.10.1971.
221 Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area, Helsinki, 9.4 1992, in 
force 17.1.2000, has superseded the earlier Convention by the same name done at Helsinki 22.3 1974, in force 
3.5 1980. On the Conventions, see Koskenniemi, M., 1993; Ehlers, P., 1993; Fitzmaurice, 1998; see also 
Mickwitz, P., 1998; And see generally at www.helcom.fi.
222 Under Regulation 4 o f Annex VII the Parties to the Convention are to agree on response regions of the 
Baltic Sea in which they shall conduct surveillance activities and take response action. An equivalent system 
existed under the 1974 Helsinki Convention, Regulation 7 of Annex VI. These are, however, not exactly 
equivalent to the zoning of the North Sea into national areas o f responsibility, on which see Edwards, D., 
1988, p. 241.
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Convention clearly provides for a state duty to provide accident information.223 The 
reporting system is harmonized with the North Sea and Copenhagen Agreement POLREP.
The Regional Seas Programme224 (the Ocean and Coastal Affairs Programme) of the 
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) functions as an umbrella for the 
establishment o f marine environment protection conventions and Action Plans in various 
sea areas. Since the relative success encountered with the 1976 Mediterranean Convention, 
the Regional Seas Programme has expanded to cover several areas (in order o f adoption): 
the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden Region;225 the Kuwait Action Plan Region; the West and 
Central African Region;226 the Caribbean Region;227 the East Asian Seas Region;228 the
223 Cf. to the less elaborate Convention on the Protection o f the Black Sea Against Pollution, Bucharest, 
21.4.1992, in force 15.1.1994, One of its protocols does, however, provide for an accident notification duty: 
Article 6 and Annex of the Protocol on Cooperation in Combating Pollution of the Black Sea Marine 
Environment by Oil and Other Harmful Substances in Emergency Situations, Bucharest, 21.4.1992, in force 
15.1.1994. For an example of a Convention which makes no specific provisions for accident information see 
the Convention for the Protection o f the Marine Environment of the North East Atlantic, Paris, 22.9.1992, in 
force 25.3.1998; The Convention refers to reporting to the Commission only in relation to dumping incidents 
caused by force majeure, see Article 7 of Annex II; The 1992 Convention replaces the Convention for the 
Prevention of Marine Pollution from Land-Based Sources, Paris, 4.6.1974, in force 6.5.1978 and the 
Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping from Ships and Aircraft, Oslo, 15.2.1972, in 
force 7.4.1974; The 1974 Paris Convention deals with accident information merely by requiring Parties to 
minimize and eliminate the consequences o f pollution incidents and to "exchange information to that extent", 
Article 13; See further Articles 8 and 15 o f the 1972 Oslo Convention; And see Baur, D.C. & S. ludicello, 
1990, pp. 71-142.
224 For extensive documentation on the Regional Seas Programme, see under www.uneo.ch.
225 Convention for the Conservation o f the Marine Environment of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, Jeddah, 
14.2.1982, in force 20.8.1985. Protocol Concerning Regional Co-operation in Combating Marine Pollution by 
Oil and Other Harmful Substances in Cases o f Emergency, Jeddah, 14.2.1982, in force 20.8.1985; 
Implementation o f the Convention performed by the Programme of Environment for the Red Sea and the Gulf 
of Aden (PERSGA), Jeddah.
226 Convention for Co-operation in the Protection and Development o f the Marine and Coastal Environment 
of the West and Central African Region, Abidjan, 23.3.1981, in force 5.8.1984. Protocol Concerning Co­
operation in Combating Pollution in Cases o f Emergency, Abidjan, 23.3.1981, in force 5.8.1984; UNEP 
performs secretariat function.
227 Convention for the Protection and Development o f the Marine Environment of the Wider Caribbean 
Region, Cartagena de Indias, 24.3.1983, in force 11.10.1986. Protocol Concerning Co-operation in 
Combating Oil Spills in the Wider Caribbean Region, Cartagena de Indias, 24,3.1983, in force 11.10.1986; 
Protocol Concerning Specially Protected Areas and Wildlife to the Convention for the Protection and 
Development of the Marine Environment of the Wider Caribbean Area; UNEP performs secretariat function 
through the Caribbean Regional Coordination Unit, Kingston.
228 Action Plan for the Protection and Development of the Marine and Coastal Areas of the East Asian Seas 
Region, Bangkok, 29.4.1981; The Coordinating body on the Seas of East Asia (COBSEA) is an 
intergovernmental meeting guiding the work under the Action Plan. UNEP Regional Coordinating Unit, 
Bangkok, performs secretariat function.
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South-East Pacific Region;229 the South Pacific Region;230 the Eastern African Region;231 
the Black Sea;232 the North-West Pacific Region;233 the South Asian Seas Region;234 the 
South-West Atlantic Region;235 and the North-East Pacific Region236. The respective 
Conventions and Protocols all deal with marine pollution incidents, and notably in a very 
coherent fashion. One deviating factor concerns institutional measures: the Mediterranean, 
the Kuwait and the Red Sea Conventions establish regional emergency centres. Several of 
the Regional Seas Conventions establish the UNEP as the Organization functioning as
229 Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment and Coastal Areas of the South-East Pacific, 
Lima, 12.11.19S1, in force 19.5.1986. Agreement on Regional Co-operation in Combating Pollution of the 
South-East Pacific by Hydrocarbons and Other Harmful Substances in Cases of Emergency, Lima, 
12.11.1981, in force 14.7.1986. Supplementary Protocol to the Agreement on Regional Co-operation in 
Combating Pollution of the South-East Pacific by Hydrocarbons and Other Harmful Substances in Cases of 
Emergency, Quito, 22.7.1983, in force 20.5.1987; Protocol for the Protection of the South-East Pacific 
Against Pollution from Land-Based Activities; Protocol for the Conservation and Management of Protected 
Marine and Coastal Areas of the South-East Pacific, Paipa 21.9.1989; Protocol for the Protection of the 
South-East Pacific Against Radioactive Contamination, Paipa 21.9.1989, entry into force 23.1.1995; The 
Permanent Commission of the South Pacific (CPPS) performs implementation function. Secretariat is 
rotating.
230 Convention for the Protection of the Natural Resources and Environment of the South Pacific Region, 
Noumea, 24.11.1986, in force 18.8.1990. Protocol for the Prevention of Pollution of the South Pacific Region 
by Dumping, Noumea, 25.11.1986, in force 18.8.1990. Protocol Concerning Co-operation in Combating 
Pollution Emergencies in the South Pacific Region, Noumea, 25.11.1986, in force 18.8.1990; The South 
pacific Regional Environment Programme (SPREP) implements the Convention. A secretariat functions in 
Apia, Western Samoa.
2jl Convention for the Protection, Management and Development of the Marine and Coastal Environment of 
the Eastern African Region, Nairobi, 21.6.1985; Protocol Concerning Co-operation in Combating Marine 
Pollution in Cases o f Emergency in the Eastern African Region, Nairobi, 21.6.1985, not in force; Protocol 
Concerning Protected Areas and Wild Fauna and Flora in the Eastern African Region; UNEP functions as 
secretariat through the Regional Coordination Unit, Seychelles.
232 Convention on the Protection of the Black Sea Against Pollution, Bucharest, 21.4.1992, entry into force 
15.1.1994; Protocol on the Protection of the Black Sea Marine Environment Against Pollution from Land- 
based Sources, Bucharest, 21.4.1992, entry into force 15.1.1994; Protocol on Cooperation in Combating 
Pollution of the Black Sea Marine Environment by Oil and Other Harmful Substances in Emergency 
Situations, Bucharest, 21.4.1992, entry into force 15.1.1994; Protocol on the Protection of the Black Sea 
Marine Environment Against Pollution by Dumping, Bucharest, 21.4.1992, not in force. An independent 
secretariat, the Black Sea Environmental Programme, in Istanbul, has been established to implement the 
Convention.
233 Action Plan for the Protection, Management and Development of the Marine and Coastal Environment of 
the Northwest Pacific Region, 1994; UNEP functions as secretariat for the Action Plan.
234Action Plan for the Protection and Management of the Marine and Coastal Environment of the South Asian 
Seas Region, 1995; the South Asian Cooperative Environment Programme (SACEP) functions as the 
implementing organ for the Action Plan.
235Action plan being negotiated since 1980; UNEP provides initial secretarial services.
236 Action plan being negotiated since 1997.
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Secretariat and co-ordinating body for the purposes o f the respective Conventions.237 
Another common feature of the Regional Seas Conventions is their mention o f the accident 
information duty also with "competent international organizations" as addressees. Special 
reference is made to the IMO.238 This is a sign of the strengthening of the role in the last 
decades o f  international organizations in the process of emergency response as a whole. 
The Mediterranean and Kuwait regional Conventions shall here serve as examples o f  
UNEP Regional Seas Conventions.
The Barcelona Convention for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea Against 
Pollution239 deals with co-operation in reducing or eliminating damage from pollution 
emergencies, and it does so in a uniquely comprehensive manner.240 The Mediterranean 
Convention provides for a very clear duty of states to provide timely emergency 
information to other Parties. Article 9(2) states that:
Any Contracting Party which becomes aware o f any pollution emergency in the 
Mediterranean Sea area shall241 without delay notify the Organization242 and, either 
through the Organization or directly, any Contracting Party likely to be affected by  
such emergency, (emphasis added)
One o f the Protocols to the Mediterranean Convention concerns oil and other harmful 
substances.243 The Protocol shows unusual detail pertaining to co-operation in contingency 
planning and dissemination of information on preventive measures, both technical and 
institutional. The institutional measures are strengthened by Articles 6(2) and 10(2), which
237See the Mediterranean, West and Central African, Caribbean and Eastern African Conventions.
238 See, e.g., Article 9 of the Eastern African Convention.
239 Convention for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea Against Pollution, Barcelona, 16.2.1976, in force 
12.2.1978, amended 10.6.1995; On the Action Plan, see Skjaerseth, J.B., 1993.
240 No express mention of emergency information is included in the Agreement concerning the Protection o f 
the Waters o f the Mediterranean Shores, Monaco, 10.5.1976, in force 1.1.1981 (The Agreement pertains only 
to the coastal areas of France, Italy and Monaco) nor in the Protocol for the Protection of the Mediterranean 
Sea Against Pollution from Land-Based Sources, Athens, 17.5.1980, in force 17.6.1983, nor in the Protocol 
concerning Mediterranean Specially Protected Areas, Geneva, 3.4.1982, in force 23.3.1986.
241 The corresponding provision (Article 12(2)) of the West and Central African Convention reads should 
instead o f the present shall.
242 UNEP, Article 13h; through the Mediterranean Regional Coordination Unit (MEDU), Athens.
243 Protocol Concerning Co-operation in Combating Pollution of the Mediterranean Sea by Oil and Other 
Harmful Substances in Cases of Emergency, Barcelona, 16.2.1976, in force 12.2.1978.
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lay down the communication and co-ordination functions of the so-called "regional 
centre".244 The heart of the emergency information duty is found in Article 8, supplemented 
by Annex I. Article 8 reads, in part:
1. Each Party shall issue instructions to the masters of ships flying its flag and to the 
pilots o f aircraft registered in its territory requiring them to report by the most rapid 
and adequate channels in the circumstances, and in accordance with Annex I to this 
Protocol, either to a Party or to the regional centre:
a) All accidents causing or likely to cause pollution of the sea by oil or other 
harmful substances;
b) The presence, characteristics and extent of spillages...
2. The information collected in accordance with paragraph 1 shall be communicated 
to the other Parties likely to be affected by the pollution;
a) by the Party which has received the information, either directly or preferably, 
through the regional centre; or
b) by the regional centre
Thus, the first information duty is placed on the persons involved in traffic on or above the 
sea. The next information step goes from either a party or the regional centre onward to 
parties potentially affected. It is interesting to note that not only has a co-ordinating centre 
been established, but it is also given preference over states as the information relaying 
body. In Article 9, the duties of the parties is the starting point, rather than persons as in 
Article 8:
1. Any Party faced with a situation of the kind defined in article 1 of this Protocol 
shall:
a) Make the necessary assessments of the nature and extent of the casualty or 
emergency or, as the case may be, of the type and approximate quantity of oil 
or other harmful substances and the direction and speed of drift of the 
spillage;
b) Take every practicable measure to avoid or reduce the effects of pollution;
c) Immediately inform all other Parties, either directly or through the regional 
centre, of these assessments and of any action which it has taken or which it 
intends to take to combat the pollution;
d) Continue to observe the situation for as long as possible and report thereon 
in accordance with article 8.
In addition to this elaborate provision, Annex I in a detailed fashion lays down the required 
contents of a report of an incident under Article 8. Among the relevant facts to be reported 
are the source o f pollution, geographic position, time, date, wind and sea conditions, details
244 The Regional Oil Combating Centre for the Mediterranean, Malta.
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about the ship concerned, and in particular, the description of the harmful substances 
involved, their quantities and concentrations and name o f the consignor, consignee o r  
manufacturer. The Annex also requires the provision o f  supplementary information to a n y  
report given under Article 8, either on demand o f the receiver of the initial report o r a s  
considered relevant by the sender of the report. In conclusion, the M editerranean 
Convention and its Protocols make an information scheme that is about equal in detail to  
the MARPOL Convention and the Helsinki Convention.
The Kuwait Convention of 1978245 shows great resemblance to the Helsinki a n d  
Mediterranean Regional Conventions. It deals with all kinds of pollution o f  the sea. In its  
genre, however, the 1978 Protocol on oil pollution emergencies246 to the K uw ait 
Convention contains an unique feature, namely an article related to the restriction o f  
dissemination o f emergency or accident information. Article IX reads:
Any Contracting State which transmits information pursuant to this Protocol m a y  
specifically restrict its dissemination. In such a case, any Contracting State or th e  
Centre to whom this information has been transmitted shall not divulge it to an y  
other person, government, or to any public or private organization without th e  
specific authorization of the former Contracting State.
This provision is an interesting restriction of the otherwise seldom expressly circumscribed 
state duty to give accident information pertaining to marine pollution disasters.247
2.2.2. G eneral International Law
Almost two decade ago, one author concluded that the requirement o f states to notify each 
other o f the likelihood that they will be affected by pollution "probably already represents 
customary law".248 The vast body o f treaty obligations on accident information discussed
245 Kuwait Regional Convention for Co-operation on the Protection of the Marine Environment from 
Pollution, Kuwait, 24.4.1978, in force 1.7.1979; The Regional Organization for the Protection of the Marine 
Environment (ROPME) has been created to implement the Convention. Its secretariat is in Kuwait.
246 Protocol Concerning Regional Co-operation in Combating Pollution by Oil and Other Harmful Substances 
in Cases o f Emergency, Kuwait, 24.4.1978, in force 1.7.1979.
247 An equivalent provision is found under Article IX of the Red Sea Convention.
248 Boyle, A., 1985, p. 369.
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above lends serious support to the argument that the duty is established in general 
international law.249 This argument is probably strongest in relation to the law of the sea, 
especially given the general support of the customary character of the LOSC.250 For 
instance, the Preamble to the 1992 North East Atlantic Convention recalls the "relevant 
provisions o f customary international law reflected in Part XII of the United Nations Law 
of the Sea Convention."
The 1986 IAEA Notification Convention does not make any reference to the existence in 
general international law o f the state duty to provide accident information. This does not, 
however, necessarily indicate a denial of the existence of such a general duty.251 *In 1985, 
the IAEA developed Guidelines on Reportable Events, Integrated Planning and Information 
Exchange in a Transboundary Release of Radioactive Materials. In spite of the notorious 
disregard for the Guidelines that the Soviet Union showed at the time of the Chernobyl 
accident, the existence of the Guidelines, and subsequent new documents, must be seen as 
factors in the development of the information duty. And despite the potential escape 
provided by the confidential information clause, and the lack of objective thresholds, the 
global Notification Convention provided the single most convincing evidence after the 
Chernobyl accident that timely and adequate information is one prerequisite for the 
prevention o f nuclear contamination o f the environment.
249 See D'Amato, A., 1971, on the "generalizability” of norms. Rules that have been agreed upon in many 
treaties could be argued to be "generalizable", and to offer sufficient proof o f the sense of obligation of states, 
therefore adequately articulating the customary character of the rule. This could be criticized for the lack of 
weight given to consent. But see Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua case, 1CJ 
Reports (1986), paragraphs 174-184.
250 See e.g. Kiss, A.C, 1989, p. 58, 84.
231 In a statement by the Australian expert to the drafting work who, in regard to the lack of reference to the 
principles of good neighbourliness and good faith stated that "[p]our l'Australie, l’omission de toute référence 
spécifique à ces principes ou aux obligations de notification et de consultation qui en découlent en ce qui 
concerne les dommages transfrontières à l'environnement n'affaiblit en aucune façon lesdites obligations”, as 
cited in Kiss, A.C., 1986, p. 147.
2Î2 IAEA, Guidelines on Reportable Events, Integrated Planning and Information Exchange in a 
Transboundary Release of Radioactive Materials, January 1985. IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/310. The Guidelines 
deal comprehensively with the co-ordinated planning of emergency response (Article V), the criteria for and 
thresholds of information exchange in case of an actual emergency (Article III, Article IV), and the 
institutional arrangements in connection to both planning and response (Articles II, IV, V); See IAEA: 
Guidance on International Exchange o f Information and Data following a Major Nuclear Accident or 
Radiological Emergency, May 1992, STI/PUB/914; IAEA: A Model National Emergency Response Plan for 
Radiological Accidents, September 1993, IAEA-TECDOC-718
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The strong support of treaty practice in the protection o f the marine environment or nuclear 
law must, however, not be overused so as to blur the existence of a truly general duty to  
provide environmental accident information. The vast treaty body could also be an  
indication that more general rules are lacking. Therefore other sources must be examined, 
and plenty o f proof exists besides treaty law to further illuminate the position of the duty in  
international law.253
Firstly, actual state behaviour with regard to accident information is an important 
consideration when seeking to establish the customary character of the duty. Twenty years 
ago, on the question of how states de facto  have acted, a rapporteur to the ILA said th a t 
state practice "shows that information is not usually withheld".254 In connection to h is 
Comment to the Montreal Rules, he again contended that states are usually willing to  
supply information.255 256It is noteworthy that these comments on state practice were m ade 
before the Chernobyl and Sandoz accidents. Two decades later, the institutional measures 
mentioned above along with the wealth of reports and information that the organizations 
have either received from states or gathered themselves are overwhelming. Also, several 
serious accidents have occurred in the past two decades. By way of earlier examples the 
following can be cited in the area o f nuclear power: information was made available to the 
IAEA on the radiological accident at Goiana, Brazil in 1987; requests for medical or other 
advice advice in relation to radiological incidents in El Salvador in 1989, Vietnam in 1993, 
Estonia in 1994 and Costa Rica in 1996; information on radiological concerns at Vandellos, 
Spain in 1989 and Ust Kamenogorsk, USSR in 1990. All these cases imply that
253 See Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. Malta), Judgment, ICJ Reports (1985). paragraph 27: 
"It is of course axiomatic that the material of customary international law is to be looked for primarily in the 
actual practice and opinio juris of States, even though multilateral conventions may have an important role to 
play in recording and defining rules deriving from custom, or indeed in developing them". See also North Sea 
Continental Shelf case, ICJ Reports (1969), p. 3.
254 Rauschning, D., ILA, Report o f the 59th Conference (London, 1982), p. 545. The equivalent comment 
accompanied by examples of positive state practice of voluntary information exchange was made already in 
1978 at the Manila Conference. See ILA, Report o f the 58th Conference, held at Manila, 1978, pp. 406-407; 
See Churchill, R.R. & A.V. Lowe, 1988, p. 263.
255 Rauschning, Dietrich, ILA, Report o f  the Sixtieth Conference, held at Montreal, 1982, p. 173. See further 
Brunnee, J., 1988, p. 107 on early state practice in Europe.
256 The great public outcry and many official condemnations of Soviet failure to give prompt information 
after the Chernobyl accident support die duty to inform (as opposed to the failure itself indicating a new rule). 
On consistency in state practice, see Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua case, ICJ 
Reports (1986), para. 186.
information is not withheld.257 Also, the Russian authorities relayed early information on 
the incident at Sosnovyi Bor in 1992, and on the serious accident at a military nuclear 
complex near Tomsk in 1993.258 *The technical standard o f warning equipment has risen 
considerably in the last few years, giving further impetus to information without political 
considerations. In contrast to all positive evidence, the demise of the Kursk submarine in 
August 2000 cast some doubts on the willingness of Russian authorities to give prompt and 
full information about sensitive issues, which, although primarily military, could have had 
environmental consequences as well.
Secondly, international institutions for the purpose of “managing” environmental accidents 
offer another dimension o f state practice in support of the accident information duty. Many 
treaties establish their own organs for the communication and co-ordination o f accidents 
and subsequent emergency situations. Under some treaties, specific national authorities or 
reciprocal warning centres are to stay in direct touch with each other in the case of an 
accident.260 In some other cases, already existing international organizations, such as the 
IAEA, the IMO, the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), the United Nations Food 
and Agriculture Organization (FAO) or the World Health Organization (WHO) fulfil the 
same function. By way of example, the IAEA has established the International Nuclear 
Events Scale (INES) and a data-banlf for the collection o f information on radioactivity, and 
the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) o f the OECD keeps an Incident Reporting System
257 But contra Woodliffe, J., 1990, p. 133-134.
258 UNEP: Improvement o f the International Response to Environmental Emergencies, 21.2.1995, 
UNEP/GC.18/2, pp. 4-5; see also IAEA: The Radiological Accident in Goiana, September 1988, 
STI/PUB/815 and IAEA: The Radiological Accident in San Salvador, May 1990, STI/PUB/847; There was 
also conflicting evidence on the flow of information after the incident at Sosnovyi Bory Hufvudstadsbladet, 
25.3.1992, p. 3; In relation to the major accident at Tomsk, 1993 (widespread contamination after accident at 
plutonium extraction facility), see further at http://iaea.or.at/worldatom/publications/98Dubs/nrsar98.html. On 
smaller accidents see, e.g. Lessons Learned from Accidents in Industrial Irradiation Facilities, IAEA, 
STI/PUB/1015, 1996; Lessons Learnedfrom Accidents in Industrial Radiography, Safety Reports Series No. 
7, IAEA, STI/PUB/1058,1998; and for reports on radiological accidents at Nezvizh, 1991 (death due to fault- 
clearance at sterilisation facility); Hanoi, 1992 (personal injury at electron accelerator facility); Tammiku, 
1994 (theft of radioactive waste resulting in death and injury); San José, 1996 (overexposure of radiotherapy 
patients resulting in death and injury); Contra, on the other hand, there does not seem to be public 
information readily available on examples o f failures to notify of smaller accidents.
239 See e.g. The Economist, 26.8.-1.9.2000, pp. 11 and Time, 28.8.2000, pp. 10-17.
260 An example is provided by the Exchange of Notes between the Government of the United Kingdom and 
the Government of the French Republic Concerning Exchanges of Information in the Event of Emergencies 
Occurring in One of the Two States Which Could Have Radiological Consequences for the Other State, 
18.7.1983.
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which includes the examination o f the root causes of nuclear reactor failures. The IAEA 
Emergency Response Centre (ERC) functions to receive, verify and further disseminate 
information on a 24-hour basis.261 62 The European Commission’ Major Accident Hazards 
Bureau (MAHB) and the Member States’ Major Accident Reporting System (MARS) a re  
important regional efforts at gathering crucial information about industrial accidents (under 
the Seveso II Directive).263
Perhaps the most noteworthy example of an institutional measure outside o f a specific 
treaty is the Joint UNEP/United Nations Office for the Coordination o f  Humanitarian 
Affairs (OCHA; formerly United Nations Department for Humanitarian Affairs, DHA) 
Environment Unit in Geneva. After an initial experimental phase of co-operation under the 
name o f the United Nations Centre for Urgent Environmental Assistance (UNCUEA), the  
Joint Unit was established in 1994 on the basis that many types o f accidents were no t 
covered by other arrangements and it was realised that there was a great need for integrated 
multi-hazard, multi-agency disaster management existed. Its main task is to facilitate the 
provision o f  technical advice and urgent assistance in technological accidents. This includes 
brokerage and information clearing-house functions, and several other coordinating 
functions are under development since a Strategic Framework on Emergency Prevention, 
Preparedness, Assessment, Response and Mitigation was prepared by UNEP in the year 
2000.264 The strategy addresses environmental law and clean production and coordination 
between the Joint Unit and the APELL (“Awareness and Preparedness at the Local Level”) 
Programme for disaster prevention, the Global Resource Information Database (GRID), and 
the UNEP/Habitat Task Force on the Balkans on issues related to prevention and 
preparedness, assessment and early warning, and response and mitigation. Apart from this,
261 Reyners, P. & E. Lellouche, 1988, pp. 11-14.
262 For the development of the system, see Asculai, E. & H.E. Collins, 1988, pp. 22-26; and Response to 
Nuclear Accidents at the International Level, paper by Bernard H. Weiss, Co-ordinator, Emergency 
Assistance Services, Division of Nuclear Safety, IAEA, Vienna, 1994; and Report o f the First Meeting o f the 
Competent Authorities..., IAEA, Vienna, 18-22.6 2001.
2Sj See further at http://mahbsrv.irc.it.
264 See Advisory Group on Environmental Emergencies, First Meeting: Report on the Joint UNEP/DHA 
Environment Unit, 16.12.1994, EU/AG/2; and see Executive Director Report to UNEP Committee of 
Permanent Representatives: Enhancement o f  the International Response Capacity with Regard to 
Environmental Emergencies, 23.5.1994, UNEP/CPR.45/7; see also Governing Council of the UNEP: 
Improvement o f  the International Response to Environmental Emergencies, 21.2.1995, UNEP/GC.18/2; And 
Governing Council of the UNEP: Further Improvement o f Environmental Emergency Prevention, 
Preparedness, Assessment, Response and Mitigation, 15.12.2000, UNEP/GC.21/3/Add.l.
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UNEP also provides for valuable monitoring activities and co-operation with many 
governmental and non-governmental organizations, and, more specifically, with different 
satellite monitoring systems.265 2678As envisaged in relation to the UNEP’s role in its new 
strategy, closer coordination between the large numbers of organizations involved may be 
needed to ameliorate the present situation, which, although generally well developed in the 
West, is especially weak with regard to the global commons and also in many developing 
countries. It is imperative that all the institutions concerned have clear command structures 
and their personnel sufficient training. As “easy” as accident reporting may seem from a 
Western perspective, far from all countries yet have response capacity. Assistance, both 
technical and financial, remains a prerequisite for effective hazard preparedness in many 
developing states.
Thirdly, the ICJ rendered in 1949 a judgment that was seminal for the development of inter- 
state information as an issue of international law. In the Corfu Channel case between the 
United Kingdom and Albania, the ICJ concluded that when a state is aware of a hazard that 
may have harmful effects for other states and does not inform the potentially affected states, 
it becomes internationally responsible for its failure to warn. The factual situation of the 
case was centred on submarine mines in Albanian waters, and the loss o f human lives and 
damage that had been caused to British warships because of those mines, le ., not 
environmental harm as such, although such has later been argued to be included.
Fourthly, together with the Corfu Channel case, the first development of note outside treaty 
law came about through the uncontested adoption in 1972 by the United Nations General 
Assembly of a Resolution on co-operation between states in the field of the environment.
265 Especially the Global Environmental Monitoring System (GEMS), the International Register o f Potentially 
Toxic Chemicals (IRPTC), the Infoterra Programme. On the background o f these and APELL, see Gosovic, 
B., 1992 and see farther under http://www.unep.org.
266 ICJ Reports, 1949, p. 22: "...it is every State's obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for 
acts contrary to the rights of other States".
267 See, e.g., Lammers, 1984, pp. 525-526. Despite the Lake Lanoux arbitration, 12 RIAA, 1957, pp. 315-316, 
being based on the interpretation o f a bilateral treaty between France and Spain it strengthens the rule of the 
ICJ in the Corfu Channel case. According to the arbitration, which dealt with the use of water by the 
upstream party of a shared watercourse, and which barely touched upon environmental concerns, a state is 
obliged to reconcile its own interests with those of neighbouring states.
268 Bimie, P. & A. Boyle, 2002, p. 136.
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The background to the Resolution is to be found in the Stockholm Conference on th e  
Human Environment and its subsequent Declaration on the Human Environment the sam e 
year. At a preliminary stage, the Stockholm Declaration contained a draft Principle on th e  
duty to inform - the so-called draft Principle 20 -  which was, in its turn, a watered-down 
successor o f  an earlier provision on the duty to consult. The duty to consult was considered 
too broad in scope, and therefore it was suggested that "only" a duty to inform be included. 
The proposed Principle 20 read:
Relevant information must be supplied by States on activities or developments 
within their jurisdiction or under their control whenever they believe, or have reason 
to believe, that such information is needed to avoid the risk o f significant adverse 
effects on the environment in areas beyond their national jurisdiction.269 70
Due to the disagreement surrounding the duty to consult and a further proposal271 to  
circumscribe the duty to inform by the inclusion of exceptions for national security, 
economic development and national efforts to improve the environment, Principle 20 w as 
never adopted by the Conference on the Human Environment.272 Consequently, the 
information duty was reconsidered at the General Assembly in the autumn of 1972, 
resulting in the above-mentioned Resolution on co-operation between states in the field o f  
the environment. ~
The 1972 Resolution refers to Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration. According to the 
Resolution, the effective achievement of the aims of Principle 21 rests on the provision o f  
"official and public knowledge" of the technical data relating to the work to be carried out 
by the acting state. Thus, the text o f the Resolution left much to be desired as regards 
clarity, and furthermore implied that only "prior" information is meant in this context. The 
information is, further, to be given and received in the "best spirit of co-operation and good
269 Co-operation Between States in the Field of the Environment, United Nations General Assembly 
Resolution, 15.12 1972,2995 (XXVII)(1972). Vote: 115 for, none against, 10 abstentions.
270 U.N. Doc.A/CONF.48/4, Annex, paragraph 20, p. 4 (1972), as quoted in Partan, D.G., 1990, p. 133.
271 By Brazil, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14 (1972), p. 119.
272 The proposal by Brazil was a reaction to a dispute between Brazil and Argentina on the Brazilian plan to 
construct a hydroelectric plant drawing water from a river which enters Argentina downstream. Argentina 
supported both the duty to consult and the unrestricted duty to inform. The dispute played a decisive role for 
the omission of draft Principle 20. See further Kiss, A.C. 1976, pp. 30-31; Partan,, D.G. 1990, pp. 133-134. 
See also Brunnee, J., 1988, p. 106.
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neighbourliness" so as not to constitute a means o f impeding or delaying the planned 
utilization of a particular natural resource.
In 1973, the General Assembly adopted a Resolution on the harmonious exploitation of 
natural resources common to two or more states.273 In Article 2, the Resolution very clearly 
sets out that "co-operation between countries sharing such natural resources and interested 
in their exploitation must be developed on the basis o f a system of information and prior 
consultation". Thus, it functions as a clarification o f the 1972 Resolution.274 The 1973 
Resolution was weakened by a notable lack of consensus.275 Still, the General Assembly 
Resolutions provide some evidence in favour o f the information duty. With the great 
majority o f states being members of the United Nations, its resolutions offer a valuable 
indication o f the opinio juris  o f states.276
Subsequent elaborations by other United Nations organs strengthen the assumption that 
states are willing to consider themselves bound by a duty to inform with regard to 
accidents. Most notably, the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer 
Space, after its 15-year work to reach consensus, in 1986 submitted its draft Principles on 
Remote Sensing.277 Principle X expressly provides that states "that have identified 
information in their possession that is capable of averting any phenomenon harmful to the 
Earth's natural environment shall disclose such information to states concerned". Principle 
X is particularly interesting as a statement embracing the idea that any and all states must 
inform of environmental harm. The basis for the duty does not depend on the state having a 
connection to the origin o f the harm, but on the mere knowledge of such harm. By referring
273 Co-operation in the Field o f the Environment Concerning Natural Resources Shared by Two or More 
States, United Nations General Assembly Resolution, 13.12.1973,3129(XXVII1)(1973).
274 A similar wording is found in Article 3 of the 1974 Charter o f Economic Rights and Duties of States, 
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3281 (XXIX) (1974): "In the exploitation of natural resources 
shared by two or more countries, each State must co-operate on the basis o f a system o f information and prior 
consultations”.
275 77 states voted for it, 43 abstained, 10 were absent, and Bolivia, Brazil, Nicaragua, Paraguay and Portugal 
voted against the Resolution. Despite the voting record of the 1973 Resolution, Partan argues that the two 
General Assembly Resolutions and the Stockholm Conference together "lend[] at least modest support to the 
existence of a duty to inform of transboundary risks in international environmental law", 1990, p. 138.
276 See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua case, ICJ Reports ( 1986), para. 188.
277 Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space: Draft Principles on Remote Sensing, 13.6.1986, GAOR
A/41/20; 25 International Legal Materials 1334 (1986).
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to the Earth rather than to individual states the Principles also take a rather n a tu re -cen tred  
approach. Under Principle XI, states shall also inform on natural disasters "as prom ptly a s  
possible".
The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 1974 g av e  a  
Recommendation on Principles o f  Transfrontier Pollution in which it states that "[c ]oun tries  
should promptly warn other potentially affected countries o f any situation which may c a u s e  
any sudden increase in the level of pollution in areas outside the country o f origin of* 
pollution".278 279It is not entirely clear whether the duty lies on the polluting state or on a n y  
state. Another, less clear, reference is found in the 1977 OECD Council Recom m endation 
concerning access to national courts and administrative agencies in cases o f  transfrontier 
pollution. The wording o f the paragraphs in these Recommendations is not expressed in  
peremptory language, but it is nevertheless significant, foremost, as a reiteration o f th e  
General Assembly resolutions, and, also, because of the temporal separation o f inform ation 
into pre and post-accident information.
In some contrast to the OECD Recommendations, the UNEP "Draft Principles of Conduct" 
express the duty to inform in clearer terms.280
3. States concerned should co-operate, in particular by means o f agreed contingency
plans, when appropriate, and mutual assistance, in order to avert grave situations,
278 OECD Council Recommendation on Principles concerning Transfrontier Pollution, 14.11.1974. 
C(74)224(1974). See Title F, Article 9; and Title E for prior information.
279 OECD Council Recommendation for the Implementation of a Regime of Equal Right o f Access and Non­
discrimination in Relation to Transfrontier Pollution, 17.5 1977. C(77)28(FinaI). See Paragraph 8(a).
280 UNEP Governing Council Decision on Draft Principles o f Conduct in the Field of the Environment for the 
Guidance o f States in the Conservation and Harmonious Utilization o f  Natural Resources Shared by Two or 
More States, 6/14(1978), 33 GAOR, Supp. 25, Annex I (A/33/25X1978). The Draft Principles were adopted 
by the General Assembly in its Resolution on Co-operation in the Field of the Environment Concerning 
Natural Resources Shared by Two or More States, 34/186(1979). Draft Principle 9:
1. States have a duty urgently to inform other States which may be affected:
(a) O f any emergency situation arising from the utilization of a shared natural resource which 
might cause sudden harmful effects on their environment;
(b) O f any sudden grave natural events related to a shared natural resource which may affect 
die environment o f such States.
2. States should also, when appropriate, inform the competent international organizations of 
any such situation or event.
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and to eliminate, reduce or correct, as far as possible, the effects o f such situations 
or events.
The text deals both with prior and post-accident information. An Explanatory Note to the 
Draft Principles does, however, reveal that the drafters did not "seek to prejudice whether 
or to what extent the conduct envisaged in the principles is already prescribed by existing 
rules of general international law".281 28This weakens the impact of the Draft Principles as a 
means o f establishing the existence of a customary duty to inform.
In 1982, the International Law Association (ILA) adopted its Rules of International Law 
Applicable to Transfrontier Pollution,283 284which deal expressly both with prevention and 
emergency information. The aim o f the so-called Montreal Rules is "to set out the rules o f 
customary international law with regard to transfrontier pollution", that is, to express lex 
lata. The ILA, in its Report on the Montreal Conference, includes references to previous
state practice: multilateral and bilateral agreements and practical cases in which states have 
voluntarily provided neighbouring states with information on planned potentially polluting 
installations.285 The Report does not, however, cite any proof of the opinio juris  of states 
vis-à-vis these practical cases mentioned. Reference is also made to the resolutions of 
international organizations: the above-discussed Stockholm Declaration and General 
Assembly Resolutions, the UNEP Draft Principles of Conduct, and the OECD 
Recommendation o f 1977 concerning equal right of access and non-discrimination.
In 1982 in Montreal and in 1984 in Paris, the ILA adopted, respectively, the Rules on 
Water Pollution in an International Drainage Basin286 and the Draft Articles on Long-
281 Explanatory Note, 17 International Legal Materials, p. 1098.
282 See, e.g., Lammers, J.G., 1984, p. 336.
283 ILA, Report o f  the Sixtieth Conference, held at Montreal, 1982 (London, 1983). The emphasis in the 
Montreal Rules shifted to pollution, shared natural resources and their equitable utilization having already 
appeared in the 1966 Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers, ILA, Report o f the 
Fifty-Second Conference, held at Helsinki, 1966 (London, 1967). The Helsinki Rules do not mention the duty 
to inform of transboundary environmental pollution, but refer generally to the prevention of new forms of 
pollution and the abatement of existing water pollution, which might cause substantial injury in a co-basin 
state (Article X).
284 As referred to by Sands, P., p. 1988, p. 179; See also Smith, B.D., 1988, p. 81, n. 78.
285 ILA, Report o f the Sixtieth Conference, held at Montreal, 1982, p. 172.
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Distance Air Pollution.286 87 289These both refer to the argumentation made in connection to th e  
Montreal Rules. Thus, many weaknesses in the Montreal Rules were transmitted to its 
successors. The Comment to the Montreal Water Pollution Rules recognizes that th e  
Stockholm Conference did not advance the duty to inform, but that the character o f the  
General Assembly Resolutions and the UNEP Draft is mandatory. The Paris Draft A ir 
Pollution Articles refer to the 1979 ECE Convention on Long-Range Transboundary A ir 
Pollution, which does not deal expressly with accident situations.
Yet another attempt to support the customary character of the duty to provide 
transboundary environmental information has been made by the Experts Group on 
Environmental Law of the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED, 
the Brundtland Commission). In 1987, the Experts Group submitted its Report on 
Environmental Protection and Sustainable Development, including a Comment on the 
current state o f environmental law.290 In Article 15, the Experts Group mentions a duty that 
"may be regarded as an established principle of environmental law"291;
States shall provide the other States concerned ... with all relevant and reasonably 
available da ta ... concerning a transboundary environmental interference.
286 ILA, Report o f  the Sixtieth Conference, held at Montreal, 1982, pp. 531-548. Cited as the Montreal Water 
Pollution Rules. Article 5 states that ... ”[b]asin states shall: ...(c) promptly inform states that might be 
affected, of any sudden change of circumstances that may cause or increase water pollution in the territories 
of those other states" (emphasis added).
287 ILA, Report o f  the Sixty-First Conference, held at Paris, 1984, pp. 377-413. Cited as the Paris Draft Air 
Pollution Articles. Article 5 merely requires states to regularly provide the other states concerned with all 
relevant and reasonably available data on long-distance transfrontier air pollution.
288 ILA Water Pollution Rules, Comment, pp. 540-541; ILA Paris Draft Air Pollution Articles, pp. 402-404.
289 See generally, Fraenkel, A., 1989, pp. 447-476.
290 WCED, Experts Group on Environmental Law, Environmental Protection and Sustainable Development, 
1987 (cited as Experts Group Report). Article 6 requires that "[SJtates shall inform all persons in a timely 
manner o f activities which may significantly affect their use o f a natural resource or their environment". It 
does not seem to refer to transboundary pollution. The Experts Group mentions that the principle is a "fairly 
novel one", p. 63; The follow-up process to the initial Experts Group Report has included, i.a., the adoption of 
the Bergen Ministerial Declaration on Sustainable Development in the ECE Region, 16.5.1990. The 
Declaration does not expressly refer to a state duty to inform, but it elaborates upon the theme o f Awareness 
Raising and Public Participation (Article 16(a-j)), where it mentions as its objective "to stimulate national 
and international exchanges of environmental information..." (Article 16(c)). One of the many outcomes of 
the entire follow-up process were the ECE Principles and Guidelines on Rights and Obligations Related to the 
Environment which were to be dealt with at the Rio Conference o f the UNCED in June 1992.
291 Experts Group Report, p. 95.
It is difficult to discern precisely to what kind o f  information this provision might refer, 
but, on the grounds that the Experts Group Report in Article 16 more specifically deals with 
prior information of planned undertakings, it probably refers to accident information. The 
threshold may, however, be low, as the wording an “interference” is not necessarily very 
severe. In support of the article, the Comment mentions multilateral treaties on international 
watercourses and resolutions o f international organizations on shared natural resources. 
Among the latter is, for example, Article 3 o f the Charter o f Economic Rights and Duties of 
States. A welcome feature is that the information duty appears to apply on all states, as 
opposed to only those from whose territory or control environmental harm may originate.
In addition, a group o f experts o f the Institut de Droit International (IDI) prepared in 1987 
a Resolution on Transboundary Air Pollution.29 93 It was adopted only shortly after the 
Chernobyl accident, and therefore reflects some o f  the problems that had become 
particularly topical at that time.294 The IDI Resolution goes beyond the above-mentioned 
ILA Montreal Rules in scope as it also expressly applies to dangerous materials (Article 
3(2)), acid rain (Article 12), the ozone layer (Article 11) and nuclear pollution (Article 10). 
The Resolution refers to natural as well as human-made pollution o f the air. Article 9 
makes a detailed account o f the kinds of preventive information that states shall exchange 
in order to carry out their duty to co-operate: regular information about air pollution in their 
territories, notification of activities envisaged with potential transfrontier pollution threats 
and consultations on actual or potential pollution problems. In respect to emergency 
response, Article 9 lays down that:
[i]n the event of an accident or activities causing a sudden increase in the level of air 
pollution, even due to natural causes, which is capable of causing substantial harm 
in another State, the State o f origin is under a duty:
(a) promptly to warn all affected or potentially affected States;
(b) to take all appropriate steps to reduce the effects of any such increase.
292 Charter of Economic Rights and Duties o f States, United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3281 
(XXIX) (1974). 29 GAOR, Supp. 31.
293 IDI, Resolution on Transboundary Air Pollution, 20.9.19S7. Cairo Session of the Institut de Droit 
International, 1987. 62 Annuaire IDI 1987, II.
294 See comment in Sands, P., 1988, p. 274.
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[i]n the event o f a disaster involving air pollution in the territory o f a State, o th e r  
States and competent international organizations should, as a matter o f urgency a n d  
with the consent o f the State concerned, undertake humanitarian action to assist th e  
victims, (emphasis added)
It seems evident from the text that the duty to inform with respect to transfrontier 
environmental pollution is meant to include many aspects, followed by the understanding 
that this prompt information must be accompanied by immediate assistance o f  a  
humanitarian character. The strength o f the text must, however, be found in the context o f  
the purpose set out by its drafters: to point out international law de lege ferenda?95 A sense  
o f obligation, opinio juris , on the part of states must be demonstrated in order to take a  
conventional duty beyond the pacta sunt servanda principle and to make softer 
pronouncements into hard obligations. A strong argument is made by Partan who, referring 
to the work o f the ILA, writes that it could be accorded "the same latitude o f opinio ju r is  as  
is accorded to governments”. On the weight of declarations and decisions by various 
international conferences and even NGOs, Handl writes that they "amount to authoritative 
expositions of the state o f the law, or, in any event, given the peculiarities o f the 
international law-making process, are highly significant in that they tend to reflect an  
emerging international consensus in respect of the provisions incorporated".295 697 Thus, texts 
also expressly referring to the legal situation de lege ferenda  are noteworthy, because they 
amount to repeated expressions o f the direction that the law is taking. The work o f the 
various international groups of experts might well be understood to provide valuable 
additional evidence in confirmation o f state intention.298
295 The Rapporteur Mr. do Nascimento e Silva expressed very clearly to the so-called 20th Commission of the 
IDI (whose task it was to prepare the text) that the aim o f the Resolution was 62 Annuaire IDI 1987, II, p.
250.
296Partan, D.G., 1990, pp. 160-16T, It would also be possible to argue just the opposite: that the works of the 
ILA, the ILC, and the WCED Experts Group Report fall short in their attempts to show the requisite 
willingness o f states to be bound beyond their treaty obligations by a general duty to inform, ibid, pp. 151- 
153. Such an argument would be overly cautious, however.
297Handl, G., 1978, p. 59.
298According to Akehurst ”[t]he practice of States needs to be accompanied b y ... statements that something is 
already law before it can become law; practice does not need to be accompanied by a genuine belief that it is 
already law”; Akehurst, M.B., 1974-75, p. 37. The ILA assertion that it wishes to express lex lata could, in 
such a view, provide for a ’’statement" in support of customary law.
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Finally, as a kind o f continuation of its work on state responsibility, the International Law 
Commission (ILC) in 1978 initiated a study on "International Liability for Injurious 
Consequences Arising Out o f  Acts Not Prohibited by International Law". Twenty-four 
years later, in 2001, the Commission finally adopted a preamble and 19 draft articles, with 
commentaries, on “Prevention o f Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities”,299 but 
excluding the initial topic on liability, the work on which was deferred in favour o f 
finishing first the prevention part o f the undertaking. This process, beginning with a 
Schematic Outline in 1982 by the first Special Rapporteur, Mr. Robert Quentin Quentin- 
Baxter,300 has been very eventful as to the development of provisions on environmental 
information, both risk-information before or during an activity, accident information, and 
information to the public. Initially, in the Schematic Outline, the duty to inform was treated 
as a procedural rule, as one o f the four so-called compound primary obligations: prevention, 
information, negotiation and reparation. There was no direct indication o f the time-frame 
(e.g. before, during or after an activity), or what types o f environmental information wras 
intended. The second Special Rapporteur, Mr. Julio Barboza, based the information duty on 
the three notions of assessment, notification and information,301 essentially relating to
299 Report of the International Law Commission, Fifty-third session, 23 April-1 June and 2 July-10 August,
2001, GAOR, Fifty-sixth, Suppl. No 10, A/56/I0, ch. V, pp. 366- 436, at
http://www.un.org/law/ilc/reports/2001 /2001 report.htm.
300 ILC, Special Rapporteur Robert Q. Quentin-Baxter: Third Report on international Liability fo r  Injurious 
Consequences Arising Out o f Acts Not Prohibited by International Law, 1982, A/CN.4/360 (cited as Quentin- 
Baxter.Third Report). The Schematic Outline was altered and resubmitted in 1984 as an Annex to ILC, 
Quentin-Baxter: Fourth Report. Although very sparsely discussed by writers, the Schematic Outline 
contained some important considerations on the duty to inform of environmental risks. In Section 2, Article 1, 
the Schematic Outline recognized that
(w]hen an activity taking place within its territory or control gives or may give rise to loss or injury' 
to persons or things within the territory or control of another State, the acting State has a duty to 
provide the affected State with all relevant and available information, including a specific indication 
of the kinds and degrees of loss or injury that it considers foreseeable, and the remedial measures it 
proposes.
The wording of the article seems to indicate any environmental information regardless of timeframe. 
According to Section 2, Article 3, the source state is entitled to withhold information on the grounds of 
national or industrial security. The affected state must in such cases be informed that information is being 
withheld, and it must also be given a clear indication of the kinds and degrees of loss or injury that it is being 
or may be subjected to.
301 ILC, Barboza: Sixth Report, Article 11: "notification" was used to convey an initial warning of risk, 
whereas "information" referred to further technical data. Presumably, the text includes the understanding that 
polluting activity that has already started is also to be communicated:
[i]f a State has reason to believe that an activity referred to in article 1 is being, or is about to be, 
carried out under its jurisdiction or control, it shall review that activity to assess its potential
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planned302 *or ongoing activities, leaving it unclear whether accident situations were r e a l l y  
covered. The Commission adopted in 1994 a set o f  Articles on prevention re la ting  t o  
ongoing activities. Article 14 on measures to prevent or minimize risk (a due d il ig e n c e  
standard) was adopted on the understanding that any future article defining p re v e n tio n  
would indicate whether the provision would also relate to measures taken after t h e  
occurrence o f an accident to prevent or minimize the harm caused. However, Article B  o n  
prevention, adopted by the ILC in 1995, did not indicate whether prevention related o n ly  t o  
measures aiming at avoiding accidents, or also to the minimization o f harm after a n  
accident has occurred.304 In contrast, Article D on co-operation provided that if  harm  h a s  
taken place states shall co-operate in minimizing the effects. In 1996, an ILC W o rk in g  
Group on liability included Article 13 on notification and information relating to p la n n e d  
activities which pose a risk o f causing significant transboundary harm. The text does n o t  
mention accidents, but, confusingly, the Commentary connects it to environm ental 
“emergencies”.305
transboundary effects and, if  it finds that the activity may cause, or create the risk of causing, 
transboundary harm, it shall notify the State or States likely to be affected as soon as possible, 
providing them with available technical information in support of its finding. It may also inform  
them o f the measures which it is attempting to take to prevent or minimize risk o f transboundary 
harm.
302 The Eighth Report by Special Rapporteur Barboza appears to narrow the scope of the information duty to  
prior information only, see ILC, Special Rapporteur Julio Barboza: Eighth Report on International Liability  
fo r  Injurious Consequences Arising Out o f Acts Not Prohibited by International Law, 1992, Articles 1 and 2. 
A/CN.4/443 (cited as Barboza: Eighth Report). In the Report, Article 1 on preventive measures lays dow n 
that an assessment of potential transboundary harm shall be made by a state before it authorizes a particular 
activity. Notification and information about the findings o f such an assessment are then to be conveyed, under 
Article 2.
J°3 Report o f  the International Law Commission on the Work o f its Forty-sixth Session, G AOR A/49/10, pp. 
367-437, esp. p. 422: In addition to the duty to notify planned activities, the Commission adopted Article 14, 
which generically provided that:
[w]hile the activity is being carried out, the States concerned shall exchange in a timely manner all 
information relevant to minimizing any risk o f causing significant transboundary harm.
According to the commentary to this article, it was meant to include steps taken after an activity had been 
undertaken, as well as "whatever would be useful, in the particular instance, for the purpose o f prevention o f 
risk o f significant harm". The article included monitoring the implementation of an activity, as well as any 
other form of information exchange, including reporting through international organizations. The requirement 
o f a "timely manner" implies that accident information may also have been covered. The commentary says 
that "when the State becomes aware of such information, it should inform the other States quickly so that 
there will be enough time for the States concerned to consult on appropriate preventive measures or the States 
likely to be affected will have sufficient time to take proper actions".
304 In 1995 the ILC adopted four articles relating to general principles: A (Freedom of action and the limits 
thereto); B (Prevention); C (Liability and reparation); D (co-operation), Report o f  the International Law 
Commission on the Work o f its Forty-seventh Session, GAOR A/50/10, see p. 211.
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o a f lU H U M A A A i
More recently, the issue o f prevention has been substantively developed under the guidance 
of Mr. P.S. Rao, the Special Rapporteur for the prevention part of the liability topic. Mr. 
Rao has maintained a distinction between procedural and substantive principles of 
prevention. The 1998 session o f the ILC on first reading adopted draft articles on 
prevention o f transboundary damage for hazardous activities. Among these are, with some 
change of wording, the two articles bearing on information and notification, first adopted in 
1996, and including the same lack of clarity. The Commentary still said that “the principle 
of notification is well established in the case o f environmental emergencies”, and there was 
no other indication that the Article meant to function before the authorization o f an activity 
(Article 10 on notification and information) would include accidents or emergencies of any 
kmd. The article relating to on-going activities (Article 14) came with the same lack of 
clarity.305 6708 The commentary stated that “ [preventing, and minimizing the risk of, 
transboundary harm based on the concept of due diligence are not a once-and-for-all effort; 
they require continuous efforts. This means that due diligence is not terminated after 
granting authorization for the activity and undertaking the activity; it continues in respect of
305 Report o f  the International Law Commission on the work o f  its forty-eighth session, 6 May-26 July 
1996, A/51/10, p. 300, Article 13;
1. If the assessment referred to in article 10 indicates a risk of causing significant transboundary 
harm, the State of origin shall notify without delay the States likely to be affected and shall transmit 
to them the available technical and other relevant information on which the assessment is based and 
an indication of a reasonable time within which a response is required.
2. Where it subsequently comes to the knowledge of the State of origin that there are other States 
likely to be affected, it shall notify them without delay.
Paragraph 2 indicates that if the State of origin, prior to authorizing a certain activity, is unaware of risks 
to some states, it must notify those states after the activity has been started, and it must do so "without 
delay", that is "as soon as the information comes to its knowledge and it has had an opportunity, within a 
reasonable time, to determine that certain other states are likely to be affected." In its commentary to this 
article, the Working Group on liability says that "[tjhe requirement o f notification is an indispensable 
part of any system designed to prevent or minimize transboundary harm", ibid. p. 298. The commentary 
mentions the strong basis of this duty in both treaty law and judicial precedent. Somewhat confusingly it 
goes on to mention that "the principle o f notification is well established in the case of environmental 
emergencies", but leaves it unclear whether emergencies are covered by this article, ibid. p. 299.
306 Procedural principles: Prior authorization; international environmental impact assessment; cooperation; 
exchange of information; notification; consultation and negotiation in good faith; dispute prevention or 
avoidance and settlement of disputes; non-discrimination. Substantive principles; the precautionary principle; 
the polluter- pays principle; and the principles of equity, capacity-building and good governance see Report of 
the International Law Commission on the work o f its Fiftieth Session, GAOR A/53/10, p. 11.
307 ibid, p. 51.
308 “While the activity is being carried out, the States concerned shall exchange in a timely manner all 
available information relevant to preventing, or minimizing the risk of, significant transboundary harm”
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monitoring the implementation o f the activity as long as the activity continues”.309 T h e  
main contents of this information exchange duty is thus to be found in the different types o f  
reporting and monitoring systems which make a fundamental part o f most environm ental 
treaties, and which will be returned to below in Chapter 3. Despite all lack of e x p re s s  
reference in the Article or its Commentary, it would be odd if accident information w e r e  
not meant to be included. A positive interpretation o f this is that accident information is s o  
fundamental and self-evidently covered that the Commission had not even thought o f  
mentioning it in the context o f information after an activity has begun.
The 1999 and 2000 sessions o f the ILC finally brought some substantive relief to the u n ­
clarities discussed above. On the basis of the Special Rapporteur’s Second and T h ird  
Reports and comments from states, the ILC during its 2000 session changed some o f th e  
prevention articles and also added a few new ones. In the Draft Articles on “Prevention o f  
Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities” adopted in 2001 the different types o f  
environmental information are distinct. The Article discussed above on notification a n d  
information prior to the authorization of an activity has once again been changed, now to  
read, as Article 8;
l .I f  the assessment referred to in Article 7 indicates a risk o f causing 
significant transboundary harm, the State o f origin shall provide the State 
likely to be affected with timely notification of the risk and the assessment 
and shall transmit to it the available technical and all other relevant 
information on which the assessment is based.
2.The State o f origin shall not take any decision on authorization of the 
activity pending the receipt, within a period not exceeding six months, of the 
response from the State likely to be affected.
The Article on exchange o f information, on on-going activities, now Article 12, has 
developed to read:
While the activity is being carried out, the States concerned shall exchange in 
a timely manner all available information concerning that activity relevant to 
preventing significant transboundary harm or at any event minimizing the risk 
thereof. Such an exchange o f information shall continue until such time as the 
States concerned consider it appropriate even after the activity is terminated.
309 Ibid, p. 62.
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It does not mention any periodicity for information exchanges, and it seems to leave the 
determination of relevance to the state of origin. Most importantly, however, Articles 16 
and 17 on emergency preparedness and notification of an emergency respectively have 
been included in the Draft, primarily modelled on the Convention on the Law of the Non- 
navigational Uses of International Watercourses. Article 16 reads:
The State o f origin shall develop contingency plans for responding to 
emergencies, in cooperation, where appropriate, with the State likely to be 
affected and competent international organizations.
Article 17 lays down that
The State o f origin shall, without delay and by the most expeditious means, at 
its disposal, notify the State likely to be affected of an emergency concerning 
an activity within the scope o f the present articles and provide it with all 
relevant and available information.
The articles on notification and information (Article 8) and on exchange o f information 
(Article 12) are followed by Article 14 on national security and industrial secrets. Although 
such information, including intellectual property, may be withheld, as much information as 
possible must be provided. The Commentary to the Draft Articles makes it clear that this 
article only relates to Articles 8, 12 and 13 (on information to the public), thus leaving out 
emergency preparedness and notifications appearing later in the Draft.
In one fell swoop the ILC has finally done away with the years-old uncertainty as to what 
types o f information are really meant. Considering that the Commission itself drafted the 
Watercourses Convention, it is a  mystery why this came so late. The inclusion of these 
articles is, according to the ILC, “justified since contingency measures or measures of 
preparedness were required to be put in place by every State as a measure of prevention or 
precaution”.310 This is an interesting comment, since it expressly connects accident 
information to precaution, thus implying a very broad understanding of the notion of 
precaution.
310 Report o f  the International Law Commission on the Work o f its Fifty-second Session, GAOR A/55/10, p. 
277.
The contribution of the ILC to the development in general international law o f the d u ty  t o  
inform on environmental accidents (and on prior notification of planned activities as w e ll a s  
on information to the public (returned to later in Chapter 4)) is noteworthy, although i t  
came exceptionally late.311 The ILC considers the legal nature of the principles found in  t h e  
Draft Articles a “self-contained set o f primary rules on risk management or prevention” , 
and it sees the work on the topic as mainly entailing “primary obligations o f due d ilig e n c e  
in essentially procedural form”.312 It now remains to be seen how the Draft will be re c e iv e d  
by states, for instance how they assess such issues as the nature or extent o f  d u e  
diligence,313and then how the Draft Articles on prevention will fit into a relationship w i th  
the notion o f “acts not prohibited by international law”, or, simply, state liability. C h ap te r  
2.3. below returns to liability, in relation to failures to inform of accidents.
Fifthly, the argument here can, in the early 2000s, now be understood to include the en tire  
spectrum o f  information, prior to activity, during and after it, and in relation to accidents. In  
respect to the customary character o f  prior information, there was up until the early 1990s, 
both clear support314 and dissenting opinions315 *in legal literature, but a decade later d issent
311 While the aim of the work carried out by the ILC is the codification and progressive development o f  
international law, the texts submitted by the ILC usually do not make a distinction between the two expressly, 
see Charter o f  the United Nations, San Francisco, 26.6.1945, in force 24.10.1945, Article 13(I)(a); Special 
Rapporteur Rao characterizes the ILC development of the prevention issue as “progressive development” , 
“for no one set o f  universally accepted procedures [are] applicable in the sphere of prevention”. Ibid, pp. 274- 
275.
3.2 Ibid, p. 278.
3.3 See, Report o f  the International Law Commission on the Work o f  its Fifty-third Session 23 April-1 June 
and 2 July-10 August, 2001, GAOR, Suppl. No 10, A/56/10, eh. V, Commentary, pp. 391-396.
314 As early as 1978, Handl did not doubt the existence of the international legal duty of prior information and 
consultation, Handl, G., 1978, pp. 57-61; Parian, who asserts that a customary duty to inform exists, does not 
make a clear distinction between various kinds of environmental information, but by mostly choosing 
examples o f prior information he seems to argue the customary character of mainly truly preventive action, 
Parian, D.G., 1990, pp. 156-161; Also Francioni writes that international practice supports the existence of a 
general duty requiring provision of information; Francioni, F., 1991, p. 208; Treating both planned projects 
and disasters with potential or actual transboundary effects in the same way, Bothe submits that ”[i]t is safe to 
say that a practice o f States has developed to give such notice, and that a customary legal duty to do so has 
resulted therefrom", Bothe, M., 1980, p. 394. See also Bothe, M., 1986, p. 123; For a similar argument, see 
Smith, B.D, 1988, pp. 80-82; In respect to contingency planning, Weiss notes that H[t]here may already be 
such a duty in customary international law in responding to marine pollution disasters", Brown Weiss, E., 
1989, p. 75.
315 In 1976 Kiss argued that "one could hardly speak at present of an existing rule in positive international law
which would impose the duty upon States to inform those who could be concerned", Kiss, A.C., 1976, p. 31; 
Sands, R , 1988, p. 35, argued that "while it may be desirable, it is not yet supported by the requisite State 
practice or by opinio juris". There is also support for the opinion that in spite o f wide treaty practice
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has now become difficult find. With regard to the main object o f this chapter, post-accident 
information, there is hardly any dissent as to the customary character o f the state duty.316 
Borrowing the words o f Sands, "it is almost impossible to find a writer who reaches an 
opposite conclusion".317 To this effect, Bruha in 1984 stated that H[d]ie Informationspflicht 
dürfte inzwischen unstreitig sein.Auch die vielfach vertraglich normierte Pflicht, 
Meeresumweltnotfalle, wo immer sie auch geschehen mögen, unverzüglich zu melden, 
wird man inzwischen dem Völkergewohnheitsrecht zurechnen können"318 After the serious 
accidents, Tolentino submitted that "[Récemment s'est dégagé, en droit international, le 
principe selon lequel un Etat est tenu de fournir à  ceux qui pourraient en subir des 
dommages des informations sur une pollution nouvellement constatée ou en 
accroissement".319 Furthermore, Rauschning held that "the duty to inform in cases of 
emergency involving a risk o f transffontier damage is an undeniable rule o f international 
law. Therefore, its existence does not depend on a future treaty".320 Brunnée asserted that 
M[t]he duty to notify other states o f emergency situations is seldom discussed and hardly 
disputed as a rule of international law. Accordingly the ILA included it routinely in its 
Montreal Rules of Transfrontier Pollution".321
These writings o f publicists reflect opinions both before and immediately after the 
Chernobyl and Sandoz accidents, and very few have pronounced their legal opinion on the
"information and consultation take place on an ad hoc basis and in an improvised manner", Bothe, M., 1986, 
pp. 123-124, referring to Zehetner, 1982, p. 54: "Den skizzierten Verfahrenspflichten wird in der Praxis zum 
Teil ad hoc zu einem aber immer bedeutender werdenden Teil in institutionalisierter Form entsprochen"; 
Brunnee concludes that although the duty to exchange (prior) information on harmful transboundary pollution 
can be considered a rule of international law, the extent of the rule is unclear because of the lack of certainty 
about the degree o f risk needed to 'activate' the duty. Brunnie, J., 1988, p. 108; See particularly the critique 
offered by Trends in International Environmental Law, by the Editors of the Harvard Law Review, American 
Bar Association, 1992, pp. 41-45: "...the notion of a customary duty of prior disclosure enjoys only dubious 
status" and "... states perceive a specific obligation of prior disclosure as contrary to their interests", p. 43.
516 See Gaia, G, 1986, pp. 828-829, for the relationship between the duty to inform and Principle 21 of the 
Stockholm Declaration; See Wagner, T., p. 33.
3,7 Sands, P.,1988, p, 39.
318 Bruha, T., 1984, p.61,n.312.
319 Tolentino, A., 1987, p. 30.
320 Rauschning, Dietrich (Rapporteur to the ILA), as quoted in the Final Report of the Rapporteur, Twentieth 
Commission of the IDI, "Air Pollution across National Frontiers", 62 Annuaire IDI, 1987,1, p. 259.
j21 Brunnde, J., 1988, p. 108.
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issue since it “slumbered” after the big accidents,322 except in relation to the i m p o r t a n t  
Principle 18 of the Rio Declaration. The Declaration clearly recognized that:
States shall immediately notify other States o f  any sudden natural disasters o r o t h e r  
emergencies that are likely to produce sudden harmful effects on the env ironm ent o f  
those States.
Unfortunately, the global commons are still left out of the text. It is p a r t ic u la r ly  
noteworthy, however, that Principle 18 omits any references to the origin o f the harm, t h u s  
making all states bound by a duty to inform others, and not only those who are d i r e c t l y  
concerned because of harmful actions which have taken place in their territory or u n d e r  
their jurisdiction or control. This seems ecologically sound and prudent from the p o in t o f  
view o f effective hazard management and accident response. Although the duty s h o u ld  
primarily rest with the state o f origin of an accident,323 it seems wise that any state s h o u ld  
inform o f  potential dangers of which it is aware. In the latter case, the information duty t h u s  
gains a preventive aspect. This is particularly the case when accidents happen in d e v e lo p in g  
countries that may not even have the equipment or capacity to detect its own techno log ica l 
accidents. Kiss acknowledges that the Conventions and Declarations adopted at the 1 9 9 2  
Rio Conference confirm that certain rules, such as the obligation for states to im m edia te ly  
notify other states of environmental emergencies, are recognised as customary in ternational 
environmental law.324 The customary obligation is also argued by Bimie and Boyle,325 a n d , 
likewise, by Sands, who argues that Principle 18 "reflects broadly held views, a n d  
crystallises developments in treaties, non-binding instruments and the practice of states".326
322 See Sands, P., 1995, generally pp. 458-461, 472-476; Bimie, P., & A. Boyle, 2002, pp. 136-137 
(emergency notification and assistance as customary obligation), 322-323 (watercourses and the general 
principles o f co-operation and emergency notification), 469-470 (nuclear installations and notification).
323 International legal literature offers little or no guidance on this issue, probably because it has been  
assumed self-evident that the question is examined from the point o f view of the duties and responsibilities o f  
the state o f origin of an accident. The 1986 IAEA Notification Convention lends strong support to the idea 
that, at least in the nuclear area, states o f origin carry the accident information duty. The Convention w as 
probably elaborated more because of a lack in 1986 of a clear customary duty to inform than due to the fact 
that custom would already then have embraced the duty of all states to inform of accidents in their 
knowledge. In an interdependent world this state of origin-thinking is outdated, and it needs, as already seen 
in the Rio Declaration, to be developed in the direction o f co-operation and joint contingency planning, rather 
than reliance on after-the-fact responsibility.
324 Kiss, A-C., 1992, see Postscript, pp. 11-12; See also Adede, A.O., 1993, p. 139.
325 Bimie, P., & A. Boyle, 2002, pp. 136-137.
326 Sands, P., Principles...»1995, p. 608.
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Since the big accidents o f the 1980s and the Rio Declaration in 1992, accident notifications 
have been conceptually tied to obligations to develop contingency planning and “risk 
communication”, combining notions of prior and post-accident information, and thus 
making the earlier distinction superfluous.327 In addition to the state duty, the notion of risk 
communication also increasingly highlights the role o f private actors in actively conveying 
information about potential risks and plans to avoid harm, not least through the 
consolidation o f the practice o f environmental impact assessments.
Finally, one further observation deserves mention in support of the argument that accident 
information represents custom: the duty also appears to include a strong humanitarian 
aspect. The above-mentioned IDI Resolution on Transboundary Air Pollution expressly 
connects the notion of humanitarian action with the duty to provide emergency information. 
The United Nations General Assembly proclaimed the 1990s to be the International Decade 
for Natural Disaster Reduction.328 The Decade was meant to enhance disaster prevention 
and preparedness, and it was one implementation o f recent efforts within the United 
Nations system to improve relief actions in accident and emergency situations. “A Safer 
World in the 21st Century: Disaster and Risk Reduction” is the motto of a new UN effort 
called the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR). The ISDR consists, inter 
alia, of efforts to develop early warning systems and public awareness o f natural and 
technological risks alike, thus making the crucial connection between humanitarian and 
environmental.329
In 1982, the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) submitted its 
Model Rules for Disaster Relief Operations,330 and in 1984 the Office of the United Nations 
Disaster Relief Co-ordinator (UNDRO) proposed a convention on expediting the delivery 
of emergency relief. The Draft Convention includes Article 6 on immediate notification
327 See esp, Handl, G., 2001, pp. 81-83, 87-90, where he argues that “emergency preparedness in response to 
industrial accidents threatening significant transboundary effects is already a genera! international legal 
requirement”, and that risk communication, as exemplified by the Seveso Directive, is a “basic international 
public policy tenet"; See also Bimie, P., & A. Boyle, 2002, pp. 136-137.
328 See further Ramcharan, B.G., 1991, p. 147; See also Yokohama Conference Report, 1994.
329 See further at www.unisdr.org.
330 UNITAR, Model Rules for Disaster Relief Operations, 1982. UN Doc. 1982.XV.PE/8.
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o f events that may lead to disasters. The term "disaster" is understood very b r o a d l y  
including any natural, accidental or deliberate events outside of on-going armed c o n f l ic i  
(Article 1(b)). This approach is truly welcome, as efficient emergency response re q u ire s  a 
comprehensive understanding o f the integrated character o f environmental a n d  
humanitarian concerns. The WHO Programme for Emergency Preparedness and R e s p o n s e  
(EPR)31 32 3endeavours to establish efficient emergency communications networks based  o n  
national focal points. Historically, humanitarian considerations might have come b e f o r e  
environmental concerns and they perhaps therefore offer a more deeply rooted c o n v ic t io n  
o f necessity. However, as the examples o f the UNDRO and the WHO show, the t w o  
considerations today function much towards the same end. The strong humanitarian -  a s  
opposed to environmental - aspect o f accident information is further illustrated by the f a c t  
that the information duty is a state-to-state duty: very few articulations o f the duty c o n n e c t  
accident information to hazard management in the global commons.
On the basis of all o f the above evidence, it seems very safe to conclude that the du ty  t o  
inform o f  transboundary technological accidents represents customary international la w . 
But it is normally possible for a state to object to the binding character o f a particular r u le  
of customary law. Although there are examples of failures to inform, it would be difficult to  
find evidence of explicit denials by states of the existence o f a duty to inform o f  
transboundary accidents. Yet, for such an eventuality, the question needs to be answ ered 
whether the duty to inform of accidents is also a general principle of law. If  it can be argued 
to be a general principle o f law, then it is further important to distinguish whether all s tates 
are covered, or only those from whose territory or control an accident originates. T h e  
general principles of law, one o f  the primary sources o f international law mentioned in  
Article 38(l)(c) o f the Statute o f  the International Court o f Justice,334 are very general in  
character, yet fundamental and legally-binding. The general principles o f  law are here 
understood as an independent source o f international law,335 and one that includes the
331 UNDRO, Draft Convention on Expediting the Delivery o f Emergency Relief, 18.6 1984. UN Doc. 
A/39/267/Add. 2. E/1984/96/Add. 2.
332 Ramcharan, B.G., 1991, pp. 152-154.
333 See, however, Gaia, G., 1986.
■*34 Statute o f  the International Court of Justice, San Francisco, 26.6.1945, in force 24.10.1945.
3j5 Most writers would agree, see Herczegh, G., 1969, p. 25; Rousseau, C., 1970, p. 374; contra see Kelsen,
H„ 1967, p. 539-540.
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possibility that, in addition to international legal principles, also legal principles from 
national legal systems could play a role in international law.336 These principles highlight 
the tension between consensuality337 and non-consensuality338, a characteristic, which is 
particularly noticeable in international environmental law where complex considerations 
meet and where there are examples of some flexibility in law-making.339
If the state duty to provide environmental accident information is to be treated as a general 
principle o f law, then on what can such an argument be based? The most readily available j 
answer can -  also in this context - be found in the support given by treaty law. The body of 
international multilateral and bilateral treaty law pertaining to the state information duty is 
extensive, and it shows convincing uniformity. The treaties governing marine pollution 
prevention are many more in number, and less controversial in their contents than those 
relating to nuclear issues. The consistency shown in the global and regional marine 
conventions is arguably an indicator o f the seriousness with which the information issue is 
taken. Also, the far-reaching institutional and technical arrangements set up in connection 
to the different schemes are of great importance as they show the practical readiness of the 
parties to engage in pollution prevention and humanitarian rescue operations. In the area of
336 Legal scholars have taken very different views on this issue: 1) Some refer to domestic principles of law, 
see Verdross, A., 1926; Verdross, A., 1955; Oppenheim, L.F.L., 1955 (1974), ed. H. Lauterpacht. p. 29; 2) 
some writers have perceived general principles of law as general principles of international law, see 
Herczegh, G,, 1969, pp. 22-24; 3) a third category of writers refer to both domestic and international legal 
norms, see further e.g. Herczegh. G., 1969, p. 26; Tunkin, G., 1971, p. 526; 4) in a fourth distinction general 
principles are primarily principles of international law and secondarily of municipal origin, for further 
reference see Herczegh, G,, 1969, p. 25; 5) a fifth possibility is the denial of the existence of general 
principles of law, see Kelsen, H., 1967, p. 539.
337 Herczegh, G., 1969, pp. 35, 43; Some writers consider general principles as part of customary law, see 
Monaco, R., 1982, p. 611; Others have pointed out the difficulties inherent in attaching the general principles 
of law to customary law and, thus, state participation in their creation, see Koskenniemi, M., 1989, p. 355, n. 
60; For an argument in favour of "a lesser degree of juridical conviction" for general principles of law, see 
Hannikainen, L., 1988, pp. 242-246. The element of consent need thus not be given the same weight in the 
formation of general principles of law as it must for custom. The 1CJ remains, however, inconsistent on this 
issue, see Reservations to the Convention on Genocide case, ICJ Reports 1951, pp. 15, 23; North Sea 
Continental Shelf case, ICJ Reports 1969, pp. 3, 23; Barcelona Traction Light and Power Company Limited, 
Judgment, ICJ Reports 1970, pp. 3, 32; Delimitation o f the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf o f  Maine Area, 
ICJ Reports 1984, p. 246.
jj8 On naturalist views, see Bernhardt, R., 1976, pp. 50-76; van Boven, T.C., 1982, p. 107.
339 See further Bimie, P. & A. Boyle, 1992, pp. 21-24; On soft law, see e.g. Hillgenberg, H., 1999, pp. 499- 
515. Further, on the sources of law in relation to environmental matters, esp. on treaties and later custom, see 
Sands, P., 1999, pp. 39-60; and on “fundamentally norm-creating character” (as in the North Sea Continental 
Shelf cases, 1969) as a prerequisite to look for state practice or opinio ;'«m , and the argument that e.g. 
sustainable development does not possess such character and is therefore neither a norm of hard nor soft law, 
but still holds some normativity, see Lowe, V., 1999.
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nuclear matters, the IAEA Notification Convention was the product of a strongly-felt n e e d  
in the international community to find some preventive mechanisms against the s p re a d in g  
o f nuclear pollution. The voluntary character o f submission of information from  a n y  
nuclear facilities (Article 3) has also been strengthened by the declarations o f the m a j o r  
nuclear weapon states to furnish information about military nuclear accidents.340 A llo w in g  
for some degree o f consent to play a role, it thus seems possible to look at a c c id e n t  
information as a general principle o f law.
Might there be some basis other than treaty law in the search for arguments in favour o f  th e  
information duty as a general principle oflaw? The strongest possibility seems to be th a t o f  
examining the actual basis for all international legal pollution prevention. First, there is th e  
inevitability or prerequisite argument:341 environmental hazards cannot possibly b e  
“managed” without proper knowledge about the actual state of the natural environm ent. 
Second, the interdependent nature o f environmental problems supports the argument th a t  
developments in national law are relevant for the creation of a general principle o f  la w  
concerning information on transboundary environmental accidents. On the national level, 
there must normally be a special relation between two parties in order for a duty to b e  
created between them.342 According to Prosser and Keeton, it has (within the U.S. legal 
system) also been recognized that if  a defendant's own negligence has been responsible fo r  
the plaintiffs situation, "a relation has arisen which imposes a duty to make a reasonable 
effort to give assistance, and avoid any further harm".343 34Where, on the other hand, the 
original danger is created by innocent conduct with no fault on the part of the defendant, it 
used to be insufficient grounds for the creation o f a duty. This seems, however, to have 
given way "to a recognition o f a duty to take action, both where the prior innocent conduct 
has created an unreasonable risk o f  harm to the plaintiff, and where it has already injured 
him". Logie points out that there are certain situations in which the English law o f tort
340 For a possibly even stronger assertion, see further Partan, D.G., 1990, p. 168.
341 As a characteristic of the state (prior ?) information duty Partan uses the "juristic inevitability" argument 
found in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, ICJ Reports, 1969, p. 37; Partan, D,G., 1990, p. 163.
342 See e.g., Charlesworth..., 1983, chapter 2, paragraph 19; On "toxic torts" and related concepts, see 
Cassels, J.,1993, pp. 75-109.
343 Prosser..., 1984 (1971), p. 377.
344 Ibid, p. 377.
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imposes a duty to warn.345 The most interesting situations from an environmental point of 
view are perhaps those in which the defendant has control over dangerous property, where 
the danger has been created by the defendant (without the risk creation itself having been 
negligent and where the danger is hidden), where the plaintiff relies on specialist 
knowledge o f the defendant or where there is no common knowledge o f the risk and the 
defendant cannot take preventive measures against it.346 The two latter situations in 
particular offer interesting analogies for the determination of which states are covered by 
the information duty. It is clear that the accident information duty lies primarily with the 
state of origin. Technological risks are, however, of such magnitude that anyone with some 
knowledge about them cannot ignore the security o f those with no or less information on 
how to prevent or minimize injury to themselves. In an accident situation, an absolute 
minimum is that pertinent information is not deliberately withheld by anyone from anyone. 
The development seems to be going further towards a common and fundamental obligation 
for states to take active measures to warn other states of environmental hazards.
No functional situation o f pollution prevention or abatement of adverse effects can be 
achieved unless the state actors can count on each other's mutual co-operation.347 This is a 
rationale for the information duty applying to every state having knowledge o f an accident. 
Information is not a one-way exercise, but it requires concerted effort, and good faith. 
Information thus becomes equal to trust. The principle o f good faith might, in turn, as 
Schwarzenberger points out, be considered both a principle o f customary law and a general 
principle of law.348 The argument here could be that the state information duty is not 
necessarily one dependent on full state consent, but it might be based on another general 
principle of law,349 thus escaping a strict burden o f consent.
345 Logie, J.G., 1989, pp. 121-124.
346 For a discussion on further implications o f the duty to warn of risk under common law, see Green, M.D., 
1990, p, 243 et seq.
347 On co-operation as a legal principle, see Boyle, A., 1994, pp. 120-136.
348 Schwarzenberger, G., 1951, pp. 28-29; See also Schwarzenberger, G., 1967, pp. 33-35.
349 On the prohibition of intentional, malicious abuse of rights as a general principle of law, see Hakap&2, K., 
1981, p. 140; Cameron, J. & J. Abouchar, 1991, p. 25, argue, de lege ferenda, that the principle of 
precautionary action could come to be understood as a general principle o f law.
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The judgment of the ICJ in the Corfu Channel case is particularly interesting. T h e  I C J  
asserted that Albania had the obligation to notify with respect to the minefields in  i t s  
territorial waters on the basis of:
certain general and well-recognized principles, namely: elementary co n sid e ra tio n s
o f  humanity, even more exacting in peace than in war,...350 (emphasis added)
It is noteworthy that the decision o f  the ICJ was not based on interpretation o f C o n v en tio n  
VIII o f  the 1907 Hague Peace Conference,351 but rather on "general and w ell-recognized  
principles". In Lammers’ opinion "the Court's Judgement in the Corfu Channel case m ay  b e  
invoked to establish a notification duty in the case that other States' rights are in danger o f  
being infringed by extraterritorial environmental interference considering that in c e r ta in  
exceptional situations such a notification duty could perhaps also be based on the ex trem ely  
vague and general notion of 'elementary considerations o f humanity’".352 In the opinion o f  
van Panhuys, there is a duty based on considerations for humanity, which obliges a s ta te  
that is aware o f the threat o f a natural catastrophe to warn another state or its public o f  th e  
potential hazard.353 According to Sands, "[h]umanitarian principles also justify th e  
provision o f  information to people who might be affected by a nuclear or other accident".354 
The argument is thus that, regardless of the origin o f  an accident - be it human-made o r  
natural or a combination o f both the respect for human needs is sufficient grounds to  
invoke a duty o f early warning o f risk.
In contrast to the search for arguments establishing customary law, the element o f consent 
is less decisive when discussing the existence of general principles of law. In particular, the  
sphere o f  international environmental law is often argued to be in great need of such 
flexible legal argumentation: i f  the needs o f  the environment as the object of legal
350/C7 Reports, 1949, p. 22. In the Nicaragua case, the ICJ held that if a state "lays mines in any waters 
whatever in which the vessel o f another state have rights o f  access or passage, and fails to give any warning 
or notification whatsoever, in disregard o f the security o f peaceful shipping, it commits a breach of the 
principles o f  humanitarian law”, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua case, ICJ  
Reports (1986), p. 112.
351 Second Hague Peace Conference Convention VIII, The Hague, 18.10.1907.
352 Lammers, J.G., 1984, p. 527.
353 Van Panhuys, V.H.F., 1972, pp. 159 et seq.
354 Sands, P., 1995, p. 610.
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protection are put foremost, the will of individual states becomes problematic, and if the 
present generation make (bad) decisions based on narrow or non-existent data, future 
generations will bear the cost o f  late and false information.355 This is where the notion o f a 
general principle o f law becomes inseparable from even '’softer" forms o f law and policy­
making. It is difficult to draw dividing lines between the various forms of vague norm- and 
programme-formulating mechanisms, because they fit poorly into the traditional views o f 
the sources o f international law. This is particularly obvious when the wish is not to 
preclude entirely the possibility of an element o f non-consensuality, nor to imply an. 
inherent dependence on supra-positive elements. The very nature of the general principles 
of law, to the degree that even this can be perceived, makes for a situation where there are 
no crystal clear answers. These difficulties do not, however, necessarily subtract from the 
argumentation. The generalities that have been pointed at might hold their value to the 
extent to which they show the direction of the development of the law.
2,2.3. Contents
The conven tional contents o f  th e  duty
On the basis o f those treaties referred to above, and which expressly provide for an 
environmental accident information duty, the following observations may function as an 
account of the most central contents o f the conventional duty:
L  G eographic d im ensions an d  p h ysica l thresholds:
a. T ransboundary impacts: the criterion of transboundary harm is the most frequent one. 
This implies a state-to-state approach. Except for some marine pollution treaties, very few 
treaties connect the information duty to harm to the global commons.
b. The threshold for activating the duty is often unclear. Usually reference is to 
"pollution incidents", "critical situations", "considerable increases in annexed substances", 
"pollution damage", etc. In the best case, mere risk of harm is the relevant threshold, but, of 
course, even this entails elements o f assessment that are left entirely to the discretion o f the
355 On this concept, see esp. Brown Weiss, E., 1989; and see D’Amato, A., 1990, pp. 190-198; Gundling, L., 
1990 a, pp. 207-212; Sands, P., 1995, pp. 199-200; Brown Weiss, E., 'Environmental Equity...’, 1995, pp. 17- 
33; ibid., ‘Opening...’, 1999; and farther on the “emerging customary international environmental law 
principle” o f intergenerational equity, McIntyre, O., 1998, p. 91; and on the same, see Granet, M-B, 2001, p. 
795; see supra ch. 1.1.2.
informing state. This is clearly the most difficult part o f most information provisions, 
the development of the precautionary principle should be guiding states towards l o w e r  
thresholds, at best mere risk o f  damage.
2, The senders o f  accident inform ation;
a. States: The information duty is owed by one state to another. A majority o f t r e a t i e s  
impose the information duty on states from whose territory or control an a c c id e n t  
originates. In some cases the duty seems to belong to any state that observes an a c c id e n t .  
Even in these latter cases reference is to treaty parties. However, this type o f in fo rm a tio n  
duty is more comprehensive in approach, and it seems to be better suited to the situations t o  
which contemporary technological activity can give rise. Many treaties call upon s ta tes  t o  
ensure that their authorities establish the technical, institutional and other necessary m e a n s  
to fulfil the information duty in case of an accident. Any "appropriate national au th o ritie s” 
may be designated to handle assessments and practical communication tasks.
b. In ternational organizations, special commissions o r  technical emergency c e n tr e s :  
These organizations or special co-operative bodies may also be charged with the duty  t o  
relay information of which they are aware. Their role is normally secondary to that o f  th e  
states Parties to a treaty. However, some organizations are required to assess acc id en t 
information they receive, and if  it proves to be correct, send it on to all states p o ssib ly  
affected (i.a., the IAEA). Organizations with this type o f information "clearing-house” 
function are sometimes also required to provide for information to the media.
c. C orporate or private persons: Some treaties require the state parties to issue  
instructions to private persons to inform with regard to accidents. Thus, the initial accident 
information duty is in some treaties placed upon private industrial undertakers or owners o r  
masters o f ships and aircraft. This only pertains to cases where pollution is not deliberate, 
that is, unlawful dumping incidents are naturally not included. Once the corporate or private 
undertakers have fulfilled their duty, the state authorities owe the next step in the 
communication chain.
3. The addressees o f  accident inform ation :
a. States: The most frequently mentioned addressees of environmental accident 
information are the other parties to the particular treaty in question. Only when the accident 
information duty is not an express one does any unclarity appear on this point. Some, but 
fewer, treaties contain reference to information to any state potentially affected. Special
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reference is in some marine pollution treaties made to the duty to relay information to the 
flag state, coastal state or, simply, to the nearest state.
b. International organizations: (1) A large number o f treaty regimes are connected to the 
work of particular intergovernmental organizations, such as the IMO and the IAEA. In such 
cases the accident information is to be relayed also to the organization and, either directly 
or indirectly, through the organization to the other parties. (2) Those regimes that have their 
own institutional arrangements in the form of supervisory commissions or technical 
emergency centres normally require that the information be relayed, respectively, also to 
the commission, or also to the technical emergency centre, or only through the technical 
emergency centre to the other parties.
4, Q ualitative an d  quantitative aspects o f  the inform ation:
a. Time: The most obvious common denominator of all accident information provisions is 
the concern that the information be given without delay/in due time/in a timely manner/as 
soon as possible/rapidly/immediately. Objective thresholds for the timeliness of 
information on incidents are seldom expressly mentioned, but the parties may be required 
to co-operate to agree on particular timeframes. Timeliness seems to be the minimum and 
most widely accepted criterion of accident information.
b. Relevance: Accident information is sometimes followed by the qualification that the 
information given must be such that it is of relevance for the abatement or minimization of 
the pollution that already might have started. Such data might include:
- the exact time when an incident has happened,
- the exact location of the incident,
- the chemical or other substances or energy involved and their quantities,
- the foreseeable environmental effects o f such substances or energy when released,
- hydrological or meteorological data
- any other information deemed important
c. Comprehensiveness: The data deemed relevant must normally also be as detailed as 
possible. The information requirement often seems to include the obligation to relay any 
new and relevant information that appears during the course o f events or based on further 
environmental assessments. Often this requirement is accompanied by the express duty of 
the states parties to give information on the measures they have already taken or plan to 
take in order to minimize the potential damage. The information must also be 
understandable to those receiving it. Linguistic and other problems are potentially great.
97
This highlights the need for involvement by international organizations, especially  to  
facilitate co-ordination and harmonisation of practices.
5. Institu tion a l m easures:
a. The least specific treaties only provide for a general duty of the states parties to d e v e lo p  
procedures for reporting.
b. Most treaties provide that "appropriate national authorities" have a function in d isc lo s in g  
information. Such authorities are seldom expressly named in the treaty text itself. P e rh a p s  
the strongest indication o f a well-developed information duty is found in those treaties th a t  
call for institutional measures in the form of particular accident notification or a la rm  
systems. These systems consist o f designated national authorities with the responsibility to  
stay operational at all times for instant communication with other similar institutions in  
other states. In the case o f an accident, the alarm systems are meant to guarantee the fa s tes t 
possible information in the form o f previously determined and compatible data.
c. Institutional arrangements directly connected to particular treaty regimes include (1 )  
supervisory commissions set up for geographically specially defined areas to control 
pollution prevention by particular or all possible forms o f pollution in that area. Some trea ty  
regimes provide for (2) special emergency response centres (international) o f a m ore  
technical nature aimed at the rapid co-ordination o f real situations. (3) Already existing 
organizations also play a role in some treaty regimes. The most notable examples are th e  
IMO and the IAEA.
6. O ther relevan t inform ation duties:
Treaties vary considerably on this point. However, many contain periodic implementation 
and compliance reporting requirements (discussed next in Chapter 3), which could reveal 
problems in contingency planning. Also various provisions on regular exchange o f  
information on technical, scientific and other data could be relevant. This criterion over­
laps with the previous one on institutional measures, as communication capacity might be 
built on national as well as regional or global level.
7. L im ita tion s or exceptions to  the du ty:
Treaties do not normally make express limitations to the accident information duty, but 
rather limiting provisions apply generally to all information exchange dealt with by the 
treaty. Sometimes this exempts accident information from limitations. A case in point is the
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\1986 IAEA Notification Treaty, which seems to exempt the immediate notification from 
any limitations while stating that some limitations apply to further information. Another 
important observation is that many treaties exempt military installations or ships from the 
provisions covered by the treaty. Force majeure and emergencies are exceptions sometimes 
permitting dumping at sea. Even in such cases, however, is the state information duty often 
a rule imposed on the states parties.
a. National security; National security is a frequent limitation to the various information 
exchanges to which states have agreed in treaties;
b. Industrial and commercial secrecy and intellectual property': these are factors 
referred to in some treaties as limitations upon the different duties to inform;
c. Limitations on private data: appears in a few newer treaties only;
d. Limitations on the receiver o f  information: a few treaties also require the recipient to 
withhold information from third states; mostly for national security or industrial secrecy 
reasons. To the extent that these limitation provisions might offer loop-holes for states to 
avoid informing about embarrassing accidents and other polluting events it becomes all the 
more desirable to see the elaboration o f effective and pre-determined alarm systems.
The contents in general in terna tion al law  o f  the duty
The documents discussed above lend support to the argument that at least the following 
minimum criteria - in addition to the humanitarian aspects - are attached to the duty as a 
customary rule: there must be a risk o f transboundary impact, and the threshold, although i '
........... ......  I > t
likely often to be unclear, lies on harm or, at best, the risk of harm to the environment. •
Given the development o f the precautionary principle, the threshold is moving towards j
risk;356 the information duty is a state-to-state duty, and it seems to have already developed •
j
into a requirement for all states to inform of potentially transboundary environmental j
I
accidents of which they are aware, whether or not they originate from within their territory j
or jurisdiction. This reflects a  preventive and co-operative approach to environmental 
degradation; accident information must be disclosed immediately or promptly, and it must 
be followed by further information, which is relevant for the minimization of harm. The 
duty is not wholly unlimited, but some restrictions related to, for instance, national defence 
or security may apply to further information beyond initial notification of an accident.
356 Cf, Draft Article 20 of the Stockholm Declaration, which recognized the need for states to supply 
information "to avoid the risk" of adverse effects, U.N. Doc.A/CONF.48/4, Annex, paragraph 20, p. 4 (1972).
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2.2.4. Functions 
M anaging and  mitigating?
Hazard management is a term, which is part o f the trend referred to in the in troductory  
chapter as the current “managerial ethic”.357 358Accident information duties have developed in  
relation to existing, given, activities; they are not connected to questions on th e  
permissibility or desirability of an activity. Hazard management, including information, is  
pragmatic, procedural and technical. Accident information has become a public re la tions 
tool in the sense that, since Chernobyl, lack o f information is connected to secrecy, o ld -  
fashioned, closed-societies - the kind of secrecy with which few would want to b e  
identified. The duty seems to be well complied with; its normative basis is no longer 
questioned and thus, in this sense, it is a successful part of “managing” environm ental 
hazards.
! f
\ But does accident information really mitigate environmental harm? The conditio sine q u a
ij non in hazard management is co-operation. Mere unilateral communications cannot form  
effective flows of accident information. Thus, another elementary aspect o f a  
comprehensive accident response system is co-operation, in all imaginable forms o f  
information exchange, consequent assistance and co-ordination with a view to preventing 
further harm. To this effect, Tolentino submits that "[l]a communication d'informations 
entre pays permet d'eviter l'extension de la pollution. Il est en effet conforme au principe de 
bon voisinage que l'Etat, pollueur potentiel, communique spontanément des 
informations". Information on oil pollution at sea may permit clean-up efforts and 
technical arrangements to limit the spread of the oil, but sometimes it does not; when, for 
instance, it cannot be done on time, the weather does not permit it, the equipment is not 
state-of-the-art. In a nuclear accident, information will allow authorities to advise people to 
stay indoors, to restrict cattle from drinking contaminated water, to dispense o f  medication; 
but does it really mitigate effects on most of the natural environment?
357 For a recent strong argument in favour o f risk and uncertainty management, see Liberatore, A., 1999.
358 Tolentino, A. S., 1987, p. 30.
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Precautionary?
As discussed above, the concept o f precaution comes with many interpretations, and it need 
not be understood too narrowly.359 Rest argued in 1993 that several mechanisms of a 
procedural nature have developed from the precautionary principle, among them the 
instruments of early warning systems as special forms of the general obligation of 
information.360 This is a system-based approach, which emphasizes the need for advance 
planning. Channels of hazard information would constitute one aspect of a comprehensive 
accident response system.361 The European Commission connects risk communication to 
risk assessments and risk management as an element o f precaution.362 This would suggests 
that information is preventive in nature, but it misses the point that some risks, notably the 
risks from accidents which have already happened as opposed to risks o f planned activities, 
can no longer be prevented; they can at best be mitigated. Even more to the point, the ILC 
in 2000, and without further explanation, described contingency and preparedness measures 
as prevention or precaution,363 This is clearly in want o f  some nuance: if  taken seriously, 
accident notifications could help prevent further damage to human health and sometimes to 
the environment, and they could therefore have precautionary elements. But this is still 
after-the-fact action and cannot be as strongly connected to proper precaution such as EIAs 
(not to mention other stronger forms o f precaution, such as total bans), which would be 
done on the basis of information before the commencement o f a potentially 
environmentally harmful activity. A n  analogy is found in the idea of contraception: if the 
aim is to avoid pregnancy, many “precautions” exist besides abstinence. The “morning- 
after” pill is one example, not a /?re-caution, but a caution nonetheless. The same goes for 
accident information. Kuokkanen refers to the extension o f managerial methods to 
“extreme events” as a “realistic approach” because they appeared already to be 
uncontrollable, thus offering an explanation to post-accident mitigation, which does not
359 On the limits of precaution in relation to nuclear activities, see Granet, M-B, 2001, p. 794.
360 See Rest, A., 1993, p. 260.
361 Also, the degree of preparedness would then depend on the activity in question: very hazardous 
undertakings would perhaps require also more elaborate preparedness.
362 Communication from the Commission on the precautionary principle, Brussels, 2.2.2000, COM(2000)1.
\
363 Report o f  the International Law Commission on the Work o f its Fifty-second Session, 2000, G AOR 1
A/55/10, p.277. /
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consider that the development o f ex post facto  systems may have been a result o f  s ta te  
unwillingness to regulate the primary activity resulting in the accident.364
R esu ltin g  in  responsibility?
Information on an accident may be referred to as a primary, yet procedural,365 norm, w hich  
may create further damage if it is not adhered to. The issue whether a failure to inform  
could lead to state responsibility and consequent liability is turned to next.
***
2.4. Inform ation  in Context 1:
Chernobyl Revisited: On the Implications of a Failure to Inform
I. The Accident
II. The Questions It Raised About State Responsibility and Liability
ILL In Treaty Law and General International Law 
II.IL In the Work o f the International Law Commission
I. The Accident
Just as the argument exists that some aspects o f  the law o f marine pollution have been 
advanced through the momentum for legal development created by huge oil spills at sea,366 
the duty o f  states to inform on environmental accidents took considerable steps forward in 
treaty law, and was thereby further strengthened in customary law, after the nuclear disaster
364 Kuokkanen, T., 2000, p. 231. For his account of the extension of environmental management to extreme 
events, see further pp. 230-236.
365 For instance, the ILC originally used the term “procedural” to describe its four so-called compound 
primary obligations: prevention, information, negotiation and reparation. See ILC, Special Rapporteur Robert 
Q. Quentin-Baxter: Fourth Report on International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising out o f  Acts 
Not Prohibited by International Law and Annex, 1983, A/CN.4/373, (cited as Quentin-Baxter: Fourth 
Report)-, More recently, the Special Rapporteur on the liability topic, Mr. Rao, has made an enumeration of 
procedural and substantive principles, see First Report on International Liability for Injurious Consequences 
Arising out o f  Acts Not Prohibited by International Law, A/CN.4/487 and Add.l( cited as Rao; First Report); 
On the distinction between primary and secondary norms, see Rosas, A., 1991a, pp. 5-6; For a critique of the 
distinction see Woodliffe,L, 1990,p. 111.
366 See e.g. Ghys, R., 1991. Also see www.osoar.org background brief for the 1992 North East Atlantic 
Convention, which refers i.a. to the 1967 Torrey Canyon oil spill as a stimulation for the Agreement for Co­
operation in Dealing with Pollution of the North Sea by Oil, Bonn, 9.6.1969, entry into force 9.8.1969; 
superseded by the Agreement for Co-operation in Dealing with Pollution of the North Sea by Oil and Other 
Harmful Substances, Bonn, 13.9.1983, in force 1.9.1989.
at Chernobyl.367 The single most widely discussed environmental accident of'thfi-'l^t,.. ' , - 
century was a failure of a nuclear reactor at the Chernobyl power plant in the former,SôvÎét 
Union.368 On 26 April, 1986 at 1.23 a.m., the fourth reactor of the Chernobyl power plant 
caught fire, giving rise to the largest accident in the history of the peaceful use o f nuclear 
energy. From the very outset o f the situation there were serious deficiencies in 
communication and information.369 The responsible officials received notice o f the accident 
only hours after enormous quantities of nuclear radiation had been released370and the lives 
of many local fire-fighters had been jeopardized.371
The delay in information was, no doubt, a reflection o f the inefficiency o f the Soviet 
response capability. Also, many would argue that the silence surrounding the accident was 
a deliberate one, in line with the customary Soviet policy o f preferral o f "security” over 
information.372 Whether the explanation for the silence lies in domestic politics or 
inefficiency, the lack of information was obvious on all levels of the Soviet administration 
as well as the Soviet public, making for complete silence in regard to neighbouring states. It 
was not until the authorities o f Sweden, Finland, Poland and Denmark on April 27 had 
detected the increase in radioactivity that the world heard about the accident.373
as? “’Chgj-jjQbyj- has become a new word in every major language. It is a symbol for the unseeable effects of 
modem technology, a reminder that to avoid disaster we must do more than avoid war", N.N. Minow, 
Foreword in Sands, 1988, p. xxviii.
368 For details on the course of the events surrounding the Chernobyl accident, see, e.g., Salo, A., 1986, pp. 
18-22; Kiss, A.C., 1986, pp. 139-141; Knabe, B., 1987 a,b; Sands, P., 1988, pp. 1-2; Cameron, P. et al., 1988, 
Appendices II, III and IV; Stuckey, D.C., 1988, pp. 687-690; Ellis, D., 1989, pp. 173-182; Medvedev, G., 
1991, pp. 65 etseq.
369 See e.g., Gould, P., 1990, pp. 61-62; Liberatore, A., 1999, pp. 61-76.
370 The reactor functioned with a graphite-moderated pressure tube and was cooled by light water. The 
accident happened during the poorly supervised testing of a turbogenerator under conditions where safety 
standards were not followed and several human errors were made. Particularly dangerous levels o f Iodine- 
131, Caesium-134 and Caesium-137 were released immediately after an explosion which blew off the cover 
plate o f the reactor. See Salo, A., 1986, p. 18; Cameron, P., et ah, 1988, Appendix III, pp. 205-211; Stuckey, 
D.C., 1988, n. 5, p. 687; Moser, B., 1989, n. 1, p. 21.
371 Sands, P., 1988, p. 2.
373 See, e.g., Knabe, B., 1987 b, pp. 176-194, on the critique of the Soviet information policy in general and 
specifically after the Chernobyl accident. See also Gould, P., 1990, pp. 22, 64-65; Liberatore, A., 1999, pp. 
61-76.
373 Salo, A., 1986, p. 18.
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Finally, with a 72-hour delay, the Soviet authorities made an announcement about t h e  
reactor meltdown to the IAEA. After that time, the political impact o f the accident fo rc e d  
the Soviet Union to disclose further data and the IAEA was able to assume its role as a n  
information collecting and disseminating organization. During the weeks following th e  
accident, the Soviet Union, although downplaying the impact of the accident, gave so m e  
short announcements to the international press and to other states through diplom atic 
channels.374 At the time of the accident the Soviet Union was not bound by any tre a ty  
obligations to inform neighbouring states, and thus it could be argued that all inform ation 
that it gave was unilateral and voluntary.375 The realization in the world community that n o  
treaty obligations existed, led, between August 25 and 29 1986, to a special meeting o f  
experts from 62 countries and 21 international and national organizations. At this so-called 
Post-Accident Review Meeting, which was convened in Geneva, the Soviet Union offered a  
report explaining the reasons for the accident. The report did not admit any design o r  
operation mistakes, but rather put the blame on the violation of instructions and operating 
rules by the staff of the power plant.376
Demands for greater openness were echoed even by governments of countries that had been 
only remotely affected by the Chernobyl nuclear fall-out, and public pressure groups and 
international organizations joined to demand improvments in international emergency 
prevention and co-operation. Whether the reasons for the strong reactions to the accident 
lay in the actual damages or in the impulses from the media of masscommunication, the 
international community certainly acted swiftly on these pressures. In unprecedented record 
time, even international legal measures were taken through the adoption in the autumn o f  
1986 o f two global IAEA conventions pertaining to transboundary nuclear pollution: the 
Convention on Early Notification o f a Nuclear Accident and the Convention on Assistance 
in the Case o f  a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency. Later in the same year as the 
failure at Chernobyl, the chemical accident near Basel provided for another example o f
374 Sands, P., 1988, pp. 1-2; Stuckey, D.C., 1988, pp. 687-688.
l7S Adede, A.O., 1987, pp. xx-xxi.
376 Sands, P., 1988, pp. 3-4. See also Moser, B., 1989, p. 11; "The disaster was in no way attributable solely 
to reactor staff; a major factor was the extremely risky design of this type of reactor...".; In contrast, see the 
account (ex post facto) by the chief engineer at the time of the plant’s construction in 1970, Grigori 
Medvedev, who writes that he was aware that the design had been ”a death sentence waiting to be executed”, 
Medvedev, G., 1991, ch. 2.
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severe transboundary pollution. The contamination o f the River Rhine received a serious 
addition as a consequence o f a fire in Warehouse 956 o f the Sandoz Chemical Factory in 
November 1986. No fire alarm or sprinkler systems had been installed in the warehouse and 
no pools for the collection o f  water from fire fighting were provided for. Thus large 
amounts of toxic chemicals were washed into the river causing severe pollution and injury 
to the economies in the neighbouring downstream countries.377
The Sandoz accident also clearly highlighted the information issue. Although the 
'International Water and Alarm Plan 'Rhine" was applicable at the time, the Swiss 
authorities provided information about the accident with a  24-hour delay. It has been 
argued that the delay in information had been due to both insufficient emergency planning 
and a certain secretiveness on the part of the Swiss officials. Furthermore, the Swiss 
officials did not initially know what authorities to contact in France and the Federal 
Republic of Germany.378 This failure to provide timely accident information clearly stood 
in contrast to the Chemical Convention governing the prevention of pollution o f the River 
Rhine.379
Public reaction to both catastrophes was very strong all over the world. Finally, after news 
of the sufferings o f the people and the environment in the Chernobyl emergency area had 
reached the public, the initial information vacuum also affected the demands for further 
giasnosi in the Soviet Union. The Chernobyl nuclear catastrophe forcefully proved the 
interdependence of the international community in face o f  the vulnerability of the global 
ecosystem. Although the horrendous immediate and short-term effects o f the radioactive 
fall-out are now documented, and the discussion on the social impacts o f the accident has 
been vivid,380 the long-term consequences for human and animal health, crops and soil and 
the entire global ecosystem still remain unknown.381
377 Bericht der Bundesregierung über die Verunreinigung des Rheins durch die Brandkatastrophe bei der 
Sandoz AG/Basel und weitere Chemieunfülle, Umweltbrief No. 34,12.2 1987 and Annex 1; See also Rest, A., 
1987 a, p. 162; Rest, A., 1987 b, p. 59; Schwabach, A., 1989, p. 444-451.
378 Schwabach, A., 1989, p. 466.
379 Convention for the Protection of the Rhine against Chemical Pollution, Bonn, 3.12.1976, entry into force 
1.2.1979. See also Convention Concerning the Protection of the Rhine against Pollution by Chlorides, Bonn, 
3.12.1976, entry into force 5.7.1985.
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When the third and last reactor at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in the Ukraine w a s  
finally shut down on December 15, 2000, it happened to the relief o f many people a ro u n d  
the world, but to the grief o f  those workers dependent on the plant. Fifteen years o f  
international pressure, financial aid and security advice had borne fruit, and one could se e  
the event as both a practical and symbolic victory for environmental considerations o v e r  
economic ones. Yet a closer look at the procedure of closing the plant reveals that it m a y  
not have been such a clear triumph o f a “new culture o f openness” over the old disregard o f  
safety standards.380 182 *
It had been necessary to shut down the third reactor at Chernobyl shortly before the date se t 
for the final closure. According to, inter alia, Finnish nuclear safety experts, it would b e  
highly irregular, very risky and contrary to all safety standards to close, open and again  
close a nuclear reactor for no real reason, especially when it was know that there was a  fau lt 
in the crucial cooling system. Yet apparently against the advice o f the nuclear safety 
authorities o f  the Ukraine, the President o f the country, Mr. Leonid Kutjma, ordered th e  
reactor to be restarted in order only to be immediately shut down during the w idely 
broadcasted closing ceremony. The reasons were political: a ceremony was wanted fo r 
several reasons, not least for a show of national pride, and the President could order such an 
exceptional procedure.
The event largely speaks for itself. It is hardly in line with the Western understanding o f  
“virtues” such as safety, expert advice, and sensitivity for public needs, but instead it speaks 
of cultural differences also in safety and risk assessments, and the relatively slow pace at
380 On both national and transboundary effects, see Medvedev, Z.A., 1990, pp. 74-220; See further, e.g., 
Wynne, B., 1989; Sands, P., 1988, p. 2; Marples, D.R., 1988; and ibid., 1996; And see articles in 38(3) IAEA 
Bulletin, 1996, Special Issue on Chernobyl, including articles on social, health and environmental effects and 
agricultural issues and nuclear safety; See also One Decade After Chernobyl -  Summing up the Consequences 
of the Accident. Proceedings Series, IAEA, STI/PUB/1001,1996.
381 Iodine has a life-span of about eight years, whereas the radio isotopes of Caesium last for about thirty 
years, see Kiss, A.C., 1986, p. 140. Estimates of human deaths in the last fifteen years, which could be related 
to the accident, place the figure at up to 30 000; See further Marples, D.R., 1996.
382 On the hopes for such a new safety culture, see e.g. Peterson, S., Chernobyl Closes, Legacy Endures, 
8.12.2000, www.reliefweb.int/ocha. Chernobyl pages.
3Sj Statement o f  Mr. Jukka Laaksonen, Director General o f the Finnish Centre for Radiation and Nuclear 
Safety, as cited in Hufvudstadsbladet, 17.12.2000, p. 9.
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which such a “culture” actually changes.384 Despite this evidence o f disregard for safety 
and reluctance to develop a new culture, international efforts to deal with the aftermath of 
the accident are remarkable.385 Conferences, workshops and special programs and aid 
efforts of UN organizations, such as OCHA, WHO, FAO, IAEA, UNSCEAR, UNDP, 
UNESCO, UNICEF, ILO and WMO, along with organizations such as the EU, IFRC, and 
EBRD make for an entire process o f activities to deal with the consequences o f and to learn 
from the accident.386
II. The Questions It Raised About State Responsibility and Liability
The Chernobyl and Sandoz accidents may serve as examples of the difficulties involved in 
attributing state responsibility for a failure to warn. Under international treaty law, the 
Sandoz accident posed several questions related to claims for compensation. When the 
Sandoz conflagration led to heavy pollution of the Rhine, 387 the 1976 Convention for the 
Protection of the Rhine Against Chemical Pollution was violated in at least two aspects. 
Firstly, the inadequate storage of the chemicals and the insufficient safety measures were 
contrary to Article 7 of the Convention. Secondly, the 24-hour delay in accident 
information, setting off the Rhine alarm, was a violation o f Article 11.
The authorities o f the Swiss Confederation did not violate as such their legislative duty to 
co-operate, but they failed to take adequate controlling measures in relation to its 
pharmaceuticals industry.388 This highlighted the issue o f causality. It is clear that large-
384 An equivalent example is found in the circumstances surrounding the demise of the submarine Kursk 
earlier in the same year, in August 2000.
385 See UN GA Resolutions on Chernobyl: 45/190, 21.12 1990; 46/150, 18.12 1991; 47/165, 5.4 1993; 
48/206,14.3 1994; 50/134,16.2 1996; 52/172, 18.2 1998; 54/97, 28.1 2000.
386 See www.reliefweb.int/ocha for the heading “International Cooperation on Chernobyl”.
387 See Bericht der Bundesregierung iiber die Verunreinigung des Rheins durch die Brandkaiastrophe bei der 
Sandoz AG/Basel undweitere Chemieunfalle, UmweltbriefNo. 34, 12.2.1987 and Annex I; Rest, A ., ' 1987a, 
pp. 160-176; Rest, A., 1987b, pp. 59-65; Schwabach, A., 1989, pp. 443-480; Jessurun d’OIiveira, H.U., 1991, 
pp. 429-445.
388 Rest, A., 1987a, p. 164; Kiss, A-C, 1987; And on the responsibility of Swiss government for lack of due 
diligence, see Report o f the International Law Commission, Fifty-third session, 23 April-1 June and 2 July-10 
August, 2001, GAOR, Fifty-sixth, Suppl. No 10, A/56/10, pp. 130-132, Commentary, p. 393 (at 
http://wyvw.un. org/law/tlc/reports/2001 /2001 report.htm).
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scale damage was inflicted to the Rhine, and the contributory effect of the negligence o f  
Swiss officials is likewise beyond doubt. Thus, even criteria for significant and u n u s u a l  
damage could be argued to have been filled, and the basis for fault set.389 The co n trib u to ry  
causation o f  pollution by the Swiss authorities placed the incident at the level o f p u b l ic  
international law. Was not the failure of the Swiss authorities to inform about the S a n d o z  
accident clearly an internationally wrongful act that would give rise to state responsib ility?  
Yet, no public international claims were brought in the case,390 although the R h in e  
Convention provides for an arbitration clause (Article 15). The Swiss government o ffe re d  
its good offices to reach the peaceful settlement o f any disputes.
The Chernobyl accident offers the other concrete example through which the question o f  
state responsibility and liability can be examined.391 At the time of the Chernobyl acc iden t 
the international law pertaining to pollution by nuclear emissions was considerably le ss  
developed than it is today after inter alia the entry into force of the two IA E A  
Conventions.392 In response to the nuclear accident at Three Mile Island in 1979, the IA E A  
published guidelines in 1984 and 1985 on information exchange and mutual assistance,393 
but no multilateral treaties were adopted. One treaty o f relevance for the 1986 setting w as 
the 1979 ECE Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution.394 Article 8 o f the 
Convention, on the exchange of information, is silent on the issue of accident information, 
referring entirely to long-term monitoring and preventive measures. Likewise, Article 5 
merely refers to consultations to be held at an early stage o f risk o f transboundary air
389 Ibid, p. 168. This reflects the high threshold set in the Trail Smelter arbitration, see supra ch. 1.2.
390 See further Schwabach, A., 1989, pp. 443 et seq.
391 See Boyle, A., ’Chernobyl..., 1990, pp. 203-219; Levy, R.E., 1989, pp. 617-667; Politi, M., 1991, pp. 
473-490.
392 See, e.g., Scovazzi, T., 1986, pp. 651 et seq.; Adede, A.O., 1987. One treaty which could have been 
relevant in the Chernobyl situation was the Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage and Optional 
Protocol, Vienna, 21.5. 1963, entry into force 12.11.1977. The USSR was, however, not party to the 
Convention.
393 Guidelines on Reportable Events, Integrated Planning and Information Exchange in a Transboundary 
Release of Radioactive Materials, January 1985, IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/321; Guidelines for Mutual 
Emergency Assistance Arrangements in Connection with a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, 
January 1984, IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/310.
394 Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution, Geneva, 13.11.1979, entry into force 16.3.1983. 
On the Convention in general, see Fraenkel, A., 1989, pp. 456-476.
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pollution. Thus, the Convention neither provides for an accident information duty395 nor 
expressly applies to pollution by radioactive materials,396
In contrast to the Sandoz situation, it appears clear that the Soviet Union was under no 
obligation in international treaty law to provide prompt notification about the accident. Just 
as in the Sandoz incident, however, the effects on the environment were enormous, and the 
contributory effect of the silence o f the Soviet officials would be difficult to question. In the 
above examples, the states may well thus already have breached their duties under 
customary international law to inform of the accidents. However, for complex political and 
other reasons, no claims were made under public international law in either case.
II.I. In Treaty Law and General International Law
What are the possible legal consequences of a state failure to implement its duty under 
international law to inform on transboundary environmental accidents? The question is 
crucial, but one for which no easy answer can be found. Questions o f responsibility and 
subsequent liability397 are not primarily in line with a preventive approach to global 
environmental concerns, yet lack of information may be assumed to slow down or prevent 
the mitigation o f the effects of an accident.398 Sanctionary potential may, thus, in itself have
395 Kiss, A.C., 1986, p. 141; Sands, P., 1988, p. 37.
396 The definition in Article 1 of air pollution simply mentions "substances or energy", although the Preamble, 
in connection to mentioning the basis of the Convention in the Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on 
Security and Co-operation in Europe, provides for a programme "starting with sulphur dioxide and with 
possible extension to other pollutants". Extensions made through the new Protocols have, however, not 
included radioactive pollutants.
397 The aim here is merely to point out some of the most central questions attached to state responsibility for a 
failure to inform on environmental accidents. For the purposes of this study, responsibility denotes the duty of 
states to answer for the breach o f a legal obligation, whereas liability is primarily understood to mean the 
responsibility of states, as a next step, to compensate for damage.
398 On the national level an increase in environmental concerns may be leading to what in the law of tort 
seems to be the acknowledgement of more circumstances where liability is established for omissions, see 
Green, M., 1990, pp. 248-249. The tort law of at least some countries has developed towards the recognition 
of a duty to act also when risk creation has occurred without the fault of the defendant, Prosser..^ 1984, p. 
377; For a survey on liability for failure to warn in the EC, see Will, M.R., 1990, p. 275 et seq.; in English 
tort law the failure to fulfil a duty to warn of imminent danger is one such nonfeasance which may lead to 
claims for compensation, see Logie, J.G., 1989, pp. 115, 117; more generally on tort law and accidents, see 
Cassels, J., 1993, pp. 54-109; in the United States, the trend brought forth with the federal Emergency 
Planning and Community Right to Know Act (EPCRA), 1986, 42 U.S.C. 11001 (also referred to as the
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some preventive effect, and funds from compensation for damage may be necessary for th e  
payment o f clean-up costs. Another argument for the need for liability is that it may o ffe r a  
method o f internalizing the costs o f dangerous activities.399
The issue o f  state responsibility for failure to inform may first be examined in the co n tex t 
o f  treaty law. Typically, environmental treaties, as well exemplified by Article 12 o f  th e  
Mediterranean Convention, provide that:
[t]he Contracting Parties undertake to co-operate as soon as possible in th e  
formulation and adoption o f  appropriate procedures for the determination o f liab ility  
and compensation for damage resulting from the pollution o f the m arine 
environment deriving from violations o f the provisions o f this Convention a n d  
applicable Protocols.
Such texts provide for examples o f  at least some measure o f acknowledgement that state  
conduct related to activities regulated by an agreement should be subject to responsibility 
and consequent liability. Equivalent notice of the need to develop state responsibility an d  
liability is taken, for instance, in some other Regional Seas Conventions,400 the 1974 and 
1992 Baltic Sea Convention, the 1988 CRAMRA,401 and the 1982 LOSC.402 The latter 
exemplifies very well the incomplete nature o f existing treaty-based notions of state 
responsibility: it first connects responsibility to the general need for states to fulfil their 
international obligations (pacta sunt servanda), and then provides that:
...States shall co-operate in the implementation o f  existing international law and the 
further development o f international law relating to responsibility and liability for 
the assessment of and compensation for damage...
Superfund Amendments Re-authorization Act of 1986 (SARA), Title III) was one which shifted the burden 
and responsibility o f safety measures to the state and local level, see further Baram, M.S., 1990, pp. 67-68, 
83-87, and see Scott, R., 1990, pp. 969-979.
399 See Doeker, G. & T. Gehring, 1990, pp. 1-4.
400 E.g., Article XIII of the 1978 Kuwait Convention; Article 15 o f the 1981 Abidjan West and Central 
African Convention; Article 11 o f the 1981 Lima South-East Pacific Convention; Article XIII of the 1982 
Jeddah Gulf o f Aden Convention; Article 14 o f the 1983 Cartagena de Indias Wider Caribbean Convention; 
Article 15 o f the 1985 Nairobi East African Convention; Article 20 of the 1986 Noumea South Pacific 
Convention. See supra Ch. 2.2.
401 Convention on the Regulation o f Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities, Wellington, 2.6.1988, not in 
force, Article 8. Generally, see Rothwell, D.R., 1996 and also 2000; But see North East Atlantic Convention.
402 Section 9, Article 235.
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Thus, the Article makes a full circle. "Existing” international law supposedly ought to 
show the way, but the inadeqacy o f the law is reflected in the express need to develop it. 
Another example illustrative o f the difficulties in developing responsibility provisions is 
provided by the 1992 Helsinki Baltic Convention, superseding the 1974 Convention.403 In 
the 1992 text the only difference in wording on developing state responsibility for damage 
was the omission of the "as soon as possible” criterion that had appeared in the 1974 text, 
and, another decade later, no substantive development of state responsibility has yet 
happened under that Convention.
Among the astonishing number o f treaties, including those bearing on the state duty to 
inform with regard to accidents, the great majority do not establish clear rules on state 
responsibility, and only under a few treaties have there been any concrete efforts to develop 
protocols on liability.404 Two outstanding examples are perhaps found, first, in the 
negotiations for a bio*safety Protocol under Article 19(3) of the 1992 Biodiversity 
Convention. The process has been marred by great polarization between African and Asian 
countries on the one hand, and many industrialized countries on the other hand. The 
protocol now provides for elaboration o f rules on liability within three years o f the coming 
into force o f the Protocol.405 The second example is found under the 1989 Basel 
Convention on the Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes, under which a 
liability and compensation Protocol has been adopted. Although there are considerable 
weaknesses in the Protocol (further dealt with below in Chapter 3 in the specific context of 
procedural aspects of waste trade), it is in itself remarkable that such an instrument on third 
party liability has at all been elaborated406 - other interesting developments in private
403 Articles 17 and 25 respectively. See supra ch. 2.2.
404 See ILC: Rao, Second Report, pp. 18-22 for a few examples o f protocol negotiations.
405 See draft article 25, UNEP/CBD/ExCOP/1/2, p. 32.
406 Protocol on Liability and Compensation for Damage Resulting from the Transboundary Movement of 
Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, Basel 10.12.1999, not in force; As o f Dec. 2000 the Protocol has 13 
signatories, of which none are African states; Both strict liability and fault-based liability appear in the 
Protocol. The notifier is strictly liable for damage until the movement document has been signed by the 
disposer. After that, the disposer is liable for damage. If only one contractor is Party to the Convention, strict 
liability is applied to damages while that Party possesses control of the waste. Fault-based liability is applied 
for failures to comply with the Convention or for wrongful intentional, reckless or negligent acts or 
omissions, see Articles 4 and 5; See generally Wolfrum, R. & C. Langenfeld, eds., 1999; and Choksi, S., 
2001.
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liability are found in maritime law, where the 1996 HNS Convention introduces s t r i c t  
liability for ship-owners and compulsory insurances and insurance certificates.407
Obviously, all conceivable situations are not covered by treaty law. Could then the f a i lu re  
to inform about another Chernobyl or Sandoz-type accident lead to demands under g e n e ra l 
international law for the international responsibility o f the state? No claims were b ro u g h t 
regarding the Sandoz or Chernobyl accidents on the basis of general international law, b u t i t  
is noteworthy that precisely these two accidents have considerably influenced the p re sen t 
conception o f the need to inform. In the 1972 Stockholm Declaration,408 the two princip les 
relevant for responsibility and liability are quite general and vague in character. P rincip le
21 combines the notion o f state responsibility with the notion of state sovereignty. P rinciple
22 provides that:
States shall co-operate to develop further the international law regarding liability  
and compensation for the victims of pollution and other environmental dam age 
caused by activities within the jurisdiction or control of such States to areas beyond 
their jurisdiction.
This text, as well as the equivalent Principle 13 o f the Rio Declaration, is strikingly sim ilar 
to those treaty provisions mentioned above which have been adopted since the Stockholm 
and, also, the Rio Conferences. Although the text (like most treaty texts) only refers to the 
need for future development o f the liability issue, it has still been argued to function as an 
expression o f the existence of some basic norms on state responsibility or liability,409 the 
argument supposedly being that one cannot develop something which does not already 
exist, however embryonic. Yet this development has been slow.
The Corfu Channel case dealt with the responsibility o f  Albania for its failure to warn 
British warships about the mines present in its waters, that is, a wrongful act. The case
407 International Convention on Liability and Compensation for Damages in Connection with the Carriage of 
Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea (the HNS Convention), London, 3.5 1996, not in force; see 
generally Odier, F., 1997; Ganten, R.H., 1997; Rengifo, A., 1997; Wolfrum, R. & C. Langenfeld, eds., 1999; 
and see 4 IMO News 1998, pp. 8-11 on background to the Protocol on Preparedness, Response and Co­
operation to Pollution Incidents by Hazardous and Noxious Substances (OPRC-HNS Protocol), London, 15.3 
2000, not in force.
408 See also Dupuy, P-M, 1980, pp. 371-374.
409 See, e.g., Rosas, A. & Z. Brodecki, 1990, p. 8.
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notably did not deal with environmental concerns as such,410 but its reference to “acts 
contrary to the rights o f other states” has later been argued to cover environmental 
hazards.411 As will be recalled, the Lake Lanoux412 arbitration was based on a bilateral 
treaty between France and Spain, and the contribution of the arbitration, that states are 
under an obligation not to change the waters o f a shared river to the serious injury of other 
states, seems to be more a reflection of duties of due diligence than state liability for result, 
that is, pollution. The ruling o f the Arbitral Tribunal in the Trail Smelter413 case between 
the United States and Canada was based on a bilateral arbitration agreement rather than 
general international law. The early Chorzow Factory414 case points in the same direction 
as the other cases: that liability to pay compensation will arise with the wrongful act of a 
breach o f an international obligation, a prerequisite often beyond fulfilment in 
environmental matters. Although these and other relevant cases mostly point towards 
responsibility for wrongful acts, there may nonetheless also be some cases that lend support 
to the acceptance of the notion o f state liability without any wrongful act.415 The origin of 
the primary obligation that is alleged to have been breached, be it treaty, custom or any 
other source o f international law, is however, as affirmed in the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros 
case,416 *of no consequence for state responsibility.
Finally, remarkable advances have been reached recently by the International Law 
Commission, which has finished its work of several decades on drafting principles on state
410ICJ Reports, 1949, p. 4.
411 Bimie, P. & A. Boyle, 2002, p. 136.
41212 RIAA, 1957, p. 285.
413 3 RIAA, 1941, p. 1905.
™ PCIJ,Ser.A, No. 13,1928.
415 The Secretariat of the ILC has, in its document Survey o f  Liability Regimes Relevant to the Topic of 
International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising Out o f  Acts Not Prohibited by International Law, 
23.6.1995, A/CN.4/471, pointed out that *'[e]ven when States have refused to accept liability as a legal 
principle, they have nevertheless acted as though they accepted such liability, whatever the terms used to 
describe their position", p. 62. On other cases, see further pp. 62-69.
416 Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Dam, ICJ Reports 1997, pp. 38-39, para. 47; See also 
Rainbow Warrior case (New Zealand-France), UNRIAA, vol. XX, 1990, p. 251, para. 75, which speaks of 
“any violation by a State of any obligation, o f whatever origin, gives rise to State responsibility and 
consequently, to the duty of reparation”; The Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited,
Second Phase, ICJ Reports 1970, p. 46, para. 86, in turn mentions “breach of an international obligation 
arising out of a treaty or a general rule of law”.
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responsibility.417 Although it still remains to be seen how the principles are met by s ta te s ,  
the ILC managed to clarify several points that had been confusing in earlier drafts. I n  
particular the decision to leave out express reference to obligations of conduct, result a n d  
prevention, which had appeared earlier418 clarifies the understanding that s ta te  
responsibility is only dependent on two criteria, those o f wrongfulness and attribution to  a  
state 419
But as Crawford and Bodeau acknowledge, “the terms ‘obligations o f conduct’ a n d  
‘obligations of result’ have much currency in international law”420 and the ILC draft is le f t  
with the notion of the “character” of international obligations, further elaborated in th e  
Commissions commentary to its draft.421 Thus, in trying to understand how s ta te  
responsibility relates to failures to inform, one might profit most from resorting to th e  
method used by some writers to concentrate on the primary rule422 It is, in one argument, a  
rule relating to conduct (o f states), as opposed to result. States may under a specific trea ty  
have a clear information duty, but the duty is not unlimited. It essentially places on the state  
a duty to act with due diligence,423 to do its best in establishing such legal, technical and
4.7 Report o f  the International Law Commission, Fifty-third session, 23 April-1 June and 2 July-10 August, 
2001, GAOR, Fifty-sixth, Suppl. No 10, A/56/10, at http://www.un.org/law/ilc/reDorts/2001 /2001 report.htm. 
On the process, see Spinedi, M. & B. Simma, 1987; Crawford, J. & P. Bodeau, 2000, pp. 45-54; and 
Crawford, J., J. Peel & S. Olleson, 2001.
4.8 For discussions on the confusions that these misleading notions have given rise to, especially through 
analogies to some national legal systems, see Crawford, J., 1999, pp. 440-442; and see Dupuy, P-M, 1999, 
pp. 374-382.
419 See Dominicé, C., 1999, for further discussion: “There is no additional criterion. The quantitative element 
is merely relevant with respect to the reaction o f other states. The breach of a multilateral obligation gives to 
the injured state the normal rights o f the ‘victim’, whereas the other states are not ‘victims’ but are entitled to 
take measures aiming at the cessation o f a conduct in breach o f that obligation, without prejudice o f 
conventional systems”, p. 353.
420 Crawford, J. & P. Bodeau, 2000, p. 47.
421 Report o f the International Law Commission, Fifty-third session, 23 April-1 June and 2 July-10 August, 
2001, GAOR, Fifty-sixth, Suppl. No 10, A/56/10, pp. 130-132, Commentary to Article 12 (at 
http://www.un.org/law/ilc/reports/2001/2001report.htm>: Further see Crawford, J., 1999, pp. 440-441; 
Crawford, J. & P. Bodeau, 2000, pp. 46-47.
422 See Pisillo-Mazzeschi, R., 1991, pp. 21-33.
42j On this concept, see Pisillo-Mazzeschi, R., 1989; and 1992, pp. 9-51; also ibid., 1991, pp. 15-35, esp. p. 
19. See also Bimie, P. & A. Boyle, 1992, pp. 141-142; See Report o f  the First Meeting o f  the Competent 
Authorities Identified under the Convention on Early Notification o f  a Nuclear Accident and Convention on 
Assistance in the Case o f  a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, IAEA, Vienna, 18-22.6. 2001,
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institutional structures which enable the transmission o f information in a way prescribed by 
the treaty. Consequently, the breach of a treaty obligation on accident information would be 
one that entails the responsibility of the state424 for fault or, as expressed in relation to the 
primary obligation, lack o f diligence. It has been argued above that the state duty to inform 
of environmental accidents, is „well, grounded in. general international law. The various 
industrial and other activities that may lead to accidents with transboundary effects are 
usually not in themselves unlawful. States may, however, act wrongfully if they do not take 
measures to inform other states o f  imminent danger. A minimum argument would be that 
unless states take all possible efforts to fulfil this obligation, they are, just as under treaty 
law, in breach of an international obligation o f due diligence and responsible for it. At this 
junction it is important to point out that the primary concern here is the responsibility of 
states for failure to inform with respect to accidents originating from their own territory, 
jurisdiction or control. So far, it is highly unlikely that states that fail to inform with respect 
to accidents originating from another state would accept any type o f responsibility. This 
latter type o f information duty is preventive, with a basis in good faith and co-operation. It 
cannot be excluded, however, that the future could, and perhaps should, see developments 
that embrace also international responsibility and liability in this regard. For the moment, 
such arguments still seem tenuous; they could find support in doctrine, but hardly in 
concrete state practice.
Besides different variations of thought regarding responsibility based on due diligence or 
conduct or means, the issue has sometimes been taken to the realm of results or even risks 
of adverse effects. The failure to give accident information can lead to great problems in the 
mitigation of effects. One argument could therefore be that the duty to inform is a rule of 
result, it is there to prevent further harm.425 Possibly, the argument could then be attached 
that, if  a very high degree of hazard is involved in the activity in question, the duty to 
inform might need to be even more meticulously observed.426 Regardless of due diligence,
para. 11: “determining what an accident is in the sense used in the Convention is left to the precautionary 
judgment of the State in their exercise of due diligence”.
424 See Politi, M., 1990, p. 476: "it is obvious that future violations o f primary obligations imposed on States 
Parties by treaty rules on prevention or mitigation o f transboundary nuclear harm will entail State 
responsibility for wrongful acts and the duty o f the violator to compensate".
424 On the careful wording on “injury” in the ILC Draft on State Responsibility, see Commentary and further 
Crawford, J., J. Peel & S. Olleson, 2001, pp. 973-974.
426 This would correspond to the understanding above in Chapter 1 that greater risk involves greater need for 
precautionary measures in order to prevent harm.
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the omission of information could therefore lead to responsibility, 427 and this ty p e  of 
breach o f obligation could well correspond to standards of strict liability.428 In sh o rt, th is  
could entail a reversal in the onus o f proof. A state that neglected its duty to inform w o u ld  
be held liable, without the need for other states to prove the relationship between la c k  o f  
information and subsequent harm. It would be up to the failing state to prove th e  n o n ­
existence o f a contributory effect. The failure to inform of an accident might thus, a s  i t  
were, augment the liability o f a state for the harm that has been caused by an a c c id e n t  
originating from the territory, jurisdiction or control o f  that state.
Both o f  the above arguments on state responsibility for breach of obligation, whether b a s e d  
on due diligence or stricter standards o f responsibility, seem perfectly plausible, a lw a y s  
depending on the interpretation given to the standard set in the primary rule. G enera lly , 
they are perhaps to be applied, respectively, to most risk situations and to very hazardous 
activities. According to some writers in the early 1990s the trend may be going f ro m  
liability based on fault (or due diligence) in the direction of strict liability,429 particularly  
regarding ultra-hazardous activities,430 which may be correct although more recen t 
environmental treaties do not seem to further reinforce the beginning o f  such a general 
trend. This is the junction where the confusion between wrongful and non-wrongful a c ts  
easily makes an entrance. The arguments on conduct versus result-based responsibility
427 Some writers would call this “objective responsibility”, see Pisillo-Mazzeschi, R., 1991.
428 See e.g., Bimie, P. & A. Boyle, 1992, pp. 143, 149. The Corfu Channel case, which based Albania's 
responsibility precisely on its knowledge of the risk of harm, has sometimes been used to support this view. It 
does, however, seem much too tenuous an argument, see Handl, G., 1980, p. 537.
429 On trend towards stricter liability see e.g. ECE, Guidelines on Responsibility and Liability regarding 
Transboundary Water Pollution, 1.3 1990, ENVWA/R.45, which provide for liability also when due care has 
been observed:
17. Liability of States entails the duty of States to provide or to ensure prompt and adequate 
compensation in case o f damage suffered by other States or persons resulting from a hazardous 
activity not prohibited by international law performed by them or by persons within their jurisdiction 
or control. This includes liability in case o f damage resulting from accidental transboundary water 
pollution when standards of due care or due diligence have been observed.
In addition to taking a stand in favour o f stricter liability, the ECE Guidelines make relatively far-reaching 
attempts to define several central concepts. Thus, for instance, the notion of damage is understood to also 
include the cost o f any preventive measures taken in order to prevent or abate pollution (Article 1 (m)).
430 See e.g., Rest, A., 1987 b, p. 62; Doeker, G. & T. Gehring, 1990, pp. 1-4; Rosas, A., 1991, p. 31; but c f  
Soljan, L, 1989, p. 209, who writes that “western States in particular have never liked the notion of strict 
liability” and refers to the European Commission’s Fifth Environmental Action Programme, which states that 
liability is a “tool o f last resort” to punish despoliation of the environment.
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function to blur the issue o f state responsibility, which ought only be based on 
wrongfulness, but, on the other hand, they also point at the exceptional complexity of 
transboundary environmental problems, which usually spring from perfectly legal activities. 
Thus a failure to inform, which rests on a duty argued to represent general international 
law, and which should lead to state responsibility, seems “simpler” a problem than its 
physical results, the pollution or other harm that it may lead to. Yet a separation of cause 
and effects in such a situation would be short-sighted, and very demonstrative of the 
shortcomings of international law to deal, after the fact, with environmental issues. 
Welcome as efforts towards stricter liability might be, it remains central that the complexity 
of transboundary pollution cannot be met by the concepts fault or strict liability only, but, 
as Pinto notes, it "require[s] examination in the light o f a variety o f factors which can be 
adequately revealed and significantly applied only through the positive co-operation of 
States concerned, procured through a regime built with principles of customary law derived 
from existing treaties and supported by 'an obligation to co-operate"*.431
In the Sandoz and Chernobyl examples above, no treaty law was available for the 
establishment of a state duty to compensate for damage caused to neighbouring states. The 
situations are representative of international environmental law as a whole. While several 
treaties on the civil liability for certain kinds o f environmental damage exist,432
431 Pinto, M.C.W., 1985, pp. 36-37.
432 See Wetterstein, P., 1990, pp. 61-62; and see Lee, M., 2000; Granet, M-B, 2001, pp. 795-801; Several of 
the relevant treaties are not in force and have only a limited number of signatories or ratifications: See e.g. 
Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, Paris, 29.7,1960, in force 1.4.1968; 
Convention Supplementary to the Paris Convention of 29.7.1960 on Third Party Liability in the Field of 
Nuclear Energy, Brussels, 31.1.1963, in force 4.12.1974 (amended 28,1.1964, in force 16.12.1974); 
Convention on die Liability of Operators o f Nuclear Ships, Brussels, 25.5.1962, not in force; Convention on 
Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, Vienna, 21.5.1963, in force 12.11.1977; International Convention on 
Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, Brussels, 29.11. 1969, in force 19.6.1975; Protocol, London, 
19.11.1976, in force 8.4.198; Protocol, London, 27.11.1992, in force 30.5.1996; Convention relating to Civil 
Liability in the Field of Maritime Carriage o f Nuclear Material, Brussels, 17.12.1971, in force 15.7.1975; 
International Convention on the Establishment o f an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution 
Damage, Brussels, 18.12.1971, in force 16.10.1978; Protocol, London, 19.11.1976, in force 8.4.1981; 
Protocol, London, 27.11.1992, in force 30.5.1996; Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage 
Resulting from Exploration for and Exploitation of Seabed Mineral Resources, London, 1.5.1977, not in 
force; Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities, Wellington, 2.6.1988, not in 
force; Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Caused during Carriage o f Dangerous Goods by Road, Rail 
and Inland Navigation Vessels, Geneva, 10.10.1989, not in force; Convention on Civil Liability for Damage 
Resulting from Activities Dangerous to the Environment, Lugano, 21.6.1993, not in force; International 
Convention on Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage, London, 23.3.2001, not in force; Finally, see 
the International Convention on Liability and Compensation for Damages in Connection with the Carriage of 
Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea (the HNS Convention), London, 3.5.1996, not in force, which
international treaties establishing clear state liability for conduct harmful to the n a tu ra l  
environment are very few and far between.433 Despite their often only partial adherence to  
the polluter pays-principle, it has been argued that civil liability schemes should n o t b e  
overlooked.434 Some o f the civil liability schemes provide for residual state liability to  p a y  
part o f  the compensation, to contribute to an international compensation fund, or to e n su re  
the payment of compensation.435 In fact, the roles o f the various actors may partly co in c id e  
with or complement each other. The failure to inform o f  an accident may in practice w ell b e  
caused by a "chain" o f omissions by different actors. This ought to be reflected in  th e  
attribution o f liability.436
Interestingly enough, some governments did reserve their right to make claims regard ing  
the damage created by the Chernobyl accident.437 Their subsequent unwillingness to  a c t 
upon the basis of notions of customary law do, however, highlight the political obstacles 
which have so far been insurmountable for states in fear of reciprocity. Despite th e  
standstill on this issue, it cannot be excluded that future accidents o f the same, or lesser, 
magnitude would give rise to claims for compensation. Although the customary norms m a y  
be somewhat difficult to establish, the international legal system today is in search o f
only has a handful of signatories and two ratifications (1/2002), but which introduces strict liability for the 
shipowner and compulsory insurance and insurance certificates.
433 The Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, 1972, in force 1.9.1972, 
creates absolute liability for the launching state for damage inflicted on Earth by its space objects. Harm 
caused by space objects could, o f course, be o f an "environmental" character, but die Convention only refers 
to property, health and life.
434 See further in Betlem, G., 1993; In contrast, according to Sands, P., 1989, p. 409, the "[Paris and Vienna] 
Conventions are worse than nothing" in terms o f environmental protection while they "encourage negligence 
by telling operators that even if an accident occurs they will be held liable only for a miniscule fraction o f its 
consequences, the remainder to be borne by the governments, citizens and future generations o f the operator 
and neighbouring states". On the ‘polluter pays’ principle see, e.g., Boyle, A., 1991 b, pp. 363-379; On civil 
liability in nuclear law, see Lee, M., 2000; and see Granet, M-B, 2001, pp. 795-80.
435 See generally, Handl, G., 1980, pp. 525-565; For an overview of civil liability schemes and their 
respective ways of establishing residual state liability, see Rosas, A., 1991, p. 38; Rosas, A. & Z. Brodecki, 
1990, p. 18; de La Fayette, L., 1992, pp. 450-451; Handl, G., 1993; Rosas, A., 1994.
436 Also the issue of liability to compensate for costs arisen due to so-called false alarms is largely unsolved. 
For false alarms on nuclear accidents, see St&hlberg, P., 1993, p. 387; But see CBSS: Agreement on the 
Exchange o f Radiation Monitoring Data, Hamburg, 7.6 2001, not in force. Under Article 2 unverified 
radiation data shall be declared as such and unverified data may not be made publicly available or available to 
third parties without the consent of the originator. This could play some role in preventing “false alarms” and 
confusing information exchange.
437 E.g., Sweden, the Federal Republic o f Germany and the United Kingdom. See Sands, P„ 1989, pp. 406- 
407.
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effective solutions, and future needs may well prove that the difficulties are both necessary
44A
and possible to overcome.
In the meantime, other methods of securing the implementation of environmental law have 
gained importance. Various institutional techniques have been developed, for instance, in 
the form o f non-compliance procedures, implementation review mechanisms, and reporting 
procedures, the last of which will be examined in detail in the next chapter. A legal device 
with some limited relevance for enhancing compliance with accident information duties 
could be the criminalization of a failure to inform.438 39 By introducing criminal responsibility 
for the failure to inform, states would give more incentive to individuals and corporations to 
comply with international law. This way, the masters o f ships and aircraft, operators of 
hazardous installations, owners o f transport businesses, and so on, would have, as it were, a 
more personal stake in hazard management.440
IIJI. In  the W ork of the International Law Commission
The evidence of the existence in general international law of state liability for harm, 
without wrongful acts,441 is considerably more uncertain than that on state responsibility for 
wrongful acts, which may now slowly be advancing after ILC efforts. Rest noted in 1987 
that although a principle o f risk liability is not yet perceptible in general international law, 
"this circumstance cannot [...] entail the categorical denial o f a customary international law 
principle of liability based on fault, because both institutions are currently still in the
438 On alternatives to civil liability in the form of emission charges, abatement agreements and risk penalties, 
see Sand, P.H., 1999, pp. 79-86.
439 In contrast, on the issue of international crimes of states, see ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility, i
Article 19, and e.g. Report o f the International Law Commission on the Work o f  Its Fiftieth Session, GAOR
A/53/10, pp. 108-168.
440 Some international documents and national constitutions refer to the individual's responsibilities vis-à-vis ?
the environment, see further Bimie, P. & A. Boyle, 1992, pp. 206-207; ibidL, p.289 on coastal state powers in 
relation to Article 211(5) of LOSC and Protocol I of MARPOL; See also the process by the ILC towards a 
Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, where wilful and severe damage to the 
environment (draft Article 26) was not included, see e.g. Special Rapporteur Doudou Thiam, Thirteenth 
Report on the Draft Code o f Crimes Against the Peace and Security o f Mankind, 1995, A/CN.4/466, and see 
A/CN.4/L.506, A/CN.4/L.5Q9 and Report o f  the International Law Commission on the Work o f  its Forty- 
seventh Session, GAOR A/50/10.
441 In the view of some writers, responsibility is only related to harm or risk o f harm, not to the breach of legal 
obligations. See further Bimie, P. & A. Boyle, 1992, p. 140.
'exception-to-the-rule* and not the 'either-or', or disjunctive, relation". This seems still v e r y  
much to be the case in the early 2000s.442 It would be an understatement to say th a t  t h e  
legal debate surrounding international liability, in the ILC sense of the concept, has b e e n  
confusing: it may nevertheless indicate the urgency with which effective solutions s h o u ld  
be sought.
It seems o f some interest therefore to examine what kind of relationship the ILC h a s  
attempted to establish between the accident information duty and state liability.443 A s  
already discussed in detail above, the work o f the ILC has recognized the duty of states t o  
notify on accidents. The argument that the accident information duty is o f  a cu sto m ary  
character or a general principle o f law, would normally lead to the ILC topic on s ta te  
responsibility444 since the breach o f an international obligation should, regardless o f  i t s  
origin or character, imply a wrongful act and lead to the responsibility of the acting state.445 
It is noteworthy that despite the initial character o f the information duty as a p rim ary  
norm,446 it has been placed by the ILC precisely in the context of "acts not prohibited b y  
international law".447 This is confusing, as is the whole o f the liability topic. The ILC w o rk  
o f the past decades first broadened the meaning o f responsibility1 and liability so that b o th
442 Rest, A., 1987 b, p. 62.
443 See also the Convention on the Law of the N on-navigational Uses of International Watercourses, New 
York, 21.5.1997, not in force, Article 28. On the development o f the emergency notification and prior 
notification duties, see Report o f  the International Law Commission on the Work o f  its Forty-sixth Session, 
GAOR A/49/10, pp. 195-326 (see further International Law Commission, 1982, Special Rapporteur Stephen 
Schwebel: Third Report on the Law o f  Non-navigational Uses o f International Watercourses. Article 10, 
paragraph 9 and see International Law Commission, 1989, Special Rapporteur Stephen McCaffrey: Fifth 
Report on the Law o f Non-navigational Uses o f International Watercourses. A/CN.4/421, Article 23.), but 
this does not add anything new to the question of liability for damages caused. See generally McCaffrey, S., 
1991, pp. 104-107 and McCaffrey, S., 1995, p. 395-404. See further Rosenstock, R., 1995, p. 392; 
McCaffrey, S. & M. Sinjela, 1998, pp. 97-107.
444 See generally Brownlie, I., 1990, p. 120 et seq.
445 One -  false - argument has sometimes been put forward that if the emphasis is put on e.g. the duty to 
inform only as a general principle of law - as opposed to a treaty or customary rule - then the whole issue 
becomes softer, and wrongfulness presumably could not arise from a failure to comply with the duty as such. 
Instead, if the duty is not complied with, and damage occurs to the affected state, then liability for actions 
may still be the result. This would, however, be a misuse both of the general principle of law label which, in 
this study, implies norms of a fundamental and, indeed, binding character, and of the principle of state 
responsibility, which is not dependent on the origin, source, o f the legal obligation allegedly breached.
446 The term “compound primary obligation” used earlier by the ILC consisted also of prevention, negotiation 
and reparation. See Quentin-Baxter: Fourth Report
447 See, e.g., McCaffrey, S., 1991, pp. 91-92 on the background of the separation of the two issues. See also 
Akehurst, M.B., 1985, p. 3 et seq.; Pinto, M.C.W., 1985, pp. 19*28; Barboza, J., 1994, pp. 301-318.
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included the obligation and its consequences, and then it became very preoccupied with re­
organizing the concepts. Indeed, the separation and consequent mixing of the responsibility 
and liability notions has not gone without criticism,448 and the Commission itself has 
recognized the need to clarify the conceptual confusion.449 This has happened through the 
development and clarification o f  the Draft on State Responsibility, but also under the 
liability heading in a decision to develop first draft articles on prevention and only then to 
move back to the main topic on liability.450
Procedural as the information duty may be, it is thus still connected to damage. In the 
context o f environmental accident information, the objective is minimization or abatement 
of already started pollution, rather than prevention proper. In the initial Schematic Outline 
the Special Rapporteur Quentin-Baxter showed a rather odd approach to the failure to 
inform. Section 2, paragraph 8 concluded that
[failure to take any step required by the rules contained in this section shall not in 
itself give rise to any right o f action.45’
Thus, the idea was that a failure to inform of a critical situation would not constitute a 
wrongful act giving rise to state responsibility for breach of obligation. Under the 
Schematic Outline, however,
[Reparation shall be made by the acting State to the affected State in respect o f any 
such loss or injury, unless it is established that the making of reparation for a loss or 
injury o f that kind or character is not in accordance with the shared expectations of 
those States.452
The notion o f "shared expectations" was truly vague. Could all Chemobyl-type nuclear 
reactors be expected to be so poorly constructed or operated that they inevitably give rise to
448 See Boyle, A., 1990 a, pp. 1-17; Bimie, P. & A. Boyle, 1992, pp. 139-141; Tomuschat. C,, 1991, pp. 37- 
72.
449 “The Working Group... noted that the scope and the content of the topic remained unclear due to such 
factors as conceptual and theoretical difficulties, appropriateness of the title and the relation of the subject to 
‘State Responsibility’.” Report o f  the International Law Commission on the Work o f its Forty-ninth Session, 
GAOR A/52/10, p. 130.
450 Ibid, p. 130-131.
451ILC, Quentin-Baxter: Fourth Report,; 1983 ILC Yearbook, vol 11, pt. I, p. 201; Section 2, paragraph 8.
452 Ibid, Section 4, para. 2.
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radiological safety problems? Since the Schematic Outline and subsequent reports 
expressly referred to lawful activities, great emphasis was placed on the balancing o f  
interests o f  the states concerned, thus providing for relative rather than absolute 
obligations.453 The failure to provide information was still connected with som e 
consequences related to the burden o f  proof:
To the extent that an acting State has not made available to an affected State 
information that is more accessible to the acting State concerning the nature and 
effects o f  an activity, and the means o f verifying and assessing that information, the 
affected State shall be allowed a liberal recourse to inferences o f  fact and 
circumstantial evidence in order to establish whether the activity does or may give 
rise to loss or injury.454
This must have been meant to be understood as a minimum benefit for the potentially- 
affected state, which had perhaps been unable to take preventive measures because o f lack 
o f adequate information.
The second Special Rapporteur to the ILC, Mr. Julio Barboza, introduced some new 
elements into the work.455 His emphasis first moved from liability based on due diligence 
and breach o f obligation towards strict liability as the main basis for the reparation duty.456 
The provision that liability arises when an injurious activity is not merely under the 
jurisdiction of the source state, but is also under its "effective control" led to some 
confusion as Quentin-Baxter used the term control to denote jurisdiction, whereas Barboza 
appears to have meant "ability to regulate" 457 458The inclusion o f the "appreciable" threshold 
for risk was noteworthy, as well as the widening of the scope of the Schematic Outline 
by including both "the low probability of very considerable (disastrous) transboundary
453 Ibid, Section 5. See also Levy, R.E., 1989, p. 661.
454 Ibid, Section 5, para. 4.
455 See generally McCaffrey, S., 1991, pp. 95-97.
456 ILC, Special Rapporteur Julio Barboza: Second Report on International Liability for Injurious 
Consequences Arising Out o f Acts Not Prohibited by International Law , 1986, para. 42-69. A/CN.4/402, 
(cited as Barboza: Second Report). On the notion strict liability, see further Handl, G., 1988 b, pp. 237-242.
457 See McCaffrey, S., 1991, pp. 97-98.
458 See ibid, p. 96.
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injury and the high probability of minor appreciable injury".459 Thus both slow 
environmental degradation and Chernobyl and Sandoz-type situations were included.
Secondly, the question o f a remedy for the breach of a procedural obligation took a slightly 
different tone. In his Second Report, Barboza proposed that the provision establishing that 
failure to fulfil procedural obligations would not give rise to any right of action would be 
omitted from the text.460 He pointed out that the proposed omission would not imply that 
failure to comply with procedural obligations would give rise to a right of action. Parian 
noted, in 1990, that the inclusion o f  a right of action for failure to fulfil, in his example, the 
information duty, would make it difficult for the ILC to reach a consensus in support of the 
liability rules.461
In the Sixth Report462 by Barboza, Draft Article 18 dealt with the issue as follows:
Failure on the part o f the State of origin to comply with the foregoing obligations 
shall not constitute grounds for affected States to institute proceedings, unless this is 
provided for in other international agreements in effect between the Parties. If, in 
these circumstances, the activity causes [appreciable] [significant] transboundary 
harm which can be causally attributed to it, the State o f origin may not invoke in its 
favour the provisions of article 23.
The hopes o f the Special Rapporteur were thus not fulfilled as the ILC kept the view that 
non-compliance should not be sufficient basis for cause o f action.463 The Special 
Rapporteur did, however, think that some consequences should be attached for non- 
compliance in order to give states incentives to comply. To that end, Article 18 provided for 
a strengthening o f the procedural duties through the inclusion o f the prohibition to invoke 
Article 23 on the reduction o f compensation payable to the affected states. Evidence thus
459 ILC, Special Rapporteur Julio Barboza: Fifth Report on International Liability for Injurious Consequences 
Arising Out o f Acts Not Prohibited by International Law, 1989, Art. 2, A/CN.4/423, (cited as Barboza: Fifth 
Report).
460 ILC, Barboza: Second Report, para. 39.
461 Partan, D.G., 1990, p. 174.
462 ILC, Barboza: Sixth Report„ Article 18.
463 Some members seem to have expressed concern over the possibility that Draft Article 18 would be 
interpreted as denying a right of action under particular treaties or otherwise outside of the Articles, such as 
under customary international law, ILC, Barboza: Sixth Report, p. 27.
123
became more important. As the Special Rapporteur expressed it, the refusal to fu l f i l  a 
preventive duty would "shift the presumption to [the acting state's] own disadvantage".464 
The consequence of a failure to inform would be a shift, perhaps partial, in the b u rd e n  o f  
proof. States failing to inform would themselves have to show that their lack o f action  h a d  
not caused further harm. This was an effort by the Special Rapporteur to give p ro c e d u ra l 
duties some "teeth".
Smith argued that a failure to "take the requisite procedural steps [...] might well su g g e s t 
’blameworthiness' affecting the measure of apportionment of reparation".465 The w ork  o f  
the 1LC also reflected that there were some members who found a shift in the burden o f  
proof insufficient, and who saw a need to elaborate a regime with more s ign ifican t 
consequences for failure to comply with procedural obligations. One understanding o f  su c h  
consequences was the creation o f responsibility for breaches,466 thus, once again, m ak in g  
the ILC work come full circle. This reflected notions prevalent already in the C o rfu  
Channel case. The focus was also on the question of what forms of satisfaction would b e  
applicable.467
After its 1992 session, the ILC reached something o f a standstill on the liability issue in  
favour o f considerations o f preventive measures.468 In 1995, the ILC provisionally adopted 
Article C, its very first article relating to liability and reparation.469 The article did not give 
any indication o f how the failure to fulfil procedural duties, such as one on accident 
information, would come to relate to liability under a future final Draft. As already
464 ILC, Special Rapporteur Julio Barboza: Third Report on International Liability for Injurious 
Consequences Arising Out o f Acts Not Prohibited by International Law, 1987, para. 179, A/CN .4/405 (cited 
as Barboza: Third Report).
465 Smith, B.D., 1988, p. 82.
466 See ILC, Barboza: Sixth Report, discussion around the proposals by the Special Rapporteur, 
A/CN.4/L.452, p. 27.
467As pecuniary compensation might be superfluous or impossible to demand, other methods might prove 
more successful. E.g. Stuckey suggested both traditional economic sanctions and such methods as the 
exclusion of a state from its position in an international organization, Stuckey, C.D., 1988, p. 711.
468 ILC, Barboza: Eighth Report, p. 6: "All these chapters [including chapter IV on state liability] are, as 
stated earlier, merely exploratory, and the new Commission should forget them for the moment".
469 In 1995 the ILC adopted on first reading four articles related to general principles: Article A 
(Freedom of action and the limits thereto), Article B (Prevention), Article C (Liability and reparation and 
Article D (co-operation), A/CN.4/L.511/Add (for earlier Drafting Committee version see A/CN.4/L.508).
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mentioned above in relation to the foundations o f the duty to inform, the Special 
Rapporteur, Mr. P.S. Rao, has continued the effort to finish first the work on prevention. 
His second report in 1999 did, however, include a short survey on how the liability issue 
has developed in treaty law,470 but the Commission decided to defer the topic o f liability 
until completion o f the second reading of the articles on prevention. One o f  the most 
interesting developments in relation to liability has been the opinion o f Special Rapporteur 
Rao, that deleting the words “acts not prohibited by international law” might secure a 
greater consensus for the draft articles. In his view, such a deletion would not make it 
imperative to review the provisions o f  the draft articles: i f  an activity was illegal, the draft 
articles ceased to apply and it became a matter of State responsibility.471 Clearly, the 
Special Rapporteur has been sensitive to the wide criticism that the topic and its conceptual 
difficulties has met.472 The 2001 session finally adopted a preamble and 19 draft articles, 
with commentaries, on “Prevention o f  Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities”,473
470 ILC, Special Rapporteur P.S. Rao, Second Report on International Liability for Injurious Consequences 
Arising out o f  Acts Not Prohibited by International Law (Prevention o f Transboundary Damage from 
Hazardous Activities), 1999, A/CN.4/501 (cited as ILC: Rao, Second Report).
471 Report o f the International Law Commission on the Work o f its Fifty-second Session, GAOR A/55/10, p. 
275 and 280.
472 See e.g. Lefeber, R., 1996, p. 226: “there are neither treaties in force nor other instances of consistent State 
practice that support the procedural approach to liability sine delicto as envisaged by the Special Rapporteur”. 
The Special Rapporteur himself refers to this criticism, ILC: Rao: Second Report, p. 22.
47 J Report of the International Law Commission, Fifty-third session, 23 April-1 June and 2 July-10 August, 
2001, GAOR, Fifty-sixth, Suppl. No 10, A/56/10, ch. V, pp. 366- 436, at
http://www.un.org/law/ilc/reports/2001 /2001 report.htm. The articles contain one rather interesting feature 
relating to the omission of risk information (as opposed to accident information). Article 11(1), which is 
essentially a consultation provision, stipulates that:
1. If a State has reasonable grounds to believe that an activity planned or carried out in the State of 
origin may involve a risk o f causing significant transboundary harm to it, it may request the State of 
origin to apply the provision of article 8. The request shall be accompanied by a documented 
explanation setting forth its grounds.
This is not a non-compliance procedure as it does not preclude whether the state o f origin has failed to 
comply with its notification duty or whether it has considered itself not bound by the duty to notify. It is also 
not meant to be misused by neighbouring states, but well-documented and based on reasonable grounds. The 
1998 commentary to the Article merely calls this provision a “second look” at the circumstances, and it is 
meant to lead either to a report under Article 8 or to consultations on the issue. It has been given some teeth 
however, by providing in Article 11(3) that the state of origin not only introduces appropriate and feasible 
measures to minimize the risk, but also, where appropriate, suspends the activity for a reasonable period. The 
elaboration of this type o f consultation provision by the ILC and some environmental treaties (e.g. 
Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, Article 3(7); Convention on 
the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, Article 18) is perhaps best seen as 
acknowledgements o f the principles of cooperation and precaution (as EIA procedures). C f  to earlier drafts in 
Report o f the International Law Commission on the Work o f Its Fiftieth Session, 1998, GAOR A/53/10, pp.
and it remains to be seen how the Commission will eventually re-start its work on l ia b il i ty .  
It may not be too far-fetched to make the argument that the weakness o f  present l ia b i l i ty  
schemes, including the conceptual confusion created by the ILC, has made it necessary  to  
develop other, often in principle weaker, procedural ways of enhancing state c o m p lia n ce  
with rules on environmental protection.
2.4. A n Assessment
There appears to be widespread acceptance o f the norm in international law that states a re  
under a duty to give immediate notification and information of physical danger o rig inating  
from their territory, jurisdiction or control. Dozens of multilateral treaties provide explic itly  
for duties to inform on environmental accidents, numerous bilateral agreements regulate th e  
same issue, and many international instruments of a soft law nature seem to reinforce th is  
norm, which is now well grounded in general international law. The 1992 Rio D eclaration 
s ta n d s  out as the most widely- accepted document, and state practice and opinio ju r is  
further support the existence o f a customary rule for states to give accident information. 
Although the Chernobyl and Sandoz accidents were dramatic and awakening examples o f  
the risks o f  industrial undertakings, states appear to share accident information more readily 
than they withhold it. According to Handl, " [experience with nuclear risk management 
suggests that relative to accident prevention, states view the ''internationalization” o f  the 
accident control phase o f hazard management as a less sensitive development, as less o f  an 
encroachment on what they may consider their sovereign prerogatives”.474 It is possible that 
humanitarian considerations play a decisive role at this juncture, as they enjoy a deeply 
rooted conviction of necessity.
The minimum contents of the accident information obligation are: firstly, that it is owed by 
one state to another, and although the duty belongs primarily to the state o f origin o f an 
accident, all states are under the preventive obligation to warn other states about potential 
transboundary environmental accidents o f which they possess knowledge. Secondly, the
60-62 and Report o f  the International Law Commission on the Work o f its Fifty-second Session, GAOR 
A/55/10, pp. 276,283-289.
474 Handl, G., 1989, p. 108; According to Francioni "[sjtates appear to feel a stronger duty to co-operate... in 
cases o f serious potential harm, even if the risk is very tenuous, than in the opposite cases o f high risk of 
pollution when the environmental damage that is likely to occur is not very serious or grave", 1991, p. 208.
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duty has some qualifications attached to it: it must be timely, relevant, comprehensive and 
comprehensible. Thirdly, the question of objective thresholds for activating the duty is still 
unsettled, but at the same time, the qualification of mere risk of transboundary effects may 
be sufficient when the consequences could be serious, and growing considerations of 
precaution give increased weight to this argument. Fourthly, the information duty is not 
wholly unrestricted, but may be subject to limitations of, for instance, national security 
concerns.
The state accident information duty is a procedural yet primary norm of international 
environmental law, and its particular strength is that it appears to be covered by a broad 
variety of normative sources o f law. Besides customary law, the accident information duty 
can be regarded as a general principle of law, possibly drawing normativity from national 
legal orders. Thus, the question o f rapid and reliable environmental information is one that 
highlights the tension between consent and lack of the same, a strain fully present in the 
making of international law on the environment.
A failure to provide accident information should, indeed, lead to state responsibility for a 
wrongful acts and entail subsequent liability. The lack o f success in resorting to the law of 
state responsibility and in developing functional liability schemes is perhaps a sign of the 
marginal role o f public international law as a means of pollution prevention. More trust 
should perhaps be given to NGOs, especially in the context o f mitigating harm to the global 
commons, but to be meaningful such often-voiced general assertions need more flesh on 
their bones. Surely, more obligations could be placed on individuals and private industry. 
This could, if one wants to take a traditional positivist stand, be done through efforts of 
criminalization o f  failures to inform, and importantly, through greater emphasis on funding 
and the quality o f transfers o f technology to developing countries. Also the role o f the mass 
media is crucial for the truthful and efficient disclosure o f  information on accidents.475 
There is the consideration that the media may now often be faster disseminators of 
environmental information than states. On the other hand speed is only one criterion of 
good information, and there may be risk of chaos and disproportional public fears due to 
immature news. Nevertheless, the positive and successful role o f the media is again one
475 See further Sands, P., 1995, p. 612.
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possible indication of a marginalized role of international law -  in the form of inform ation 
duties - in enhancing environmental protection.
Although one might generally argue that the state-to-state approach is hopelessly ou tdated  
and a slowing factor in the process of environmental protection, efficient accident 
information may, on the contrary, be dependent on strong, centralized institutional 
structures. States have resources that other actors do n o t Only one’s imagination sets the 
limits to the technological measures that could, one day, replace the present systems o f  
providing environmental information. The most technology-optimistic may dream o f  fu lly  
automatic control systems, but even a small portion of doubt amidst technology b e lie f  
functions to remind about the inevitability of human political will. States, not surveillance 
satellites and computerized communications systems, are still the main actors o f  
international law, and they carry the burden of the information duty. It is possible that the 
greatest incentive for states to share information is that the cost o f "mere" information is 
negligible compared to the contribution it gives as an easy initial step in the co-operation 
between states. The alternative to shared accident information is the even greater cost o f  
silence and subsequent loss in credibility.
As to the functions of accident information, writers - often from fields o f  the social 
sciences other than law - sometimes use the Chernobyl accident as a lesson for the future o f  
hazard management, that is, as a  positive endeavour to learn to deal with future 
accidents.476 47 Information flows are seen as central in such managerial approaches. 
Extremely optimistic, the ILC even sees contingency measures or measures o f preparedness 
as prevention or precaution. To call information after an accident precaution would be 
taking the concept not beyond its possible, still flexible, limits, but certainly to the far end 
o f credible interpretation. It is a caution, not a pure /^re-caution. Yet the greatest frustrations 
connected to those preventive procedures that information and notification duties
476 “(W)hile some scholars conclude that technological accidents can be prevented if certain conditions are 
met, and others suggest that accidents are inevitable in complex and tightly coupled systems, few would 
dispute the claim that some accidents are unfortunately likely to occur in countries or sectors where, for 
example, overconfidence may undermine prudent management of risky operations and products, or where 
scarce economic resources and political instability prevent safety from being a sufficiently high priority. 
Therefore, the analysis of the responses to, and learning from, major accidents is a task that must be 
continued,” Liberatore, A., 1999, p. 23.
477 Report o f  the International Law Commission on the Work o f  its Fifty-second Session, GAOR A/55/10, p. 
277.
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(especially post-accident or activity) represent is that one cannot be quite convinced that 
they always make a difference for the environment. This hesitancy would not come from a 
lack o f trust in the judgment o f  the ILC, but from the fact that there is so little concrete 
evidence that information would have really ameliorated the plight o f the environment, as 
opposed to helping single animals (e.g. out of an oil-slick) or as opposed to humanitarian 
help (e.g. to radiation victims).
As argued above, the dogmatic bases of different information duties are readily discernible. 
But rather than serving as a positive learning opportunity for the future, the “lessons” of the 
Chernobyl accident and following legal actions are depressing. Granted, the accident 
furthered the cause of legal development of duties to inform, but it also powerfully 
underlined the weaknesses o f the other end of international law, that of responsibility after 
the fact. Now true sadness would set in if both the weakness o f international law and  doubts 
about the environmental effects o f information had to be accepted at the same time. The 
relative lack o f options given by international law may be one (of perhaps many) reason(s) 
for the need for a managerial attitude, and it is easy to be sympathetic towards it. The idea 
of Special Rapporteur Rao o f the ILC that prevention would be “essentially a question of 
the management of risk”478 would have sounded unfamiliar a few decades ago, but it well 
reflects the mood of the 1990s and still remains very much valid in the early 2000s. 
Certainly, the years after the accident showed evidence o f a strong managerial ethic, where 
great efforts were put into creating and analysing procedural tools for environmental 
management. This theme continues in the next chapter on peer review.
47S ILC: Rao, Third Report, see Report o f  the International Law Commission on the Work o f its Fifty-second 
Session, GAOR A/55/10, p. 275.
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3. TO SUPERVISORY INFORMATION EXCHANGE...
3.1. Introduction
The "state information duties" discussed above are focused on the individual state and its 
obligations vis-à-vis other states. A  duty to inform is "activated" when there is special need 
for it, before the start of a project that could harm another state or in accident situations. 
This may be either treaty-based or customary. In contrast, the starting point for a 
supervisory method is always a treaty. By far the most frequently used, and perhaps the 
least sophisticated,479 supervisory method is “reporting”, that is, a form of self-assessment 
and peer review where the parties to environmental treaties submit information, which then 
functions as evidence, on how they and their peers have implemented and complied with 
the treaty in question.480 Different inspections and fact-finding missions are still more 
unusual ways o f verifying other states’ treaty compliance.481 Although some might see 
mere symbolic value in going through the motions of supervisory information exchanges, 
states frequently include provisions on information gathering and assessment in treaties, 
and this type o f “verification” is widely assumed to have a positive influence on the 
behaviour of states.482 According to Alston, in the human rights context, for several
479 For an early argument to this effect, Fischer, D.D., 1984, p. 166.
4,0 Sand P.H., 1999, pp. 276-277, writes that “the implementation o f agreements or instruments has mainly 
been influenced by such factors as financial resources, technical and scientific assistance, public information 
and national reporting duties. By contrast, international supervisory bodies, non-compliance procedures and 
dispute settlement procedures so far have not played a major role”; NB his separation of reporting duties from 
NCPs.
481 International law and cooperation know o f several types o f fact-finding, which will not be dealt with 
below, e.g., various inquiry procedures, conciliation commissions, truth commissions, the role o f the UN 
Secretary General, various rapporteurs under (esp. human rights) treaties, election monitoring, and monitoring 
o f political or other trials.
482 See CNS: Summary Report o f  the Contracting Parties’ First Review Meeting, 1999, see NUSAFE: 
www.iaea.org/worldatom/Documents/Legal: “ The Contracting Parties furthermore observed that the self- 
assessment process, starting with ratifying the Convention and preparing a National Report, had already 
initiated steps and measures by many Contracting Parties to improve implementation of their obligations”, p. 
2; And see Pawlak, S., 1991, p. 143; See also e.g. Ferreira, V., 1992, p. 279 for the conviction that the review 
of reports can ensure compliance; Fischer, W., 1992, p. 284: “verification, if  properly formulated, leads to 
confidence {...] and can lead to more co-operation”. Fischer uses the familiar arguments found in game 
theory for the need for verification, and makes the argument that most environmental treaties represent so- 
called co-ordination games which need low intrusiveness in verification, whereas climate change, being such 
a complex issue, lies somewhere between a co-ordination game and a dilemma game and therefore has a 
higher demand for intrusiveness. An arms control agreement would be a full-fledged dilemma type game, p. 
283. On this issue, see also di Primio, J.C., G. Stein, H.F. Wagner, 1992.
reasons, “the very act o f  reporting is significant”.483 This chapter tries to explore w h e th e r  
the same could be said for reporting under environmental treaties, that is, whether r e p o r ts  
could be said to accumulate relevant environmental information and how, if  at all, it m ig h t  
influence the evolution o f  international law on the environment.
In the words of one writer in the early 1990s, what we need is "less the adoption o f  n e w  
instruments than more effective implementation of existing ones".484 And, similarly, in  th e  
context o f human rights law, two authors in the year 2000 wrote that “the overriding 
challenge for the future is to develop the effectiveness o f [...] monitoring mechanisms” .485 
Agenda 21, adopted at UNCED in 1992, had already urged states to establish “efficient an d  
practical reporting systems on the effective, full and prompt implementation o f  
international legal instruments”486, and in the same vein, the ECE Lucem M inisterial 
Declaration urged states to elaborate non-compliance procedures (NCPs) in relation to  
environmental treaties. NCPs were meant to avoid complexity, be non-confrontational and  
transparent, leave competence for making decisions to the determination o f the contracting 
parties, allow contracting parties to consider what technical, technical-legal487 and financial 
assistance may be required within a specific treaty and, finally, to include a transparent and 
revealing reporting system and procedures as agreed to by the parties.488 This 1990s trend -  
still very much continuing - in both state practice and academic interest to stress 
effectiveness, implementation, compliance489 enhancement or elicitation,490 verification,491
483 Alston, P., 2000, p. 524: “the very act o f reporting is significant, as is the process of defending the report 
and responding to questioning. Similarly, even where the position of a government remains clearly unmoved 
by the entire process, the government itself should not be seen as the sole actor of importance. Opposition 
groups, civil society in general, the media, regional and international organisations and other states can all 
draw significant inferences from the critical conclusions drawn by the treaty bodies.”
484 Koskenniemi, M., ’Breach of Treaty or...’, 1992, p. 123.
485 Alston, P. & J. Crawford eds., 2000, Editors’ Preface, p. xv.
486 Agenda 21, Rio de Janeiro, 13.6 1992, UN Doc. A/CONF.151/26, chapter 39, para. 8(a).
487 Further on methods of legislative assistance and the transfer of legal-institutional innovations, see Sand, 
P.H., 1999, pp. 241-252.
488 Declaration by the Ministers o f the Environment of the Region of the United Nations Commission for 
Europe and the Member of the Commission o f the European Communities Responsible for the 
Environment, Lucem, 30.4.1993,7, para. 22.1; See further Handl, G., 1994, p. 327.
489 In legal literature and international documents alike the two terms are often used without prudent
differentiation. At the UNCED in 1992 a proposal for Chapter 39, para. 7(a) (now 8(a)) on Implementation
Mechanisms in Agenda 21 mentioned the term "compliance with international legal instruments", but the
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supervision492 and monitoring493 o f international obligations are the typical means of 
establishing the accountability494 o f  states vis-à-vis their environmental commitments, and, 
at the same time, concrete manifestations o f a “managerial ethic” in environmental 
protection.
wording was changed into the seemingly wider "effective, full and prompt implementation". The latter term 
often refers to a state's measures to make an international treaty applicable or enforceable under national law, 
that is, initial "paper-implementation". In a further distinction made by Jacobson and Brown Weiss, 
compliance may be understood to involve a change in behaviour o f the targeted actors, Jacobson, H. & E. 
Brown Weiss, 1994, pp. 4-6; Jacobson, H. & E. Brown Weiss, 1995, pp. 119-; Also Brown Weiss, E., 'New 
Directions...’, 1995, p. S.
490 Different verification methods may elicit compliance more or less effectively, or not at all. The terms used 
for describing elicitation processes partially overlap with classifications of verification. For instance, 
elicitation of compliance could be categorized as 1) reporting procedures, 2) implementation review 
mechanisms, and 3) mechanisms o f response to non-compliance, see Breitmeier, H. et a l 1995, p. 9. Thus, 
reporting could fall into both verification and elicitation, whereas some other forms of verification might be 
included in various review mechanisms; See generally Fox, H. & M.A. Meyer, eds., 1993; Kummer, K., 
1994; Fleischhauer, C-A., 1995.
491 The term verification (of compliance) is brought from international disarmament law. No exact legal 
definition of verification exists, see Pawlak, S., 1991 , p. 129.; The UNGA (Principle 13, General Assembly 
Resolution 43/81 B., 1988) has referred to verification as:
Verification o f compliance with the obligations imposed by an arms limitation and disarmament 
agreement is an activity conducted by the Parties to an arms limitation and disarmament agreement 
or by an organization at the request and with the explicit consent of the parties, and is an expression 
of the sovereign right of States to enter into such arrangements.
Verification involves the collection of information, analysis of the received information and a determination 
of compliance or non-compliance, see UN Doc. A/45/372, 28.8.1990, p. 28; In Sur’s definition, the term 
includes at least the establishment of facts, their legal assessment in relation to a certain norm and the 
political reaction to a determination of a violation of an international norm, Sur, S,, 1988, p. 7; In human 
rights law the terms prefered to verification are usually supervision or control.
492 In the context of environmental law, just as in disarmament law, the term verification is often seen as the 
main term describing supervision or control over state compliance. Considering the non-intrusive character of 
reporting methods, and the fact that many terminological choices exist, “verification” is rather ill-suited as the 
term of choice when one explicitly wants to put this type of supervision into a broader context of 
accumulation of environmental information. If, on the other hand, the challenging view that supervisory 
information exchange is of little value persists in the end, then there may be a case for new policy calls for 
“true verification”. Nonetheless, in order to indicate the terminological nuance and the confusion alike, 
supervision along with all other possible words and related concepts appear in this text. Generally, see 
Blokker, N. & S. Muller, 1994.
493 Monitoring is often done by technical means, such as satellite surveillance, and it aims at the collection of 
concrete information on the physical state of the environment. See e.g. the multifaceted work of the European 
Environment Agency (EEA), including its reports on the state of the environment in the EU, e.g. EEA: 
Environment in the European Union and the Turn o f  the Century, Luxembourg, 1999. And see Handl, G., 
2001, p. 102-104; Sometimes, however, the same term is used, also in environmental law, for administrative 
or expert or other supervision, see e.g. P.C. Szasz, 1999.
494 See Alston, P., 1996, pp. 24-27, where he notes that it is not the respective terms supervision, monitoring, 
verification, etc., which change in meaning over time and context, but the principle of accountability that 
ought to be focused on.
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Whether the political outcomes o f supervisory mechanisms can correspond to the actua l 
needs o f compliance enhancement remains a subject o f  contention, and a subject w hich  
criss-crosses several disciplines: legal, political, economic, even historic, sociological, 
statistical and many others, obviously including the natural sciences. The complexity, and  
vagueness, o f such concepts as treaty “efficiency”,493 *95 "effectiveness”496 and "change" in  
state behaviour has given birth to much confusion and incompatibility in recent research. 
So, while serving as a reminder about intricacy, this compels the legal writer to be cautious 
in dealing with the causal links and interaction between international law and this maze o f  
state behaviour and social sciences. The aim o f this chapter is thus not to search for p ro o f 
o f the cause and effects in the common dilemma o f  whether supervision enhances 
compliance; it is simply assumed that supervision does have at least some positive effect, 
and such potential positive functions shall be discussed.
Reports -  the main objects of this chapter - include information both on administrative or 
legal measures in relation to a treaty, or physical data either on the environmental effects o f  
those treaty-based measures or other information on environmental behaviour in a state. 
Reports are based on the initial consent of states to participate in a  given treaty system. 
Therefore they are not ’’forced” upon states, but rather they represent a reciprocal and 
"soft", non-adversarial method o f furthering the common aim of a treaty. In environmental 
treaties reporting procedures may either exist alone or be part o f more specifically 
pronounced NCPs. Finally, it may also be noted that procedural norms are sometimes the 
object of supervision, i.e. states also report on how they have fulfilled various information 
requirements. If a state does not report, the reporting obligation itself then becomes 
unfulfilled. Reporting procedures generally represent primary norms in international law, 
although the distinction between primary and secondary becomes somewhat blurred in that
493 For a discussion on efficiency (Pareto and Kaldor-Hicks) and effectiveness (sufficient funding; appropriate
allocation o f compensation; appropriate forms of compensation) in the context of the Biodiversity
Convention, see Jenks, D.T., 1995, pp. 647-648 and 659-664.
496 See e.g. Sand, P.H., 1992; Wettestad, J., 1992, pp. 101-121; Haas, P.M, R.O. Keohane & M.A. Levy eds., 
1993; Skjaerseth, J.B., 1993, pp. 313-334; Susskind, L.E. 1994; Susskind, L.E., 'What WitI It Take...’, 1994; 
See also The Effectiveness o f Multilateral Environmental Agreements - A Report from a Nordic Project, 
Copenhagen: Nordic Council of Ministers, TemaNord 1996:513, pp. 5-6; Effectiveness essentially refers to 
the outcome of a certain action as compared to the goals set out for the action. On the one hand, a treaty can 
be effective or ineffective in reaching its stated goals. It may be ineffective even if states Parties comply with 
the treaty, see Jacobson & Brown Weiss, 1994, pp. 4-6. On the other hand, a state may be in compliance with 
a treaty to a certain degree, that is, it may reach agreed goals only partially and to varying degrees over time.
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such procedures function precisely for the sake o f controlling the implementation o f and 
compliance with other "truly" primary norms.497
But supervision can go further than reporting to include outside control over state action 
by means of fact-finding missions and inspections,498 all still under the treaty provisions. 
The furthest developed inspections mechanisms with environmental relevance are found 
under the IAEA’s Safeguards Inspectorate, which is primarily aimed at verifying that 
nuclear installations are used for peaceful purposes, and which now, in a new system called 
“integrated safeguards”, also uses environmental monitoring techniques and satellite 
telecommunications systems in addition to classical verification methods.499 An early 
example of environmental on-site inspections would be found in the 1974 Nordic 
Environmental Protection Convention.500 Just as several types of state information duties 
were treated as “side products” to the accident information duty in the previous chapter, the 
discussion below on reporting procedures will also touch upon some of these other forms 
of supervisory information gathering. Supervisory mechanisms, whether called verification, 
monitoring, control, compliance enhancement, peer review or something else, are treated as 
part of the broader context o f  environmental information exchange between states. The 
shortcomings o f state responsibility, the problem that third party settlement o f disputes 
does not necessarily function in the solving o f complex polycentric environmental 
issues,501 or the absence of effective enforcement mechanisms may offer some explanation
497 On the distinction between primary and secondary norms in relation to verification, see Rosas, A., The 
Concept...', 1991, p. 1-2.
498 See Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control in Implementing Agreements on Maritime 
Safety and Protection o f the Marine Environment, Paris, 1982; and Convention for the Mutual Recognition of 
Inspections in Respect o f the Manufacture of Pharmaceutical Products, Geneva, 1970.
499 The IAEA has some 220 nuclear safeguards agreements with 139 states and it carries out some 2500 
inspections in over 900 facilities each year (in 2001). Classical methods include tamper-resistant metal seals, 
surveillance cameras, and analytical instruments to verify e.g. accounting of nuclear materials. See Treaty on 
the Non-proliferation o f Nuclear Weapons, London, Moscow, Washington, 1.7.1968, in force 5.3.1970; and 
Additional Protocol 1997. Further on recent developments of the verification mechanism to include more 
environmental aspects, see http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/Press/News/sgarticle 01 .shtml, and on training of 
inspectors see 43(1) IAEA Bulletin 2001, pp. 41-43; In human rights; on visits to states under the CAT inquiry 
procedure, see Bank, R., 2000, pp. 166-167, 169-172.
500 Nordic Convention on the Protection of the Environment, Stockholm, 19.2.1974, in force 5.10.1976; The 
Convention is most famous for its provisions on transboundary litigation and equal access, see generally, 
Phillips, Ch. 1986, p. 155-; Broms, B., 1986, p. 141-; Brunnée, J., 1988, pp. 171-17
501 See further Sand, P.H., 'New Approaches...’, 1991, pp. 193-206; generally Sand, P.H., Transnational...’, 
1991; and on reasons for why traditional adjudication may be ill-suited to solve international environmental 
problems see Wirth, D., 1994, p. 779; and Chayes, A. & A. Chayes, 1995, p. 205; and Knox, J.H., 2001, pp. 7
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to the question why pragmatic, alternative methods, NCPs, have been developed fo r non** 
compliance, but not to the qualitative question whether the managerial supervisory m e th o d s  
offer good ways of environmental information accumulation. The managerial trend h o l d s  
the potential to tell us something about the state of international law in general a n d  
international environmental law in particular. The pertinent question is thus what role, w h a t  
strengths and limits, these types o f information schemes might have for the developm ent o f  
international law on the environment.
Outside o f  environmental treaty law remain many types of information gathering o r  
“verification” done by single individuals, non-governmental organizations,502 en terprises, 
or states (individually or in cooperation with others),503 be they legally made observations 
or illegal spying.504 Obviously some of the most valuable information about the g lo b a l 
environment comes from sources derived other than through the immediate application o f  
environmental treaties, and most notably through different uses of satellites and o th e r  
recent monitoring technology, whose original uses may have been other th a n  
environmental.505 Depending on the state in question, it may or may not make use o f  
independent data also to fulfil its own treaty-based information sharing requirements. 
Perhaps the most noteworthy international effort outside individual treaties is UNEP’s 
“Earthwatch” workplan for its sub-programme on environmental assessment and reporting.
It is a comprehensive programme (which would be worthy of extensive research) focused 
on sensing, reporting and early warning for integrated information management and 
dissemination of environmental analyses, nationally and regionally. Assessment and 
reporting is mainly based on the Global Environment Monitoring System, GEMS, and the
et seq. on such reasons and also for an argument for the relevance o f some types of supranational adjudication 
based on private claims against states in international tribunals.
502 E.g. on the role of NGOs in relation to monitoring environmental problems and bringing transparency into 
governmental decision-making in India, see Ranjan, S., 2001, p. 94.
503 An example is provided by the Arctic Council’s Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP), 
which includes both a Trends and Effects Programme and a Strategic Plan (both now for 1998-2003) to be 
implemented through National Implementation Plans on diverse issues concerning the Arctic environment. 
See esp. The AMAP Assessment Report: Arctic Pollution Issues, 1998, at http://www.amap.no.
304 “Spy Satellites for Environmental Monitoring”, 26/2/3 Environmental Policy and Law 1996, p. 107.
305 E.g. the European Space Agency’s (ESA) Envisat was launched 1.3.2002 to gather environmental data, 
including data on stratospheric ozone, temperature and climate change, the state o f the oceans and coastal 
regions, etc., look at http://www.esa.int/export/esaCP/index.html: And see NASA’s Terra satellite (launched 
18.12.1999), from which images are available to large numbers of researchers worldwide, at http://eosr 
am.gsfc.nasa.gov/.
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State of the Environment Unit; data harmonization, management and dissemination are 
handled through the Global Resource Information Database, GRID;506 institutional 
capacity-building and servicing is done through regional networks; and management and 
coordination o f  it all by the UN system-wide Earthwatch coordination facility.507
Reporting mechanisms as such are nothing new in public international law.508 In 
disarmament law, reporting procedures are generally too weak and unsatisfying as main 
methods of verification.509 Disarmament and arms control treaty systems may, however, 
offer models for other stronger verification procedures that could be of some use for the 
environmental area.510 The well-developed reporting procedures found in global human 
rights treaties,511 on the other hand, show greater similarities -  in strengths and weaknesses
506 See http://www.grida.no for access to environmental information open to the public. And for 
environmental information relating to the European Union, see the E10NET of the European Environment 
Agency (Council regulation 1210/90 of 7 May 1990, OJL120), http://www.eea.eu.int/
507 www.unep.ch/earthw: and UNEP: ‘Earthwatch' Workplan for the Environmental Assessment and 
Reporting Sub-programme o f UNEP, Nairobi, March 1994; and see Gosovic, B., 1992 on background to both 
GEMS and GRID.
508 For compliance and monitoring issues in international humanitarian law, see, e.g., Drzewicki, K., 1989, 
pp. 109-131; Rosas, A., ’International Monitoring...’, 1993, pp. 221-246.
509 According to Lang, W., in P. Szasz, ed., 1999, “compliance control/monitoring in respect of disarmament 
and environmental treaties have little in common”, p. 258.
310 Orava, S.J., 1992, pp. 151-176; The imbalance of financial resources makes the environmental polarity 
very different from its Cold War disarmament counterpart. In the latter, the big East-West powers, which 
agreed on mutually controlling each others weapons arsenals, were each others close equals, i.e., both had 
over-kill capacity in weapons, and both therefore had something to negotiate on giving up. In short, they 
could "afford" verifying and cutting down as long as it happened evenly. In the environmental arena, states 
are not, apart from the rhetoric of sovereignty, each other’s equals because they pollute differently, they 
use/have access to different resources, they are of very different financial, technological and know-how 
abilities, etc.; But for post-Cold War verification, see esp. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, 
Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, Paris, 14.2.1993, in force 
29.4.1997; Generally, see Dorn, A.W. & D. Scott, 1995; and further see Bothe, M., N. Ronzitti and A. Rosas, 
eds., 1998.
511 Just as in environmental law, issues of implementation, compliance, monitoring and supervision -  i.e. 
accountability -  have been a main focus of research, but timewise one step ahead in the human rights area 
(and humanitarian law, see. e.g. Drzewicki, K., 1989 and 1991; Rosas, A., 1993), having begun in the 1980s, 
and continued in the 1990s and early 2000s, On reporting, fact-finding and other forms of supervision, see 
e.g. Shelton, D., 1980, pp. 6-16; Lemer, N., 1980; Meron, T., 1982; Vasak, K„ ed., 1982; Fischer, D.D., 
1984; Westerveen, G., 1984; Gomez del Prado, J.L., 1984; Thoolen, H. & B. Verstappen, 1986; Innés de 
Neufville, J., 1986; Cancado Trindade, A.A., 1987; Henkin, L , 1989, pp. 67-87,249-273; Cassese, A., 1990, 
pp. 171-174; Graefrath, B„ 1990, pp. 290-333; Balton, D.A., 1990, pp. 120-129; Skogly, S.I., 1990; 
Dormenval, A., 1991, esp. pp. 13-33; Cohen, C.P. et ai, 1992; Alston, P., ed., 1992; Dimitrijevic, V., 1993, 
pp. 1-24; Bloed, A. et al., eds., 1993; Brett, R., 1993; Suy, E., 1994; Higgins, R., 1994, pp. 107-110; Cassese, 
A., 1994, pp. 115-125; and see generally Conference on Administrative and Expert Monitoring o f
alike - with those in environmental law.512 Within human rights law, m ultilateral513 
reporting procedures have developed from fairly modest starting-points. From v o lu n ta ry  
reporting on the provisions o f the Universal Declaration o f Human Rights in the 1950s, th e  
practice has developed to include, under different treaties, most states o f the w o rld . 
Reporting requirements have, through the practice o f various international superv iso ry  
bodies, gained a considerable degree of independence and acceptance,514 and they h a v e  
since come to be the primary means o f monitoring compliance with global human r ig h ts  
norms.515 Instrumental to this development has been especially the International L ab o u r 
Organisation (ILO), which was the first to initiate a reporting procedure for all its
International Legal Norms, Center for International Studies, New York University School o f Law, February 
1996; and further esp. Crawford, J., 2000.
512 Despite the many conceptual and other differences (such as likelihood for interstate conflicts, “legalistic” 
human rights vs. “political” nature of environmental law, and the position of the global commons, which defy  
categorization as interests of either North or South, rich or poor, developed or developing, being simply in the 
interest o f  all) between the two areas o f  law, environmental treaties have mostly been influenced by the 
organization of supervisory mechanisms under human rights treaties. Human rights treaties are concluded 
between states, but the main beneficiaries of the agreements are individuals or groups o f individuals. The 
threshold for resorting to the general law o f international responsibility is very high in both areas of law, but 
in the human rights field one method o f compliance supervision has become to make the individual a party to 
proceedings by granting locus standi before a supervisory organ, see e.g. Vasak, K., 1982, p. 225; 
Dimitrijevic, V., 1993, pp. 3-5; Hannum, H. ed., 1984, pp. 59-163; Buergenthal, T., 1995, pp. 110-147, on 
e.g. the EHCR and the European Commission and Court of Human Rights. Although some discussion is 
devoted to questions of the locus standi o f individuals in international environmental law, the pertinent 
question may go considerably beyond the individual in less anthropocentric considerations o f the value and 
"standing" o f nature itself. On the individual in environmental law and on animal rights and eco-rights, see 
e.g. Bimie, P. & A. Boyle, 1992, pp. 190-213. Further on differences between the two fields, see Bodansky, 
D., 2000, pp. 363-365.
513 As opposed to bilateral monitoring efforts; see, e.g. Kent, A.‘, 2001, who argues that “bilateral pressures 
are low on the scale of effectiveness in comparison to multilateral pressures” (p. 583) and that “at most, 
bilateral monitoring achieves temporary, superficial, and instrumental change and, at worst, as has been the 
case with China, erodes the power, influence, and efficacy of the most effective monitoring agencies -  
multilateral human rights institutions”, p., 624.
5.4 Since the initial opposition based on arguments on state sovereignty from former socialist states, and some 
reluctance from other countries to require reporting on rights which were thought of as immediately 
justiciable, reporting procedures have thrived. Nonetheless, the traditional distinction in human rights law, 
and which does not have any parallel in environmental law, between civil and political rights, on the one 
hand, and economic, social and cultural, on the other, has given rise to some differences in supervisory 
approaches. The former "hard" rights have, especially in Europe, been thought o f as directly justiciable, 
whereas the international control over compliance with "softer" social rights has been left to mechanisms 
other than, for instance, individual complaints. Many developing countries were also initially reluctant to 
report on the shortcomings in their domestic human rights situation, but with a growing realization that 
reporting offers a forum for pointing at the difficulties encountered in complying, the problem has gradually 
been disappearing; see Dimitrijevic, V., 1993, p. 9; and generally see Steiner, H. & P. Alston, 1996; Cf on 
limited political support from states, Crawford, J., 2000. pp. 10-11; and Banton, M., 2000.
5.5 Milllerson, R.A., 1991, pp. 126-127; Alston, P., 1991, p. 13; and see generally Rosas, A. & M. Scheinin, 
1995, pp. 356-367; Steiner, H.J. & P. Alston, 1996; But cf. on evolving ’’judicial” practices in e.g. the CERD 
Committee, see Banton, M., 2000, p.56-60.
138
conventions.516 Reporting requirements now exist in many, though not all,517 global treaties 
concluded under the auspices o f  the United Nations.518 The European Convention of 
Human Rights (EHCR),519 which deals primarily with social and political rights that are 
enforceable in the end also in the European Court o f Human Rights, well exemplifies those 
regional human rights treaties that make less use o f reporting and more o f judicial or quasi­
judicial procedures.520 Human rights reporting procedures seem to be premised on the
3,6 All ILO conventions are covered by the reporting requirements included in the Constitution of the 
International Labour Organisation, Versailles, 28.6.1919, in force 10.1.1920; The relevant Article 22 reads: 
’’Each of the Members agrees to make an annual report to the International Labour Office on the measures 
which it has taken to give effect to the provisions of Conventions to which it is a party. These reports shall be 
made in such form and shall contain such particulars as the Governing Body may request”; According to one 
writer already twenty years ago, the ILO has "... so developed this technique that it is now of unquestionable 
effectiveness", Vasak, K., 1982, p. 224; Further c f  Rossilion, C., 1974, pp. 40-49; Shelton, D., 1980; Leary, 
V., 1992; Valticos, N., 1994, pp. 99-113; Romano, C., 1996.
317 See Article 36 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, 28.7.1951, in force 22.4 1954, and Articles II 
and 111 of the Protocol related to the Status o f Refugees, 31.1.1967, in force 4 .10.1967.
3I® See Article 16, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), New York,
16.12.1966, in force 3.1.1976; Article 19, United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), New York, 10.12.1984, in force 28.6.1987; Article 
7, International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, 30.11.1973, in 
force 18.7.1976; Article 40, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR), New York,
16.12.1966, in force 23.3.1976, reads: ” 1. States Parties [...] undertake to submit reports on the measures they 
have adopted which give effect to the rights recognized herein and on the progress made in the enjoyment of 
those rights [...] 2, Reports shall indicate the factors and difficulties, if any, affecting the implementation of 
the present Covenant”; Article 9, International Convention on the Elimination of AH Forms o f Racial 
Discrimination (CERD), 21.12.1965, in force 4.1.1969, lays down that ’’States Parties undertake to submit 
[...] for consideration by the Committee, a report on the legislative, judicial, administrative or other measures 
which they have adopted and which give effect to the provisions of this Convention: (a) within one year after 
the entry into force o f the Convention for the State concerned; and (b) thereafter every two years and 
whenever the Committee so requests. The Committee may request further information from the States 
Parties.”; The same wording is found in the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), New York, 18.12.1979, in force 3.9.1981, with the addition in 
Article 18.2. that ”[r]eports may indicate factors and difficulties affecting the degree of fulfilment of 
obligations In Article 44.2., the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (CTC), New 
York, 20.11.1989, in force 2.9.1990, which is otherwise is similar to the CCPR, specifies that ”[r]eports shall 
also contain sufficient information to provide the Committee with a comprehensive understanding of the 
implementation of the Convention in the country concerned”.
319 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Rome, 4.11.1950, in force 
3.9.1953; Generally, see e.g. Steiner, H. & P. Alston, 1996.
320 But for contrast c f  with the European Social Charter (Council o f Europe), 18.10.1961, in force 26.2.1965; 
Additional Protocol, 5.5.1988, in force 4.9.1992; Amending Protocol 21.10.1991; Additional Protocol 
Providing for a System of Collective Complaints) system which amounts to "a semi-judicial review" that 
requires reports on progress in achieving the goals of the Charter to be submitted to its Committee of 
Independent Experts, and which, according to the amending Protocol of 1991 (Art. 2), shall be able to give 
and publish legal opinions on state compliance, see e.g. Buergenthal, T., 1995, p. 157; The Committee of 
Experts is also to be elected by the Parliamentary Assembly, rather than by the Committee o f Ministers (Art. 
3). Voting shall be done on the basis of 2/3 majority of those states parties to the Charter (rather than all 
Members of the Council of Europe voting in the Committee of Ministers, Art. 5) The amending Protocol is 
also meant to make the entire supervisory process more transparent. See Fuchs, K. 1994, pp. 164-166, p. 157.
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assumption that "every State is an actual or potential violator of human rights [...] and [...] 
that a degree of routinized international accountability is in the best interest o f the S tate  
itself, o f  its citizens, and of the international community".* 521 At the same time, this prem ise 
may have been acceptable to states because reporting procedures offer the least intrusive 
method o f  verification or supervision of the internal matters of states.522 Thus reporting 
procedures have thrived, but the “inherent problems with a system for human rights 
protection based essentially on self-criticism and good faith”, along with the enormous 
workload o f the institutions, overdue reports, and funding problems, have been recognized 
as signs o f crisis in the supervision of global human rights.523 Indeed, the m ost 
disappointed commentators have even suggested abolition,524 rather than reform,525 o f  the 
report-based human rights monitoring system, a  proposition that has not surfaced so clearly 
-  yet - in the environmental supervision debate.
Chapter 3.2. is a survey into the main elements o f reporting obligations under a handful o f  
environmental treaties; A) Treaty provisions; B) Contents; and C) Functions. For 
comparison, it makes some references to reporting under human rights treaties in order that 
those precedents might provide points of reference against which to assess and generalize 
on reporting as a method o f supervising of environmental treaty obligations. It is followed 
by a closer look at reporting and other procedural rules in the Basel and Bamako 
Conventions on hazardous waste trade, and in the particular context o f Africa. Point B) on 
the contents o f  reporting obligations are examined by a set o f questions:
Reports are reviewed by organs of the Council of Europe, see Charter Article 21-29; Additional Protocol 
Article 6; and further on the reporting procedure and the collective complaints system, see Harris, D., 2000
521 Alston, P., 1991, p. 13.
522 Henkin, L., 1989, p.258.
523 See esp. Crawford, J., 2000, pp. 1-11, quotation p. 7; cf. Leckie, S., 2000, p. 130.
324 Esp. Bayefsky, A., 1994; See polemic by Alston, P., 2000, pp. 501 -525.
523 The need for reform, and an optimism about it, is reflected by e.g. Leckie, S., 2000, who on ICESCR 
Committee writes that ”[t]he system is improving in important ways”, p. 129; For the issue o f reform see 
entire volume o f  Alston, P. & J. Crawford eds., 2000, and esp. e.g. Gallagher, A., p. 227, who suggests that 
“in the likely absence o f any radical restructuring” the treaty bodies should prioritise their work, so that they 
could “be more productively and positively employed in working on a practical level, with cooperative 
governments and other key national partners in the difficult but essential task of strengthening human rights 
protection from within” .
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The institutional structure o f the system:
- what institutions are created or already exist?
- who are the report examiners and how are they elected?
- do they act in their personal capacities or as representatives of governments?
The mandate o f the report examining body:
- how are reports dealt with?
- can the examining body request additional information?
* can the body arrange discussions, hearings or other forms o f further fact-finding?
- what action can the examining body take on the basis o f a report? Mere statements of 
facts; recommendations to, e.g., a Conference o f the Parties; recommendations to the 
reporting state itself; binding or semi-binding decisions and alterations o f previous 
standards?
The concrete repo rt contents:
- reporting schedule and intervals?
- qualitative and quantitative expectations?
The exceptions:
-are there pronouncements o f  the limits or exceptions to what should be reported?
The compliance o f states with reporting obligations:
-how have states fulfilled their reporting obligations? Have their reports actually been dealt 
with?
The problems encountered by states in reporting:
-what particular difficulties do states have in fulfilling their reporting obligations?
3.2. Reporting under Environmental Treaties
Reporting procedures in some form exist in most international environmental treaties.526 527As 
the numbers are very high, it is necessary to resort to one classical environmental law 
methodology in order to limit the examination here to some of the most central 
multilateral conventions representing different fields of environmental protection: a) 
pollution o f the atmosphere and long-range transboundary air pollution; b) biodiversity and 
pollution o f  the commons as exemplified by Antarctica; and c) marine pollution. This
526 No reporting system is found under the Treaty for Amazonian Co-operation, Brasilia, 3.7.1978, in force 
2.2.1980; A duty to report is found in, but has not been applied, under the African Convention on the 
Conservation o f Nature and Natural Resources, Algiers, 15.9.1968, in force 16.6.1969.
527 On traditional research methods in international environmental law, see Springer, A.L., 1983, pp. 37- 
38.
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means that bilateral treaties, which in a limited number o f cases provide for direct state-to­
state reporting, and soft-law documents528 529are left out, and so are the considerably m ore
M A
specific regional supervisory and complaints arrangements o f the EU.
3.2.1. T reaty  Provisions
a) Pollu tion  o f  the atmosphere a n d  long-range transboundary air po llu tion
The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer530 in Article 7 provides 
that
Each Party shall provide statistical data to the Secretariat on its annual production 
(as defined in paragraph 5 or Article 1), and, separately,
-amounts used for feedstocks,
-amounts destroyed by technologies approved by the Parties,
-imports and exports to Parties and non-Parties respectively, o f each of the 
controlled substances listed in Annexes A and B as well as of the transitional 
substances in Group I of Annex C, for the year dining which provisions concerning 
the substances in Annex B entered into force for that Party and for each year 
thereafter. Data shall be forwarded not later than nine months after the end o f the 
year to which the data relate.
Along with this already unusually clear reporting requirement on equally clear obligations, 
the Montreal Protocol was the treaty that led the way into non-compliance procedures.531 
At their fourth meeting in 1992, the parties to the Protocol adopted (under Article 8) a new 
procedure, which was to avoid complexity; be non-confrontational; be transparent; and 
leave all decisions to the Meeting o f  the Parties (MOP; not to any subordinate body). The 
process, as it still stands, can be started by one party against another party; by the
528 Some “reporting” has also developed under a few environmental soft law documents, e.g. the 1982 World 
Charter for Nature, see Sand, P.H., 1999, p. 275.
529 Also the North American setting has more specific supervisory mechanisms, see side agreement to the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 1993: die North American Agreement on Environmental 
Cooperation, Washington, 13.9.1993.
5j0 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Montreal, 16.9.1987, in force 
1.1.1989, amended, by Decision II/2 at the Second Meeting o f the Parties to the Montreal Protocol, 
London, 29.6.1990, in force 10.8.1992, amended and adjusted, Copenhagen, 25.11.1992, in force 
22.9.1993.
531 For the original arrangement, see Note on procedures and institutional mechanisms for determining non- 
compliance with the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, UNEP/OzL.ProLG.1/2, 
30.5 1989.
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Secretariat; or by a party in respect of itself. An Implementation Committee reports 
regularly to the MOP, and those reports may contain recommendations on individual cases 
that have been brought to the attention o f the Committee.532
The parties to the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution 
(LRTAP)533 o f the ECE have developed supervisory procedures based on state reporting 
and a monitoring programme called Evaluation and Monitoring o f Environmental Pollution 
(EMEP).534 According to Article 8 o f the LRTAP, the parties shall "in their common 
interest" exchange available information on a number of facts, including "data on emissions 
at periods of time to be agreed upon, o f agreed air pollutants, starting with sulphur dioxide" 
and on "major changes in national policies and in general industrial development, and their 
potential impact, which would be likely to cause significant changes". The Convention, 
which, symptomatically for framework agreements, does not feature other concrete 
obligations beyond reporting, has since 1979 developed Protocols to deal with the 
reduction of emissions of sulphur (in two Protocols);535 nitrogen oxides;536 volatile organic 
compounds (VOCs);537 persistent organic pollutants (POPs);538 and the control of 
acidification, eutrophication and ground-level ozone.539
532 Generally on this development, see Szill, P., 1995, pp. 99-103.
533 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, Geneva, 13.11.1979, in force 16.3.1983.
For general development o f the regime in the 1970s, see Brunnge, J., 1988; Pallemaerts, M., 1988; 
Fraenkel, A., 1989; Giindling, L., 1991 and subsequent commentary by P. Fauteux; Levy, M.A., 1993.
534 Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution on Long-term 
Financing o f the Co-operative Programme for the Monitoring and Evaluation of the Long-range 
Transmission of Air Pollutants in Europe, Geneva, 28.9.1984, in force 28.1.1988; See also Article 10 of 
LRTAP. See Gosovic, B., 1992, ch. 7, especially on interaction between EMEP and UNEP-based 
GEMS; Abate, D. & Shahid, A., 1994, pp. 79-80.
535 Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution on the Reduction of 
Sulphur Emissions or their Transboundary Fluxes by at least 30 per cent, Helsinki, 8.7.1985, in force 
2.9.1987; Protocol to the Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution on the Further 
Reduction of Sulphur Emissions, Oslo, 14.6.1994, in force 5.8.1998.
536 Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution Concerning the 
Control of Emissions of Nitrogen Oxides or Their Transboundary Fluxes, Sofia, 31.10.1988, in force 
14.2.1991.
537 Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution on the Control of 
Emissions of Volatile Organic Compunds or their Transboundary Fluxes, Geneva, 18.11 1991, in force 
29.9.1997.
538 Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution on Persistent Organic
Pollutants, Aarhus, 24.6 1998, not in force; Under the auspices of UNEP, c f  the Convention on Persistent 
Organic Pollutants, Stockholm, 22.5.2001, not in force, see www.chem.unep.ch/pop*/.
Under the first three Protocols on sulphur, nitrogen oxides and VOCs, reporting procedures 
were simply aimed at parties reporting annually on emission levels or progress achieved 
under national programmes, policies and strategies.540 According to one writer, under that 
early system “there is a conscious attempt on the part o f  the secretariat not to embarrass 
parties in these reports”.541 The Second Sulphur Protocol, in requiring parties also to "take 
and apply national measures" and, subsequently, to report on such concrete measures, 
provides for a  more detailed reporting requirement.542 Under the VOC, Second Sulphur, 
POPs and acidification Protocols, those parties within the geographical scope o f  EMEP 
shall also report to it on emission levels.543 Inspired by, and partly identical with, the non- 
compliance procedure o f the Montreal Protocol, the LRTAP system also has its own NCP 
and an Implementation Committee. The system’s details have been worked out outside o f 
the Protocols, in a Decision by the Convention’s Working Group on Strategies, in order for 
it to be more easily amendable. The four latest Protocols make use o f this system, which in 
some aspects has become stronger than its Montreal counterpart:544 i.a., the Secretariat can 
react on any information it receives and the Committee does not have to reach an amicable 
solution with the party accused o f being in non-compliance.545 Finally, i.a. the Second 
Sulphur Protocol has also established a possibility for fact-finding missions. The 
Implementation Committee may, when it considers the non-compliance with the Protocol 
of a party,
[undertake, upon invitation o f the Party concerned, information gathering in the 
territory of that Party546
539 Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution to Abate Acidification, 
Eutrophication and Ground-level Ozone, Goteborg, 30.11.1999, not in force,
540 Article 4 , 19S5 Sulphur Protocol; Article 8, Nitrogen Protocol.
541 See Levy, M.A., 1993, pp. 90-91.
542 Art. 4(1) and 5(1 Xa).
543 Articles 8(3); 5(2); 8(4); and 7(1) respectively.
544 Para. 3 and 5 o f the Decision taken by the Executive Body at the Adoption of the Protocol on the 
Structure and Functions of the Implementation Committee, as well as Procedures for its Review of 
Compliance, ECE/EB.AIR/40, pp. 30-32; Decision 1997/2 Concerning the Implementation Committee, 
its Structure and Functions and Procedures for Review of Compliance, ECE/EB.AIR/53, Annex III. The 
VOCs Protocol, article 3(3), Decision 1997/3, ECE/EB.AIR/53, p. 32
545 See generally, Szdll, P., 1995, pp. 104-106; Churchill, R.R., G. Ktttting, L.M. WaiTen, 1995, pp. 190-192.
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This is a strictly consent-based tool for acquiring information, and not to be confused with 
such ad hoc inspections that may exist in disarmament treaties.
The Nuclear Safety Convention o f  the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
envisages a peer review scheme based on reporting and Meetings of the Parties.546 47 Article 5 
states that:
Each Contracting Party shall submit for review, prior to each meeting refened to in 
Article 20, a report on the measures it has taken to implement each of the 
obligations o f this Convention.
This requirement is to be read in conjunction with Article 4, which requires states to take 
legislative, regulatory and administrative measures and other steps necessary for 
implementing the obligations under the Convention.
Finally, one of the most interesting examples of reporting is found in the Global Climate 
Change Convention (FCCC) signed at Rio in 1992.548 The Convention establishes an 
elaborate reporting mechanism based on "common but differentiated obligations" between 
developed and developing countries.549 It does not use the term “reporting”, however, but 
only speaks of national “communications”. Under Article 12, all parties to the Convention 
are to submit a national inventory o f anthropogenic emissions and information on steps 
taken or envisaged to implement the Convention. The inventories are based on rather clear
546 Para. 7(b) o f the Decision taken by the Executive Body at the Adoption of the Protocol on the 
Structure and Functions of the Implementation Committee, as well as Procedures for its Review of 
Compliance, ECE/EB.AIR/40, pp. 30-32.
547 Nuclear Safety Convention, Vienna, 20.9.1994, in force 24.10.1996; See further Nuclear Installations 
Safety Net (NUSAFE): www.iaea.org/worldatom/Documents/Legal.
548 On the drafting history o f the Convention as well as on its general contents, see e.g. Borg-Olivier, A,, 
1989; Grubb, M., 1991; Barrett, J., 1991, pp. 183-200; Boyle, A., 1991, pp. 7-19; Plant, G., 1991, pp. 165- 
181; Plant, G., 1991,’Pledge and Review...’; Churchill, R., 1991, pp. 147-163; Tolbert, D., 1991, pp. 95-108; 
Churchill, R. & D. Freestone, eds., 1991; Széll, P., 1991, pp. 167-185; Chayes, A., E. Skolnikoff & D. Victor, 
1992; Young, O.R., 1993; Boehmer-Christiansen, S., 1994, pp. 181-198; Oberthür, S., 1994, pp. 299-303; 
Boisson de Chazoumes, L., 1996, pp. 285-300; On the background to supervision issues and the run-up to the 
Convention see Ferreira, V., 1992; Pulvenis, J-F, 1994, esp. pp. 91-109; on Joint Implementation under the 
Convention, Loske, R. & S. Oberthür, 1994, pp. 45-58; and Activities..^ OECD, 1997; and on ecological 
challenges to international law on climate change, Taylor, P., 1998; Further for all recent public 
documentation under the Convention Secretariat, http://unfccc.int.
M9Articles4(l)(j);4(2),7,12.
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formats and methods, all in order to enhance comparability between reports.550 The 
inclusion o f  more specific information is dependent on whether a state party is a developed 
state or other state included in Annex I o f the Convention. Likewise, depending on 
development status, parties were to submit initial reports under the Convention within six 
months or three years o f the entry into force o f the Convention. Least developed states may 
make their initial communications at their discretion. Thus, the reporting scheme reflects 
the substantive provisions of the Convention. The Kyoto Protocol to the Climate Change 
Convention also makes dear distinctions on both substantive and procedural obligations 
depending on the development status o f the parties.551
The Kyoto Protocol (in Article 3(2)) stipulates that the developed country parties to the 
Protocol must by 2005 have made “demonstrable progress” in achieving its commitments, 
and that greenhouse gas emissions shall be “reported in a transparent and verifiable manner 
and reviewed in accordance with Articles 7 and 8”. Article 7 is an agreement on the two 
types of information to be included by developed countries: firstly, an annual inventory o f 
emissions, including supplementary information to ensure compliance with the substantive 
provisions in Article 3; and secondly, an inclusion in the national communication under 
Article 12 o f the Climate Change Convention on compliance with the commitments under 
the Protocol. The 1997 Protocol text requires the Conference o f the Parties (COP) to adopt 
guidelines for the preparation of information to be submitted, a work that is still going 
on.552 All communications were originally to be reviewed by an expert review team and, 
ultimately, by the COP, but since COP 6 communications are also to be considered by the 
facilitative branch o f the so-called compliance committee. Furthermore, under Article 6, 
the COP is to elaborate guidelines for verification and reporting on implementation of 
transfers o f emission reduction units.553 Interestingly, “any such units may not be used by a 
party to meet its commitments under Article 3 until any issue o f compliance is resolved”.
550 On better comparability of specific data as compared to general information on implementing 
measures, see Bodansky, D., 2000, p. 370.
i$i On Kyoto Protocol and post-Kyoto developments generally, see further Cameron, P., 2001, pp. 3-23.
152. E.g. FCCC/CP/2001/L.28; COP7 Decision on Article 7, where the SBSTA is asked to develop criteria for 
some concrete aspects of reporting. For texts of the various reporting guidelines, look under 
http://unfccc.int/issues/natcompartan1.html.
553 Cf. Article 17.
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Apart from the Kyoto mechanisms for emission reductions, the elaboration of an NCP 
seems to have been a priority issue among those states participating in the Kyoto 
process.554 To this end a joint working group (JWG) was established at COP 4,555 to 
function under the subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) and the Subsidiary Body for 
Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) of the Convention. At COP 6 in late 2000, 
the issue was considered on the basis o f a text proposed by the co-chairmen of the JWG.556 
The text proposed the establishment o f the already mentioned compliance committee, 
including a facilitative and an enforcement branch, the latter o f  which would have the 
mandate to suspend the rights and privileges of a party in non-compliance. Interestingly, 
this far-reaching proposal was well met by states when COP6 resumed its work in July 
2001, and, after some adjustments, decided upon at COP7 in November 2001.557 The 
parties agreed that the enforcement branch shall be responsible for determining whether an 
Annex I Party is in compliance with both quantitative emission commitments, 
methodological and reporting requirements and eligibility requirements (on transfers of 
emission reduction units; under Articles 6,12 and 17). Non-compliance shall now lead i.a. 
to higher deduction rates, the requirement to develop a compliance action plan, and to the 
suspension of eligibility to make transfers.558 In relation to these procedures the Kyoto 
Protocol parties that have been affected by decisions by the enforcement branch may resort 
to an appeals procedure if  they believe that they have been denied due process. The COP, 
which acts as the appeals body, may override a decision by the enforcement branch by a 
majority of at least three-quarters. As opposed to the relative weakening of the reduction 
targets under the Protocol (due to more weight given to carbon absorbing forests), the 
control methods agreed at Bonn and Marrakech are surprisingly strong commitments to 
reduce climate change. It remains to be seen however, whether the control methods will be
554 Article 18 of the Protocol calls on the first COP “to approve appropriate and effective procedures and 
mechanisms to determine and to address cases o f non-compliance with the provisions of this Protocol, 
including through the development of an indicative list of consequences, taking into account the cause, type, 
degree and frequency of non-compliance”.
555 FCCC: Decision 8/CP.4.
356 FCCC/SB/2000/11.
557 FCCC/CP/2001/L.21, at COP7 at Marrakech, 5.11 2001.
558 Cf. FCCC/CP/2001/L.7, section VIII and FCCC/CP/2001/L.21, Annex to the Decision.
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implemented by the parties, and, of course, whether compliance can make a d ifference 
despite gaps in ratification.559
b) B iod iversity  an d  pollu tion  o f  the commons as exem plified by A ntarctica
Under the 1992 Biodiversity Convention (CBD)560
Each contracting Party shall, at intervals to be determined by the Conference o f  the 
Parties, present to the Conference of the Parties, reports on measures that it has 
taken for the implementation of the provisions of this Convention and the ir 
effectiveness in meeting the objectives o f this Convention.
The first national reports were submitted in 1998 and the second set in 2001. Apart from  
these, three specific thematic reports have so far been concluded or are envisaged by 
parties, namely on alien species, benefit-sharing and forest ecosystems. An (at least 
seemingly) new institutional set-up will be established under the Cartagena Biosafety 
Protocol to the Convention on Biodiversity: a Clearing-House Mechanism (CHM) for the 
facilitation o f  exchange o f scientific, technical, environmental and legal information meant 
to assist parties, especially developing countries, in the implementation o f the Protocol. The 
Clearing-House is also meant to provide, where possible, access to other international 
biosafety information than that submitted by the parties. The first meeting of the COP when 
the Protocol enters into force is to decide upon the modalities and the operation of the 
mechanism.561
Under Article VII(5) of the framework 1959 Antarctic Treaty,562 parties are to submit 
information in advance on all expeditions, stations and military personnel or equipment at
559 As o f July 20, 2001, the Protocol had 84 signatories and 37 ratifications. After the COP6 and COP7 
decisions discussed above, the ratification figures are growing. Standing for approximately 28% of global 
emissions, the non-ratification of the United States is the single largest blow to the Protocol’s success.
S6° United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity, Rio de Janeiro, 5.6.1992, in force 29.12.1993, 
Article 26. On the CBD see www.biodiv.org. On the protection of biodiversity and the development of 
the CBD, see also e.g. de Klemm, C., 1989; Sands, P., 1995, pp. 381-387; Jenks, D. T., 1995.
561 Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Cartagena, 29.1.2000, not in force,
Article 20. See www.biodiv.org/biosafe/protocol.
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Antarctica, 563 and under Article VIII(3) reports from the observers referred to in Article 
VII of the treaty are to be transmitted to the representatives of parties participating in the 
meetings of the parties. The 1991 Environment Protocol to the Antarctic Convention 
(Article 17) - as well as the Annexes to it - have their own annual reporting obligations on 
steps taken to implement the Protocol/Annexes and on compliance with its provisions 
(Article 13).564 Reports are circulated to all parties as well as the Committee for 
Environmental Protection (CEP) established under the Protocol, and are then considered by 
the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting, and “made publicly available”. In addition to 
reporting procedures, the Protocol establishes an inspection system (Article 14), where 
Parties can designate inspectors from among their own nationals, and such inspectors shall 
be given access to all parts o f stations, installations, equipment, ships and aircraft open to 
inspection under Article VII(3) of the Antarctic Treaty. Reports on inspections are sent to 
parties covered by them for comment and these comments along with the report are sent on 
to the Consultative Meeting and made public, just as annual reports. It would seem that this 
new system, which is similar to the earlier arrangement under the Convention on the 
Conservation o f Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR), discussed below, has 
started functioning rather well.565
K2 Antarctic Treaty, Washington, 1.12.1959, in force 23.6.1961; See the Scientific Committee on 
Antarctic Research o f the International Council of Scientific Unions, (SCAR) pages at 
http://www.scar.Org/Treatv/treatv .htm: Generally on law and environmental protection in the 
Antarctica, see Francioni, F., 1992; Watts, A., 1992; Verhoeven, J. et als., 1992; Kimball, L.A., 1993; 
Elliott, L.M., 1994; Rothwell, D., 1996 and ibid, 2000.
563 As an example, see U.S. (National Science Foundation, Office of Polar Programs) information submitted 
under Art. VII at http://www.nsf.gov/od/oDp/antarct/treatv/.
564 Protocol to the Antarctic Treaty on Environmental Protection, Madrid, 4.10.1991, in force 14.1.1998. On 
the Protocol, see further Rothwell, D., 1996 and Rothwell, D., 2000, pp. 591-614.
565 And cf. wider Article 5 on exchange of information and scientific advice of the Convention for the 
Protection of Antarctic Seals (CCAS), London, 11.2.1972, in force 11.3.1978:
1. Each Contracting Party shall provide to the other Contracting Parties and to SCAR the 
information specified in the Annex within the period indicated therein.
2. Each Contracting Party shall also provide to the other Contracting Parties and to SCAR before 3 1 
October each year information on any steps it has taken in accordance with Article 2 o f this 
Convention during the preceding period 1 July to 30 June.
3. Contracting Parties which have no information to report under the two preceding paragraphs shall 
indicate this formally before 31 October each year.
4. SCAR is invited: (a) to assess information received[...] (b) to report on [...} significantly 
harmful effect on the total stocks o f such species
In addition to this reporting scheme, the CCAS parties also exchange information through the Scientific 
Committee on Antarctic Research (SCAR). According to Lyster, S., 1985, p. 50 (see generally, pp. 48-51) 
“[t]he strict reporting requirements of the Convention should ensure that any commercial sealing operation is 
rapidly brought to the attention of the Parties if one does begin”.
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In addition to requiring the reporting of harvesting activities, on statistical or biological 
data, and on activities contrary to the Convention, the CCAMLR566 567requires information on  
compliance measures and on “the imposition of sanctions for any violation.” The 
CCAMLR sets up a strong Commission with the function to “give effect to the objective 
and principles set out in Article II”. Thus the Commission itself is under a duty to conserve 
Antarctic marine living resources and to adopt an ecosystems approach. Unlike several 
other conservation treaties’ executive bodies, the CCAMLR Commission requires 
consensus on substantive issues. The provision under Article X that the Commission can 
draw the attention of the arties to any party whose activities affect the implementation o f  
the Convention is subject to being the “opinion o f the Commission”, which would seem to 
render it ineffective because o f the consensus requirement. Apart from reporting, the 
supervisory system of the Convention under Article XXIV(2) also includes observation and 
inspection, although by inspectors subject to the jurisdiction o f the party of which they are 
nationals. Nonetheless, a functional compliance system has over the years developed in 
relation to most conservation measures under the CCAMLR, including a scheme to 
promote compliance with the conservation measures by non-parties to the Convention.568 
The inspection system has been in use since the 1989/90 season. Reports from inspections 
are by the Commission submitted to the flag state o f the inspected vessel. Flag states are 
then required to report to the Commission on prosecutions and sanctions that it has 
imposed on the basis of inspections. A Standing Committee on Observation and Inspection
i66 Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR), Canberra, 
20.5.1980, in force 7.4.1982. See generally, Lyster, S., 1985, pp. 156-177; Bimie, P. & A. Boyle, 1992, 
p. 445; Rothwell, D., 2000; And see further www.ccamlr.org: The provisions of the Convention on the 
Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities (CRAMRA), Wellington, 2.6.1988, which is not in 
force, are weaker than, but similar to the CCAMLR. Article 7 provides that:
1. Each Party shall take appropriate measures within its competence to ensure compliance with this 
Convention and any measures in effect pursuant to it. [...]
2. Each Party shall notify the Executive Secretary, for circulation to all other Parties, of the measures 
taken pursuant to paragraph 1 above. [...]
567 Article XXI states that
1. Each Contracting Party shall take appropriate measures within its competence to ensure 
compliance with the provisions o f this Convention and with conservation measures adopted by the 
Commission to which the Party is bound in accordance with Article IX of this Convention.
2. Each Contracting Party shall transmit to the Commission information on measures taken pursuant 
to paragraph 1 above, including the imposition o f sanctions for any violation.
568 CCAMLR: 118/XVII.
150
(SCOI) further considers and prepares advice to the Commission on matters related to 
inspections and measures by parties to enforce compliance with the conservation measures.
c) M arine po llu tion
The 1982 LOSC calls for reporting on the environmental risk monitoring done under 
Article 205.569 Likewise, states parties are to report on assessments they have made on 
planned activities under their jurisdiction or control that may cause substantial pollution of 
or significant and harmful changes to the marine environment. The International 
Convention for the Prevention o f Pollution from Ships (MARPOL 73/78) requires states 
parties to report on several issues:570 under Article 4 on violations to the Convention, 
parties are required to furnish the flag state ("Administration") of a violating ship with 
evidence of a violation, and the flag state must report further to the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO); Article 11 provides for the communication of information to the IMO 
on, inter alia, official reports or summaries of official reports in so far as they show the 
results o f the application o f the Convention; and an annual statistical report, in a form 
standardized by the IMO, of penalties actually imposed for infringement o f the Convention. 
Amendments to the 1978 Protocol have further developed the scheme for reporting on 
incidents involving harmful substances.571 The MARPOL Convention greatly differs from 
the air pollution, climate change and biodiversity or conservation treaties discussed above
569 Reporting examples could be drawn from several other international treaty regimes regulating marine 
pollution than the ones mentioned below; see, e.g., Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by 
Dumping o f Wastes and Other Matter, London, 13.11.1972, in force 30.8.1975; amended 12.10.1978, in 
force 11.3.1979; amended 24.9.1980, in force 11.3.1981; amended 3.11.1989, in force 19.5.1990; 
amended 12.11.1993, in force 20.2.1994; i.a. Article VI(4). And see Protocol to the Convention on the 
Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, 7.11.1996, not in force: 
intended to replace the 1972 Convention.
570 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, London, 2.11.1973; Individual 
Annexes entered into force at different dates; Protocol of 1978 Relating to the International Convention 
for the Prevention o f Pollution from Ships 1973, London, 17.2.1978, in force 2.10.1983; amended 
7.9.1984, in force 7.1.1986; amended 5.12.1985, in force 6.4.1987; amended Dec. 1987, in force 
1.4.1989; amended March 1989, in force 13.10.1990; amended 17.10.1989, in force 18.2.1991; amended 
March 1990, in force 3.2.2000; amended Nov, 1990, in force 17.2.1992; amended 4.7.1991, in force 
4.4.1993; amended 6.3.1992, in force 6.7.1993; amended 13.11.1994, in force 3.3.1996; amended
14.9.1995, in force 1.7.1997; amended 10.7.1996, in force 1.1.1998; amended 23.9.1997, in force 
1.2.1999; * 1997 Protocol adding new Annex VI on Regulations for the Prevention of Air Pollution from 
Ships, 26.9.1997, not in force.
571 Amendments 5.12.1985, in force 6.4.1987; 10.7.1996, in force 1.1.1998. See further at www.imo.org.
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in that it contains a well-developed system of certification o f ships and inspections o f their 
activities.
The 1992 Convention for the Protection o f the Marine Environment o f the North East 
Atlantic and the 1992 Convention on the Protection o f the Marine Environment o f the 
Baltic Sea Area572 73 both include reporting procedures. Article 22 of the North East Atlantic 
Convention reads:
The Contracting Parties shall report to the Commission at regular intervals on:
a) the legal, regulatory, or other measures taken by them for the 
implementation o f  the provisions of the Convention and o f  decisions and 
recommendations adopted thereunder, including in particular measures 
taken to prevent and punish conduct in contravention o f those 
provisions;
b) the effectiveness o f the measures referred to in subparagraph a) of this 
Article;
c) problems encountered in the implementation of the provisions referred to
in subparagraph a) o f  this Article.
The new Baltic Convention essentially sets the same reporting obligation on the parties, but 
in Article 16(2) it also provides that, on the request o f a party or the Commission, the 
parties shall provide information on discharge permits, emission data or data on 
environmental quality, “as far as possible”. This points to some differences in the mandate 
of the parties in so far as requesting additional information.
The amended Mediterranean Convention requires reports that are very similar to those 
under the North East Atlantic Convention.574 The Protocol on Specially Protected Areas
572 For excellent homepages, see further www.ospar.org.
573 See further www.helcom.fi; And Koskenniemi, M , 1993; Ehlers, P., 1993; Fitzmaurice, 1998; See also 
Mickwitz, P., Implementation o f  Key Environmental Principles. Experiences from the Protection o f  the Baltic 
Sea, Copenhagen: Nordic Council o f Ministers, NORD 1998:2.
574 The old Article 20 required that ”[t]he Contracting Parties shall transmit to the Organization reports on the 
measures adopted in implementation of this Convention and of the Protocols to which they are Parties, in 
such form and at such intervals as the meetings of Contracting Parties may determine”. Convention for the 
Protection o f the Mediterranean Sea Against Pollution, Barcelona, 16.2.1976, in force 12.2.1978, amended
10.6.1995. Article 26 now requires that:
l.The Contracting Parties shall transmit to the Organization reports on:
(a) the legal, administrative or other measures taken by them for the implementation of this 
Convention, the Protocols and of the recommendations adopted by their meetings;
and Biodiversity also sets up its own separate reporting requirement, quite in accordance 
with Article 26 o f the Convention. The Protocol reports have to consider a wide number
of issues beyond the status and state of specially-protected areas, such as the creation of 
databases o f specially-protected areas and co-operation with governmental and non­
governmental organizations. The reports are to be considered by the Meetings o f the Parties 
to the Protocol, which can make recommendations to the parties on measures to be adopted 
for the implementation o f the Protocol. In addition to general annual reporting on 
hazardous waste generated and transferred within the Protocol area, the Hazardous Wastes 
Protocol adopted in 1996 adds a provision entitled Verification. It is consultation-based and 
only gives the treaty’s Organization the possibility to report on the matter to the P'parties, 
which in tum “considers” such reports.57 76
3.2.2. Contents 
Institutional structure
Several different patterns o f institutional structure co-exist. Usually environmental treaties 
establish a Conference of Parties (COP; or Meeting of Parties, MOP) with the dual function 
of reviewing and amending the treaty and supervising compliance with it.577 Treaty 
secretariats may be specifically created, or existing international organizations may provide 
secretarial services which can be partly supervisory in character.578 Sometimes parties to a 
treaty report directly to an existing organization, such as the parties of the MARPOL to the 
IMO or the parties to the African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural
(b) the effectiveness of the measures referred to in subparagraph (a) and problems encountered in the 
implementation of the instruments as mentioned above.
2,The reports shall be submitted in such form and at such intervals as the Meetings of 
Contracting Parties may determine.
575 Protocol Concerning Specially Protected Areas and Biological Diversity in the Mediterranean, Barcelona,
10.6.1995.
576 Articles 13 and 15(d), Protocol on the Prevention of Pollution of the Mediterranean Sea by Transboundary 
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, Izmir, 1.10.1996, not in force.
377 Or “Executive Body”, equivalent to COP, as under LRTAP; See e.g. Biodiversity Convention, Article 
23(4).
578 E.g., UNEP for the Mediterranean Convention and for the Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, Washington, 3.3.1973, in force 1.7.1975 (CITES), which 
initially designated the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN), a semi-NGO, as its 
secretariat. On the background, see Kiss, A-C., 1980, pp. 101-102.
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Resources to the Organization o f African Unity (OAU).579 580The parties to the LOSC have to
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report to "the competent international organizations", that is, at least, the IMO. The se t­
up may also be a division between an executive body o f the treaty, such as a COP o r a  
commission such as the OSPAR Commission under the North East Atlantic Convention o r 
HELCOM under the Baltic Convention, and a  secretariat, new or previously existing.
The environmental treaty bodies clearly differ from those seen under the major global 
human rights treaties, the latter o f  which have remarkably similar institutional set-ups for 
reporting, mostly based on the examples set by the Human Rights Committee under the 
CCPR and the Committee on Racial Discrimination established by the CERD.581 The 
various supervisory treaty bodies, which are normally elected by the parties,582 are made up 
of “experts” acting in a personal capacity. Their mandates are limited to the tasks given to  
them by the treaty or according to rules agreed on by the treaty body, but they are free to 
acquire information on human rights situations from sources outside the government 
reports they examine. The ILO system is based on two distinct committees, the so-called 
Committee o f Experts, which is a smaller body of independent experts serving in their 
personal capacity, and the tripartite Conference Committee.583
Rather than employing independent experts to review the reports, environmental reports are 
more often examined either by international bureaucrats and the states parties, or directly 
by parties to the various treaties, that is as “pure” peer-review. An in-between example is 
provided by the IAEA Nuclear Safety Convention. The meetings o f the parties are called 
"review meetings" and their stated purpose is the "review by experts of national reports". 
However, the Convention does not specify whether the experts are to be independent or to 
act in their own capacity; rather, the Convention only mentions that the parties are to be
579 African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, Algiers, 15.9.1968, in 
force 16.6. 1969, see Article XVI(2).
580 Article 205.
581 Generally on CERD see further Lemer, N., 1980, pp. 76-78; and esp. Banton, M., 2000; For the example 
of the committee of independent experts under the CRC, see Balton, D.A, 1990, pp. 127-128.
582 The most noteable exception is the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights which is elected 
by ECOSOC.
583 Leary, V.A., 1992, see pp. 595-602; Vasak, K., 1982, p. 224. Further see Rossilion, C , 1974, pp. 40-49; 
Valticos, N., 1994, pp. 99-113; Romano, C., 1996.
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represented by one delegate, and such alternates, experts and advisors, as it deems 
necessary.584 The reports due under the Climate Change Convention, in contrast, are to be 
examined at first by teams o f experts and then by the COP.585
The Implementation Committee set up under the LRTAP Second Sulphur Protocol is also a 
peer review organ, consisting o f eight parties at a time. It can, however, also
[ejnsure that the quality o f data reported by a Party in accordance with article 5
(Reporting) is evaluated by the EMEP technical centres, and/or by an independent
expert nominated by the Implementation Committee.586
This means that "accusations" by one party against another must be verified, possibly fully 
independently. The Committee itself reports its findings and tentative recommendations to 
the parties at sessions of the Executive Body. Parties whose implementation or non- 
compliance is under consideration may not themselves participate in the elaboration and 
adoption of recommendations on that matter. In the end, any decisions on 
recommendations are taken by the parties. The lack in most environmental treaty systems, 
except for a few o f  the newest ones, o f  independent experts reviewing reports (both non- 
politically and with respect to scientific evidence, when given or otherwise existing) could 
be perceived as a negative factor,587 but, on the other hand, expert bodies, such as those 
under the global human rights treaties, 588 seldom have any powers to make more than 
superficial recommendations, and their independence is sometimes questioned.589
584 Article 20 and 24; Annex to the Final Act o f the Diplomatic Conference: Some Clarification with 
Respect to Procedural and Financial Arrangements, National Reports and the Conduct o f Review 
Meetings, Envisaged in the Convention on Nuclear Safety, 33 I.L.M. 1525 (1994), Articles 2 and 3.
585 Cf. for Kyoto Protocol, where there are expert review teams “composed of experts selected from those 
nominated by Parties to the Convention and, as appropriate, by intergovernmental organizations...” (Article 
8(2)); and cf. on the role of the fac ilita te  branch of the compliance committee, FCCC/CP/2001/L.21, at 
COP7 at Marrakech, 5.11 2001.
386 Para. 6(d) of the Decision taken by the Executive Body at the Adoption of the Protocol on the 
Structure and Functions of the Implementation Committee, as well as Procedures for its Review of 
Compliance, ECE/EB.AIR/40, pp. 30-32.
587 On the role of experts in environmental regimes, see further Victor, D.G.» K. Raustiala & E.B Skolnikoff, 
1998.
588 Further on the composition of human rights committees, problems inherent in election in the UN of so- 
called experts, and the need for diversity, see Scott, C., 2000, pp. 417-437.
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M andate o f  report-exam ining bodies
The Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) in  
Article X states that "[t]he Commission shall draw the attention of all Contracting Parties to  
any activity which, in the opinion of the Commission, affects the implementation by a  
Contracting Party of the objective of this Convention or the compliance by that Contracting 
Party with its obligations under this Convention". The notion of "drawing the attention" o f  
parties to a problem of compliance is hardly what one might wish from a strong 
environmental treaty system. Yet, this example illustrates only too well the lack of powers 
o f many treaty bodies to take any binding or even semi-binding decisions or 
recommendations on non-compliance. According to Boyle, “[treaty bodies’] significance as 
enforcement devices lies not in their formal powers, which they rarely possess, but in their 
capacity to bring to bear a form of community pressure and international accountability” 
and “such institutions have the crucial advantage of providing a forum for all interested 
states to participate in a process o f negotiated equity that is much the most useful model for 
resolving polycentric problems where no single state’s acts are responsible and the interests 
of all are at stake”.589 90
Usually, the final word lies with the full number of parties to an environmental treaty. For 
example, in the case o f the LRTAP Second Sulphur and subsequent Protocols, there is an 
institutional novelty, a committee specifically meant to deal with implementation and non- 
compliance. But it can only review reports, ask for further information, undertake 
information gathering in the territory o f a party -  if the party presents an invitation - and 
make "any recommendations it considers appropriate regarding compliance with the 
Protocol". This latter power is still more than the experts reviewing some o f  the major 
human rights treaties may do.591 The Executive Body o f the Protocols may on the basis o f
589 In human rights, the problem of independence (i.e. pressure from governments trying to influence single 
members) led e.g. the CRC Committee to abandon the use o f so called country rapporteurs. The system was 
however re-introduced in 1999 as it was considered a useful means of making review o f reports more 
efficient: see Lansdown, G., 2000, pp. 123-124, and CRC, Report o f  the Twenty-first Session, 1999, 
CRC/C/87; and Clapham, A., 2000, pp. 188-190.
590 Boyle, A., ’International Law and...’, 1991, pp. 17-18.
591 Boyle, A., 'International Law and 1991, p. 18. Boyle refers to the role of the independent members of 
the UN Human Rights Committee and the UN Committee on Torture reviewing compliance with the CCPR 
and the CAT, respectively.
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Committee recommendations then “decide upon measures of a non-discriminatory nature 
to bring about full compliance with the protocol in question, including measures to assist a 
party’s compliance”.592 Such decisions are to be taken by consensus. The parties have 
hardly delegated any wide powers to the Committee. Nevertheless, this arrangement still 
represents the latest "generation" of verification/non-compliance systems, and it is a 
concrete step forward from the earlier agreements with no such arrangements. A 
comparison between the powers of the HELCOM and OSPAR Commissions is to the 
advantage of the North East Atlantic Commission: it can decide upon and "call for steps to 
bring about full compliance", a wording similar to that found in the Montreal Protocol - and 
equally as vague.
Cases o f this nature can be contrasted with the mandates of human rights treaty bodies, 
which derive either directly from the treaties or from decisions of the bodies themselves.593 
One of the main tasks of the treaty bodies is to review reports submitted to them by treaty 
parties and, usually, to report back to these, by including summaries or general comments, 
or at best some “mild” recommendations or suggestions either to the parties or to the 
UN.594 The mandates are not completely static: they seem to be organic in the sense that 
they evolve over time through the internal procedures of the various committees to deal 
with new issues and demands.595 The eighteen independent expert members of the Human 
Rights Committee, for example, "study” or "examine" both initial and subsequent reports 
and makes "general comments"596 which together with the "observations" o f the state party 
in question are submitted to the General Assembly through the ECOSOC.597 Under the ILO
592 Decision 1997/2 Concerning the Implementation Committee, its Structure and Functions and Procedures 
for Review of Compliance, ECE/EB.AIR/53, Annex III, paragraphs 6 and 11, pp. 30-31.
593 For instance, the treaty bodies can often decide on the periodicity of reports, for an early example see e.g. 
CCPR, Decision on Periodicity, CCPR/C/19/Rev.l, 26.8.1982; and c f Art. 18 CEDAW, and on it, Bustelo, 
M., 2000, p. 80.
594 See e.g. Bustelo, M., 2000, p. 79-81.
395 See e.g. the evolutionary processes under the CERD Committee, M. Banton, 2000, esp. pp. 75-78; and 
Leckie, S., 2000, pp. 129- 144 on ICESCR Committee.
596 CCPR, Statement on the Duties o f the Human Rights Committee under Article 40 o f the Covenant,
CCPR/C/18, 19.8.1981: the General Comments of the Human Rights Committee should comment on the 
implementation of the reporting obligation, the implementation of the obligation to guarantee the rights set 
forth in the Covenant, questions related to the application and content of individual articles of the Covenant, 
and suggestions concerning co-operation between parties in applying and developing the Covenant; At best, 
the general comments may thus highlight insufficiencies found in a large number of reports.
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system, treaty compliance is first reviewed by the Committee o f Experts in a rather 
technical way, and without direct discussions with government representatives.598 T heir 
"observations" are published in a report and their "direct requests" for further information 
are sent to governments. The Conference Committee in  turn meets representatives o f  the  
tripartite constituents for discussions on serious cases o f  non-compliance. The Committee 
reports each year to the International Labour Conference. Neither body takes any form al 
decisions, but their reports may function as a  "moral sanctionM.599An interesting part o f  the  
ILO system is that states are obliged to report also on conventions that they have not yet 
ratified, as well as on recommendations.600 The Commission on Human Rights appoints 
special rapporteurs to visit specific countries and to report to it on human rights situations 
in those countries, and a few treaty bodies, notably the Committee under the European 
Convention on Torture and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, have 
provisions for on-site inspections in  their own capacity.601 Normally supervisory bodies can 
ask for additional information to be submitted i f  reports are incomplete. Perhaps the m ost 
significant stage o f the reporting procedure appears to be that o f the oral exchanges 
between the treaty body and governments602 According to one writer, difficulties have been 
addressed more frankly in such oral examinations, but problems remain, not least because 
government officials answering questions are "inherently limited" when defending the 
report o f the state they represent,603 and because not all oral exchanges are natural two-way 
discussing situations where answers would be given directly to questions asked.604 In order 
to avoid the often overly-biased opinions of government representatives, the members o f
397 See Higgins, R., 1994, p. 109; The CERD, in contrast, takes formal decisions, most of which deal with the 
reporting obligations under article 9 and take the form o f General Recommendations, Specific Situations in a 
Given State Party, Specific Forms o f Racism and Racial Discrimination, or Specific Articles of the 
Convention, see Gomez del Prado, J., 1985, pp. 508-512; and see Banton, M., 2000, pp. 60-68.
598 See Ivanov, S.A., 1991, pp. 153-163; See also Sand, P.H., ’New Approaches...’, 1991, p. 198.
599 Samson, K„ 1994, pp. 126-130.
600 Articles 19(5)(e) and 19(6)(d) of the ILO Constitution.
601 See Higgins, R., 1994, p. 108. On missions, by invitation, of the CERD Committee, see M. Banton, 2000, 
pp. 65-66.
602 See e.g., Müllerson, R., 1991, p. 126.
603 Dimitrijevic, V., 1993, p. 13.
604 See e.g. on CED AW Committee practice, Bustelo, M. 2000, pp. 91-92.
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treaty bodies resort to other sources of information through the media, intergovernmental 
organizations and NGOs.
Finally, a somewhat different type of mandate is found under the Climate Change 
Convention and Kyoto Protocol. Initial country reports or “communications” under the 
Convention are to be subject to an in-depth review, which in turn should be carried out by 
expert review teams. The purpose o f the review of initial communications is to be 
facilitative, non-confrontational, open and transparent in order to assist parties in carrying 
out their responsibilities.605 On the basis of discussion in the Intergovernmental Negotiating 
Committee for a Framework Convention on Climate Change (INC),606 the COP decided on 
the method by which initial country reports (from Annex I parties) are examined.607 The in- 
depth review process is not necessarily a device for the control of compliance proper. 
Rather, the reports, which are non-judgmental and diplomatically worded, are a means of 
finding out how  parties go about reaching the results they do.608 They reflect particular 
national circumstances at the time o f compilation of the reports, taking account o f such 
factors as biomass situation, decisions to develop or phase out nuclear power, and many 
other factors contributing to a  state's compliance with the goals set in the Convention. The 
expert group assessment of a country situation does not rely only on the parties' reports, but 
on visits to the country concerned, and meetings with a wide array o f governmental 
agencies and non-governmental organizations, all in an open and frank way. Thus the in- 
depth reviews, rather than being either verification or NCPs proper, have become more a
605 The first reports of developed-country Parties to the Climate Change Convention were due on 
September 21, 1994, see further Oberthiir, S., 1994, pp. 299-300; They were dealt with on a preliminary 
basis and a synthesis produced by a group o f experts: For the example of information submitted before 
the First COP to the FCCC see: First Review o f  Information Communicated by Each Party Included in 
Annex I to the Convention, 29.3.1995, FCCC/1995/lnf.4. and FCCC/CP/1995Inf.4/Corr.l. And see INC: 
First Review o f Information Communicated by Each Party Included in Annex I to the Convention, 
7.12.1994, A/AC.237/81.
606 See INC: Report o f  the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee fo r  a Framework Convention on 
Climate Change on the Work o f its Tenth Session held at Geneva from 22 August to 2 September 1994, 
A/AC.237/76; and see INC: Report o f the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee fo r  a Framework 
Convention on Climate Change on the Work o f  Its Eleventh Session held at New York from 6 to 17 
February 1995, A/AC.237/91 and A/Ac.237/91/Add.l.
607 FCCC: Report o f  the Conference o f the Parties on Its First Session, Part II, Berlin, 28.3-7.4.1995, 
FCCC/CP/1995/7/Add. 1, Decision 2/CP.l. and Annexes I, II and III., pp. 7-12.
608 Interview with Mr. P. Stianssen, United Nations Climate Change Secretariat, Geneva, 11.7.1995; and 
see Bodansky, D., 2000, p. 372.
159
way of reaching a dialogue with the parties to the Convention, and a way o f capacity and  
confidence building.609
Kyoto Protocol expert review teams are required to assess the implementation of the  
commitments and identify any potential problems and report thereon to the COP. The CO P 
has to consider the report or information given by the Secretariat with the assistance of the  
SBI or the SBSTA, and to take “decisions on any matter required for the implementation o f  
this Protocol”. This wording in itself sounds like any other treaty text, but the potential o f  
the new NCP that has been negotiated, and especially the prospects of some concrete 
enforcement measures under it, may yet bring a system remarkably different from most 
other environmental treaties.
R eport con ten ts
Generally the main aim o f human rights reports is to gain information on how states have 
implemented a given treaty in their domestic legislation. Initial reports set, as it were, the 
"starting-point" for new states ratifying a convention, notably by providing an explanation 
o f the relationship between the treaty and the domestic law of the country.610 Further 
periodic reports, usually at two-to five-year intervals, then follow up the first one by 
reporting on progress made in achieving the goals or standards of the treaty. A central 
component o f most reports should be information on the obstacles encountered in 
implementing the treaty and any such measures, which have been adopted to overcome the 
obstacles. The Human Rights Committee has stated that reporting under the CCPR should 
include information on the practices and decisions of courts and other organs o f the state 
party and further relevant facts that are likely to show "the degree of actual implementation
609 Ibid; Interview with Mr. R. Kinley, the United Nations Climate Change Secretariat, Geneva,
11.7.1995; Mr. Kinley then envisaged that, if nothing else, the fear o f reciprocity would probably prevent 
the process from becoming a country-to-country discussion, and indeed, the new practice has proved him 
right. See e.g. FCCC/SBI/2000/CRP.14.
610 See e.g. CCPR, Guidelines Regarding the Form and Contents o f  Initial Reports from  States Parties, 
CCPR/Cy5/Rev.2, 28.4 1995; for an example of an initial report, one by Latvia to the Human Rights 
Committee under the CCPR, see Consideration o f  Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 o f  
the Covenant, CCPR/C/81/Add.l/Rev.l, 19.10.1994; And see the Committee’s efforts at helping states 
Parties meet their reporting obligations, Human Rights Committee, 74th Session, 27.3.2002, press release 
under http://www.unhchr.ch/huridoc/.
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and enjoyment o f the rights recognized in the [CCPR]".611 This is an example o f a 
recognition o f the need to gain information about more than “mere” legislation, but 
expectations o f content are here still phrased in general terms, and leave much discretion to 
states, with the ensuing problem that reports may be incompatible, focusing on detail when 
overall information is required, or on general discussion when detailed accounts o f actual 
practice should be needed.612
As seen in the examples of treaty provisions referred to above, environmental reports may 
also contain references to a) implementing legislation, b) administrative structures, or c) 
decisions of courts and other judicial organs, as well as to progress made and d) problems 
encountered under any of these. Requirements may also include information on e) 
implementation mechanisms, for instance permit or licensing systems. But reports under 
environmental treaties differ considerably from their human rights counter-parts in that 
they additionally contain much more f) technical and scientific information, often statistics 
and data on substances, emissions, or procedures (i.e. actual physical behaviour) when such 
are regulated in a treaty, much of which may be beyond the reach o f the non-natural 
scientist reader. Physical data in reports is usually related to implementing measures under 
the treaty itself, such as greenhouse gas inventories, and more seldom to other (than treaty- 
regulated) g) environmental behaviour and its ecological effects.613 Initial reports exist in 
some treaties, and just as under human rights treaties, their rationale is to provide a basis 
for further reporting. For instance the parties to the Montreal Protocol are required to report 
on statistical data on their production, imports and exports o f controlled substances for the 
year 1986, which was the year before the adoption o f the Protocol, and, since the London 
amendments to the Protocol in 1990, the equivalent data for added substances for the year 
1989.614 Likewise, parties to the 1991 VOC Protocol to LRTAP are required to submit 
reports on levels of emissions o f volatile organic compounds in its territory for a year to be
611 See Compilation o f General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty 
Bodies, 29.7.1994, HRI/GEN/l/Rev.l, p. 3.
612 For the equivalent problems of discretion in communications to the Human Rights Committee, and 
especially criteria on how they should be deemed admissible, see Steiner, H., 2000, pp. 15-53.
6,3 See further Bodansky, D., 2000, p. 369; and look further on resource and trade data to be exchanged under 
the International Tropical Timber Agreement, Geneva, 18.11.1983, in force 1.4 .1985.
614 See Montreal Protocol, Article 7(1) and the amended Article 7(1) and 7(2).
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taken as a  base year for calculations.615 An interesting qualitative expectation is found in  
the VOC Protocol to LRTAP, which requires parties to include in their annual reports h ) 
any revisions which may be necessary for reports already made for earlier years.616 617
The COP, or equivalent executive body, is often mandated to establish the form and  
intervals o f  the reporting requirement. Under some conventions, guidelines have been  
elaborated to help states fulfil their reporting duties, and these sometimes come in very  
clear format and are available on the internet.618 Under the Nuclear Safety Convention, fo r 
example, reports address each obligation under the Convention separately, and should 
demonstrate how the obligations have been met. Also, reports indicating that a particular 
obligation has not been fulfilled, or that there have been problems in relation to it, should 
state i) what measures are being taken or planned to meet the obligation.619As exemplified 
by the amended Mediterranean Convention, many treaties also include their protocols and, 
more importantly, recommendations taken under them in the reporting requirements. 
Broadening the questions covered is a positive development, particularly when (as is often 
the case with framework conventions) protocols and recommendations are the documents 
that set concrete objectives for pollution prevention.620 In this context the example of the 
ILO and its requirements on reporting also on non-ratified conventions is useful. 
Presumably, better results can be achieved when states are pressured to share information
6,5 Article 8(1).
616 Article 8(2)(a).
617 See e.g. Biodiversity Convention, Article 23(4)(a) and www.biodiv.org/natreD/index for a summary of 
decisions the COP has taken on national reporting format and intervals (4 years). In the FCCC system 
dead-lines for the submission of reports are decided by the COP; for Annex I states, see e.g. FCCC: 
Report o f  the Conference o f  the Parties on Its First Session, Part II, Berlin, 28.3-7.4.1995, 
FCCC/CP/1995/7/Add. 1, Decision 3/CP.l, pp. 13-14.
618 See e.g., INC: Guidelines and Procedures for First Communications, December 1993, A/AC.237/45 and 
A/AC.237/45/Add. 1. For an example o f report data formats, see www.osDar.org/eng/html/formats: Under the 
Montreal Protocol, see http://www.unep.org/ozone/reports.$html#dataforms: For a reporting system, which is 
not treaty based, see the CSD (the Agenda 21 follow-up body) guidelines for national reporting 
http://www.un.org/esa/agenda21/natlinfo/niau/csd9/csd9.htm
619 Article 21 and 22 of the Convention and Article 2 of the Annex; A MOP to the Convention has specified 
the form and structure of reports to be submitted, dates for submission, and the process for reviewing them. 
Intervals will be no longer than three years, since that is specified for review meetings. For national reports 
presented to the First Review Meeting in 1999, see www.iaea.org/worIdatom.
620 See further Bodansky, D., 2000, p. 368 on positive correlation between specific obligations and better 
reporting and review processes.
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even on j) their intentions, that is, steps they may - or may not - be taking in order to 
prepare for joining a particular treaty.
Both the amended Mediterranean Convention and the Biodiversity Convention refer to k) 
"the effectiveness" of measures taken to implement the treaties as something to be reported 
on. Neither treaty defines in any way the term "effectiveness". This is hardly surprising, but 
makes for a wide range o f discretion for states to set whatever parameters they find suitable 
in their reports. Thus, unless clear guidelines have been set, there are no objective criteria 
for "effectiveness" in compliance, and, for instance, the subjective views of a governmental 
official writing a report may be determinant. This naturally weakens the quality o f reports 
and makes it more difficult to compare them, a fact that again underlines the importance 
of NGOs in verifying the contents o f state reports.621 22 And finally, reports under 
environmental treaties may contain information on 1) particular punishments and penalties 
given under legislation prompted by the treaty. Here, the MARPOL requirement to report 
on penalties imposed for infringement o f the Convention is a clear example.623
Exceptions
The strictly treaty-based reporting procedures “embody” their own exceptions: reporting 
requirements are not phrased as general rules with exceptions, they are by definition 
limited to the contents of the initial agreement or further, still usually consent-based, 
developments o f the substantive rules. Thus a state does not report on “everything” minus 
exceptions for defence or intellectual property rights or the like (in clear contrast to the 
third “phase”, which is concerned with individual rights and discussed in Chapter Four), it 
reports on its achievements in relation to implementation o f or compliance with particular 
substantive rules or framework principles.
In some environmental treaties, however, the scope o f application of exceptions to states’ 
information duties may be worded so broadly that they could be read to cover the reporting
621 See ibid., p. 370.
622 See Handl, G., 1991, pp. 72-75.
623 Article 11(1X0, see supra.
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obligation as well. This is then either intentional or an extra cautionary measure, but is 
nonetheless often unnecessary given that treaty texts usually define and enumerate w hat 
aspects o f the treaty states are to report on. Finally, the low quality of some reports m ay  
also be indicative of unwillingness, rather than always being a sign o f inability, o f reporting 
on some issues.
C om pliance with reporting obligations
Human rights and environmental treaties struggle with very similar problems when it 
comes to compliance with reporting obligations. Currently over 1,300 reports to the m ain 
United Nations human rights treaties are overdue.624 Many other reports, although 
submitted, lack in comprehensiveness and depth, and even when submitted, the reviewing 
institutions themselves often do not have sufficient time and resources to engage in proper 
discussions over the report contents.625 The issue of compliance with reporting obligations 
was addressed, for instance, during the World Conference on Human Rights held at V ienna 
in June 1993,626and it has repeatedly been dealt with since then by the General Assembly 
and the Meeting of the Chairpersons of the Human Rights Treaty Bodies, as well as by 
NGOs and publicists.627In their general comments and recommendations the human rights 
treaty bodies themselves have also pointed out problems with compliance.628 For instance,
624 The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR; formerly UN Centre for Human 
Rights, UNCHR), International Instruments Branch, keeps up-dated lists o f the status of state party reports to 
be submitted to the principal international human rights instruments, under http://www.unhchr.ch/. For 
comparison, see also Study by the Independent Expert on Enhancing the Long-Term Effectiveness o f  the 
United Nations Human Rights Treaty Regime, A/CONF.157/PC/Add.l 1/Rev.l for the situation in the early 
90s; and for 1993 and 1998, see chart at p. 5 in Crawford, J., 2000, as adapted from Alston, P., Final Report 
on Enhancing the Long-term Effectiveness o f  the United Nations Human Rights Treaty System , 7 March 
1997, E/CN.4/1997/74; For CEDAW, see Bustelo, M., 2000, p. 84. But contra on the excellent reporting 
record under e.g. the European Social Charter, see Harris, D., 2000, p. 348.
623 Generally on the backlog problem under human rights treaties, see Crawford, J., 2000, pp. 4-6. For 
CEDAW, see Bustelo, M., 2000, p. 84-93; but contra for CERD see Banton, M., 2000, p. 60. : "although the 
number of incoming reports has been increasing, the Committee has not allowed any backlog o f unconsidered 
reports to build up”.
626 See Amnesty International, World Conference for Human Rights. Facing up the Failures: Proposals for 
Improving the Protection o f  Human Rights by the United Nations, London, 1992.
627 For examples o f African states’ reporting under human rights treaties, see Hatchard, J, 1994; and Viljoen, 
F., 2000.
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the Commission on Human Rights has frequently discussed the problem of overdue 
reports.628 29
No comprehensive compilations of over-all figures for reports due, or incomplete or poor 
reports for global environmental treaties are yet to be found. That is probably mainly 
because most treaties are relatively recent and the system is less coherent and less 
coordinated than in, for instance, the human rights field. By way of examples o f early 
reporting problems, the Marine Environment Protection Committee of the IMO in 1992 
regretted that most states parties to the MARPOL 73/78 had not submitted the mandatory 
reports under the Convention. Only 20% of arties had submitted reports since the 29th 
session o f the Committee in 1990. In 1992 more than 30 parties to MARPOL had never, 
since the entry into force of the Convention in 1983, submitted a report to the IMO.630 The 
parties to the Montreal Protocol first fulfilled their reporting obligations very 
conscientiously for 1986, the first year data was required. After the initial reporting boom, 
compliance with the requirement dropped sharply,631 632rising again slightly after the mid- 
1990s. Under the Basel Convention, the first round of reports in 1992 caused problems 
because o f the recent entry into force o f the Convention. For the year 1993 roughly two
628 Some treaty bodies have issued documents specifically on the status o f reports due, see e.g. Committee on 
the Elimination of Racial Discrimination: Submission o f Reports by States Parties in Accordance with Article 
9 o f  the Convention, 27.6.1994, CERD/C/265; For instance, the Human Rights Committee, charged with 
monitoring the CCPR, has noted that "the fact that most States parties have (...] engaged in a constructive 
dialogue with the Committee suggests that the States parties normally ought to be able to fulfil the reporting 
obligation ... and that it would be in their own interest to do so in the future". Compilation o f General 
Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, 29.7.1994, 
HRI/GEN/l/Rev.l, p. 3; and it has also noted that only that part o f reporting provisions, which require initial 
reports has become regularly operative, and that many reports submitted are too brief and general, lacking in 
substance, etc., See also the Committee’s efforts at helping states Parties meet their reporting obligations, 
Human Rights Committee, 74th Session, 27.3.2002, press release under http://www.unhchr.ch/huridoc/.
629 See e.g. Commission on Human Rights: Effective Functioning o f Human Rights Mechanisms: Treaty 
Bodies, E/CN.4/2002/110,7.12.2001, found under http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/
630 See IMO News No. 2, 1992, on the 32nd session of the Marine Environment Protection Committee, 2- 
6.3.1992, p. 9, and see Chayes, A. & A.H. Chayes, 1995, pp. 156-157, on IMO, and esp. on early Soviet 
misreporting to the International Whaling Commission; And see Bodansky, D., 2000, p. 375 on early 
inadequate reporting under CITES; and see also further under http://www.cites.org/ where national reports are 
not directly found, but Standing Committee acknowledges that reporting has improved after the adoption of 
resolutions 11.37 and 11.89 on determination o f failures to report and the possibility for listing those parties 
and further suspension of trade with those parties, look at 
http://www.cites.org/eng/cttee/standing/46/agenda.shtml for CITES SC46 Doc. 17, 12-15.3 2002 and esp. 
Annex listing received and due reports since 1997.
631 See Koskenniemi, M., 'Breach of Treaty o r...’, 1992, p. 130.
632 By September 1997 some 74% (113 out o f 152 Parties) had reported for the year 1995, see 
UNEP/OzL.Pro.9/12, 25.9.1997.
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thirds o f the parties to the treaty submitted reports. Parties from developing countries had 
particular difficulties in fulfilling their obligations. In response, the first two Conferences 
of the Parties in 1992 and 1994 took decisions that urged the parties to fulfil their reporting 
obligations633 but, despite those efforts, reporting frequency under the Convention fell 
somewhat to about 44% for 1994.634
In the early 1990s, it was thus noted that poor compliance with reporting obligations and 
low quality o f reports posed major problems.635 63Sachariev envisaged two main ways o f  
dealing with the problem: firstly, precise deadlines for the submission o f reports, and, 
secondly, some measure o f pressure or "threat" by the reviewing organ to rely on estimates 
if  the state does not report. A well-known example o f a method for sanctioning non- 
compliance with reporting procedures is found within the Montreal Protocol under which a 
decision has been taken to the effect that a party hoping for special status as a developing 
country will not be eligible unless it submits the required data on its consumption.637 A 
later example is found under CITES, where failure to report can now lead to 
recommendations for suspension o f  trade with parties.638
63j For reports received between May 1992 and March 1994, see Reporting and Transmission o f Information 
Required Under the Basel Convention, June 1994, SBC No. 94/007; For reports received between July and 
October 1994 see Second meeting of the Open-ended Ad Hoc Committee for the implementation of the Basel 
Convention: Reporting and Transmission o f Information Required Under the Basel Convention, 17.11.1994, 
UNEP/CHW/C.2/1/INF.9. See also No. 6 Managing Hazardous Wastes, Newsletter of the Basel Convention, 
March 1995; Basel Convention: Decisions Adopted by the First (1992) and Second (1994) Meetings of the 
Conference o f  the Parties, June 1994, UNEP/SBC/94/008, see Decisions I/II and II/17. However, with the 
exception o f some countries mentioning difficulties they had with reporting, the second COP showed very 
little debate on reports; Interview with N. Basavaraj-Schroth, Basel Convention Secretariat, Geneva, 
11.7.1995.
634 49 (out o f 111) reports were received by late October 1997 for data for the year 1994, UNEP/CHW.4/18 
and UNEP/CHW.4/18/Corr. I .
635 See particularly International Environment: International Agreements Are Not Well Monitored, United 
States General Accounting Office Report to Congressional Requesters, January 1992, GAO/RCED-92-43; 
And see Sachariev, K., 1991, pp. 42-43.
636 Sachariev, K., 1991, pp. 42-43.
637 For further examples o f sanctioning non-compliance, ibid., p. 43.; And see Decision II/10, 
UNEP/OzL.Pro.2/3 (1990).
638 The Standing Committee acknowledges that reporting has improved after the adoption o f resolutions 11.37 
and 11.89 on determination o f failures to report and the possibility for listing those Parties and further 
suspension o f trade with them, look at http://www.cites.org/eng/cttee/standing/46/agenda.shtml for CITES 
SC46 Doc. 17, 12-15.3 2002.
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Clearly, some progress has been made under a few treaties since the earliest reporting 
exercises. The Basel Convention parties have slowly improved their record, so that nearly 
half the parties reported for the year 1998 and nearly 60% for the year 1999.639 Only three 
Parties out of fifty failed to submit reports to and attend the First Review Meeting of the 
Nuclear Safety Convention in 1999,640 and under the Environment Protocol to the Antarctic 
Treaty a good number of national reports have been turned in and made publicly 
available.641 The Biodiversity Convention has developed its reporting system, and also 
received first reports by about half o f  its parties.642 But the biggest success among global 
treaties is probably found under the Climate Change Convention, where industrialized 
countries have very good reporting records, both for initial and subsequent 
communications,643 and developing countries are following suit,644 especially after some 
financial resources and technical support have been made available.645
639 87 reports were received for 1999,72 for 1998, and 62 for 1997; For the Secretariat’s Country Fact Sheets 
prepared on the basis of the national reports, access under http://www.basel.int//pub/.
640 One further party sent its report, but did not attend. All four were developing countries, and their non- 
compliance was published in the CNS: Summary Report o f the Contracting Parties' First Review Meeting, 
see Nuclear Installations Safety Net (NUSAFE): www.iaea.ora/worldatom/Documents/Legal. The Report 
also notes that “the National Reports submitted were in most cases o f high quality and provided ample 
information on steps and measures taken and in progress to implement the obligations... of the Convention. 
[...A]ll questions asked by Contracting Parties in the review process were addressed by respondent Parties. 
The discussions in the Country Group sessions and the Plenary sessions were open and constructive, 
illuminating issues o f special interest, providing additional insights with regard to national safety 
programmes, and generally demonstrating the strong commitment o f each participating Contracting Party..
p. 2.
641 For some very preliminary comments, see Rothwell, D., 2000, pp. 591-614.; Esp. for all publicly available 
documents, see at http: //cep.npol ar.n o//0 ldB s/cephome.htm: and for those national annual reports for both 
Convention and Protocol submitted together at CEP III, 2000, at 
http://cep.npolar.no//InnhoId/cep archive/CEP III Documents.htm
642 By the deadline on 1 January 1998 the CBD Secretariat had received 16 reports, but by the end of March 
1998 it had received 86 reports, representing about half of the parties. Second reports were due on May 15 
2001 to be dealt with at COP 6 in April 2002. Look at http://www.biodiv.org/world/reports.asp.
643 For exceptionally clear electronic accessibility (or indications o f hard-copy availability) o f all national 
reports, see at http://unfccc.int/resource/natcom/index.html.
644 For industrialized countries (who have all submitted initial communications) c f  e.g. that by April 1998,23 
o f 25 Parties had submitted second national communications that had been due in April 1997, UN Doc. 
FCCC/SBI/1998/INF.1, and by February 2002, 35 (out of 39) parties had submitted their second national 
communications. By February 2002, 18 (out of 39) parties had submitted third national communications. By 
February 2002, only one country, Belarus, had not submitted any of the three communications required. For 
developing countries cf. that by April 1998 only eighth parties had submitted (several incomplete) initial 
communications, which were due in March 1997, FCCC/SBI/1998/INF.3, and by the end o f 2001 all non- 
Annex I parties had submitted their initial communications and one party, Mexico, had submitted its second 
national communication.
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But several treaty secretariats still do not publish data on reports due, let alone mention the 
names o f the parties that have neglected reporting.645 46 647Undoubtedly, and despite the defence 
of lack o f funds that many countries put forward, the great number of overdue reports 
detracts from the credibility o f the entire reporting system. Just as in the human rights 
field, this is therefore where the role o f non-governmental organizations becomes 
crucial.648 Neither human rights nor environmental NGOs usually have formal access to  
participation in reporting procedures,649 but their material may nonetheless be very 
valuable.650 There are some notable exceptions: the Committee against Torture (CAT) can 
ask NGOs for oral or written submissions;65 ^ he Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ESCR) receives both oral and written submissions from NGOs;652 and, 
finally, the Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC) can ask specialized agencies, 
UNICEF and other competent bodies for expert advice, a provision which has in practice 
led to both written and oral NGO submissions, that is, alternative and more critical 
reports 653 Among environmental treaties, CITES stands out as the example o f a treaty with
645 National Communications from  Parties Not Included in Annex I  to the Convention. Provision o f  Financial 
and Technical Support, FCCC/WEB/2001/2,25.10 2001.
646 For treaty secretariats that still (as in February 2002) fail to give out numbers, or country-names, o f 
missing reports on their internet homepages, see e.g. under Vienna Convention and Montreal Protocol at 
http://wvw.unep.org/ozone.
647 On human rights "reporting" and information gathering done by NGOs, governments and various research 
institutions, see e.g., Innés de Neufville, J., 1986, pp. 681-699; Skogly, S.I., 1990, pp. 513-528; And see 
generally, Alston, P., ed, The United Nations..., 1992; Brett, R., 1993, pp. 121-144; Buergenthal, T., 1995, 
pp. 321-323; Viljoen, F.,2000, p. 116;
648 Buergenthal, T., 1995, pp. 321-323; C f  Sixth and Seventh Chairpersons’ Meetings, A/50/505, para. 23 and 
A/51/482, para. 35-36.
649 On formal grounds for NGO participation, see generally, Knox, J.H., 2001, pp. 25-26, where the author 
also discusses Chayes, A. & A. H. Chayes, 1995, p. 249, lack o f reference to the formal grounds for NGO, 
and expertise, participation in managerial methods.
650 For the example of CEDAW, where neither the Convention nor the Committee’s rules o f procedure allow 
for formal NGO participation, but where recent practice has led to NGO involvement in the formulation of 
general comments and in providing country specific information, see further Bustelo, M., 2000, pp. 105-108. 
Vis-à-vis environmental treaties, see Bodansky, D., 2000, pp. 374-376.
651 See Amnesty International, World Conference for Human Rights. Facing up the Failures: Proposals for 
Improving the Protection o f Human Rights by the United Nations, London, 1992, p. 36; Bank, R., 2000, p. 
151; Clapham, A.,2000,pp. 182-184.
652 See Leckie, S., 2000, pp. 133-134 on ESCR Committee and alternative sources of information which
facilitate “the adoption of some forceful concluding observations’.
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some stronger ties to NGOs and their independent information, against which to assess 
national reports.654 The tasks o f NGOs, especially coalitions o f NGOs, are in influencing 
the preparation o f reports at the national level, in raising public awareness through the 
media when human rights violations - or environmental harm655 - is discerned, and in 
providing information against which to verify the correctness of state reports. In some 
instances such NGO “verification” has strongly influenced the character of the human 
rights report review situations as well as Committees* comments.656 Access to reports and 
their background material is thus crucial.657Although some countries have reasonably 
strong legislation on public access to government documents, globally this is a topical issue 
of great concern, and it will be further discussed in chapter 4.
Problems still exist in relation to compliance with environmental reporting requirements, 
and the level o f  detail may vary considerably658 despite guidelines.659 Yet a new and 
somewhat surprising phenomenon has also evolved. Under some treaties, particularly the 
Climate Change Convention, and to some extent also the Biodiversity Convention, many 
reports are bright, costly publications designed by publicity specialists, making use of 
many colour pictures and graphs - quite the opposite of ordinary bureaucratic reports. The
633 Under CRC Article 45. See Brett, R,, 1993, pp. 138-139; and further Theytaz-Bergman, L., 1996, pp. 537- 
538; and further see Lansdown, G., 2000, pp. 118-122, on reporting as a process with a national dimension.
654 CITES uses esp. two NGOs for information: the World Conservation Monitoring Unit’s database of 
compilations of national reports and TRAFFIC (Trade Records Analysis o f Fauna and Flora in Commerce) 
information on illegal trafficking in wildlife.
6'5 Further on the roles of NGOs in environmental law, see Sands, P. & A. Bedecarré, 1990, pp. 799-822; 
Sands, P„ 1991, pp. 61-68; Tolbert, D., 1991, pp. 95-108; Livemash, R., 1992, pp. 12-43; Kiss, A., 1992, pp. 
14-15; Doherty, A., 1994, pp. 199-218; SjOstedt, G., B.I. Spector & W. Zartman, 1994, pp. 233-249; ibid., pp. 
3-19; Princen, T. & M. Finger, 1994; Schweitz, M.L., 1995, pp. 415-420; Sikkink, K., 1995, pp. 413-415; 
Ponce-Nava, D„ 1995, pp. 131-140; Burhenne, W.E., 1995, pp. 207-219; Werksman, J., 1996; French, H, 
1996, pp. 251-258.
656 Generally see Steiner, H. & P. Alston, 1996, pp. 457-470; On the crucial role of NGO reports for the 
ESCR Committee’s “ad hoc complaints procedure”, Craven, M, 1994, p. 91-113. The author writes that the 
Committee has developed a “quasi-judicial competence” in its role as supervisory body;.cy Leckie, S., 2000, 
pp. 133-134; and c f  other examples o f NGO influence by Clapham, A., 2000.
657 Vasak, K., 1982, p. 225. See Leary, V., 1992, for a commentary on the closed meetings and subsequent 
lack of publicity of the ILO Committee of Experts, p. 597; Generally, see Alston, P., 2000, pp. 512-515.
658 On problems and successes encountered with communications from non-Annex 1 countries of the FCCC, 
see FCCC/SBI/2000/L.5.
639 See e.g. under the Montreal Protocol, http://www.uneD.Org/ozone/reports.shtml#dataforms. For a reporting 
system, which is not treaty based, see the CSD (the Agenda 21 follow-up body) guidelines for national 
reporting http://www.un.org/esa/agenda21/natlinfo/niau/csd9/csd9.htm
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visibility o f  the reports, for instance on the Internet, in conjunction with their relatively 
good quality substantively, could well be an indication that reporting is taken seriously.660 
It seems that it became something o f a trend in the 1990s to use the reports as an  
environmental public relations tool. That would call for certain caution and independent 
verification. On the other hand, the practice by some treaty secretariats and by individual 
countries themselves to make reports available on the internet has made them considerably 
more accessible to researchers, the general public, NGOs and governments alike, and th is 
trend again should raise the value o f  reports.661 The internet would then function as a carrot 
for governments.
P roblem s encountered
Although the problems with fulfilling reporting requirements are very similar in the two 
areas, ameliorating efforts have been much more broadly discussed in the human rights 
area than in the environmental one, maybe because the former has had more time to create 
both backlogs and some views on where the main problems lie. Experience gained from 
some major problems in human rights reporting could serve as lessons learned for 
environmental reporting (but maybe also vice versa) to the extent that a small number o f 
environmental institutions have developed more sophisticated procedures. The large 
number o f  reports to be submitted to different human rights treaty bodies has been 
repeatedly discussed. Efforts to co-ordinate reporting between different bodies asking for 
very similar or even identical information have been topical at least since the mid-1980s.662
660 Interview with Mr. R. Kinley, the United Nations Climate Change Secretariat, Geneva, 11.7.1995.
661 See web pages of the CBD; FCCC; IAEA; OSPAR; HELCOM etc. On the web-pages of the IAEA’s 
Nuclear Installation Safety Net countries now answer questions about their safety issues. Many countries also 
publish their own national reports on the internet, see e.g. Finnish pages: 
www.stuk.fi/vdinvoimalaitokset/nvr/safetv-convention. For an example of country reporting related to 
compliance with the Antarctic Treaty, Articles III(l), VII(5) and Rec. VIII(6), and voluntarily posted on the 
internet, see Belgian pages: www.belspo.be/antar
662 Cancado Trindade, A.A., 1987, pp. 314-356; The chairpersons o f the human rights treaty bodies have 
recommended measures, inter alia, on reducing the burden of reporting, see e.g. Improving the Operation o f 
the Human Rights Treaty Bodies, Fifth Meeting o f Chairpersons of Treaty Bodies, 19-23.9.1994, 
HRI/MC/1994/2. See also equivalent First Meeting, 16-17.8.1984, A/39/484; Second Meeting, 10- 
14.10.1988, A/44/98; Third Meeting, 1-5.10.1990, A/45/636; Fourth Meeting, 12-16.10.1992, A/47/628; The 
Vienna World Conference on Human Rights made recommendations on the implementing functions, and 
more specifically, on the co-ordination o f reporting requirements of the human rights treaty bodies, see the 
Vienna Declaration and Programme o f Action, adopted by the World Conference on Human Rights 
25.6.1993, A/CONF. 157/23, Part II, E. See also the Vienna Statement of the International Human Rights
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For instance, the General Assembly has recommended the designation o f specific national 
administrative units to co-ordinate reports to different treaty bodies, and urged the treaty 
bodies to consider the utility o f  single comprehensive reports and of replacing reports with 
specifically tailored reports and thematic reports.663 Other reforms, such as the 
establishment o f cross-treaty body working groups and streamlining the timing of different 
reports have been suggested, as well as more radical propositions of a single, 
comprehensive treaty body to deal with reports under the different human rights treaties.664
Developing countries in particular often lack the resources, both financial and 
administrative, to research, monitor, and write the various reports.665 Guidelines for the 
form and contents of initial and periodic reports,666and guidelines for so-called "core 
documents" on the general information required under most human rights treaties,667 have 
been elaborated. For instance, the Commission on Human Rights is continuously trying to 
improve its training and assistance in reporting through fellowship programmes,668 funding, 
by aiming at rationalizing and simplifying the reporting obligations, for instance through
Treaty Bodies, A/CONF.157/TBB/4; and see the interim report on the updated Study by the Independent 
Expert on Enhancing the Long-Term Effectiveness o f the United Nations Human Rights Treaty Regime, 
A/CONF. 157/PC/Add. 11/Rev.l.
663 Effective Implementation o f International Instruments on Human Rights, Including Reporting Obligations 
under International Instruments on Human Rights, 23.12.1994, A/RES/49/178. The General Assembly has 
considered the issue o f reporting to human rights treaty bodies at each o f its sessions since 1982. The first 
resolution was 37/44 o f3.12 1982: On utility o f thematic reports, see Banton, M., 2000, pp. 70-71.
664 See Alston, P., Final Report on Enhancing the Long-term Effectiveness o f  the United Nations Human 
Rights Treaty System, 7.3.1997, E/CN.4/1997/74; and see Clapham, A., 2000, pp. 195-198 on the 
“govemmentalization” o f treaty bodies and remedies in the form of creation o f a permanent professional 
treaty body to review all reports; and see Scott, C., 2000.
665 Higgins, R., 1994, p. 109.
666 See e.g. CESCR: Revised General Guidelines Regarding the Form and Contents o f  Reports to be 
Submitted by States Parties under Articles 16 and 17 o f the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, E/C. 12/1991/1; CCPR, Guidelines Regarding the Form and Contents o f  Initial Reports from  
States Parties, CCPR/C/5/Rev.2; CERD: General Guidelines Regarding the Form and Contents o f Reports to 
be submitted by States Parties under Article 9, Paragraph I, o f  the Convention, CERD/C/70/Rev.3; CRC: 
General Guidelines Regarding the Form and Content o f  Initial Reports to be Submitted by States Parties 
under Article 44, paragraph 1(a) o f the CRC, UN Doc CRC/C/5; and General Guidelines Regarding the 
Form and Content o f  Initial Reports to be Submitted by States Parties under Article 44, paragraph 1(b) o f  the 
CRC, UN Doc CRC/C/58; On reporting guidelines under the African Charter, see Viljoen, F., 2000, pp. 111- 
113.
667 Preparation o f the Initial Parts o f State Party Reports ("Core Documents") under the Various 
International Human Rights Instruments, HRI/CORE/1,24.2.1992.
668 The UNHCHR and the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) have organized 
regional training courses for persons responsible for preparing periodic reports.
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core documents and cross-referencing practices,669 and by revising the Manual on H uman  
Rights Reporting, which is aimed at assisting reporting and providing continuity for the  
process.670 As an effort to encourage states to report, the Manual repeatedly points out that 
reporting procedures are not meant to put states in a bad light but rather to assist them in  
identifying problems and to point out remedies. But states’ reporting difficulties are by no 
means the only ones: the treaty reviewing bodies themselves are in backlog. Lack o f  
resources, both staff, time, funding, and access to simple technology,671 are the m ain 
culprits for mounting un-read and un-processed reports, the utility of which are then highly 
dubious, except perhaps as internal, national writing exercises, which in any case, may be 
one of the most important aspects o f the reporting process. And this is the crux o f the 
matter: that sometimes those national writing exercises happen without public scrutiny, and 
the filing of reports to an international body o f  peers (which may not even have time to 
consider it) becomes the main way for some states o f fulfilling treaty obligations.672 *The 
capacity and willingness o f states to  make their own writing process more transparent and 
open to local scrutiny, and the willingness of states, under the treaties, to make their final 
reports publicly available to anyone become “tests” o f  at least part o f the utility o f the 
reporting systems. This again highlights the issue o f resources, especially to technology, as 
electronic dissemination seems the easy solution to all report accessibility, yet it is far from 
the reality o f most people in developing countries.
Reporting under many environmental treaties requires access to very sophisticated 
information, the collection and assessment o f  which is dependent on resources at the 
national level. Calls for a “diversity o f sources” have in the human rights arena usually
669 In 2001,115 states had submitted core documents, and several states had started using cross-references to
avoid duplication of texts, see Commission on Human Rights: Effective Functioning o f  Human Rights 
Mechanisms: Treaty Bodies, E/CN .4/2002/110, 7.12.2001, p. 4., found under
http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/. On funding, ibid.
670 Manual on Human Rights Reporting Under Six Major International Human Rights Instruments, United 
Nations, New York, UN Doc HR/PUB/91/1 rev. 1997, sales No. GV.E.97.0.16, and at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf7manual/hrr.Ddf. The Manual currently exists in English and Spanish, and versions 
in Russian, French, Arabic and Chinese are planned, as well as updating related to new reporting 
requirements under the CRC and its two new Optional Protocols.
671 See Alston, P., in Final Report, 7.3.1997, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1997/74, para. 84; And see e.g. Crawford, J., 
2000, pp. 6-7; and for CRC see Lansdown, G., 2000, p. 125; for CERD see Ban ton, M., 2000,
672 See Leckie, S., 2000, p. 131. On NGO participation in report drafting, see Clapham, A., 2000, pp. 190-
192.
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meant the inclusion of NGO material,673 but in the environmental field this may be much 
broader still, including, because o f  demands for scientific accuracy, especially many 
technical and scientific bodies and institutions’ information. The enormous data-load, very 
specialized knowledge (which often is beyond the understanding of any bureaucrats, 
lawyers or politicians), and technical needs, both simple computerization and highly 
advanced monitoring technology, together with the great number of treaties, mean that 
there is enormous need for technical help, particularly for developing countries, as well as 
for countries in transition to market economy.674 In fact the workload has become heavy for 
any government, and not just those with small administrations. In response to these 
problems, some newer treaties have arrangements to help parties complete their reporting 
requirements.675 Even where most parties are developed countries, the problem of 
coordinating and streamlining overlapping information requirements, for example between 
framework conventions and their protocols,676 have been addressed, and some initial 
coordinating efforts are being taken between UNEP-hosted environmental treaties, also in 
streamlining reporting requirements between the agreements.677 Most recently, the need has 
been voiced to minimize use of paper copies and revert to web-based information- 
exchanges and dissemination to the public.678 Web-based reporting would fulfil both state-
473 But contra, see Gallagher, A., 2000, for a discussion on other key partners than the traditional NGOs in 
human rights protection, e.g. the role of independent national human rights institutions and the technical 
support given by treaty bodies.
Some countries have pointed at difficulties related to the scarcity of resources and availability of adequate 
data, see, for instance, Framework Convention on Climate Change: Report o f the Conference o f the Parties 
on Its First Session, Berlin 2S.3-7.4.1995, FCCC/CP/1995/7, p. 21.
675 Non-Annex I countries to the FCCC have a Consultative Group o f Experts to help them with national 
communications, FCCC/SBI/2000/CRP.13. For the example o f a decision to cut down on frequency and 
contents in so-called annual reviews, see pp. 4-5, ECE, Executive Body for the Convention on Long-Range 
Transboundary Air Pollution: Report o f  the Fifteenth Session o f the Executive Body, 1998, ECE/EB.AIR/53.
476 See e.g. early efforts to co-ordinate reporting between the Antarctic Treaty and the Agreed Measures for 
the Conservation of Antarctic Fauna and Flora, Recommendations of the Third Antarctic Treaty Consultative 
Meeting, Brussels 13.6.1964, 17 U.S.T. 992. Article XII(2) provides that “Each Participating Government 
shall inform the other Governments in writing before the end of November o f each year of the steps taken and 
information collected in the preceding period o f  July 1st to June 30th relating to the implementation of these 
Agreed Measures. Governments exchanging information under paragraph 5 of Article VII of the Antarctic 
Treaty may at the same time transmit the information relating to the implementation of these Agreed 
Measures."
677 On UNEP efforts to coordinate between (mainly its own) environmental treaties, see its Division of 
Environmental Conventions, which is tasked with identifying synergies and promoting collaboration amongst 
agreements, i.a. by publishing a bulletin, Synergy, accessible at http://www.uneD.ch/conventions/: And esp. 
on streamlining under biodiversity-related Conventions, look under http://www.biodi v .org/world/reports. asp.
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to-state information “circulation” requirements and have the benefit of making national 
reports and other information readily available to the public -  provided, as just noted, that 
the technology is accessible in the first place.
Just as with human rights reports, the cost o f environmental reporting may be an issue o f  
great concern for many developing countries. It was noted already in the early stages o f the 
Climate Change Convention that the costs o f both limiting emissions and fulfilling 
reporting requirements should be properly studied by means of, for instance, country 
studies on the basis of which incremental costs o f compliance could be ascertained.678 79 Such 
studies were, and are still, necessary not least for the just development o f financing 
mechanisms to help states with difficulties in fulfilling their obligations, both substantive 
and procedural. To this end, the Secretariats o f  some Conventions give technical advice to 
countries drafting their reports, and by way o f  a more concrete example, the Subsidiary 
Body for Implementation of the Climate Change Convention has made an arrangement 
with the Global Environment Facility (GEF) to provide financial and technical support to 
non-Annex I (developing) countries for the preparation o f national communications.680
3.2.3. Functions
Attempts at trying to discern what functions or roles reporting procedures could have for 
environmental treaty obligations are perhaps by definition exercises in positive thinking.681
678 See e.g. a Norwegian discussion paper, submitted at the 2001 CEP IV Meeting of the 1991 Protocol on
Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, concerning measures to make reporting more efficient and 
co-ordinated (including the suggestion to convert fully to web-based reporting) between the 1959 Antarctic 
Treaty and the Protocol, look at
http://cep.npolar.nO//lnnhold/cep archive/Docs/CEP%20IV/Enalish/wp24e.pdf: and on need for digitalisation 
of reports in human rights field, see Leckie, S., 2000, pp. 142-143.
679 See Chayes, A. et a l , 1992, pp. 10-11.
680 FCCC/SBI/2000/INF.8. On the Basel Convention Trust Fund, see UNEP/CHW/C. 1/4/26, 30.6 1999 and 
infract. 3.3.
681 E.g. Alston’s categorization of functions for supervision in human rights must be intentionally optimistic: 
they largely coincide with those functions presented in the name of the human rights treaty body of which he 
was chairman, perhaps because it would be difficult to take seriously a treaty body that did not work hard to 
make its member parties fulfil the aims with what (albeit limited) means were available: Alston, P., 1991, pp. 
14-16. See Compilation o f General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights 
Treaty Bodies, 29.7 1994, HRI/GEN/l/Rev.l, pp. 43-45, for very similar objectives of state reports found in 
the general comments adopted by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in 1989. A 
stronger example of the same phenomenon is found in reports under the IAEA, but then that is not surprising:
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But while it may be necessary to keep in mind that an “x-functiorT (all possible sceptic or 
even cynical views in a nutshell: a time-winning, a make-believe, a keeping-up- 
appearances, or a cosmetic or other pointless function) could sometimes be an accurate 
description of disbelief in a particular reporting procedure or review situation, some o f the 
huge numbers o f reports must be assumed to have constructive functions vis-à-vis 
environmental protection. This does not have to mean that all functions must be positive, at 
least not all o f the time, nor that they need be simultaneously present. Some could play 
larger roles than others. What is more, it is perhaps obvious that even the existence o f some 
constructive functions are not evidence that reporting and related procedures would 
necessarily be the best possible supervisory methods for environmental treaties.
At least three o f the useful, and optimistic, functions mentioned by Alston in relation to 
human rights reporting seem directly applicable to environmental reporting as well:
1) "The initial review function" appears to be very much the same as in human rights 
reporting: part o f the process of conforming a state’s legislation and administrative and 
other practice to the convention a state is about to or has just joined. The importance of 
initial reports may be crucial for the continued process of periodic review precisely because 
they offer a point o f comparison by which to assess progress in compliance.
2) "Policy formulation" is crucial in human rights, and just as in human rights, some 
changes in environmental behaviour may take longer to come about and may need long­
term policy formulations and even changes in traditions rather than only changes in 
legislation.682 Consumption patterns are a case in point; policy formulation lies at the heart 
of the “managerial” method of solving environmental problems, in contrast to decision- 
making/politics o f some more confrontational or immediate kind.
the aim of the Agency is to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and its texts need perhaps reflect that 
the control systems it has developed are sufficient. The Agency dresses its optimistic approach in terms of 
learning processes by saying that “[b]eing a Contracting Party to this Convention entails a commitment to a 
continuous learning and improving process, something which is a key element of a high-quality safety 
culture”, see CNS: Summary Report o f the Contracting Parties’ First Review Meeting, 1999, see NUSAFE: 
www.iaea.org/worldatom/Documents/Legal. p. 2.
612 Cf. Bodansky’s (2000, pp. 365-367) “policy reform function”, which could include a range of more or less 
coercive methods, e.g. pressure from different actors on states to perform better and the national process of 
preparing a report.
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3) An "evaluation function" to assess progress or lack o f  the same. This is made easier i f  an  
“initial review” is in use. Again, the information is mostly on legal matters, not so much on  
the real state of the environm ent683 Information is also important for the sake o f  
reciprocity:684 suspicion that others may be "free riders" or that some may be making huge 
profits when others try to meet agreements, may be motivating factors for information 
exchange. The free-rider problem does not exist in the same sense in the human rights field.
But there also seem to be some differences in nuance between the two fields:
4) According to Alston, the "monitoring function" of reporting is crucial to human rights 
law. In it, states must point at more than the de jure situation in the country, they must 
monitor actual events and practice and submit relevant, including statistical, information. 
Reports that lack this may be viewed with great scepticism. But, as much as technical 
monitoring is central to environmental verification, reporting may be a good source o f  
information on policy and law, even if probably a less reliable way of acquiring "hard" 
scientific and technical data on the actual state of the environment, unless the former 
coherently and accurately integrate the latter, which it often does not. In contrast, as 
technical monitoring o f human rights may be very difficult in a practical sense (satellites 
cannot detect mental abuse or torture in prisons etc.), and not as easily put into meaningful 
statistical data, reporting procedures are more central.
5) A compliance-enhancing (or non-compliance preventive) function which contains both 
public scrutiny and, through the light that reports in some cases may shed on non- 
compliance, the admission o f problems in meeting, for instance, emission standards.685 
Reports can function as a basis for recognizing i.a. technical and financial needs, which in
683 On the role o f hard data from monitoring for the flexibility o f  a Convention, see Churchill, R.R., G. 
Rutting, L.M. Warren, 1995, p. 194: “The provisions for monitoring of both data and techniques should 
ensure feedback into the integrated assessment models so that emission ceilings can be adjusted if necessary 
using the clearly defined amendment procedures.”
684 See e.g. Bodansky, D., 2000, p. 363.
685 C f  Alston’s “public scrutiny function” and “the function of acknowledging problems”, op.cit. supra. In 
"the public scrutiny function", reports are important both for a government's international accountability and 
for its domestic accountability. Preparation of the report gives occasion to consult different social, economic 
and cultural and other sectors o f society. C f  Bodansky’s “compliance function”. See Lansdown, G., 2000, pp. 
114-115, for attempts to enhance public scrutiny and participation at the national level under the CRC, where 
both reports and summary records of the state’s dialogues with the CRC Committee are to be published.
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turn, in an optimistic argument sometimes put forward as the main rationale for reporting 
procedures,686 could lead to greater compliance. Also, the wider the legal (and political) 
powers an examining body possesses, the better equipped it is for pushing for greater 
compliance.687 The development under the Kyoto Protocol to include an “enforcement” 
function will be interesting in this regard, and, if  it materializes fully in the practice of 
parties to the Protocol, potentially ground-breaking for the way the utility of softer 
compliance-enhancing methods, such as report and review procedures, may come to be 
understood.
6) A dialogue function between the reporting state or states and a supervisory organ. This 
may be a more accurate way o f describing reporting procedures than the 
compliance/preventive function mentioned above. It would also embrace the ideas that 
parties to treaties need room to admit problems, but it would be very cautious as to the 
prospects o f direct effects o f the review situation on compliance. The reason for calling 
discussions about reports dialogues is that the supervisory organs do not have any judicial 
or quasi-judicial functions. Instead, diplomatic parlance stresses that one o f the rationales 
behind the dialogue is to assist the reporting state in carrying out its obligations under the 
treaty.688 The role o f reporting procedures is thus less the finding of single cases of non- 
compliance and more the achievement o f a constructive assessment on progress made.689 
Although reporting procedures frequently form the basis for so-called NCPs under 
environmental treaties, there are several methods that may be better suited for proper non- 
compliance investigation: technical monitoring, and if  ever they were more widely agreed 
upon, perhaps some on-site inspections, inquiries and fact-finding missions, and, as results
686 International Environment: Strengthening the Implementation o f Environmental Agreements, United 
States General Accounting Office Report to Congressional Requesters, August 1992, GAO/RCED-92-188, 
pp. 7-10.
687 Harris, D., 2000, p. 360 on the experience o f reporting under the European Social Charter writes that “the 
lesson of the ESC reporting system in this regard is that a system of supervision that does not result in a 
legally binding decision can suffer from problems of compliance1’ and “[unfortunately, states are not 
prepared, within either the Council of Europe or the UN, to agree to a reporting system that results in legally 
binding decisions. If one reason for this is that the purpose of such a system is to achieve improvement 
through constructive dialogue rather than confrontation, the general experience to date does not make this a 
wholly convincing argument.”
688 Pocar, F. & C. Bernard, 1991, p. 27; and see Viljoen, F., 2000, p. 118, n. 31, on the African Commission, 
which has said that the nature of the examination of reports is a ’’constructive dialogue”.
689 Sachariev, K., 1991, p. 41. And for the human rights context, see e.g. Balton, D.A., 1990, p. 128; Banton, 
M., 2000, pp. 69-73; Bustelo, M.R., 2000, pp. 85,91-92; and Leckie, S., 2000, p. 132.
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of these, various stronger non-compliance and complaint procedures {cf. Kyoto) and , 
finally, to some extent, judicial methods of reviewing state conduct.
7) An information accumulation function. Reporting is important for the creation o f  an  
over-all picture of, first, how a particular treaty functions,690 and, secondly, the general 
environmental behaviour o f a state. But unless taken very seriously by states, and probably 
not even then, it is unclear whether reporting can cover all aspects o f  environmental 
information. Therefore data from independent technical monitoring needs to be w idely 
included, and, equally important, made widely accessible. All in all, national reports 
accumulate massive amounts o f information on the state o f the environment and on state 
actions in relation to the environment. Seen simply as that, information, the function is 
definitely there, even considering that much o f the information piled up may be o f pitiful 
quality. The function o f simple gathering of information need not be frowned upon; it m ay 
have important roles to play on the national level where data is collected, analysed, 
compiled and debated, but its further utility as a tool o f international environmental 
protection is obviously dependent on further activity. To the extent that report contents are 
increasingly being made publicly available, especially on the internet, the information 
accumulation function may also become a “public dissemination function”. This 
development, which is clearly taking place,691 is very significant as evidence o f some new, 
although still limited, trend towards greater transparency, or even a “culture o f openness” 
in those instances where outside comments are welcomed.692
8) A modest sanctionary or repressive function. At least in theory, reports may entail the 
loss of credibility for a state, and pressure from both the review organ and international 
opinion may follow. Indeed, most treaty bodies have some, albeit very limited, possibilities 
to put pressure on the reporting state, particularly in any hearing-situations, and such mild 
pressuring is one o f the main rationales for the reporting schemes. Just as in human rights, 
environmental reporting procedures are criticized for the problems that governments have
m  Cf. Alston’s “evaluation function” and “information exchange function”: on the basis of information 
received, supervisory organs can elaborate general comments on human rights situations.
691 The prime example is offered by the FCCC at htto://unfccc.int/resource/natcom/index.html. See also other 
sites, as indicated supra.
692 C f  to human rights where Fischer already in 1984 wrote that, "[t]he refusal o f  governments to provide 
domestic or international NGOs with reports might, in itself, constitute grounds for questioning the 
government's good faith in human rights matters", Fischer, D.D., 1984, p. 179.
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in giving information on their own activities and the inherent risk of lack o f objectivity. 
This “sanction” function is thus largely dependent on NGOs re-processing or using the 
information from national reports to create media coverage and attract negative attention.693 
In the absence o f outside scrutiny, the idea is lost and the function either minimal or non­
existing.
In contrast, it is clear that the role o f the reporting procedures found under those marine 
pollution treaties that contain enforcement mechanisms is different from the role of 
reporting under the majority o f environmental treaties. Under the MARPOL Convention, 
violations of the Convention are punishable either by the party under whose jurisdiction the 
violation occurred or by the flag state. Also, the inspection system gives the authority 
carrying out a ship inspection the possibility to detain the ship until it satisfies required 
conditions. The self-assessment that country reports are based on is not as strong a method 
of supervision as the certification and inspection system is. Interestingly, the IMO web­
pages say that “ [i]t is generally recognized that the effectiveness o f international 
conventions depends upon the degree to which they are obeyed and this in turn depends 
largely upon the extent to which they are enforced. The 1978 Protocol to MARPOL 
therefore introduced stricter regulations for the survey and certification o f ships.”694 The 
role of e.g. MARPOL reports could thus not be as accentuated as under most treaties’ NCP 
procedures where reports are the only means of acquiring information or where other 
supervisory mechanisms exist, but may never be resorted to in practice.
9) A legislative function. Besides institutional functions, reports may also play some role in 
the creation of new or amended norms under a treaty in that they add to the various kinds 
of understanding o f an environmental problem that are needed in order to make changes to 
or tighten treaty goals, for instance, emission standards or technical requirements.695 Some
693 Cf. Alston’s “public scrutiny function” in human rights reporting.
694 See www.imo.org/imo/convent/pollute.htm under section dealing with the MARPOL (in October 2001).
695 See Sand’s argument, 1999, pp. 341-343, on the practice in environmental matters of flexible standard 
adjusting institutions, e.g. through technical amendments, reinterpretation, exemptions, escape clauses, loop­
holes, and expert advice. Cf. Bodansky’s “legislative function”, which he argues contributes to scientific 
understanding (referring to national inventories of greenhouse gas emissions, which although correct, is 
problematic as evidence because it represents an unusual kind of clear, science based assessment seldom seen 
under other environmental treaties) and to assessments of progress of states under treaties, and that these form 
a “factual basis for decision about whether to develop new or amended norms”, 2000, p. 367.
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environmental treaties have “flexible” procedures for norm-amendment, where especially 
technical standards may be changed through less than full state consent. Under those 
treaties where some expert/scientist advice is taken in relation to state reports, the role o f  
“expertise” for further norm-creation remains an issue open to questions about the nature o f  
initial state commitments under the treaty and even to the legitimacy o f the treaty.696
10) A dispute-avoidance function. This aspect appears to have modest potential in  
environmental questions that are truly international in character, whereas, in contrast, in the 
human rights field it is less likely that inter-state disputes arise.697 The more “political” 
nature o f environmental cooperation, as opposed to the more “legalistic” international 
human rights protection,698 could be an argument for the reasons why such softer methods 
of dispute-avoidance or early settlement are preferred in environmental cooperation. This 
is, however, a highly speculative theme, where “proving” (in any remotely scientific sense 
of the word) that a certain reporting procedure has actually meant avoiding a larger conflict 
is akin to the earlier acknowledged problem o f proving cause and effect in compliance 
enhancement.
In the end, the dialogue function and the information accumulation function, rather than the 
compliance and repressive functions, seem to stand out as the more accurate descriptions o f  
the role o f environmental reports. The question whether environmental reporting 
predominantly functions in a preventive or in a repressive way cannot find an answer on 
such a traditional scale. Firstly, reports are normally after-the-fact measures; they tell their 
audience something about measures already taken rather than future plans. They may have 
some non-compliance preventive role, and through that, at best, some modest role in the 
prevention o f environmental degradation, but probably never any really precautionary role.
696 See Sand, P.H., 1999, p. 345: ”If  treaty standards can be modified without formal amendment, 
governments cannot be sure o f the treaty obligations they assume at the moment o f signature and ratification
-  what is effective compliance today may be either irrelevant or non-compliance tomorrow” and “liberal use 
of devices to facilitate compliance (such as exemptions and escape clauses) tends to undermine the credibility
-  and even jeopardize the legitimacy -  o f  a treaty regime, as illustrated by the history o f catch quotas and 
‘scientific permits’ under the International Whaling Convention and o f ivory trade quotas under the CITES”; 
On the other hand Sand does not see evidence of outright technocratic tendencies in environmental regimes; 
Cf. on expert and scientists’ power in EC environmental law, de Sadeleer, N., 2001, p. 132.
697 Adede, A, 1995.
698 For a discussion on these characteristics, see Bodansky, D., 2000, p. 364.
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Herein lies the necessary distinction between substance and procedure: usually only clear 
norms can be successfully supervised, except when procedure slowly leads the way into 
substance. In the first instance, reports only “reconfirm” the legal obligation itself, it is 
“only” supervision, and its role dependent on the primary norm, rather than independent. In 
the second instance, best seen in a few framework conventions, reporting and other 
procedures could have some independent, instrumental role on the way to stronger norms, 
and this way of developing international environmental law then has a longer-term role for 
the prevention o f environmental degradation. On the other hand, according to some writers, 
environmental reports serve a “legislative function” in that they contribute “to the factual 
basis for decisions about whether to develop new or amended norms”,699 and such 
amendments sometimes happen in flexible expert or scientist led procedures without full 
state consent This classical dilemma on the making of and on the quality of the primary 
norms is addressed further below in Chapter 4.
Secondly, reporting procedures are at most very mildly repressive; they could offer only 
“soft punishment” in the sense of public shame through bad publicity.700 Clearly, states 
prefer that compared to the risks o f resorting to state responsibility. But this development 
towards softer responsibility, of which reporting systems are central elements, is not 
unproblematic only because it is popular. Where Chayes and Chayes see the role of review 
and assessment, including some reporting, as a way of resolving differences about the 
“content and applicability” of the governing norms, Koskenniemi to the contrary argues 
that methods building on transparency create “soft responsibility” which could even 
undermine the legally-binding nature o f the obligations they have looked to fulfil in the 
first place.701
***
699 By allowing an assessment of state progress and through scientific knowledge. Bodansky argues that 
reports contribute to scientific understanding o f a problem, which is a proposition with limitations, since 
reports at best refer to scientific finding but have little to do with the actual scientific research or formulation 
of results: see Bodansky, D., 2000, p. 367; Cf. Sand, P.H., 1999, see supra.
700 On the role of reputation for states, see Henkin, L., 1979, p. 52; and further on shame and disgrace in 
relation to compliance with international norms, see Young, O.R., 1991, esp. p. 176.
701 Koskenniemi, M., 1992, pp. 127-12$; And see Knox, J.H., 2001, p. 24, n. 70
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3.4. In form ation  in Perspective 2 :
Africa and the Waste T rade: Substance over Procedure?
I. Introduction
II. International Developments - Substantive
III. Procedures on Openness and Consent
IIU . Prior Notification
III.II. Prior Informed Consent
III.III. Accident Information
III.IV. Reporting
IV. Concluding Observations
I. In troduction
An in-depth study is required to illustrate how the legal basis for second phase-information 
exchange in the context o f a particular treaty system may have developed. The area chosen 
for closer examination is that of international trade in hazardous wastes. Waste trade gained 
international legal interest in the mid-1980s, and it seems to represent an area o f  
international law where procedural norms on information have been instrumental to the  
development o f the whole area. Procedural duties were followed by substantive bans. B y 
taking an African perspective702 to the problem it also seems to cut across many social and 
political problems that make the topic anything but one-dimensional. The approach is based 
on the proposition that although both individual countries and international treaties may 
successfully ban waste trade to Africa, the compliance o f states still needs to be supervised 
and illegal trade monitored. Also, as long as some importing African states and some 
waste-producing states, notably the United States,703 remain outside treaty systems or 
without relevant national legislation, the availability of (international) procedural norms on 
different types o f information exchange which encourage transparency and explicit consent 
remain instrumental to the safe conduct of hazardous transfers. State practice in the form o f  
national legislation, international treaties and subsequent traces of evolving customary 
international law are examined, firstly, in order to outline the legal strains involved, and 
secondly, to gain a chronological and geographical-political outline of the legal evolution 
from procedure to substance.704
702 On Africa and sustainable development, see esp. Johannesburg Plan of Implementation, Section VIII, 
September 2002.
703 See Grout, D.Z., 1999, pp. 19-25; and esp. Choksi, S., 2001.
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As the ugly evidence of modem consumption - hazardous waste - piles up in the backyards 
of the industrialized world, the economically attractive short-term solution for many 
countries still is to sell the problem. The international trade in hazardous waste is good 
business.704 05 Meanwhile, the environment and the people of countries least prepared to deal 
with toxic waste are the ones who bear the social cost. Discussions on the development of 
the law relating to international waste trade are by necessity part of a larger debate on 
poverty,706 and in the particular case o f  trade to or in Africa, on North-South relations, but 
they may also contain human rights aspects, notably those related to the human rights to 
life and health.707
Reacting against the relocation of environmental hazards from the industrialized world to 
the developing states, several African states in the late 1980s and early 1990s completely 
banned the import o f hazardous wastes into their territories.708 More specifically, they were
704 In this study, trade, transport, and transfer are all used to denote parts of the entire process of 
transboundary handling of waste. Waste management is understood to be one specific form of hazard 
management (see above Ch. 3.1.). Hazardous and toxic are terms used interchangeably and they are both 
based on the very basic presumption that to a larger extent than "mere" waste they denote a higher risk of 
adverse impact on the natural environment in cases where something goes askew. Nuclear wastes are 
understood to be a category of wastes distinct from other high-risk wastes.
705 For a bibliography o f sources on trade in toxic waste, see http://eei.lib.uidaho.eda/egiQ2/lewis01.html: 
Wynne, B., 1989, p. 120; Peter, C.M., 1990, p. 64. See idem pp. 65-68 for examples of official toxic waste 
agreements with African states (Guinea Bissau, Benin, Equatorial Guinea and the Congo) and of illegal 
agreements between private individuals and foreign exporting firms. See MacKenzie, D. and Mpinga, J., 
1988, pp. 30-31, for numerous examples o f waste arrangements between African countries and exporting' 
companies; Pambou Tchivounda, G., 1988, p. 709; and see further Kitt, J., 1995, p. 485-489; Choksi,/S., 
2001, pp. 512-515.
7W In the last two decades, see e.g., the seminal Founex Report, reprinted in Annex I U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.48/10, 22 Dec. 1971, esp. Ch. A, para. 2-4; and further on environment and development see 
Sinjela, A.M., 1984; Handl, G., 1988, p. 607; Conable, B.B., 1990; Beckerman, W., 1992, pp. 481-496; 
Pallemaerts, M., 1993, e.g., p. 16; Okonmah, P.D., 1997, p. 60; The Economist, Special Survey on 
'Development and Environment', 21.3.1998.
707 See Resolution o f26.4.2000 by the UN Commission on Human Rights on dumping of toxic and dangerous ' 
wastes where the Commission categorically condemns dumping in developing countries, which adversely( 
affects the human rights to life and health o f individuals in those countries. See also work of the Special 
Rapporteur o f the Commission on Human Rights on the adverse effects o f the illicit movement and dumping 
of toxic and dangerous products and wastes on the enjoyment o f human rights, at website of the UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, http://www.unhchr.ch/. And on the development of this issue within the 
Commission on Human Rights, and on the role o f law, especially international law, for the prevention of 
exports of hazardous wastes, see Tomasevski, K., 1995, pp. 264-265. Generally on waste and environmental 
justice in developing countries, Lipman, Z., 1998.
708 On the concept of "pollution havens", see Pearson, Ch., 1987. See also Rose, E., 1989, pp. 223-244; Vu, 
Hao-Nhien Q., 1994; Park, R.S., 1998; and further see Ranjan, S., 2001, p. 44; Generally on hazardous waste 
management at the global level, see O’Neill, K., 1998, pp. 138-163;
also reactions to such incidents as the dumping in 1988 o f Italian toxic and nuclear wastes 
in Koko, Nigeria. The Koko catastrophe ultimately led to the reshipment o f the hazardous 
waste back to Italy.709 In the same year, Nigeria experienced another threat when more 
toxic waste was shipped from Italy on the container ship "Karin B". In this case as well, the 
waste was repatriated to Italy.710 These early incidents led to raised public awareness not 
only in Nigeria but throughout Africa and internationally.
On a constitutional level, the 1990 Constitution o f Namibia provides for a rather 
progressive environmental provision, which mentions, inter alia, that “in particular, the 
Government shall provide measures against the dumping or recycling o f foreign nuclear 
and toxic waste on Namibian territory”.711 And on a statutory level many countries,712 
among those several African states, have legislated against the import o f toxic waste.713 For 
example, the 1988 Environmental Protection Act o f the Gambia makes dumping or 
attempting to dump any waste produced from sources outside the Gambia a criminal 
offence, both for private persons and corporate bodies, and it imposes penalties for such 
illegal conduct.714 Likewise, the 1988 Law on Toxic and Nuclear Waste o f the Ivory Coast 
forbids any trade, import, transit, transportation, deposit and storing of toxic or nuclear 
industrial waste and noxious substances on its territory.715 In Nigeria, the 1988 Decree on 
Harmful Waste criminalizes purchase, sale, importation, transit, transportation, deposit and 
storage o f  harmful wastes.716 The penalties prescribed under the Nigerian Decree are 
unusually severe: they include life sentences and forfeiture of vehicles and land used for
709 See Ikhariale, M., 1989; See also Guobadia, A., 1993, p. 1.
7t0 See Handl, G. and R.E. Lutz, ‘An International...’, 1989, p. 360, n. 32.
711 Constitution o f Namibia, 1990, Chapter II, Article 95(L).
7,2 Over 100 countries have national bans or some import restricting legislation, see Puckett, J., 1997, p. 9.
713 In Tanzania a waste disposal task force was formed in 1988 under the National Environment 
Management Council with a view to gathering experts and administrators to work towards the prevention 
of imports of hazardous and nuclear wastes into Tanzania. See Peter, C.M., 1990 p.74.
714 Environmental Protection Act, No. 15 o f 1988, Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, 9. 29 I.L.M. 208 (1990). Also 
reprinted in 1(3) RADIC 1989, pp. 511-512. Similar provisions are found in the 1988 Environmental 
Code of Togo.
7,5 Law on Toxic and Nuclear Waste, No. 88-651 of 1988, Article 1. Journal Officiel 7.7.1988, pp. 258- 
259. Also reprinted in 1(3) RADIC 1989, pp. 511-512.
716 Harmful Waste (Special Criminal Provisions, etc.) Decree, No. 42 of 25.11 1988, Section 1. 
Supplement to Official Gazette Extraordinary, No. 79, vol. 75, p. A 779.
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such criminal activity. The equivalent legislation in Cameroon is even more severe: it 
imposes death penalties for illegal introduction of toxic or dangerous waste.717
The complete import bans in many African countries gave rise to a debate in India, that it 
was becoming the new target o f hazardous waste dumping, and that all imports should be 
banned. At the same time, however, its industry voiced the need for inexpensive raw 
materials and thus, free trade.718 719The Indian legislative response, which has developed 
especially because o f active NGOs, public interest litigation and an active judiciary, is 
not a total ban in that the 1989 Hazardous Wastes Rules, which were amended in 2000, 
allow for import, and now also export, o f hazardous wastes as raw materials for recycling 
or reuse. The Hazardous Waste Rules base such imports and exports on a prior informed 
consent (PIC) procedure, and make, since the amendment, all activities subject to the rules 
of the Basel Convention (discussed below). Allowable import is subject to a case-by-case 
examination on merit by the State Pollution Control Board, and authorization by the Union 
Ministry o f Environment and Forests, a procedure that includes the fulfilment of procedural 
obligations of prior notification and subsequent further information.720 Thus the Indian 
experience is one that aims at reconciling the conflicting interests - so readily recognizable 
through the example of trade in hazardous wastes - of environmental protection and 
economic development.
7,7 Section 6. On a national level, the discharge of hazardous substances into Nigerian territory or waters 
is also prohibited, but subject to authorized exceptions. The 1988 Federal Environmental Protection 
Agency Decree (No. 58 of 30,12.1988, Official Gazette, p. A 909) prescribes for procedural rules in 
emergency situations, and further gives the responsible Minister wide powers to prescribe, inter aliat 
additional notice and reporting requirements. See further, Guobadia, A., 1993. For details on 
environmental legislation in Nigeria before the Koko incident, see pp. 75-76, Ikhariale, M , 1989. For 
Cameroon, see Art 4, la Loi No. 89/027 (portant sur les déchets toxiques et dangereux) "est punie de la 
peine de mort, toute personne non autorisée qui procède a l'introduction, à la production, au stockage, à 
la détention, au transport, au transit ou au déversement sur le territoire camerounais des déchets toxiques 
et/ou dangereux sous toutes leurs formes."
718 Ranjan, S., 2001, p. 45.
719 See e.g. Ramakrishna, K., 1985; Baxi, U., 1987; Craig, P.P. & S.L. Deshpande, 1989; Desai, B., 1993; 
Anderson, M., 1996; Ranjan, S., 2001, pp. 74-75 and see p. 94.
720 Hazardous Wastes Management and Handling Rules, 1989, Art. 11; Amended 6.1.2000; See also 
Environmental Protection Act, No. 29 of 23.5.1986; the Public Liability Insurance Act, No. 6 of 1991; 
and the National Environment Tribunal Act, No. 27 of 1995; But India is not yet party to the Ban 
Amendment, discussed below, see Ranjan, S., 2001, pp. 76-83.
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While many African countries unilaterally banned imports from outside the continent, 
developed waste-generating countries legislated on relatively precise procedural rules. For 
example, the Nordic countries passed legislation also on the trade aspect of waste 
management. The Norwegian, Swedish and Finnish provisions respectively required the 
prior notification to national authorities o f any planned export o f hazardous wastes. 
Swedish legislation expressly required notification to the importing state, the other two 
referred to international law. Export was subject to  permission by national authorities and 
consent o f the importing state and transit states. The Swedish Decree most explicitly 
defined and enumerated the terms o f permissibility for export.721 72
In the United States, the 1984 Hazardous and Solid Waste Act amended previous 
legislation by requiring the prior notification to and consent of any country importing 
hazardous wastes. This was a substantial improvement o f previous rules, which simply 
required prior notification o f a proposed shipment, including only very few details and no 
consent requirement.723 724The Council o f the European Community reached agreement in 
1984 on a Directive on Transfrontier Movements of Hazardous Waste, requiring prior 
notification o f any transfers.725 An amendment in 1986 added the requirement of prior 
(informed) consent and broadened the scope o f these obligations to include non-member 
states as well. A considerably stronger step still was taken in 1993 when the Council
721 For Norway see: Regulations Concerning Export and Import o f  Hazardous Wastes, 23.5 1990 
(Forskrift om eksport og import av farlig avfall); for Sweden see: Decree on Export and Import of 
Hazardous Wastes, 25.6 1992 (Forordning om export och import av farligt avfall m.m.); for Finland see: 
Waste Management Act 31.8 1978/673 - 20.12 1991/1655 and Waste Management Decree, 16.3 
1979/307 - 16.4 1987/425 (Jatehuoltolaki and Jatehuoltoasetus).
722 42 USC, Section 6938 (1984). The Act amended the Federal Resource Conservation and Recovery 
Act (RCRA). See also the Superfund or Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and 
Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), 42 USC Section 9601; and the Superfund Amendments and 
Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA).
723 See further Scherr, J.S. 1987, pp. 138-139. For criticism o f U.S. legislation, see Park, R.S., 1989; and 
see Choksi, S., 2001; Further on questions relating to U.S. joining of the Basel Convention and 
legislation that would be needed to do so, see Grout, D.Z., 1999, pp. 19-25.
724 EC Council Directive of 6 Dec., 1984 on the Supervision and Control within the European 
Community o f the Transfrontier Shipment o f Hazardous Wastes, 84/631/EEC, OJ No. L 326/31.
725 For a comparison between the U.S. and EC’s respective internal regimes for trade in hazardous wastes, 
Levis, L., 1998.
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passed a Regulation on the Supervision and Control of Shipments of Waste within, into, 
and out of the European Community.726 27 Under Article 18 of the Regulations all exports of 
waste to African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states were prohibited. The only exception 
to this ban was the possibility to return processed waste back to an ACP state that had sent 
waste to an EC state for processing.728 729301
II. International developments - substantive
The notion "green imperialism" is a criticism of Western conditionality on development 
aid and investment. The waste trade brought environmental concerns to the attention of
many African states, not least in the discourse on new forms o f outside dominance....But
the waste trade is also an issue o f the pragmatism bom out o f need for foreign trade and 
investment. Far from all African states have legislated against waste imports in all its 
forms. Yet both among those who have banned imports and those who have not, there is a 
growing tendency to acknowledge that the income from recycling (rather than disposal of)
* 7 I A
"less" hazardous waste or "secondary raw materials" is much needed in weak economies. 
For several decades now, greed among corrupt authorities and official denials of 
shipments that have taken place continue to add to the need to deal with the problems 
beyond the realm o f national discretion. Here multinational enterprises (MNEs) are major 
actors, and the very nature of their ownership, economic strength, and relative negotiating 
power are factors that "internationalize" the legal interests involved. One of the latest cases
726 EC Council Directive of 12 June, 1986, 86/279/EEC, OJ No. L 181/13. In order to implement these 
EC directives, the United Kingdom passed the Transfrontier Shipment o f Hazardous Waste Regulations 
in 1988, SI 1988, No. 1562.
727 EC Council Regulation of 1 Feb., 1993 on the Supervision and Control of Shipments of Waste within, 
into and out of the European Community, 259/93, OJ No. L 30/1.
728 See also below on the Lomé Convention.
729 Park, R.S., 1998, writes about waste trade as a form of international “environmental racism”; Peter,
C. M., 1990, p. 64, refers to a "new form of slavery", "colonialism" and "poison-tourism". Cock and Koch 
mention "toxic colonialism" and "garbage imperialism", 1991, p. 173. See generally on awareness of the 
problem in the Third World in the 1980s before the larger debate on sustainable development: Dembo,
D. et al eds., 1988. See also Pambou Tchivounda, G. 1988, p. 710; On “environmental justice” in 
developing countries, see Lipman, Z., 1998; But see Ranjan, S., 2001, p. 44, who “merely” claims that 
“[t]ransboundary movements of hazardous wastes from industrialized countries to developing countries 
constitute transfer o f pollution”.
730 See e.g. Ranjan, S., 2001, p. 45.
731 See MacKenzie, D. and J. Mpinga, 1988, p. 31; and see Choksi, S., 2001, p. 514, n. 24.
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of intentional efforts to bring hazardous waste into Africa is from September 2000: a much- 
criticized authorization by South Africa for the import o f mining waste from Australia. 
According to Handl and Lutz, the development status o f  recipients o f hazardous transfers, 
as well as the potential long-term harm to those countries, equally bring the issue to the
7^1international level.
At the international level, quite contrasting substantive approaches were first adopted by  
industrialized waste exporting states and importing developing countries in Africa. Apart 
from bilateral arrangements between the United States and Canada and the United States 
and Mexico,732 34 the first multilateral efforts in the area were taken by the UNEP, which in 
1987 adopted its Cairo Guidelines and Principles for the Environmentally Sound 
Management o f Hazardous Wastes.73S 736The Guidelines, which by their very nature form a 
non-binding document, nevertheless started the process that led to the adoption in 1989 by 
many waste exporting states o f the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary 
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal.
The Basel Convention adopted a regulatory rather than prohibitive approach to the 
international waste trade, whilst still providing for a minimum international standard for the 
purposes o f classification of wastes to be controlled, and the criminalization of illegal
732 See e.g. www.ban.org or http://a11africa.com/stories.
733 Handl, G. and R.E. Lutz, 'The Transboundary... ’ 1989, pp. 42-43; See also Handl, G., 1987-88, p. 
611; And generally see O’Neill, R., 1998, pp. 138-163.
734 Agreement between the Government o f Canada and the Government of the United States o f America 
Concerning the Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Waste, Ottawa, 28.10.1986, in force 8.11.1986; 
and Agreement o f Cooperation between the United States of America and the United Mexican States 
Regarding the Transboundary Shipments o f Hazardous Wastes and Hazardous Substances, Washington 
11.11.1986, in force.
735 Cairo Guidelines and Principles of Environmentally Sound Management of Hazardous Wastes, 1987, 
UNEP/GC 14/30(1987).
736 Convention on the Control o f Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, 
Basel 22.3.1989, in force 24.5.1992. The Basel Convention has been ratified by most European states 
and Canada as well as by many Latin American, Asian and African states. As of 9.4.2002, the 
Convention has 149 ratifications. For appraisals of the Convention, see Handl, G„ The 1989 Basel 
Convention...’, 1989; Rummer, K., 1992, pp. 530-562; and Rummer, R, 1995.
737 Art. l(l)(a). There is no "black list" banning certain substances, but rather all substances are tradable 
as long as they are controlled.
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traffic in wastes.73 *38 The main environmentalist critique of the Basel Convention was, and 
still is, that the regulatory approach to waste trade does not sufficiently encourage solving 
the problem at its source, that is, in the country where it has been produced, and that the
y
expertise and technology needed to manage the waste often, does not exist in the less 
developed importing countries.739 Another critique is that every transfer or stage in the 
transportation o f potentially hazardous waste means one more risk of harm to people and 
the environment. Similar criticism of the legitimizing of waste trade can be directed 
towards policy declarations made earlier by the Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD)740 and towards agreements made by individual industrialized 
states.741 On the other hand, champions of continued opportunities for transboundary trade 
in hazardous wastes claim that it can “reduce disposal costs, decrease risks associated with 
hazardous waste management and disposal, and supply resources for receiving 
countries”.742
Two months after the signing o f the Basel Convention, the Organization of African Unity 
(OAU)743 reacted by adopting its Resolution on Dumping o f Nuclear and Industrial Waste 
in Africa.744 The Resolution declared the dumping of nuclear and industrial wastes in 
Africa a crime against Africa and the African people. It also called upon member states to 
put an end to transactions that are already agreed to, and to otherwise adhere to the Cairo 
guidelines. As the next step, the 1989 Fourth Lomé Convention between ACP states and 
the EC committed the EC countries to prohibit all direct or indirect export of radioactive or
73S Articles 4(3), 4(4) and 9(5).
7j9 See MacKenzie, D. and J. Mpinga, 1988, pp. 30-31; Wynne, B., 1989, pp. 122-124; Choksi, S., 2001,
p. 525.
740 See OECD Council Recommendation C(76) 155; Decision and Recommendation C(83) 180;
Resolution C(85) 100; Decision and Recommendation C(86) 64; Decision C(88) 90; Resolution C(89)
112; Decision C(90) 178; Decision C(92) 39.
741 See especially Canada-United States and United States-Mexico agreements referred to above. For a 
thorough list of legal instruments o f the EU and the OECD and a list o f  international treaties and other 
legal instruments in the area, see Rummer, K.., 1995, pp. xxvii-xxxvii.
742 For arguments in favour of continued hazardous waste trade, see Waugh, T., 2000.
743 On law-making in the OAU, see generally Maluwa, T., 2000, pp. 201-225; And look at http://oau-oua.org.
744 OAU Council o f  Ministers, Resolution on Dumping of Nuclear and Industrial Waste in Africa, 23.5 
1989, Res. 1153. Reprinted in 28 ILM (1989), p. 567; 2(1) RADIC (1990), p. 145. For an appraisal, see 
Mahalu, C.R., 1990, pp. 61-71. See also Pambou Tchivounda, G., 1988, p. 710 et. seq.
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hazardous waste to the ACP countries, while simultaneously the ACP states w ere 
committed to prohibit the import o f such wastes.745 A s already mentioned, the EC in 1993 
changed its legislation to correspond to the Lom é Convention. Clearly, this w as a  
development in the right direction from the point o f view  of the participating African states.
Despite these actions and national import bans in m any African countries, concerted action 
was felt to be a necessity. Thus, a regional waste import-banning scheme was elaborated 
under the auspices of the OAU in 1991 in Bamako leading to the African Convention on 
Transboundary Movements o f Hazardous Wastes.746 According to Article 4(1), the im port 
into Africa from non-contracting parties o f any hazardous wastes is deemed illegal and 
criminal. The Convention was largely a regional reaction against the lenient attitude 
adopted in the Basel Convention,747 and it followed the - self-evident - recognition in the 
Basel Convention and by OECD states o f the sovereign right of individual states or 
regional groups of states to adopt bans against the entry or disposal o f foreign hazardous 
wastes and other wastes in their territories.748 In Article 11, the Basel Convention 
recognizes that parties may enter into bilateral, multilateral and regional agreements on 
transboundary movements o f hazardous wastes so long as they provide for the 
environmentally sound management o f wastes. Several consequent agreements refer to this 
provision, which, together with Principle 14 o f the Rio Declaration,749 may have inspired 
some regional arrangements.750 Such earlier regional agreements are not necessarily
745 Fourth ACP-EC Convention of Lomé, 15.12 1989, in force 1.9 1991; See Article 39; See generally 
Lipman, Z., 1998; See also Fifth ACP-EC Convention, Cotonou, 23.6 2000, not in force, Articles 32(d),
49, COM(2000)324 final.
746 Convention on the Ban o f the Import into Africa and the Control of Transboundary Movement and 
Management of Hazardous Wastes Within Africa, Bamako 29.1.1991, in force 22.4.1998; see 
http://www.oau-oua.org: and generally see the Fridtjof Nansen Institute’s Yearbook of International Co­
operation on Environment and Development, http ://ww\v. greenvearbook.org/agree/haz-sub/bamako.htm: 
Further on the Convention after its first MOP, see Eguh, E.C., 1998, pp. 256-263.
747 See esp. Gudofsky, J.L., 1998, p. 246.
748 Bamako Convention Article 4(1); See the Preambles to the Basel Convention and OECD Decision 
C(83) 180.
749 States “should effectively cooperate to discourage or prevent the relocation and transfer to other States of 
any activities or substances that cause severe environmental degradation or are found to be harmful to human 
health”.
750 See e.g. OECD Decision C(92) 39, Preamble; Central American Regional Agreement on the 
Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes, Panama City, 11.12.1992; Preamble, Austrian-German 
Agreement, Vienna, 12.1.1993 and Bonn 16.2.1993.
further-reaching than the Basel Convention itself was at the time, but they may, as in the 
case of the Central American Regional Agreement, provide for import bans from states not 
parties to the agreement.
The debate arising from the strong reaction among African and also other developing 
countries against the managerial rather than prohibitive approach in the Basel Convention 
led to pressures to amend the Convention.751 The second Conference of the Parties (COP 2) 
in 1994 took decision II/2 immediately banning the export of hazardous wastes from 
OECD or EC countries (or Liechtenstein) to non-OECD or non-EC countries for final 
disposal, and phasing out, by the end o f 1997, wastes intended for recovery or recycling.752 
As the binding character o f  the Decision had been questioned by some countries, this 
radical change to the Basel Convention became clearly legally-binding with the amendment 
of the Convention by adding new Article 4 A at COP 3 in 1995.753 The new article prohibits 
waste exports for final disposal or recycling from so-called Annex VII states to states not 
listed in the Annex.754 Thus, when the amendment enters into force export will still be legal 
between Annex VII states or between states parties that are not listed. By leaving out the 
OECD and EC criterion and instead only mentioning the Annex VII list, countries may 
later join the Annex rather than the OECD, and reap the benefits of intra-list trade.755 
Likewise, the Bamako Convention leaves the door open for exporting waste, that is, to 
conduct trade in hazardous waste between the contracting parties.
731 For a detailed account of the amendment process see Krueger, J., 1999, pp. 31-37.
752 Further on shipments of hazardous wastes for recycling and recovery, see Gudofsky, J., 1998.
753 Further see Lavranos, N., 2002, p. 46.
754 3rd Conference of the Parties, Amendment to the Basel Convention, Decision 111/1, Geneva, 
22.9.1995, not in force; involves Annex VII countries (OECD, EC and Liechtenstein); movements under 
Annex IVA (final disposal) were prohibited and movements under Annex IVB (recovery, recycling or 
reuse) were to be phased out by 31.12.1997 and prohibited as of that date. The original target dates have 
not been met.
753 In response to some new applications to join Annex VII, COP-4 in 1998, by Decision IV/8, decided 
that no new members would be accepted to Annex VII until the Ban Amendment enters into force. The 
Ban Amendment has 28 ratifications as o f January 2002, and it needs 62 to enter into force; Several 
African states joined the Basel Convention after the adoption of the Ban Amendment, look under 
www.basel.int: Further on the trade implications of the Ban Amendment, see Wirth, D., 1998, pp. 237- 
248
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By way o f an example of a regional legal development expressly taking the situation o f  
developing countries into consideration, the 1996 Mediterranean Hazardous W astes 
Protocol under the Barcelona Convention is parallel to the Ban Amendment in that it, on  
the one hand, states that Parties shall “prohibit the export and transit of hazardous wastes to  
developing countries, and Parties which are not Member States o f  the European 
Community shall prohibit all imports and transit o f hazardous wastes”. On the other hand, 
the Protocol leaves the possibility that transboundary movements can be allowed i f  a  
Mediterranean developing country does not have the technical capabilities nor the disposal 
facilities needed and instead a state o f import can ensure that the waste is disposed of in  an  
environmentally sound manner. Such transfer is then managed through a number o f  
procedural safeguards very much like the ones present in the Basel and Bamako 
Conventions to be discussed below.
Since the adoption o f the Ban Amendment, the main controversial issue within the Basel 
Convention has been the distinction between final disposal and recovery, recycling o r 
reuse. While the ban on final disposal was relatively easily digested by the parties, m any 
still liked to profit from exporting or importing wastes meant to be recycled.* 757 In order to  
enter into force, the Ban amendment must be ratified by two-thirds (63 parties) o f the  
parties participating in COP 3. As of spring 2001, the number o f ratifications is only a 
handful, with most parties still uncertain. By adding two new lists, A and B, of substances 
to the Convention, clarity was brought by COP 4 in 1998 to the issue of which 
classifications of wastes are covered by the ban: List A substances cannot be transported to 
developing countries, whereas List B substances are open to trade as recyclables even to 
non-OECD states.758 As the lists develop and the rules of the game are clearer for
736 Protocol on the Prevention of Pollution of the Mediterranean Sea by Transboundary Movements o f 
Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, Izmir, 1.10.1996, not in force; Under the Kuwait Regional Convention 
for Co-operation on the Protection of the Marine Environment from Pollution, 24.4.1978, in force 1.7.1979, 
see also the Protocol on the Control of Marine Transboundary Movements and Disposal of Hazardous 
Wastes, 1998; and cf. Convention to Ban the Importation into Forum Island Countries of Hazardous and 
Radioactive Wastes and to Control the Transboundary Movement and Management of Hazardous Wastes 
within the South Pacific Region, Waigani, 16.9.1995, in force 21.10.2001.
757 Despite their initially strong support for the ban some developing states soon questioned whether they 
could afford the loss of income when recycling of wastes that were considered potential "secondary raw 
materials" became prohibited, see Krueger, J., 1999, p. 95, n. 37.
758 Further on this development see Choksi, S., 2001, p. 520-521.
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(exporting) industry and states alike, the decision whether or not to ratify the amendment 
should become easier to make.
On the substantive level the inter-African export and management scheme offers at least 
seemingly strong safeguards for the prevention of pollution.759 Firstly, each contracting 
party is obliged to prevent the export o f hazardous waste to states which have prohibited all 
such imports or i f  the waste is likely not to be handled in an environmentally sound manner 
by the presumptive importing country.760 In addition it requires precautionary measures, 
such as the promotion o f clean production methods applicable to entire product life 
cycles.761 762The requirement o f environmentally sound management is central to the Basel 
scheme as well, but it does not pursue the precautionary approach quite as far as the
• J f / )
Bamako Convention, which embodies a strict understanding of precaution. The concept 
of environmentally sound management is not clearly defined in either Convention, and 
according to Bimie and Boyle the obligation is "no more than a reformulation of the 
standard of due diligence" normally used to describe international environmental 
obligations.763 In the Basel Declaration on Environmentally Sound Management, the Basel 
Convention parties attempt to put some flesh on the bones o f the concept, inter alia, by 
underlining the importance of the exchange of information on experiences gained in the 
area.764 However elusive the obligation of environmentally sound management may be, the 
Basel Convention places the obligation on importing states as well, thus requiring them to 
share the responsibility o f preventing pollution of the - global - environment.765
759 Further on the Bamako Convention and implementation strategies after the first MOP, see Eguh, E.C., 
1998, pp. 256-263.
760 Article 3(i-k).
761 Article 3(f)(g).
762 Further on the relatively strict understanding of precaution in the Bamako Convention, see Katz, D., 2001, 
pp. 957-958.
763 Bimie and Boyle, 1992, p. 339. Interestingly enough, as regards trade between the Basel Convention 
Parties, the requirement of environmentally sound management receives some clarification by reference 
in the above-mentioned Swedish legislation to national health and environmental considerations as the 
minimum requirement for the foreign management of wastes originating in Sweden. As for trade 
between non-Parties, bilateral or multilateral agreement must exist with Sweden, and the Basel 
Convention criteria for permissibility are the minimum requirement.
764 Adopted at COP 5 in 1999, see www.basel.int/COP5/ministerfinal: and see UNCED: Agenda 21, chapter 
20 for its elaboration of the concept of environmentally sound management.
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Another substantive strength found in both Conventions is the duty of the exporting s ta te  
to assure that the exporter re-imports wastes that, despite fulfilling obligations set out u n d e r  
the Conventions, "cannot be completed in accordance with the terms o f the contract".765 66 
The duty to re-import illegally exported wastes, on the other hand, shows some d ifferences 
between the two Conventions. In cases where the illegal action is due to conduct on the p a r t  
of the exporter or generator, the state o f export shall ensure that the wastes are taken b a c k  
by the exporter or generator, or by the state itself. In the Basel Convention, however, th e  
exporter can be relieved from his duties if  the re-importing measures are impracticable. T h e  
wastes must then be otherwise disposed o f in accordance with the provisions o f  th e  
Convention.767 If the illegality o f  the movement o f waste results from the conduct o f  th e  
importer or disposer, the Basel Convention provides for a duty o f the state of im port to  
ensure that the wastes are disposed o f in an environmentally sound manner by the im porter 
or disposer or, if necessary, by the state itself. In an equivalent situation, the B am ako 
Convention lays down the duty o f the importing state to ensure that the wastes in question 
are returned to the exporter.768
A weakness, on the other hand, is found in the limited practical scope o f the w astes 
covered by the Basel Convention, that is, only household wastes and hazardous wastes, as 
defined in the Convention's Annexes or by national law.769 701The Bamako Convention 
includes nuclear wastes and such substances that have been banned, refused registration 
or voluntarily withdrawn in the country o f manufacture for health and environmental 
reasons, such as various pharmaceuticals. Thus, for the most part, neither system deals 
with the regulation o f substances, such as various industrial chemicals, which are no t
765 Article 4(2)(g).
766 Articles 8 (Basel) and 8 (Bamako).
767 Articles 9 (Basel) and 9 (Bamako).
768 Articles 9(3) (Basel) and 9(4) (Bamako).
769 Article 1.
770 Cf. the IAEA Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive 
Waste Management, Vienna, 29.9.1997, in force 18.6.2001, relating i.a. to siting (Articles 6,13) and to public 
information on safety issues (Preamble), further at http://www.iaea.org.
771 Article 2(1 )(d) and 2(2).
intended for disposal772 or which are intended for the production of chemical weapons,773 
and neither Convention deals with transboundary trade in hazardous technologies in the 
sense of installations and factories.774
III. Procedures on openness and consent
By necessity any separation of legal norms as either substantive or procedural is somewhat 
artificial and burdened by overlapping notions. On the substantive side, the options range 
between complete bans and complete freedom of trade and movement. As seen above, the 
response has been largely dependent on the importer and exporter status of the states 
concerned, but many African states have still not taken national or international legislative 
measures against hazardous wastes. The procedural norms on information exchange and 
reporting are o f importance as long as the Basel amendment to ban exports outside of the 
EC and OECD is not in force, and thereafter between parties to the treaty regimes, 
sometimes with extensions o f duties towards non-parties as well, and to the extent that 
customary norms exist, to all transboundary trading and management of wastes.
The Basel and Bamako treaties are examined in a search for the following procedural 
norms: prior notification o f planned movements; prior informed consent; following a 
movement of waste, accident information; and finally, general information on legislation 
and annual reporting under the Conventions, including reporting on illegal waste
772 The regulation o f trade in chemicals is internationally governed by, inter alia, the Convention on the I 
Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International I 
Trade, Rotterdam, 11.10.1998, not in force; For earlier procedures see the non-binding UNEP London 1 
Guidelines for the Exchange of Information on Chemicals in International Trade, UN Doc. A/44/25, p. 
156 (later amended); UNEP Code o f Ethics on the International Trade in Chemicals; and the Food and 
Agriculture Organization's Code of Conduct on the Distribution and Use o f Pesticides, FAO C85/25 -  
Rev; On these and the International Register o f Potentially Toxic Chemicals, see further Gündling, L, 
1989, pp. 66-70; See further on earlier procedures in hazardous chemical exports: Scherr, J.S., 1987; 
Walls, M.P., 1988, pp. 120-146; See further under www.unep.ch.
773 The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical 
Weapons and on Their Destruction, Paris, 14.2.1993, in force 29.4.1997, recognizes the right to develop, 
produce, otherwise acquire, retain, transfer and use toxic chemicals and their precursors for purposes not 
prohibited under the Convention, Article VI(1). Generally, see Bothe, M., N. Ronzitti & A. Rosas, eds., 
1998.
774 On such installations generally, see Hand], G. and R.E. Lutz, eds., 1989; and Lutz, R.E., 1988, pp. 
629-677.
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movements (that is, violations o f existing regimes). The treaties represent the “first” an d  
“second phases” of development o f environmental information provisions.
III.I. P rio r notification
The common rationale for prior notification has been that without knowledge there can be  
no rational decision-making by countries to prevent harm to their environments. This w as 
recognized by the OECD when it first took up the problem of hazardous waste movements 
in the mid-1970s. Its approach was to deal with procedural aspects of waste management 
through the adoption on provisions on notification and consent.775 These OECD efforts and  
the Cairo Guidelines' provisions on pre-authorization information776 7are followed up in the 
Basel and Bamako Conventions alike.
Thus, in situations where trade is conventionally regulated, excluding single states w hich 
have unilaterally banned or restricted imports, both Conventions make certain provisions 
for initial information o f  proposed transboundary movements of hazardous wastes. Such 
initial information must be given according to criteria set out in Annexes to the 
Conventions and must clearly state the "effects" (Basel) or "potential dangers" (Bamako) o f  
the wastes on human health and the environment. The Basel and Bamako Conventions 
both require that:
[t]he State of export shall notify, or shall require the generator or exporter to notify, 
in writing, through the channel of the competent authority of the State of export, the 
competent authority o f the States concerned of any proposed transboundary 
movement of hazardous wastes [or other wastes]. Such notification shall contain the 
declarations and information specified in Annex IV A of this Convention [in Annex 
V A], written in a language acceptable to the State of import. (Alternative Basel text 
in brackets. Emphasis added.)778
775 OECD Council Recommendation C(76) 155; Decision and Recommendation C(83) 180; Resolution 
C(85) 100; Decision and Recommendation C(86) 64; Decision C(88) 90; Resolution C(89) 112; Decision 
C(90) 178; Decision C(92) 39. See further Bothe, M., 1990, p. 423.
776 Article 16.
777 Articles 4(3)(u) Bamako and 4(2)(f) Basel.
778 Article 6(1) Bamako and 6(1) Basel; See further Winter, G., 1998.
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The contents o f the information required in the Annexes are essentially the same. For 
example, names and addresses of exporters and generators o f waste, site o f disposal, means 
of transport envisaged, physical descriptions of the waste, packaging envisaged, quantities, 
method of disposal and a declaration by the generator and exporter that the information is 
correct. Oral messages do not qualify as notification of proposed waste movements. The 
notification duty covers information to transit states and importing states alike, and also 
transit states and importing states that are not parties.779 The main difference between the 
Conventions is, however, that the Bamako Convention requires shipment specific 
notifications even where hazardous wastes having the same physical and chemical 
characteristics are shipped regularly to the same disposer via the same customs office.780 781
The Basel Convention takes a less stringent controlling approach in expressly allowing 
general notifications for similar and regular shipments to the same disposer via the same 
customs office during a maximum period of 12 months. This provision may water down the 
information requirement and serve to legitimise increased movements rather than 
reductions as otherwise envisaged in the Convention. On the other hand, this so-called 
Control System has matured over the last few years, and the Secretariat has worked
7ft 1towards making it function properly.
The prior notification requirements have not gone entirely without criticism. Export 
notifications have, i.a., been referred to as the "liberal compromise".782 They are not 
enough o f a safeguard against pollution risks if the receiver has no or insufficient expertise 
or administrative and scientific resources to appraise the consequences of an envisaged 
shipment. It was therefore early argued that exporting countries ought to be held to a higher 
standard than simple prior notification.783 Under the Basel Convention the standard will 
indeed be raised when exports are banned from EC and OECD states to Parties that do not 
belong to those groups, but prior notification remains the central instrument for those
779 Articles 6(9), 7 (Bamako) and 6(10), 7 (Basel).
780 Article 6(6).
781 But contra see Vu, 1994, for an example of a loop-hole in the Convention related to a case o f attempted 
dumping o f waste in Somalia in 1992.
782 See Scherr, J.S., 1987, for a reference at p. 145 toM. Dowie, 1979.
783 See Handl, G., 1987-88, p. 617.
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between whom trade is allowed. Obviously, prior notification does not cover illeg a l 
transfers.
III.1I. Prior informed consent
In many environmental treaties information provisions are followed by various 
consultation and negotiation requirements, especially where the activity being regulated h a s  
potentially immediate transboundary environmental risks attached to it.784 Express consent 
requirements are, although there are some recent examples to the contrary in the areas o f  
trade in hazardous chemicals and pesticides and in biosafety,785 786unusual for common areas 
or shared resources and even contradicted in judicial practice. In the context o f  
hazardous waste trade or movements, however, it is the territory o f one state rather than a 
shared resource that is potentially affected, and the international scheme is meant to be  
considerably stronger than usual. Instead o f being required to give neighbouring states a  
mere chance to bring forth their opinions and fears about a certain project (negotiation an d  
consultation), the waste regime is based on the consent o f the importing or transit state to  
acquiesce to the acceptance of a particular shipment. The notion o f prior informed consent 
(PIC) thus includes the requirements discussed above pertaining to prior notification and 
the consequent reaction from the state receiving such notification. This stress on consensus 
can of course only be looked upon as an expression of normal and traditional state 
sovereignty, but in the context o f  waste movements it arguably also serves the point o f
784 See, for example, Article 5 of the Nordic Convention on the Protection of the Environment, 
Stockholm, 19.2 1974, entry into force 5.10 1976. See also Article IX on consultations and procedure for 
requesting clarification in the Chemical Weapons Convention.
785 For an express and well developed PIC procedure, see Convention on the Prior Informed Consent 
Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade, Rotterdam, 11.10.1998, not 
in force; See also the “Advance Informed Agreement Procedure” in Articles 7-10 and 12 o f the Protocol on 
Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Cartagena, 29.1.2000, not in force. See further
www.biodiv.org/biosafe/protocol/
786 See the Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping from Ships and Aircraft, 
Oslo, 15.2.1972, in force 7.4.1974. The subsequent Oslo Commission Recommendation 89/1 offers an 
example of the acknowledgement o f prior consent to dumping in the North Sea during the time of 
phasing out dumping. See also the Lac Lanoux arbitration, 12 RIAA, 1957, pp. 315-316, for an outright 
denial of the existence of a rule of prior informed consent for application in the management of a shared 
resource.
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safeguarding environmental interests against perceptions of short-term economic
■ 787necessity.
In both the Basel and Bamako Conventions the central idea is that the importing Parties 
shall:
respond to the notifier in writing consenting to the movement with or without 
conditions, denying permission for the movement, or requesting additional 
information. A copy o f the final response o f the State of import shall be sent to the 
competent authorities o f the States concerned [which are Parties]. (Alternative 
Basel text in brackets)78 88 789
Prior informed consent is not understood to be merely a yes/no option, but rather it implies 
the power o f the importer to set such conditions as it finds appropriate for a particular 
movement.
The same requirements for full consent appear to apply to non-parties: according to both 
Conventions the required notifications and responses are to be transmitted to such 
governmental authority as may be appropriate in the case of non-parties. The 
Conventions make this full consent a prerequisite for the actual commencing o f the 
transboundary movement. Another prerequisite lies in the requirement o f the importing 
state to confirm to the exporting state that a contract exists between the exporter and the 
disposer specifying the environmentally-sound management of the wastes in question.790 
Thus, it appears that whatever the conditions listed by the importing state might be, the 
minimum requirement under these international treaties is the environmentally sound 
management criterion, debatable as its relationship to precaution may be, and the 
procedural notification and consent rules are meant to safeguard that requirement.
Transit states fall into a somewhat odd category as far as the requirement o f PIC is 
concerned. Under the Basel Convention the duty o f  exporting states to secure notification 
to transit states is clear, but the transit state may relinquish its right to consent and
787 See supra for the example of the Indian Hazardous Waste Rules, as amended 2000, and its PIC procedure; 
SeeRanjan, S., 2001.
788 Articles 6(2) (Bamako) and 6(2) (Basel).
789 Articles 6(9) (Bamako) and 6(10) (Basel).
790 Articles 6(3) (Bamako) and 6(3) (Basel).
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consequently be regarded as permitting a transit movement through its territory if  it d o es  
not respond to the prior notification within sixty days.791 Although the prior notification 
duty applies in respect to non-party transit states it remains somewhat unclear whether th is  
particular category of states can also waive their right o f prior consent under the B ase l 
Convention.792 However, as non-parties they would obviously be free to act unilaterally to  
waive their own consent requirements, save perhaps in situations where such actions w ould  
lead to higher than usual risks o f adverse effects to neighbouring states and therefore be 
contrary to customary international law. Once again, the Bamako Convention provides fo r 
stronger safeguards, as it clearly requires both party and non-party transit states to respond 
to the prior notification within sixty days and it does not agree to any right of waiver o f  
consent by non-parties.793 As such, the Bamako Convention serves as an interesting 
example o f attempts to bind third parties.
The requirements of prior informed consent, especially under the Basel Convention and 
the new Convention on PIC in the trade of hazardous chemicals and pesticides, naturally 
raise the question why such a procedure was not sufficient for the members o f the OAU? 
What more could one ask for, than the right to refuse or accept shipments at one’s ow n 
will? This is a  point that has been underlined by those hoping for continued development o f  
trade in hazardous wastes, rather than complete bans. For instance, Waugh claims that 
improving the PIC function through further regulation, such as baseline technical and 
operational standards for receiving facilities, and management, including oversight 
mechanisms and “compliance assistance opportunities”, as well as financial assistance to 
developing countries and a clearer liability system would be a better approach than banning 
all trade opportunities.794 The crux of the matter is two-fold: the temptations of lucrative 
deals may be bigger than the perceptions of the risks involved, and corrupted officials make 
the matter worse. The response o f the OAU states when adopting the import ban in the 
Bamako Convention was thus a one-off resort to the right o f consent, and it can be seen as 
recognition o f the imbalance in trade between the rich exporters of the North and the poor 
importers o f the South.
791 Article 6(4).
792 See Lang, W., 1991, p. 154.
793 Articles 6(2),(4) and 7.
794 Waugh, T-, 2000, pp. 520-538.
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IlUn. Accident information
Two particular types of communication take place after a waste incident, that is, 
information on when, where and how an accident has occurred, and information on 
violations of the treaty regimes (regardless of resulting pollution). The first type, accident 
information to neighbouring states, should ideally be preceded by information to the local 
public on emergency preparedness (both for humanitarian and environmental reasons). In 
order to mitigate environmental effects on the international level, the Basel and Bamako 
Conventions make identical provisions for emergency information. The respective Articles 
read as follows:
"The Parties shall, [whenever it comes to their knowledge], ensure that, in the case 
o f an accident occurring during the transboundary movemement of hazardous 
wastes or their disposal, which are likely to present risks to human health and the 
environment in other States, those States are immediately informed.795
The treaty texts do not make it clear whether such emergency information is to be 
conveyed through the Secretariats or directly to the competent authorities of the states 
concerned, or perhaps, via both channels. Clearly, this is something of a weakness, since 
particularly emergency situations require as well established channels of communication as 
possible for immediate mitigation of environmental damage. Under both schemes, 
accidents that have occurred are to be reported to the Conference o f the Parties through the 
Secretariats in connection to annual reporting mechanisms, but this is o f course pointless 
from the point o f view of immediate mitigation.796 A potential strength o f the schemes are 
that both Conventions encourage the parties to consider the establishment of a revolving 
fund to assist on an interim basis in case o f emergency situations to minimize damage from 
accidents.797 Under the Basel Convention such a mechanism is taking shape in the form of 
the Technical Cooperation Trust Fund, whose scope of application has been enlarged to 
cover help by the Secretariat to developing countries or countries with economies in
795 Article 13(1) (Basel) and 13(1) (Bamako).
796 Articles 13(3)(f) (Basel) and 13(3)(f) (Bamako).
797 Articles 14(2) (Basel) and 14(3) (Bamako). Decision II/2 of the Second Conference of the Parties to 
the Basel Convention requested the Ad Hoc Working Group of Legal and Technical Experts to consider 
the elements required for establishing an emergency fund.
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transition in cases o f emergencies involving hazardous waste movements, including 
incidents due to illegal traffic. Cooperation is to be done with the UNEP/OCHA 
Environment Unit. Parties are urged to make contributions to the Fund to support 
emergency assistance.798 Whether this Fund/these funds will ever be truly functional 
mechanisms for the spreading o f the cost of risks taken only remains to be seen.
III.IV. Reporting
The first reporting requirement relates to the legislation states have passed in the area o f  
waste management. Articles 4(1 )(a) and 13(2)(c,d) of the Basel Convention require states 
which have prohibited or limited the import o f  wastes to inform the other parties about such  
decisions. The import ban under the Bamako Convention is equally strengthened by th is  
notification duty.799 The parties must inform each other about which national authorities 
they have designated as "competent authorities" and as a "focal point" and in any changes 
in them,800 and about national definitions o f  hazardous wastes and any changes in such 
definitions.801 8023The Bamako Convention includes equivalent provisions with the addition o f
A M
a designated "dumpwatch". Obviously, this all presupposes relevant legislation to report 
on, and many countries have needed help in its development. To that end, and with the 
advice o f  experts, the Secretariat o f the Basel Convention has developed and revised draft 
model national legislation for states in the process of establishing legislation and
B A I
institutional mechanisms.
798 Interim Guidelines for the Implementation of Decision V/32 “Enlargement o f the Scope of the Technical 
Cooperation Trust Fund”, in 2000 accessed at www.unep.ch/basel/meetings/interguide: and see 
UNEP/CHW/C. 1/4/26, 30.6.1999, Annex on Trust Fund budget and national contributions, access under 
homepages www.basel.int.
799 Articles 4(3 )(q) and 13(2)(c).
800 Articles 5 and 13(2Xa).
801 Articles 3 and 13(2Xb).
802 Articles 5 (includes the designation o f a "dumpwatch"), 3 and 13.
803 Revised Draft Model National Legislation on the Management o f Hazardous Wastes and Other 
Wastes as well as on the Control o f  Transboundary Movements o f  Hazardous Wastes and other Wastes 
and their Disposal, Basel Convention Series/sbc No: 94/003, Geneva, April 1994; See also Compilation 
o f the Provisions o f National Legislation Related to the Control o f Transboundary Movements o f
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Secondly, the parties to the two Conventions are also required to report annually to the 
COP through the Secretariat on amounts of hazardous wastes imported or exported, on 
transfers which did not go as planned, on accidents, on measures taken to develop 
technology, and on measures taken to reduce transboundary movements.804 COP 2 o f the 
Basel Convention parties in 1994 did not produce a debate on the reports as such although 
about one third o f  the parties had not reported. Some countries admitted to having had 
difficulties, but no unwillingness, in meeting the requirement, and that assistance would be 
welcomed. To meet this need a Manual for the Implementation o f the Convention and a 
Questionnaire on Transmission o f Information has been produced and also the Technical 
Cooperation Trust Fund established. In 1999, 87 parties and in 1998 72 parties reported 
under Articles 13 and 16 o f the Basel Convention, as compared to 62 for the year 1997.805 
This steady increase in reporting, after great problems in the early 1990s, is interpreted as a 
growing commitment of the parties to report, and also as a consequence o f the active role 
played by the Secretariat in facilitating reporting.806
Institutionally, country reports under the Basel Convention are handled first by the 
Secretariat, which makes an analytic summary and Country Fact Sheets that are then sent 
on to the so-called Open-ended Ad Hoc Committee for the Implementation of the Basel 
Convention.807 The Ad Hoc Committee meets between the COPs, and in addition to taking
Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal and to the Environmentally Sound Management o f  Hazardous 
Wastes, Basel Convention Series/SBC No: 94/002, Geneva, January 1994.
804 Articles 13(3) (Basel) and 13(3) (Bamako).
803 For reports received between May 1992 and March 1994, see Reporting and Transmission of Information 
Required Under the Basel Convention, June 1994, SBC No. 94/007. For reports received between July and 
October 1994 see Second meeting of the Open-ended Ad Hoc Committee for the implementation of the Basel 
Convention: Reporting and Transmission o f Information Required Under the Basel Convention, 17.11.1994, 
UNEP/CHW/C.2/1/INF.9. See also No. 6 Managing Hazardous Wastes. Newsletter of the Basel Convention, 
March 1995. Basel Convention: Decisions Adopted by the First (1992) and Second (1994) Meetings of the 
Conference of the parties, June 1994, UNEP/SBC/94/008, see Decisions 1/11 and 11/17. However, with the 
exception of some countries mentioning difficulties they had with reporting, the second COP showed very 
little debate on reports; Interview with N. Basavaraj-Schroth, Basel Convention Secretariat, Geneva, 11.7 
1995; 49 (out of 111) reports were received by late October 1997 for data for the year 1994, 
UNEP/CHW.4/18 and UNEP/CHW.4/18/Corr. 1.
806 Comment on the Basel Convention’s old web-pages, www.unep.ch/basel: in 2002 equivalent found at 
www.basel.int under national reports and country fact sheets for 1999; and for newest reports, see under latter 
web-address.
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decisions on various issues related to implementation it reports to the COP on s ta te  
conduct.807 08 Furthermore, the gathering, analysis and dissemination of country-by-country 
data has been facilitated by the establishment of an Information Management System , 
which is an electronic information system and an integrated telecommunications netw ork 
for the Parties.809 The Country Fact Sheets, along with other material produced by th e  
Secretariat, and COPs are available on the internet. The OAU and its Bamako Convention 
does not yet provide the same level o f transparency.
Initially, it was not entirely clear whether the reporting requirement under Article 13(3)(b) 
o f the Basel Convention referred only to legal movements of wastes or whether reports 
were to be made about illegal transfers as well, but with the general obligations agreed 
upon in Article 4 where the parties undertake to co-operate in the dissemination o f  
information and prevention o f illegal traffic along with the elaboration o f  a standard form  
for reporting confirmed cases o f illegal traffic, the issue has been institutionalised. The 
number o f  reports on illegal traffic is still quite limited. Demands by the Secretariat fo r 
information on confirmed or suspected illegal traffic has produced only a handful o f  
reports, and there is firm ground to believe that many more cases have gone unreported.810
The possible effects o f the new export ban on illegal traffic is hard to foresee. Essentially 
the same split in views exists on this issue as did during the original negotiations on the 
Basel Convention: either one considers the information and consent scheme with entailing 
transparency as the best option for ensuring that accidents get publicity and illegal traffic 
remains unnecessary or one argues that a total ban is clearer and therefore easier to monitor 
than a bureaucratic scheme.811 In the end however, regardless of whether the system is a 
managerial and consent based one or based on a total ban, the core issue remains: export 
and import o f hazardous wastes, for final disposal and especially for recycling, remain
807 Earlier called the Open-ended Ad Hoc Committee for the Implementation of the Basel Convention. On its 
work see e.g. Reporting and Transmission o f Information Required under the Basel Convention, 
UNEP/CHW/C.2/1/INF.9,17 November 1994.
808 And see UNEP/CHW/C. 1/4/26, 30.6.1999 for general discussions and decision on need to develop 
implementation and compliance mechanisms under the Convention.
809 Decision 1/4 o f the First Meeting of the Open-ended Ad Hoc Committee for the Implementation of the 
Basel Convention and Decision 11/18 o f the Second Conference o f the Parties, Geneva, 25.3.1994.
810 UNEP/CHWJ/19; UNEP/CHW.3/7; UNEP/CHWAVG.4/LSG./1/2. Krueger, J., 1999, pp. 90-91.
8,1 Krueger, J., 1999, p. 90.
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lucrative options, and shams, misclassifications and withheld information will flourish to 
the detriment o f people and the environment.
Control of the African import ban is clearer in Articles 4(1 )(a) and 4(2)(b) of the Bamako 
Convention. It requires information on illegal waste import or dumping activity to be 
forwarded as soon as possible to the Secretariat who shall then distribute the information to 
the other contracting parties. This is an additional procedural safeguard with the function of 
bringing international attention to the wrongdoings o f other parties. The fear of 
transboundary leakage of hazardous materials is a politically explosive issue entailing 
security problems threatening the stability between countries or whole regions. Such 
instability has already been experienced between Nigeria and Benin when Benin made 
plans to dispose o f waste in a common border area and the Nigerian President threatened 
his neighbour with military action.812
IV. Concluding Observations
The tale of the international regulation of trade in hazardous waste is a success story in 
several ways. The global treaty, the Basel Convention, has (as of December 2000) been 
ratified by 142 states, and it has been followed by regional arrangements, most notably the 
Bamako Convention for the African continent. The political and legal efforts o f the late 
1980s and early 1990s gave birth to a treaty system that has now reached some maturity. 
The system is a success especially from an African perspective. It is probably 
unprecedented that an issue o f crucial importance for the continent so quickly - within 
about ten years - leads to strong international action. The reasons for this are impossible to 
point at without political study, but may lie in the fact that hazardous waste trade is a 
limited issue, that it caught considerable attention in media all over the world and raised 
environmental consciousness, along with a need for states to show "progress" in 
environmental protection, may have been contributing factors. The sum total, the expected 
complete prohibition of export of hazardous waste to Africa will in itself be a reason for 
applauding the states involved. But until the entry into force o f  the export ban, far from all
8,2 See Peter, C.M., 1990, p. 68.
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IAfrican states are covered by such formally strong measures. General international law  
should still play a role for those states.
In view of the international and national developments in the area o f hazardous w aste 
trade, the question thus arises whether any signs o f  customary international law have 
developed? The question is relevant at least for as long as there are still both potential 
exporting states (most notably the United States),813 and importing states outside o f the 
treaty systems. If the different procedural obligations discussed above were to be dealt w ith  
separately and in detail, variations in the extent to which some norms have been established 
might follow. Firstly, any discussion on the customary character o f a state's right to prior 
informed consent includes some elements of paradox. Consent is obviously a most natural 
attribute o f state sovereignty. A t the same time, in the context of hazardous waste trade, it 
serves the purpose of strengthening international control mechanisms, which otherwise in 
the area o f transboundary environmental affairs tend to remove decision-making from the 
national to the international level. The prior consent requirements o f the Basel Convention, 
non-binding instruments, and national legislation restate what inherently must be custom. 
The Bamako Convention and national import bans in Africa agree and take the customary 
right one step further. The notion o f prior informed consent further strengthens the initial 
information and co-operation requirements. Bimie and Boyle criticize the Basel 
Convention for its failure to promote public access to decision-making.814 Taking this 
critique a bit further, consent o f  the state o f import is a weak safeguard if  it is based on 
corruption815 or quick profits rather than true knowledge among the public about the 
consequences of hazardous imports. Secondly, prior information o f planned undertakings 
has been referred to as representing general international law, and it certainly seems to do 
so, 816 especially in light of the development of EIA procedures (as discussed above in
813 See further on U.S. reluctance to ratify the Basel Convention, Choksi, S., 2001, pp, 509-539.
8l4Bimie, P. and A. Boyle, 1992, p. 342.
8ti On bureaucratic and political corruption in Africa, and legal measures related to it, see Coldham, S., 1995, 
pp. 115-126. And see Mbaku, J.M., 2000; And further Handl, G., 2001, pp. 56-58 on international law, both 
binding agreements and soft law instruments, relating to combating bribery and corruption.
816 A few dissenting opinions still existed in the late 1980s on the grounds of lacking state practice or 
opinio juris. See supra Chapter 2; See e.g. Bothe, M, 1980, p. 394; But contra see Sands, P., 1988, p. 35.
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Chapter 1). Thirdly, accident information is no longer questioned as a customary rule of 
international law.817
Fourthly, since supervisory methods, such as annual reporting, are specific to a given 
treaty, the point of departure is that states do not owe each other any reporting, 
monitoring818 or other verification duties under general international law. This may, 
however, be flawed by unnecessary caution. The perception o f the normative basis for 
reporting and other supervisory procedures may change if the issue is placed into the 
broader context o f information sharing between states. After all, the simple primary 
rationale of reporting procedures and other forms o f compliance supervision is to gather 
information on state actions and, in some instances, generally on the state of the natural 
environment. In that perspective, the above-discussed general duty of states to inform on 
activities with potential transboundary environmental impacts is not far away from the 
more specific topic of reporting and control measures. This leads to the argument that 
reporting and other supervisory mechanisms that cumulate environmental information are 
concrete manifestations in treaty law o f  the duties of states in general international law to 
co-operate and to inform on environmental matters, and that in doing so, such methods 
further reinforce the weight o f the norm in general international law. This does not at all 
deny the possibility that supervisory procedures simultaneously might exist as implications 
of other needs felt in the international community: for instance, it could still be argued that 
control exists because of states' suspicions of each other’s activities.
The Preamble to the Basel Convention reflects the belief that one way of fulfilling the 
obligation of “environmentally sound management” is the enhanced control of and the 
proper exchange of information on transboundary movements of hazardous wastes. As 
pointed out by one writer, under the Basel Convention, "information exchange is not only 
the tool for its implementation .but also condition sine qua non for its scope and some o f its
8,7 See supra Chapter 2.
818 Handl, G., 2001, p. 102, writes: “Environmental monitoring is the sine qua non for any state to be able to 
meet its multifaceted customary or treaty-related legal obligations regarding the environment. Many o f these 
obligations, in particular, those created by global environmental regimes, are premised on state parties 
establishing an environmental baseline from which national environmental trends can be measured and 
assessed. Treaty practice specifically calling for monitoring merely reflects, reinforces or refines what post- 
Rio has probably already evolved into a customary legal obligation for states, namely to monitor 
environmental trends generally”.
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provisions”.819 The treaty does provide for some evidence of an international consensus o n  
the need to adopt a precautionary approach to waste management.820 Such an approach 
need not be confined to an understanding of it as disposal at site (although that is the goal), 
but it could also include the benefits that transparency brings into waste management. 
Recognition of co-operation and information existed before the Basel Convention in th e  
Cairo Guidelines,821 in subsequent OAU documents endorsing the Cairo Guidelines,822 *824an d  
most lately in the Bamako Convention.
If it were not for the exceptional consequences that hazardous wastes can cause, m ost 
African states would be likely to welcome the economic benefits involved. But, as the  
substances involved are capable o f causing damage that could well climb over the threshold 
o f severe or serious harm to the environment, the applicability o f the most fundamental 
international rules on pollution prevention are unquestionable. Information, prior informed 
consent and other procedural obligations related to openness may also be argued to  
represent interpretations or implementations of the customary duty of states not to cause 
harm to the environment o f other states. The Basel Convention refers to the dumping o f  
illegal wastes as being in contravention not only of the Convention, but also of general 
principles of international law. This obligation is perhaps even stronger when the 
interests o f less developed countries are contrasted with industrialized states and the MNEs 
acting from within their jurisdictions. To this effect, Ranjan argues that “the prohibition on 
the transboundary movement o f hazardous wastes to developing countries” has
819 Introduction by I. Rummel-Bulska in Reporting and Transmission o f  Information Required under the 
Basel Convention, June 1994, SBC No. 94/007, p. i.
820 See further Bimie, P. and A. Boyle, 1992, p. 334; and see Ranjan, S., 2001, pp. 89-90.
821 Article 4.
822 See the OAU Council o f Ministers' Resolution on the Declaration of the African Year of the 
Environment 1991, CM/Res. 1662 (LI), reprinted in 2(4) RADIC 1990, pp. 682-683; On an undertaking 
to co-operate in the transboundary movement of hazardous waste, see further Article 59, OAU Treaty 
Establishing the African Economic Community, Abuja 3.6 1991, reprinted in 3(4) RADIC 1991, pp. 792- 
839.
825 See Principle 21, the United Nations Declaration on the Human Environment, Stockholm 16.6 1972, 
11 ILM416 (1972); Trail Smelter arbitration, 3 RIAA, 1941, p. 1938,1962. Also the Corfu Channel case 
points in the direction of a state duty to inform other states of hazards that it is aware of and which might 
affect other states, see ICJ Reports, 1949, p. 4; See generally Bimie, P. and A. Boyle, 1992, ch. 3.
824 Art. 9(1 )(e) of the Basel Convention.
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“crystallized into a universal customary norm of international law”.825 As indicated by the 
provisions on technology transfers in the above-discussed documents, and as pointed out by 
the Special Rapporteur on toxic wastes of the UN Commission on Human Rights,826 many 
developing states do not have the economic or technical means to carry out the safe 
disposal of hazardous wastes. The extent of the duty o f exporting states to take 
precautionary information and consent measures thus stands in proportion to the risk that 
the exported827 waste presents -  this being a standard of diligence that some would argue 
against as being too weak or uncertain. From the point of view of those African states that 
have banned waste imports, the obligations on information and consent are but a minimum 
norm, and they insist on more. For the exporter states, these procedural obligations might 
be reaching the limit of their international undertaking, but nevertheless based on custom 
so as to bind also those states that have no treaty ties preventing export.
Could the failure to fulfil procedural duties affect the determination o f liability? The 
answer is likely to be in the affirmative. Under the Basel and Bamako Conventions the 
grounds for illegality o f a hazardous waste transfer are connected to failures to fulfil the 
duties o f information and consent.828 829The exporting and importing states alike are required 
to introduce domestic legislation to prevent and punish illegal traffic. The question 
remains, however, who should bear" the final responsibility for harm to the environment 
from hazardous waste exports when these domestic efforts fall short o f securing full 
redress?
Firstly, there is the question of the allocation of responsibility between the exporting and 
the importing states. If the importing state has had a full chance to consent to the imports in
825 Ranjan, S., 2001, p. 89. Ranjan bases his argument especially on Art. 9(1 )(e) of the Basel Convention.
826 Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on the adverse effects o f the illicit movement 
and dumping of toxic and dangerous products and wastes on the enjoyment of human rights; On the Special 
Rapporteur, Ms. Fatma Zohra Ouhachi-Ksentini’s missions, see further at website of the UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, http://www.unhchr.ch/. See also Resolution o f 26.4.2000 by the 
Commission on Human Rights on dumping o f toxic and dangerous wastes.
827 On hazardous technology exports, see Francioni, F., 'Exporting... 1991, p. 293.
828 Articles 9(1) (Basel) and 9(1) (Bamako).
829 For instance, the Gambian legislation referred to above imposes penalties in the form of fines or 
imprisonment for dumping of wastes produced from sources outside the Gambia, Sections 6 and 7. The 
equivalent Nigerian provisions are considerably more severe, see supra Chapter I.
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question on the basis o f sufficient prior information, then perhaps it ought to bear the  
responsibility simply as a normal consequence of such sovereignty. Alternatively, further 
protection could be afforded to the importing state if  it was a developing state. That is, o n  
the basis o f  the development status o f the importing state the exporting state could be h e ld  
at least partly accountable as well. This is a radical argument, but it has been made.830 I f  
environmental harm arises as a consequence o f  failures to fulfil procedural obligations th e  
argument may grow in validity.831 The state duty not to cause harm to the environment o f  
other states becomes violated when the correct procedural duties are neglected. This is n o t 
a strict standard, but rather one based on due diligence,832 but where the failure to fulfil 
procedural duties could still result in a shift in the burden of proof to the advantage o f  the  
importing developing state.
Secondly, there is the question o f civil liability versus state responsibility for the exporter 
and the exporting state. As seen, the various procedural obligations imposed by 
international treaty law are geared both towards the exporting state and the exporting 
private party. In practice there is likely to be a link between the two. However, the 
determination o f liability demands a separation o f duties because environmental liabilities 
that fall upon the private exporter mean that the "polluter pays",833 whereas state liability 
simply could mean a burden on tax-payers. However, from the point of view o f the 
developing state that has suffered environmental harm due to the exporter’s negligence, the 
source o f  the payment makes little difference as long as its damages are met. In order for 
ends to meet, however, there needs to be both private and final state involvement,834 as well 
as insurance and fund mechanisms, such as under the IMO’s 1996 Convention on Liability
8j0 See Waugh, T., 2000, p. 526, and further references in n. 195.
831 See further Francioni, F., ‘Exporting...’, 1991, pp. 291-294.
8j2 On due diligence standards in international law and under U.S. law relating e.g. to hazardous wastes, 
see Soljan, L., 1998, pp. 220-221. And see the Superfund or Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation and Liability Act p f  1980 (CERCLA), 42 USC Section 9601; and the Superfund 
Amendments and Reauthorization Act o f  1986 (SARA). Under CERCLA Section 9601(35)(B) the 
degree o f knowledge that a defendant has about the risks of pollution from his transaction or the area 
around it raises the standard of diligence required, see ibid 1998, p. 221.
833 See further Boyle, A., 'Making the Polluter Pay?...’, 1991, pp. 363-369.
834 For an argument for state responsibility, see Francioni, F., ‘Exporting...’, 1991; In contrast, see 
Sands, P., 1989, p. 409.
and Compensation for Damages in Connection with the Carriage o f Hazardous and 
Noxious Substances by Sea (the HNS Convention).835
Both the Basel and Bamako Conventions refer to the need for the parties to co-operate in 
the establishment o f protocols on liability and compensation.836 The parties to the Basel 
Convention have managed to negotiate an instrument, where both strict and fault-based 
liability appear. The Protocol on Liability and Compensation for Damage Resulting from 
the Transboundary Movement o f Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal is not yet in 
force,837 and it does not greatly change the sad level of development of the issue in general 
international law, where much work lies ahead of states before these questions of 
environmental risk/cost allocation can be satisfactorily solved. At any rate, there is also 
much opposition to strict, several or joint liability for damages related to waste trade, 
especially from waste generators who fear that they might, for instance, be innocently 
liable, for example, for the disposal facility’s negligence in a situation where they could not 
possibly supervise such a facility.838 Instead, pro-trade writers suggest the establishment of 
trust funds and taxes to help pay unexpected clean-up costs.839 However, most 
environmental treaties are nowhere even close to achieving a liability instrument, and 
together with funding mechanisms and insurance, the eventual success o f the Protocol can
835 See the International Convention on Liability and Compensation for Damages in Connection with the 
Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea (the HNS Convention), London, 3.5.1996, not in 
force, which introduces strict liability for the shipowner and compulsory insurance and insurance certificates. 
This global Convention has only a handful of signatories and two ratifications (1/2002); See generally 
Ganten, R.H., 1997; Odier, F., 1997; Rengifo, A., 1997; Wolfram, R. & C. Langenfeld, eds., 1999.
836 Articles 12 (Basel) and 12 (Bamako). As far as waste generation within Africa, however, the Bamako 
Convention, Article 4(3)(b), requires its parties to impose strict, unlimited liability as well as joint and 
several liability on hazardous waste generators.
837 Protocol on Liability and Compensation for Damage Resulting from the Transboundary Movement of 
Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, Basel 10.12.1999, not in force; As o f Dec. 2000 the Protocol has 13 
signatories, of which none are African states. Both strict liability and fault-based liability appear in the 
Protocol. If both the importing and exporting states are parties to the Basel Convention, the notifier is strictly 
liable for damage until the movement document has been signed by the disposer. After that, the disposer is 
liable for damage. If only one contractor is party to the Convention, strict liability is applied to damages while 
that party possesses control of the waste. Fault-based liability is applied for failures to comply with the 
Convention or for wrongful intentional, reckless or negligent acts or omissions, see Articles 4 and 5; See 
generally Wolfrum, R. & C. Langenfeld, eds., 1999; and Choksi, S., 2001.
838 There would, especially, be “significant U.S. opposition to the imposition of such liability on generators 
and transporters”, Waugh, T., 2000, p. 527.
839 Ibid., pp. 528-529.
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only be hoped for.840 The Protocol is marred by potential loopholes: it speaks o f  
“operational control”, which can be circumvented by hiring other exporters to notify and 
control; it exempts parties from liability if they have other arrangements which fully m eet 
or exceed Protocol provisions, an argument which has been used by some developed 
countries against joining the Protocol; and it does not provide for the liability o f exporters 
or generators for future damages, that is gradual, long-term harm from waste disposals.841 
This last point is particularly problematic for developing countries that lack 
environmentally sound hazardous waste management technology.
The new international regulation o f trade in other hazardous substances than waste, that is 
chemicals and pharmaceuticals, is o f great value, since there should be fewer loopholes 
based on the misuse o f labelling. Still, the waste trade will not disappear overnight. The 
implementation of procedural norms still depends both on the extent of state will to fulfil 
them and, on the existence of equivalent functioning transparency at the national level. The 
allocation o f social, economic and environmental risks is still largely unbalanced to the 
detriment o f importing developing states. The initiative under the global Basel Convention 
to arrange a conference in 2001 to deal with the specific problems o f Africa in relation to  
hazardous wastes was therefore very welcome.842 Even with strong legal constraints, such 
as under the Bamako Convention and coming up under the Basel Convention, and growing 
coordination between different environmental treaties and institutions,843 illegal traffic844 
would be likely to continue because o f the large profits in play. International law, including 
its implications of state responsibility and liability, may be a frighteningly slow (and in the 
view of MNE activities, even unfair) tool for the dismantling of the waste trade problem.
S40 On issues discussed in relation to the drafting o f the Protocol, e.g. the channelling o f liability, liability for 
illegal traffic etc., see Handl, G., ‘Comments on Draft Articles o f a Protocol on Liability and Compensation 
for Damage Resulting from Transboundary Movements o f Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal*, 
UNEP/CHW.l/WG.l/5/L.l/Add. 1; See also Consultants’ Study on Financial Limits o f  Liability under the 
Protocol, Summary, by H. Boeken, E. de Kezel and K. Bemauer, www.unep.ch/base 1/Protoco 1/Report.
841 Further on these loopholes, see Choksi, S., 2001, pp. 524-526.
842 First Continental Conference for Africa on the Environmentally Sound Management o f Unwanted Stocks 
of Hazardous Wastes and their Prevention, Rabat, 8-11.1.2001, see www.unep.ch/basel/Congress/.
843 Such as strengthened cooperation in customs controls, see UNEP efforts at collaboration and synergies in 
relation to the Basel Convention, www.basel.int. and see 5 Synergy June 2001, p. 7.
844 Further on illegal traffic and the Basel Convention, see Fathalla, A., 1996, pp. 33-39.
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This makes the case for greater openness, and its potential for public scrutiny and 
government accountability, even more compelling.
***
3.4. An Assessment
Success?
Reporting procedures are very successful in the sense that they flourish in nearly all 
multilateral environmental treaties. They are evidence of widespread will among states to 
agree to such procedures, whether because they are considered indispensable, satisfactorily 
functional, or lesser evils than substantive promises. Reports offer points o f reference for 
assessing, and re-assessing, state behaviour. They give insights into state behaviour after 
the fact, and are therefore often considered to have the potential o f playing some role in the 
repression of non-compliance. In a system which ought to function on the expectation of 
shared responsibility and reciprocity, they may give rise to unease when non-compliance is 
revealed. To the extent that reporting and other information-gathering can provide a basis 
for negotiations, the procedures may function as at least modest or, at best sophisticated, 
forms o f early dispute avoidance mechanisms.845 Neither does the environmental harm- 
prevention effect o f reporting procedures be wholly scorned upon: even if  the international 
part of the schemes were futile, the national preparation of reports could have some limited 
significance, depending on the publicity and participation o f the endeavour.
Functions
Mostly, however, reports are neither preventive nor repressive, the classical dichotomy is /  
not an accurate tool for describing the roles and functions o f environmental reports. Instead7 
the most convincing descriptions seem to relate to information accumulation and d ia lo g u e .-  
The first because it is so obvious (great numbers o f reports, including data, statistics etc., 
irrespective of whether it is ever read or utilized) and the second because it describes, in a 
nutshell, that truly preventive or repressive roles are not only slim wishes, they are 
unwanted by states.846 The accumulative function is massive, and the information can often
845 Handl,G.,1994, p. 329.
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be focused on issues o f great international relevance. The contents of reporting obligations 
are varied, but typically related to states’ implementation of and compliance with particular 
treaty obligations, as opposed to general information on the state o f the environment. A t 
best, reports are comprehensive and coherent with other reports, they are conscientiously 
submitted on time, there are institutional arrangements where “true” dialogue can happen 
about states successes and failures in treaty compliance, and reports are made public and  
easily accessible to all. Evidence o f this best scenario seems to be growing under som e 
environmental treaties, where at least the technical modalities of reporting are beginning to  
be in place, and where the actual effects o f reports and the dialogue around them on states’ 
environmental behaviour is often assumed to be positive, although cause and effects are no t 
readily discerned.
Strategy
As it stands, information accumulation has become an end in itself, a structure or strategy 
for the way in which environmental treaties, and all o f international environmental law 
today, is construed. Indeed, as Handl writes, it seems that “NCPs are clearly here to 
stay”.846 47 It is o f course quite possible to imagine that satellite monitoring and other “hard” 
verification in the future could so completely take over environmental information 
gathering848 that institutional methods such as reporting would become superfluous for 
compliance control. This could certainly involve both more accuracy and greater measures 
of objectivity, provided the scientific measuring methods are agreed upon and cooperation 
with local scientific groups and local authorities are maintained.849 Although technology 
may offer all the possibilities for this development, some social and economic 
considerations are likely to continue keeping less sophisticated methods in primary use. 
Most importantly, satellites, and the data they accrue, are costly and often far beyond the 
attainment o f developing countries. Also, so-called paper-implementation of treaty 
provisions can for obvious physical reasons not be covered by technological means.
846 C f on states’ lack of will to improve human rights supervision, see Crawford, J., 2000, p. 10.
847 Handl, G., 1994, p. 328.
848 See generally Litfm, K.T., 1995, p. 1 et seq. For the wider discussion on the implications, legal, 
technological and those related to national security, of satellite monitoring or remote sensing, see Spitzer,
D., 1986; Frieden, L., 1988; Szafarz, R., 1988; He, Quizhe, 1992; Sayn-Wittgenstein, L., 1992.
849 See interesting early estimate related to the prospects of climate change monitoring by Fischer, W., 1992, 
p. 284.
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Therefore less costly institutional mechanisms are likely to continue as the preferred 
method in many treaty regimes. And, at any rate, technology-belief, which will be returned 
to below, is problematic: it does not generate values, but its use (the way it is directed, what 
is chosen as objects of study, etc.) presupposes many notions o f choice.
Procedure before substance?
The elaboration o f  procedural paragraphs may be a first step on the path to realizing a full 
environmental treaty with concrete prohibitions, reductions or other means o f pollution 
control. Procedural norms may be easier to agree on, and they may, as it were, open the 
channels of communication between states. The picture drawn above of the legal restraints 
in the international trade in hazardous wastes may tell us something about the role of 
procedural requirements. On the one hand, information, consent and transparency are 
instruments for the environmentally successful management o f waste transfers; on the other 
hand, they have under the Basel Convention been necessary steps on the path to banning 
waste exports to non-EC or non-OECD states. Procedure has thus gone before substance. 
The waste trade scheme in the Basel Convention is however an unusual way o f letting 
procedure before substance. States have more often preferred framework conventions, 
which are by definition empty o f concrete goals, but often contain procedural 
obligations.850 Research, monitoring and various information exchange provisions are often 
the basis, the minimum that states can agree upon failing exact targets. The Climate 
Change Convention is the example par excellence o f a situation where states initially found 
it extremely difficult to reach agreement on anything beyond the framework itself, except 
on reporting; but this does not mean that framework conventions have been failures. On the 
contrary, it is perhaps a matter of whether one chooses an optimistic or pessimistic 
perspective, because there is likewise the argument that a weak procedure-based beginning 
may well result in a strong substantive end.851
850 The Basel Convention, although largely functioning on the basis of procedural norms, cannot be called a 
framework convention because it contains norms on the best ways of handling waste (e.g. in situ), and it is 
not a priori meant to be followed by concrete protocols etc.
851 Fauteux, P. in commentary to Giindling, L., 1991, p. 111. See also Hahn, R. & K.R. Richards, 1989, p. 
438.
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In 1991, Gündling wrote that “ [t]he framework convention approach gives an incentive to  
defer from difficult issues to be agreed on later;' i f  ever.”852 But he also admitted: “On the
other hand, environment protection needs widespread international co-operation. Radical
./
solutions are difficult to realize and sometimes counter-productive; flexible strategies and  
instruments are needed. The framework convention-protocols-approach may be considered 
as such a strategy”853 The Vienna Convention on the Ozone Layer had in the late 1980s ju s t 
led to concrete targets under the Montreal Protocol, and the LRTAP system has in the  
1990s developed with several Protocols on exact reductions. Also, since these arguments, 
reporting procedures and other “flexible” NCP-measures have developed considerably, and  
“self-monitoring”854 has mostly become peer review, in a few instances with elements o f  
expert advice added. In other instances, information and supervisory provisions may have 
been brought in later, through treaty amendments or Protocols. This may be a sign tha t 
some, or the same, procedural duties may be difficult to agree on or that they are negotiated 
in response to earlier treaty compliance. In all o f these cases, the attitude is reflected that 
the object o f the treaty, for instance pollution, can be managed through co-operation.
Management
Overwhelmed by the practical evidence of management, such as the hundreds, maybe 
thousands o f reports turned in under different treaties each year, the researcher could easily 
be seduced to believe in a managerial ethic. On the other hand, even hopefulness does not 
generate vision that makes reporting look like a state-of-the-art way o f  dealing w ith 
environmental problems. They are slow, they are state-to-state, they are often not turned in, 
and it is doubtful whether many really read them. Then there is the example o f the Bamako 
Convention. A conviction that procedural norms on information, notification and consent 
are not sufficient protection against the risks o f  hazardous wastes led many African states 
to choose the radically different and much shorter path of immediately resorting to  
substantive import bans, either unilaterally or via the Bamako Convention. Several new
852 Gimdling, L., 1991, p. 100.
853 Ibid, p. 98.
854 And in 1989 Hahn and Richards had argued that “international environmental agreements usually contain 
only weak enforcement mechanisms and that individual countries typically monitor their own compliance”. 
But they did not see that as inherently bad. In their view countries could reap the public image benefits of 
signature without bearing the cost o f  implementation, and that that would make good political sense, see 
Hahn, R. & K.R. Richards, 1989, pp. 437-438.
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/ /
African states also joined the Basel Convention after its Parties decided to in troduced
/
export ban outside of the EC and the OECD. It is difficult to see how this could have been
/
a reaction against greater openness as such, but it could be an argument that i t  reflects a
frustration with the “managerial ethic”, the idea that everything can be controlled through
/
light procedures o f various kinds. /
Despite its attractiveness, the current managerial ethic comes with several specific 
limitations and reasons for worry. Firstly, as noted, reports under environmental treaties 
hardly represent and do not necessarily contain the cutting edge of environmental data. 
Written by bureaucrats with different training backgrounds, they may be, for instance, too 
general to reflect properly on scientific knowledge or too scientifically oriented to be 
properly digested by the few who read them. The “hard facts” from satellite surveillance 
and other types o f technical monitoring may never reach the state reports. Reports could 
also simply “drown” in the massive and growing amounts of available environmental 
information. They do, however, add to the diversity o f sources o f environmental 
information, and to the extent that they are increasingly made publicly available, they could 
be acquiring a greater role as points of reference against which state conduct can be 
verified, that is by the public, rather than by peers only. This is an important point (related 
to greater rights o f access to environmental information which is discussed in the next 
chapter) especially because of its implications for a growing culture o f openness and for the 
re-distribution o f some sort of “responsibility” also to those individuals and groups of 
individuals who read and react, or fail to react, in public to information to which they have 
access.
Secondly, reports alone could hardly be said to “develop” international law on the 
environment in any immediate or constructive sense, mostly, reporting looks like an excuse 
for the maintenance of the status quo. Arguments on a “legislative function” for reporting 
systems, or rather whole NCPs,855 however, point towards the “flexibility” o f norm- 
amendment that has been built into some current environmental regimes. The conclusion
855 See Sand’s argument, 1999, pp. 341-343, on the need in environmental matters for flexible standard 
adjusting institutions, e.g. through technical amendments, reinterpretation, exemptions, escape clauses, loop­
holes, and expert advice. Cf. Bodansky’s “legislative function”, which he argues contributes to scientific 
understanding (referring to national inventories of greenhouse gas emissions, which although correct, is 
problematic as evidence because it represents an unusual kind o f clear, science based assessment seldom seen 
under other environmental treaties) and to assessments of progress of states under treaties, and that these form 
a “factual basis for decision about whether to develop new or amended norms”, 2000, p. 367.
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that “the very act of reporting is significant” is thus just as valid (for the same general 
reasons o f belief in compliance enhancement through mild international scrutiny as in  
human rights reporting) also under environmental treaties, given the present managerial 
ethic o f incremental change. In the long run, “flexible”, expert or scientist-influenced, and 
often open-ended treaty management, including reporting, has relevance for norm creation 
and amendment, but the very basic problem remains that such an ethic of soft supervision, 
information gathering and incremental change may sometimes be problematic in terms o f  
legitimacy and ill-suited to environmental protection at large when, thirdly, reporting and 
other soft supervision could also fail as tools in assigning ultimate responsibility. Instead, 
soft management might increase free-riding.856 57 And fourthly, the fact that not only 
prevention, but especially precaution, continues to gain a stronger position in  
environmental law, the predominantly after-the-fact character of state reports makes them  
dubious as a method o f furthering environmental protection. This would not be so 
problematic if  there were several other stronger precautionary methods o f  international 
cooperation in simultaneous use, which there rarely is, or if  there was certainty about the 
quality o f  the substantive norms, rather than uncertainty about where incrementalism and 
ex post^7Cto-“flexibility” is leading.
Procedure without substance?
An examination of reporting procedures thus does not tell us very much about the strength 
o f the substantive duties involved: the information received could be void o f meaning if the 
norms that are to be checked on are weak or watered down in the first place. Weak or 
poorly phrased environmental rules may well, when either implemented or supervised, lead 
to ’’correct” or “correlating” information, but precisely that information may be beside the 
point/irrelevant/nonsense from the point of view of the goal, environmental protection. 
The legal framework is then a slowing factor, a tool that performs the wrong work. 
Inversely, the poor quality o f  environmental information would hinder the sound 
development of environmental law,858 simply because the messages sent are out of 
proportion, outdated, late, ill-measured, partial, falsified or simply left out.
856 1.e. for the credibility and legitimacy o f an environmental treaty, see Sand, P.H., 1999, p. 345, see supra.
857 Ibid, p. 345.
858 Cf. Bodansky’s “legislative function” o f national reports, 2000, p. 367, and Sand, P.H., 1999, p. 341-343, 
discussed supra.
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And indeed there has been a tendency in the last decade to mention so-called treaty 
congestion as a source of concern in international environmental law.*59 Developing 
countries in particular are said to have some difficulties in keeping up with the rapid 
developments within the area, and, as within human rights law, some treaties' reporting and 
monitoring obligations pose considerable challenges to small and non-specialized 
administrations. This is, however, mostly a quantitative concern, and although it is a valid 
point in some contexts, if over-emphasized it could still be said to distort the overall picture 
of international environmental law. Although many questions are rather well developed, 
especially regionally, in both qualitative and quantitative terms, enormous weaknesses 
remain and entire global questions such as global wanning have, in a grave understatement, 
serious teething problems.*60 Despite their abundance, environmental norms may be 
insufficient, and there is a strong case for qualitative development.*61
This is a distressing thought, because it would imply a need to go from peer review and 
management back to norms da capo. Do we need more and/or better norms or do we need 
better compliance and supervision? The questions are suffocating, because although 
affirmative answers probably need to be given to both, a sense of being trapped in a vicious 
circle, or a dualist straightjacket in the traditional idealist-realist tradition, is bom.859 60*62 Indeed 
one alternative could be to speak up, once again, for better norms. This could have its 
immediate merits, but also shortcomings similar to those of one-sided stressing of 
compliance enhancing and supervision.863 From norms to compliance, back to norms, and
859 Brown Weiss, E., ’New Directions...’, 1995, pp. 4-7.
860 In the case of global warming both in terms of the quality of the negotiated rules (the targets) and the 
ratification dilemma; See generally, Cameron, P. & D. Zillman, 2001; and Cameron, P., 2001, pp. 3-23.
161 For the issue of quality control in the human rights area where many rather frivolous suggestions for new 
’’human rights" have been suggested, see Alston, P., 'Conjuring Up...’ 1992, pp. 207-221. In the 
environmental area, the problem is not so much that concerns of lesser importance would be raised 
internationally, but that despite urgency entire crucial questions do not harden into law. A case in point has 
for decades been toxic chemicals, a situation which is now beginning to be rectified as a first step has been 
taken through the adoption of UNEP’s global POPs Convention at Stockholm in 2001.
862 See Kennedy, D., 1999, p. 469 on modernism as “eternal return”: “This sort of internal criticism o f  the 
law, which led international lawyers in this century from formalism to process, places us now against the 
constraints o f process as well, wishing for a broader, alternative world of choice and strategy”.
863 The “pendulum” movement remains irrespective of constellation: Consensus among states (norm-making) 
and subsequent peer review (supervision); or epistemic influence (norm-making) and expert control
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with time yet again to compliance, seems like a pendulum movement, where stressing one  
always implies reviewing the other. Ultimately, the abundance o f norms on information 
together with their normative “emptiness” if they come without attached substance may b e  
an indication o f the marginalized role o f international law as a whole for environmental 
protection. This is one o f the central paradoxes in “international environmental law”, and  
forms a basis for the discussion in the next chapter on rights of access to environmental 
information.
(supervision); or public participation (norm-making) and public control/watchdog (supervision); or some 
other constellation.
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4. ...AND ON TO INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS OF ACCESS TO INFORMATION?
4.1. Introduction: A Process Come to a Dead End?
The two previous chapters have discussed the various environmental information duties 
and exchanges between states. The managerial attitude of which these information schemes 
are manifestations is functionalist and pragmatically based on context-specific self-interest 
and state practice. Yet -  or just for those reasons - the managerial ethic is not without 
worrying limitations. Among possible dilemmas, the two previous chapters have pointed at 
two shortcomings specific to the role o f inter-state environmental information:
In the first case, state duties to inform with regard to planned undertakings and accidents 
(the “first phase” of development in environmental information exchanges) were argued to 
be crucial for the mitigation (as opposed to prevention) o f transboundary environmental 
harm, and the fundamental character of these duties were argued to be strong 
representations o f customary law and even general principles o f law. But at the same time, 
such information duties were sadly seen to play only a modest role in environmental 
protection. Information duties are not action; they are mere -  albeit important - 
prerequisites. And at any rate, although centralized warning-systems may be crucial in 
some types o f accidents, in many cases the speed and even accuracy o f the media in 
relaying information may be more important than information exchanges based on formal 
agreements between states.
In the second case, the supervision/compliance trend was seen as worthy o f serious 
consideration, not least because the debate in favour o f a managerial ethic seems to contain 
such conviction o f necessity. Reports and other control methods were treated not so much 
as verification proper (suspicion, balance of interests etc.), but more as a means of 
gathering information on the environment (a “second phase” in the development of 
environmental information exchanges). Attention was mostly focused on the softer 
functions of reports, particularly the means they offer for dialogue and drawing attention to 
the problems states have in fulfilling their obligations. However, the discussion on 
supervisory information exchanges led to the fear that although solid environmental 
information may be produced through the control mechanisms that have developed under 
many treaties, the opposite could also be the case. Hosts of procedural obligations do little
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good if  there is not the right quality - as opposed to quantity - of substantive norms. In the  
weakest cases there is only procedure and organization but no substance, that is, on ly  
methods o f management, but little agreement on what is to be done, and this amounts to  a  
’’quality dilemma”. The argument would be that in such cases either the mere motion o f  
informing could not have meaning for environmental protection, or it would become a  
method o f  incremental norm-amendment with open questions on legitimacy attached, and  
that in both cases the tool, environmental law, might be ill conceived.
The “modesty dilemma” and the “quality dilemma” come together to raise some troubling 
questions: where does a managerial attitude take us? Is it at the cutting edge o f international 
environmental law and policy or does it, on the contrary, cut o ff the edge o f environmental 
protection? Does the information and supervision boom of the 1990s reflect frustration 
with the inherent weaknesses o f  international law (such as the slow development o f state 
responsibility, as well as shortcomings in international enforcement and sanctions 
mechanisms) and a fatigue and exhausted resort to management and softer forms o f  
persuasion? Or is the promotion o f  management a response in appreciation o f the rapid 
proliferation of international environmental norms, understood as proof o f - a  triumph o f  
confidence in - the ability o f international law to stand up to the challenges posed by 
environmental degradation? Perhaps neither o f these, but rather a mixture o f pragmatic 
aspirations, this liberal-institutionalist trend is seductive in simplicity and convincing as to 
the merits o f information/openness/transparency as the buzz-words o f today. Denying some 
of its merits would be outright cynicism, and yet it leaves a nagging sense o f want. Even 
the promise held by the Kyoto Protocol is a case in point: it contains provisions for an 
enforcement mechanism - one o f  the most elaborate seen so far -  but the future o f the 
Protocol is marred by the fact that key states remain outside. And even if  its global 
ratification was certain, it may well be that its success would be dependent on compliance 
enhancement mechanisms other than the managerial ones considered above, i.e., reduction 
methods,864 865 transfers o f technology, scientific and technical support and financing
D i e
mechanisms (also those outside of the Convention system, such as the World Bank 
initiated Prototype Carbon Fund (PCF), developed as a tool for the emerging carbon
864 For a comparison of different regimes, see e.g. Epstein, M. & R. Gupta, 1990.
865 On funding under the Protocol see Decision 5/CP.6 on Implementation o f the Buenos Aires Plan of 
Action, FCCC/CP/2001/L.7, taken at the resumed COP6 at Bonn in July 2001.
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emissions market and intended also as a  way to realize the jo in t implementation866 (JI) and 
clean development mechanisms (CDM) of the Kyoto Protocol867), to mention but a few of 
those potential methods which have here been completely left outside of the discussion.
Most treaties deal with problems o f a  lesser magnitude than global climate change but still 
have much greater weaknesses built into their control systems. Article 27 o f the amended 
Mediterranean Convention requires the Meetings of the Contracting Parties to assess 
compliance with the Convention and the Protocols as well as the measures and 
recommendations on the basis of periodic reports. The meetings shall recommend the 
"necessary steps to bring about full compliance" with the Convention. A few other treaties 
refer to the same "steps", but the concrete means available for treaty bodies and meetings of 
parties is still very vague indeed. Although some report-examining bodies do have the 
possibility of actually pointing at cases o f non-compliance on the basis of reports, the 
process seldom goes that far. Changes in decision-making powers o f treaty bodies, 
especially their possibilities to take decision by less than consensus votes, a development 
most interesting in the Montreal Protocol,868 is a possible way to concrete meaning for 
phrases such as “steps to bring about full compliance”. But even then the qualitative issue 
of what such steps might consist o f remains unsolved, and there are few clues as to the 
options. This is perhaps one o f the most central weaknesses o f  the systems now in use. The 
compliance and enforcement mechanisms in the Kyoto Protocol may prove to change the 
situation - but only for that agreement. Even if the Kyoto Protocol or some other process 
would provide inspiration for strengthened control measures, the majority o f environmental 
treaties are likely to continue with their weaker structures for a long time to come.
There is a risk that the initial hope on which the very theme o f this study -  i.e. the potential 
of information accumulation as a tool for environmental protection generally and the 
development of international environmental law specifically -  was based, is lost in the
866 On the concept, see e.g. Loske, R. & S. Oberthür, 1994; Oberthür, S., 1994, pp. 45-58; and Activities..., 
OECD, 1997
M7 The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Prototype Carbon Fund: Participant’s 
Agreement and The Instrument, 22.7.1999.
868 See Palmer, G., 1992, pp. 259-283. For examples from conservation treaties see e.g. CITES, which 
requires 2/3 majority voting for decisions, but contra the CCAMLR Commission requires consensus on 
substantive issues.
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dilemmas bome by the managerial ethic. The weaknesses of the present ethic m ay 
overshadow the ’’promise” o f information accumulation. Yet both the hope for a positive 
role for environmental information arrangements in international law and the discussion on
the dilemmas present in these managerial arrangements could perhaps benefit from a shift 
o f interest towards public access to information. Greater transparency could mean better 
checks on decision-making, accountability, and it could fend off problems o f free-riding.869 
Therefore it has with increasing frequency been argued that one possible route to better 
environmental protection goes via enhanced public access to environmental information 
and greater public participation in environmental decision-making. Here developments in  
international law could come to play a role in influencing also traditionally secretive or 
undemocratic societies. This would be an argument that continues on and broadens the 
initially hopeful note vis-à-vis the role o f environmental information for environmental 
protection and law.
/
4.2. Access and Participation in  Environm ental Treaties
By approaching the information issue from the level o f the "receiving end", the individual 
or whole communities or groups of individuals, it should be possible to get a more 
complete picture of the already very broad field o f environmental information in 
international law. The chapter starts off with a look at the A) treaty provisions and some 
soft law pronunciations forming the evolution o f the topic from states’ affirmative duties to 
disseminate information to the public, to access to obtain information that falls short o f 
individual rights-language. Dissemination and access cannot be successfully divided into 
traditional environmental media-based groups as accident information and supervisory 
information provisions could above. When summing up B) the contents o f rights of access 
to environmental information, dividing lines are found in the extent of access: what can be 
accessed, documents, narrow but specific, or broader general environmental information? 
Do access rights exist narrowly to specific environmental concerns only, or generally to 
any environmental situations? And finally, do access rights exist in treaty law only or 
perhaps even in general international law? Access is still more often granted to citizens 
rather than to anyone in a transboundary context, and therefore some national and regional 
arrangements are discussed alongside multilateral treaty development. Also, it is asked
869 See e.g. Sand, P.H., 1999, p. 345.
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whether the contents of treaty-based dissemination and access are circumscribed by some 
exceptions. And finally, whether there are any examples o f explicit rights-language in 
relation to access.
This last question is continued in an in-depth examination of the most recent developments 
within the European Union and the UN Economic Commission for Europe, and some of the 
issues they raise, in chapter 4.3. Besides treaty provisions, evolution and contents, this 
stage of the study brings in a discussion on C) the possible functions of full-fledged rights 
of access to environmental information. The legal development o f access to environmental 
information may or may not show similarities to the development of the state information 
duties discussed above, but more importantly, it is assumed to bring in the potential for new 
approaches to environmental protection and law. The chapter thus explores the idea for a 
“new ethic”, as opposed to the idea o f a “managerial ethic” from the point of view of these 
regional developments. This includes the challenging less optimistic view that a rights- 
development is not as attractive or feasible an option for the advancing of international 
environmental law as one might think at first glance.
4.2.1. Treaty Provisions
a) General Rights to Public Information
The evolution o f rights of access may first be approached through the notion of a general 
"right to information". General rights o f  access to public documentation are frequently 
provided for in Western legal systems,870 and several OECD countries further have express 
legal provisions on the access of citizens to environmental information, either documents or 
more general.871 Several international agreements and declarations refer to the freedom or
870 For instance, in the United States: the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. 552, 1967 and the Privacy 
Act; New Philippine Constitution, 1973, Section 6, Article IV; Estonian Constitution, art. 44; The 
Constitution o f Finland, 11.6.1999 731/1999, Section 12; and for Finland see the Act on the Publicity of 
Official Documents, 9.2.1951 83/1951, latest amendment 1.6.1999 526/1999 and Decree 22.12 1951 
650/1951, latest amendment 1.1 1995 1558/1994; (and see Lag om offentlighet vid ràttegâng, 21.12.1984 
945/1984, latest amendment 1.3.2000 109/2000; Lag om fbrvaltningsfbrfarande, 6.8.1982 598/1982, latest 
amendment 1.12.1999 688/1999, esp. par. 5.) and especially Act on the Openness of Government Activities, 
21.5.1999 621/1999.
871 E.g. in Finnish legislation, see Environmental Protection Act 86/2000; For an overview of several 
countries, Winter, G., 1990. See also Vallauri, J-P, 1989, pp. 293-299; Campbell, D., 1994; and for reference
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right o f the individual to seek and receive information.872 Provisions are not unrestricted, 
but limitations o f secrecy normally accompany them,873 and it would be hard to argue for 
the existence in general international law o f a separate, generic right to information. 
Instead, some would argue that such a right may perhaps in specific cases, and in particular 
legal systems, be based on other existing rights.874 It is also important to remember that a 
fright to information, as constructed in international agreements, refers to the right o f
if;
persons under the jurisdiction o f  the state, thus normally excluding transboundary 
' information. Express mention o f a right to environmental information in legally-binding 
international documents are still relatively rare, as will be discussed below.875 There is, 
however, hardly any reason why environmental information should automatically be 
assumed not to fit under the various general information provisions. On a regional level, 
the European Convention on Human Rights876 can be interpreted to contain a right o f  
access to environmental information.877 Such an assertion would have to be made under 
Article 10 on the basis that the information looked for is of general importance, or under 
Articles 8 (as has been done in case-law) and 2 arguing that environmental hazards 
constitute a threat to individual privacy and life, and that information therefore is vital.878
to U.S. Clean Water Act and Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act, see Handl, G., 2001, pp. 49- 
50.
872 Article 19(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, New York, 16.12.1966, entry into 
force 1976; Article 13 of the American Convention on Human Rights, San José, 22.11.1969, entry into force 
1978; Article 9 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, Nairobi, 27.6 1981, in force 
21.10.1986; Article 19 of the Universal Declaration o f  Human Rights, United Nations General Assembly 
Resolution 217 A (III), 10.12.1948; See Tolentino, A.S., 1987, p. 30; The various instruments also contain 
provisions on the freedom of expression, another prerequisite for effective communication of, e.g., 
environmental information. See further, Fauchald, O.K., 1991, pp. 109-110, and see Ôsterdahl, I., 1992; 
Suksi, M , 1997, p. 2.
873 See further Fauchald, O.K., 1991, p. 106.
874 Suksi, M., 1997, see pp. 2-3, where he writes i.a. about the connection between the rule o f law and a right 
to information, and about the connection between a right to information and participatory, political rights.
875 See further The Nordic Council o f Ministers' Working Group on Environmental Information: What You 
Don't Know Will Hurt You. Environmental Information as a Basic Human Right, 1992.
876 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Rome, 25.3 1957, in force 
3.9.1953. NB: The EC is not a Party to the Convention.
877 Weber, S., 1991, pp. 178-183; and see generally also Desgagné, R., 1995, pp. 263-294.
878 Traditionally European case-law has not supported such a broad interpretation of the European 
Convention, see Weber, S., 1991, p. 185; But contra more recent case-law relating to Article 8 and 
environmental information, see Guerra et al. v. Italy, 19.2.1998, 116/1996/753/932, where the European 
Court of Human Rights held that the applicants would have been entitled to "essential information that would
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b) Emergency Information to Workers
The communication o f risk information can be directed from individuals/private parties to 
states, from states to individuals/private parties, from individuals to individuals and from 
states to states. Any "right" o f the individual to receive information must be 
accompanied by the obligation of the state to communicate such information. According to 
Kiss and Shelton, “ [djuties o f the states can be limited to abstaining from interfering with 
public efforts to obtain information from the state or from private entities, to requiring the 
state to obtain and disseminate all relevant information concerning both public and private
AAA
projects”. In a sense, the historical predecessor o f transfrontier environmental 
information between states is knowledge presented -  nationally - to individuals involved in 
work at hazardous installations. The development has gone from the discretion o f owners 
and operators o f dangerous undertakings to inform potentially endangered workers to the 
"right to know" about dangerous activities in ones own workplace. Knowledge about 
exposure to risk is not only considered a prerequisite for personal security, but also an 
important means towards the prevention of accidents.879 081 The main topic in Chapter 2, state- 
to-state accident information, meshes with the issue o f access to environmental information 
through one interesting treaty, the ILO’s Convention No. 174 concerning the Prevention of 
Major Industrial Accidents.882 The ILO Convention, quite in the tripartite tradition o f the 
Organisation, speaks not only of the duties of the employer and the state via its competent 
authorities, but also of the rights and duties of workers. Under Article 20 o f the 
Convention, workers at a major hazard installation shall:
(a) be adequately and suitably informed o f the hazards associated with the 
major hazard installation and their likely consequences;
(b) be informed o f any orders, instructions or recommendations made by the 
competent authority;
have enabled them to assess the risks they and their families might run”; Further see Desgagné, R., 1995; 
Miller, C., 1999, pp. 157-176; And see Thornton, J. & S. Tromans, 1999, pp. 35-57,
879 Weber, S., 1991, p. 185, argues that the European Convention may even force a state to obtain 
environmental information from individuals. See idem., n. 9, p. 177 on information between individuals.
880 Kiss, A. & D. Shelton, 1993, p. 494.
881 Smets,H., 1989, p. 16 and Smets, H., 1991, pp. 451-452; Van de Gehuchte D. and D. Comelis, 1994, pp. 
36-37.
882 ILO Convention No. 174, Geneva, 22.6.1993, in force.
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(c) be consulted in the preparation of, and have access to, the fo llow ing  
documents: (i) the safety report; (ii) emergency plans and procedures; (iii) accident 
reports:
(d) be regularly instructed and trained [... ]
(e) [...]take corrective action and if  necessary interrupt the activity where [ . . .]  
they have reasonable justification to believe that there is an imminent danger o f  a  
major accident, and notify their supervisor or raise the alarm,[...]
(f) discuss with the employer any potential hazards they consider capable o f  
generating a major accident and have the right to notify the competent authority o f  
those hazards, (emphasis added)
Thus far the workers. The next step has been information to the public at large,883 that is, 
residents o f a particular community. Under ILO Convention 174, the competent authority, 
i.e., the state, shall under Article 16 disseminate to the general public liable to be affected 
by a major accident, without their having to request it, information on safety measures and 
the correct behaviour to adopt in case of an accident. The public is thus not granted any 
explicit rights of access, but duties are placed on the parties to the Convention, just as in the 
case of information to another state. The policy issue whether the aim under the 
Convention o f Members to “formulate, implement and periodically review a coherent 
national policy concerning the protection o f workers, the public and the environment 
against the risk of major accidents” should include clear rights o f access to information 
thus remains an open challenge to states.
c) Environmental Information Dissemination to the Public
In the most fundamental sense, information to the public begins with education.884 
Principle 19 of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration885 refers to the importance o f education in 
environmental matters. An equivalent emphasis on the value of education is found in the 
World Charter for Nature.886 These two documents deal, however, with the issue in a very
883 Issues of consumer safety information remain outside o f the scope o f this study.
884 See generally Tolentino, A.S., 1987, pp. 32-33. The author argues, i.a., that access to environmental 
education is coherent with Article 19 on the freedom of information, expression and opinion in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, 10.12.1948, UN GA Res. 217 A (III).
885 No equivalent provision is included in the Rio Declaration of 1992.
886 Articles 15 and 16, World Charter for Nature, United Nations General Assembly Resolution 37/7, 
28.10.1982,37 GAOR, Supp. 51 (A/37/51).
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general fashion, and as education is fundamental for the effective response o f the public to 
environmental emergencies and for public participation in environmental decision-making 
there are great challenges as to the quality of such instruction.
An example at national level from the area of risk and accident information is provided by 
the United States where the Emergency Planning and the Community Right to Know Act887 
(EPCRA) stands as basis for a relatively elaborate information scheme complemented by 
state and local regulations.888 The EPCRA is however circumscribed in at least one 
important way: it does not require any communication of, or indeed even the preparation 
of, particular analyses on the risks o f a certain industrial undertaking. This makes for an 
information scheme that, for its effective implementation, is largely dependent on measures 
taken voluntarily by the industry in fear o f costly litigation.889 Thus public pressure is at the 
core o f this system, rather than expert advice and preventive supervision by the 
authorities.890
The public's access to environmental information on risks and accidents is well developed 
within the European Community. The so-called Seveso Directive of 1982, and replaced in 
1999 by the “Seveso IF’ Directive, concerns the communication of risk information from
887 Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act, 1986,42 U.S.C. 11001. Also referred to as the 
Superfund Amendments Reauthorization Act o f 1986, or SARA, Title III. The original Act is divided into 
sections on emergency planning, emergency notification, community right to know reporting and toxic 
chemical release and emissions inventory reporting. These reports are to flow through state emergency 
response commissions and local emergency planning committees, and the entire scheme is run by the 
Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) regulations and lists of toxic chemicals and their respective 
threshold quantities. In case of an emergency, section 304 requires the submission of immediate information 
from an operator to the local committee and the state commission. Under Section 324a, subject to Section 322 
on trade secrets:
[e]ach emergency response plan, material safety data sheet... inventory form, toxic chemical release 
form, and follow-up emergency notice shall be made available to the general public ... by the [EPA] 
Administrator, Governor, State emergency response commission, or local emergency planning 
committee, as appropriate.
888 See further Scott, R., 1990, pp. 971-975. On Californian legislation, Pease, W.S., 1991, pp. 12-20; and see 
“Sector Facility Indexing Project”, 62 Federal Register 19573, 1997.
889 The issue of voluntary prevention became particularly topical in the U.S. after the Exxon Valdez oil-spill 
off the coast o f Alaska on March 24, 1989. The so-called Valdez Principles were formulated by the Coalition 
for Environmentally Responsible Economies to function as a corporate self-governance code on 
environmental conduct. The enforcement of the Valdez Principles, which are entirely based on voluntary 
action, is meant to be social conscience, i.e., a trait of ethics which may well turn out to be fruitful investment. 
See further Amato, A.L., 1989.
890 See generally Baram, M.S., 1990, pp. 65-88,
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operators o f hazardous installations to public authorities, and from public authorities on  to  
the public at large.891 In contrast to the U.S. system, the Seveso Directive does not provide 
for direct risk information to be relayed from operators to the public. Article 8(1) o f  the 
Directive reads:
Member States shall ensure that persons liable to be affected by a major accident 
originating in a notified industrial activity [...] are informed in an appropriate 
manner of the safety measures and o f  the correct behaviour to adopt in the event o f  
an accident.
After the industrial accident at Basel in 1986, the Commission of the EC proposed a second 
amendment to the Directive, providing for the active communication of hazard information 
through various media that reach the members o f a community, that is, leaflets, televised 
information, etc. Annex VII, which was introduced by the second amendment, specifies the 
contents o f  the risk information. These include the potential effects o f accidents, 
characteristics of the involved substances, details on actions to take in case o f  an accident, 
information on warning systems, on-site and off-site emergency plans, and details on how 
further information would be relayed in case o f  an accident.892
In contrast to the EPCRA system in the United States, the Seveso Directive offers more o f  
what has been described as a "need to know" than a "right to know" approach.893 This 
means that information is provided for the effective response to accidents in accordance 
with existing emergency plans. This narrower EC scheme does, however, not function as a 
replacement of expert advice and regulation by national authorities, but as a supplement to
891 Council Directive of 24 June 1982 on the Major Accident Hazards of Certain Industrial Activities, 
82/501/EEC, O.J. L230/25 (1982), Cited as the Seveso Directive; 1st amendment 87/216/EEC of 19 March 
1987 mainly clarified entries and threshold levels in the Annexes; 2nd amendment 88/610/EEC of 24 
November 1988, OJ L 336 07/12/88, p. 14, see text above; 3rd amendment 91/692/EEC of 23 December 1991 
replaced Article 18 on reporting of implementation o f the Directive; On the development o f the issue, see 
also Council Directive of 18 September 1979 Amending for the Sixth Time Directive 67/548/EEC on the 
Approximation of the Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions Relating to the Classification, 
Packaging and Labelling of Dangerous Substances, 79/831/EEC.
892 Generally, see Kiss, A., & D. Shelton, 1993, p. 495. On difficulties in national implementation of the 
Seveso Directive, see Wynne, B., 1990, pp. 89-107; and Barratt, R. and H. Enmarch-Williams, 1994, p. 196. 
On France and the Seveso Directive, Vallauri, J-P, 1989, pp. 293-299; and see Report on the application in the 
Member States of Council Directive 82/501/EEC of 24 June 1982 on the major-accident hazards of certain 
industrial activities for the period 1994-96, OJ C 291, 12.10.1999, pp. 1-48.
893 See Baram, M.S., 1990, pp. 67-68.
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Jit. Unlike the EPCRA, the Seveso Directive requires thorough risk analyses of specific 
undertakings, thus imposing broader duties on national authorities.
The new “Seveso II” Directive substantively enhances the legal situation on several 
issues.894 In addition to a provision on accident information from one state to another (“first 
phase” information duty, as referred to in Chapter 2) the public's access to environmental 
information is, in Article 13, phrased as follows:
Member States shall ensure that information on major accident hazards, safety 
measures and requisite behaviour in the event of an accident is supplied, without 
their having to request it, to persons liable to be affected by a major accident [...] 
and to any natural or legal person who so requests, without the latter being required 
to demonstrate a legitimate interest.
Still in the realm o f emergencies, the OECD developed norms in 1988 on the access o f the 
public to environmental information.895 896Very similar in content to the first EC Seveso 
Directive, the OECD Council Decision recognized that the potentially affected public has a
• ♦ o n /
right to be provided with information about the risks o f hazardous installations. 
Essentially focused on prevention, the Decision deals both with information meant to 
provide knowledge about emergency preparedness and information meant to facilitate 
public participation in decision-making on the siting and licensing of hazardous activities. 
The latter kind o f  prior information about private sector industrial undertakings can usually 
be gained by the state via licensing and EIA obligations. The Decision sets out the criteria 
for the former kind o f preparedness information in stating that it should be timely, 
comprehensible, re-issued periodically and updated. The Decision does, however, leave 
some ambiguity as to who should give the information to the public, that is, the operators 
of installations or the public authorities after receiving relevant information from the 
operators. No special request o f information is required by the public, it shall be furnished 
automatically. As the information relates particularly to educating the public on how to
894 “Seveso II”, Directive 96/82/EC of 9 December 1996, in force 3.2.1997, replaced the original Directive 
and was mandatory at the latest as o f 3.2.1999. Further see Barratt, R. and H. Enmarch-Williams, 1994, pp. 
195-199.
895 See generally Smets, H., 1989, pp. 16-19 and Smets, H., 1991, pp. 449-456,462-467.
896 Council Decision-Recommendation concerning Provision of Information to the Public and Public 
Participation in Decision-Making Processes related to the Prevention of, and Response to, Accidents 
Involving Hazardous Substances, 687th session, 8.7 1988. C(88)85(Final). Does not include military 
installations or civilian nuclear installations.
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respond in case o f an accident, particularly the following are considered important: details 
on how the potentially affected public will be warned in the event of an accident; details o f  
the actions and behaviour the potentially affected public should take in the event o f  an  
accident; and the source o f post-accident information (e.g., radio frequencies). T he 
Decision further provides for the protection o f  confidential information relevant for, in ter  
alia, national security, as defined by national law.
An interesting forerunner in access to environmental information is the Nordic 
Environmental Protection Convention of 1974,897 In many ways an unusual treaty, the 
Nordic Convention opened the way for transboundary access to environmental information 
in a rather curious way. The text does not expressly mention any individual right of access 
to information, but in granting equal access to judicial and administrative proceedings in 
another contracting state, it indirectly acknowledged some means o f receiving information 
to individuals affected or potentially affected by a nuisance caused by environmentally 
harmful activities in another state. The right includes the possibility to bring before a court 
or administrative authority in another contracting state the question o f permissibility o f an 
activity, including the question o f measures to prevent damage, and to appeal against the 
decision to the same extent and on the same terms as a legal entity o f the state in which the 
activities are carried out. This is thus a far cry from a general right o f access to 
environmental information without having to prove an interest. It is nonetheless a strong 
manifestation o f a culture of openness and equality, possible already in the 1970s because 
of its centuries old roots in the relatively homogenous Nordic countries. Well within this 
tradition, the Convention also includes a provision (Article 7) under which a state’s 
supervisory authority “i f  it finds it necessary on account of public or private interest” shall 
publish communications from another state’s court or administrative authority “in the local 
newspaper or in some other suitable manner” . This again would fulfil some elementary 
public information requirement on the national level.
897 Nordic Convention on the Protection of the Environment, Stockholm, 19.2. 1974, in force 5.10.1976; See 
generally, Phillips, Ch. 1986, p. 155-; Broms, B„ 1986, p. 141 Brunnée, J., 1988, pp. 171-174; and see 
Lappe, M., 1993, for an assessment o f the Convention in relation to German environmental law; Further, 
Sand, P.H., 1999, p, 276. And see also Wolfrum, R. & C. Langenfeld, 1999 for some references to the 
Convention and liability issues; The equal access principle has been included in some later treaties, see e.g. 
the ECE 1992 Industrial Accidents Convention, Article 9(3). See infra Ch. 4.3.III.V.
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An early “generation” of treaties did not mention access or let alone public participation, 
but at best co-operation and exchange among parties of scientific, technical and statistical 
information.898 An example of this would be the 1985 Vienna Convention for the 
Protection of the Ozone Layer (Article 4) and the subsequent Montreal Protocol,899 which 
adds a general provision on co-operation in promoting public awareness of substances that 
deplete the ozone layer (Article 9). The Biodiversity Convention is also a case in point. The 
CBD does not contain any access rights language. Public participation is mentioned only, 
but importantly, in the context of environmental impact assessment procedures (Article 
14(l)(a)). On the other hand, it stresses public education900 and awareness training and 
exchange of scientific and other information, presumably among parties only.901 The 
educational approach is very valuable indeed, but quite different from the later access- 
based one, and the two ought to be complementary, not exclusive of each other. However, 
later treaties’ access-provisions tend not to be followed by education-provisions.
Another example o f a very restrictive view of public information is found in the 1991 
Alpine Convention, which under Article 4 requires parties to “establish an appropriate 
program of public information on the results of research and observations as well as on
898 E.g. the Convention on the Protection of the Black Sea Against Pollution, Bucharest, 21.4 1992, entry into 
force 15.1 1994; Cf. LOSC, Articles 200,204 and 205.
899 See generally Ott, H., 1991, pp. 188-208.
900 According to CBD Article 13 on Public Education and Awareness the Contracting Parties shall:
(a) Promote and encourage understanding of the importance of, and the measures required for, the 
conservation o f biological diversity, as well as its propagation through media, and the inclusion of 
these topics in educational programmes, and
(b) Cooperate, as appropriate, with other States and international organizations in developing 
educational and public awareness programmes, with respect to conservation and sustainable use of 
biological diversity.
901 Article 17 on Exchange of Information provides that:
1. The Contracting Parties shall facilitate the exchange o f information, from all publicly 
available sources, relevant to the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity, 
taking into account the special needs of developing countries.
2. Such exchange o f information shall include exchange o f results of technical, scientific and 
socio-economic research, as well as information on training and surveying programmes, 
specialized knowledge, indigenous and traditional knowledge as such and in combination 
with the technologies referred to in Article 16, paragraph 1. It shall also, where feasible, 
include repatriation of information.
This is a type of state-to-state information exchange, quite in the category of “first phase” exchanges 
discussed above in Chapter Two. The reference to “from all publicly available sources” hardly broadens the 
provision, but gives states a basis for excluding some data. It is thus a “first-phase” information exchange 
requirement, with only indirect bearing on individuals’ or groups’ access to environmental data.
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Tmeasures taken”. International NGOs are to be cooperated with “to the extent that such 
cooperation contributes to the efficacious application o f  the present Convention”.902 To 
safeguard the administrative and legal traditions o f several o f the parties to the Convention, 
these provisions are followed by the restriction that the “publication o f information shall be 
applied with respect for national laws regarding confidentiality. Information designated 
confidential shall be treated as such”.
The Nordic Convention, the OECD Decision and several of the treaties just mentioned 
mesh well with the Principles and Guidelines on Rights and Obligations Related to the 
Environment that the UN Economic Commission for Europe developed in preparation for 
the UNCED in June 1992.903 The ECE Guidelines state, for instance, that:
Competent authorities should provide individuals, groups and organizations access 
to information relevant to the environment, held by those authorities!...]
Competent authorities should make available, and encourage industries to make 
available, information about potentially serious impacts o f  industrial accidents, 
including information on contingency planning, and give information to the public 
immediately when such accidents occur.
Competent authorities should make available at regular intervals reports on the 
state o f the environment.
Competent authorities should facilitate and encourage public participation, [i.a.], 
by providing wide notification to the public, making information widely available, 
convening open fora and receiving written views.
These Guidelines offered a wide framework for the development on the global level of the 
public’s access to environmental information. Agenda 21 incorporates the equivalent
902 Convention on the Protection of the Alps, Salzburg, 7.11.1991, in force 6.3.1995. Generally, see S. 
Warsinsky, “Notes on the Alpine Convention”, www.mtnforum.org.
903 See also WCED, Experts Group on Environmental Law, Environmental Protection and Sustainable 
Development, 1987, Articles 6 and 15; The follow-up process to the initial Experts Group Report included, 
i.a., the adoption of the Bergen Ministerial Declaration on Sustainable Development in the ECE Region, 
16.5.1990. It elaborated upon the theme Awareness Raising and Public Participation (Article 16(a-j)) where it 
mentions the objective "to stimulate national and international exchanges of environmental information" 
(Article 16(c)) and to "develop further national and international systems o f periodic reporting o f the state of 
the environment"(Article 16(e)). One of the many outcomes of the entire follow-up process was (on the 
initiative by the Netherlands and Norway in October 1990) the Draft ECE Charter on Environmental Rights 
and Obligations, ENVWA/R.38. At an ad hoc meeting at the Hague in July 1991 the Draft became the above 
cited ECE Draft Document on Principles and Guidelines on Rights and Obligations Related to the 
Environment: Awareness Raising and Public Participation, 5.7.1991, ENVWA/AC.7/2.
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objectives in a truly "soft" form.904 In Principle 10, the Rio Declaration deals with access to 
information in general language, and without express mention of rights:905
Environmental issues are best handled with the participation of all concerned 
citizens, at the relevant level. At the national level, each individual shall have 
appropriate access to information concerning the environment that is held by public 
authorities, including information on hazardous materials and activities in their 
communities, and the opportunity to participate in decision-making processes. 
States shall facilitate and encourage public awareness and participation by making 
information widely available. Effective access to judicial and administrative 
proceedings, including redress and remedy, shall be provided.
Although a step towards a procedural right to environmental information, the Rio provision 
is still flawed. It clearly does not intend to cover information access in a transboundary 
context, and the text does not define what "appropriate" access might entail. The 
Johannesburg Plan o f Implementation goes no further: it only elaborates upon access at the 
national level. On the other hand, the Plan mentions that states should ensure access both to 
environmental information and to judicial and administrative proceedings in environmental 
matters.906
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Articles 4(1 )(i) and 6, 
combines an educational approach with an access and public participation approach. This 
is, however, only at the national or, “as appropriate”, on the subregional or regional levels. 
At the international level, there is only an obligation to cooperate in and promote the 
development and exchange o f educational and public awareness material and to implement
904 UNCED, Agenda 21, Rio de Janeiro 3-14.6.1992. A/CONF.151/4. Part IV, pp. 29-31. See also Chapter 
4.2.1. on the Experts Group of the WCED; And see Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe 
(former CSCE, now OSCE), Report on Conclusions and Recommendations o f the Meeting on the Protection 
of the Environment, Part I, Sofia Meeting on Protection of the Environment, CSCE/SEM.36, 2.11.1989, 
which confirms the right of individuals, groups, and organizations to obtain, publish and distribute 
environmental information; look at Bloed, A., 1993, pp. 413-423; C f to other soft law documents, e.g Cairo 
Guidelines and Principles for the Environmentally Sound Management of Hazardous Wastes, UNEP 
Governing Council Dec. 14/30, 17.6.1987, para. 20; The Hague Recommendations on International 
Environmental Law, 16.8.1991, para. 3; The Nuuk Declaration on Environment and Development in the 
Arctic, 16.9.1993, para. 6; UN GA, Programme for the Further Implementation of Agenda 21, para. 113; 
further on Agenda 21 and access to environmental information, see Bakkenist, G., 1993; and see IUCN Draft 
International Covenant on Environment and Development, 1995, Art. 12, para 3.
905 See further A., 1996, p. 43; and Thornton, J. & S. Tromans, 1999, pp. 36-37.
906 World Summit on Sustainable Development, Plan o f Implementation, Article 119, Johannesburg, 
September 2002. See further Article 146: "All countries should also promote public participation, including 
throrough measures that provide access to information regarding legislation, regulations, activities, policies 
and programmes. They should also foster full public participation-in sustainable development policy 
formulation and implementation.
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education and training programmes on climate change. It is also noteworthy that the 
provision on access to information on climate change at the national or regional level is not 
phrased in terms of rights, but as an obligation of the parties, and further according to their 
national laws and within their respective capacities. The latter qualifications also apply to 
public participation. This is thus a rather weak manifestation of access to environmental 
information, but it well reflects the state of legal development of the issue at the time o f the  
Convention’s adoption during the Rio Conference in 1992.
d) A ccess ’’S h o rt o f  R ig h ts”
Indeed 1992 appears to have been a watershed year when it comes to stressing transparency 
and public awareness.907 New, but less radical, conventions from that time refer to the 
importance o f openness, but they still mention only the state’s duty to inform the public, 
not the public’s right o f access. The 1992 Baltic Sea Convention is such a treaty where no 
rights language can be found.908 Yet, it is also an example o f a treaty under which 
substantive information work has been done through publications and, most recently, the 
Helcom website. It may thus serve as an example o f an “early” concerted mechanism for 
relatively broad dissemination o f  environmental information.
In the 1996 Mediterranean Hazardous Wastes Protocol,909 Article 12 on information to and 
participation of the public states that:
1. In the exceptional cases in which transboundary movement of hazardous wastes 
is permitted under Article 6 o f this Protocol, the Parties shall ensure that adequate 
information is made available to the public, transmitted through such channels as 
the Parties deem appropriate.
2. The State o f export and the State of import shall, in accordance with the 
provisions of this Protocol and whenever possible and appropriate, give the public
907 But see e.g. 1994 Nuclear Safety Convention for an example o f a new convention with no reference to 
transparency, openness or public access to information. It merely mentions appropriate information to a 
state’s own population and competent authorities for emergency planning and response (Article 16(2)).
908 See Article 17 on Information to the Public and see Preamble: “Conscious of the importance of 
transparency and public awareness as well as the work by non-govemmental organizations for successful 
protection o f the Baltic Sea Area”.
909 Protocol on the Prevention o f Pollution o f the Mediterranean Sea by Transboundary Movements of 
Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, Izmir, 1.10.1996, not in force.
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an opportunity to participate in relevant procedures with the aim of making known 
its views and concerns.
Typically, the information provision is reasonably strong, although phrased as a state duty, 
rather than as a right o f access. In contrast, the public participation provision is strongly, 
perhaps completely, watered down. The aim o f  public participation is not decision-making, 
but merely the voicing o f “views and concerns”, and when “appropriate” at that. This is 
discouraging; but has to be seen against its background: the Mediterranean Convention 
parties represent a wide spectrum of social and political systems and economic 
development, and this must be taken to imply that already the information provision may 
have been radical enough for many states, and the public participation idea just too much of 
a promise.
Some of the most developed public participation schemes are found in treaties and other 
documents related to accidents.910 It appears to be the easiest context in which to introduce 
public decision-making procedures, probably because o f the rather narrow subject matter at 
hand, that is contingency planning and various mitigation and rescue operations if an 
accident happens.911
Public participation in decision-making related to contingency planning is however not 
always desirable. Public knowledge of safety plans, procedures, shelters, safe water, etc.
910 But cf. Convention to Combat Desertification in Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and/or 
Desertification, Particularly in Africa, Paris, 14.10.1994, entry into force 26.12.1996, esp. Article 3(a) and
(c), which is an elaborate example of a public participation provision outside contingency planning.
911 Code of Conduct on Accidental Pollution o f Transboundary Inland Waters, 1990, Economic Commission 
for Europe, E/ECE/1225-ECE/ENVWA/16, Article 7:
1. In order to promote informed decision-making by central, regional or local authorities in 
proceedings concerning accidental pollution of transboundary inland waters, countries should 
facilitate participation of the public likely to be affected in hearings and preliminary inquiries and 
the making of objections in respect of proposed decisions, as well as recourse to and standing in 
administrative and judicial proceedings.
2. Countries o f incident should take all appropriate measures to provide physical and legal persons 
exposed to a significant risk of accidental pollution of transboundary inland waters with sufficient 
information to enable them to exercise the rights accorded to them by national law in accordance 
with the objective of this Code,
See also Article 111(f) of the International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of 
Oil Pollution Damage, Brussels, 29.11.1969, in force 6.5.1975. This early convention speaks o f notifications 
on pollution prevention measures taken on the high seas and which are to be done also to “known physical or 
corporate persons concerned”.
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may be reassuring, but it also makes society more vulnerable to sabotage and terro rism . I t 
is something of a paradox, that while industry is protecting itself more and more rig o ro u sly  
against intrusions into production and safety, public authorities are opening up. F u tu re  
developments in terrorism, especially in the use of biological and chemical weapons, c o u ld  
radically come to reverse this development.
The ECE has for some time now been an important - perhaps, along with the EU, the m o s t 
important - intemational/regional forum for advancing the principle o f a right o f p u b lic  
access to environmental information and public participation. Apart from the 1992 
Guidelines mentioned above, the ideas started taking shape in the Convention on  
Environmental Impact Assessment in a Tranboundary Context, where Article 3(8) requires 
that the parties “ensure that the public of the affected Party in the areas likely to be affected  
be informed of, and be provided with possibilities for making comments or objections on, 
the proposed activity”.912 The EIA Convention also furthers the principle o f public 
participation when it says in Article 2(6) that:
The Party of origin shall provide, in accordance with the provisions o f this 
Convention, an opportunity of the public in the areas likely to be affected to 
participate in relevant environmental impact assessment procedures regarding 
proposed activities and shall ensure that the opportunity provided to the public o f  
the affected Party is equivalent to that provided to the public of the Party o f origin.
This principle o f equality between potentially-affected people could of course be said to 
imply only a minimum standard as the level of participation-rights in the party of origin 
may be very low indeed.
Adopted one year later, the Helsinki Convention on Transboundary Watercourses and 
International Lakes also embraces the idea o f public information (Article 16). Its 
information provisions are more detailed than those in the EIA Convention, providing inter 
alia for availability free o f charge. The public information principle is further specified in
912 Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, Espoo, 25.2.1991, in force 
10.9.1997; And see generally on development within the ECE: Draft ECE Charter on Environmental Rights 
and Obligations, Proposal by the delegations of the Netherlands and Norway, 14.12.1990, ENVWA/R.38; 
Draft Document on Principles and Guidelines on Rights and Obligations Related to the Environment: 
Awareness Raising and Public Participation, 5.7.1991, ENVWA/AC.7/2.
238
the 1999 Protocol on Water and Health.913 Interestingly enough, the Protocol in Article 5(i) 
motivates (and now uses the term) information access and public participation as a quality
need:
Access to information and public participation in decision-making concerning water 
and health are needed, inter alia, in order to enhance the quality and the 
implementation of the decisions, to build public awareness of issues, to give the 
public the opportunity to express its concerns and to enable public authorities to 
take due account o f such concerns. Such access and participation should be 
supplemented by appropriate access to judicial and administrative review of 
relevant decisions;
The Protocol also stresses the enhancement o f the awareness of the public o f  its rights and 
entitlements to waters, as well as its moral and other obligations to contribute to the 
protection o f water and the conservation of water resources (Articles 5(m) and 9(b)). Other 
than this, the Protocol is, in Article 10 on public information, more exact than the 
Convention both in defining the content of information to the public and the exceptions to 
such information, both to be made available/denied within the framework of national 
legislation. Although adopted as recently as 1999, the Protocol does not speak o f access 
rights. Neither does, more understandably, the EIA Convention, the Watercourses 
Convention itself nor the ECE Industrial Accidents Convention o f 1992.914 The latter 
(referred to above in Chapter 2) is mostly concerned with accident and emergency 
preparedness information to the public -  also in a transboundary context -  but it explicitly 
refers to the obligation o f the country of origin of a possible accident to give the affected 
public (whether in its own country or another party) an opportunity to participate in 
“relevant procedures” with the aim o f making known its views and concerns on prevention 
and preparedness measures (Article 9(2)). Just as in the case of the EIA Convention, this is 
rather vague, but nonetheless a noteworthy legal development.
913 Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and Internationa] Lakes, Helsinki, 
17.3.1992, in force 6.10.1996; Protocol on Waterand Health, London, 17.6.1999, not in force.
914 Convention on the Transboundary Effects o f Industrial Accidents, Helsinki, 17.3.1992, in force 19.4.2000.
239
4.2.2. Contents
E xtent o f  Rights
By way o f summary of the above examination of states’ duties to d issem inate  
environmental information and individuals* access “short of rights**, at least the fo llo w in g  
types o f  contents and limitations seem to apply:
Firstly, the evolution o f this legal theme has not varied dramatically between the d iffe ren t 
sub-areas o f environmental law, that is, the different environmental media.
Secondly, and instead, a clear division is found between narrow access to contingency 
planning and accident-related information on the one hand, and other broader and m o re  
general data on the state of the environmental on the other hand. This runs parallel with an d  
underlines the conclusion in Chapter 2 on state-to-state accident information duties, th a t 
accident situations are the most solidly anchored part o f state commitments to share 
environmental information.
Thirdly, individual access to environmental information can be understood in terms o f  
extent. First, there is the crucial distinction between dissemination of, or access to, 
documents or general environmental information. While the former may be very specific, 
the latter otherwise implies much broader access to information. Most environmental 
treaties speak broadly o f “information” dissemination or access, not documents. Second, 
access can be either passive or active: the dividing line between what is a  state duty to 
inform (related to a “first phase” or “second phase” information exchange requirement) and 
what is a right of access (“third phase”) is sometimes difficult to draw when legal norms 
speak o f “access” but only provide for mechanisms o f relaying information to the public, 
not for the public’s ways of acquiring information for themselves. As seen in the above 
examples, most environmental treaties still include only state duties to disseminate 
information, and some include access rights that fall short of explicit individual rights- 
language. This is relevant for a third way of understanding extent, namely that it would be 
forced to draw, on the basis o f the above, any far-reaching conclusions about the extent o f 
existence in general international law of individual access to environmental information. 
This question is briefly returned to below in relation to the possible weight -  or exception- 
offered by the Aarhus Convention.
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Finally, the contents and extent of development o f participation rights under the 
multilateral environmental treaties discussed above are remarkable manifestations of a 
“new” topic under the environmental theme, but they are far from unrestricted. Existing 
provisions are circumscribed by lack of indications o f the concrete meaning of 
participation, and by frequent inclusion of restrictive language referring to national 
measures “as appropriate”. Nonetheless, the participation provisions are usually connected 
to information provisions, and they underline, despite their weaknesses, the idea that 
transparency and openness can be related to accountability, a theme further returned to 
below. /
E xceptions
Treaty-based duties to disseminate and give access are usually attached with some 
exceptions. The exceptions could include information that compromises, or poses a risk of 
compromising, national defence, public security, international relations, environmental 
security (i.e. material which could lead to environmental damage if disclosed), matters sub 
judice, commercial and industrial confidentiality, intellectual property, the confidentiality 
o f personal data, the confidentiality of proceedings, and material by third parties without 
those parties being under obligation to give out information. This list gives a very rough 
order of frequency, and other additional considerations o f  confidentiality could be included. 
It is clear, however, that none o f  the treaties above impose unrestricted obligations for 
states to disseminate to or give access for individuals to environmental information.
E xplic it R igh ts o f  A ccess to  E nvironm ental Information
Only a few newer conventions from the early 1990s onwards take the full step o f  explicitly 
bringing in the rights aspect,915 Such a step was taken under the Council o f Europe’s 1993 
Lugano Civil Liability Convention, which is, however, not yet in force.916 The Lugano 
Convention is interesting in that it mentions both access to environmental information held 
by public authorities and access to specific information held by operators, i.e. other private
915 It is noteworthy that the 1986 IAEA Notification Convention failed to introduce any right o f public access 
to environmental information, and that the 1986 IAEA Assistance Convention explicitly requires an assisting 
state to co-ordinate with a requesting state before releasing information about assistance given after a nuclear 
accident, see Art. 6(2).
916 Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Resulting from Activities Dangerous to the Environment, 
Lugano, 21.6.1993, not in force; See generally, Sands, P., 1995, pp. 619-620.
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parties. The first (Article 14) is specified to mean access without a need to p ro v e  a n  
interest, and it is followed by an explicit list, very similar to forerunning trea ties, o f  
situations were access may be restricted: i.a. the confidentiality o f p ro ceed in g s , 
international relations, national defence, public security, matters sub judice , co m m erc ia l 
and industrial confidentiality, intellectual property, the confidentiality o f  personal d a ta , 
material by third party without that party being under obligation to do so, or material w h ic h  
could lead to environmental damage if  disclosed. A person who has been re fu se d  
information should have the right to seek judicial or administrative review of the decision . 
The second (Article 16) is specified to cover access to information, which is necessary to  
establish the existence of a claim for compensation under the Convention. A person w ho  
suffered damage may thus request the court to order an operator to provide specific  
information, and an operator may do the same vis-à-vis another operator. The sam e 
restrictions apply as under a person’s access to information held by public authorities, and 
an operator may refuse to provide information where it would incriminate him.
The 1992 North East Atlantic Convention also establishes a kind o f  right of access to 
environmental information in relation to the maritime area in question.917 It goes about it in 
an indirect manner, however: according to Article 9, parties must ensure that their 
competent authorities are required to make available information to any natural or legal 
person who makes any reasonable request and without that person having to prove an 
interest, without unreasonable cost and as soon as possible and at the latest within two 
months. The list of exceptions is similar to that in the Lugano Convention, and the reasons 
for a refusal to give information must be given. Thus, the content of the state duty is as 
clearly established as under several other treaties, but it is never phrased as an individual 
“right” o f access although the text concretely speaks o f requests, costs, etc.
It was not until the adoption under the auspices o f  the ECE in 1998 o f the Aarhus 
Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access 
to Justice in Environmental Matters, however, that a clear right o f access to environmental 
information was created on a regional level.918 As a parallel development, important steps
917 Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North East Atlantic, Paris, 22.9.1992, in 
force 25.3.1998; See also especially the Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the 
North East Atlantic, Paris, 22.9.1992, in force 25.3.1998
towards greater transparency and openness were taken within the European Union. The 
similarities and differences in emphasis between these legal developments, their evolution 
and contents, including exceptions, shall serve as basis for an exploratory discussion below 
about the possible functions and problems of access and participation rights for the 
development of international environmental law.
***
4.3. Inform ation in Perspective 3 :
Potential for a New Ethic? EU and ECE Viewpoints
I. Introduction
II. Towards Rights of Access to Information and Participation
II.I. Under the ECE Aarhus Convention
II.II. In European Community Law
III. Functions and Problems
III.I. A New Trend in International Law?
III.II. Awareness Raising 
III.IIL Democracy, Legitimacy and Accountability 
III.IV. Technology-belief 
III.V. Anthropocentricity and Rights 
III.VI. Restrictions to Open Society
IV. Potential for a New Ethic?
I. Introduction
The method o f resorting (in Chapters 2 and 3) to a  case-study/treaty-study to underline the
particular context or circumstances o f a legal problem or treaty development in itself
/
underlines the pragmatic, functionalist and state practice-centred managerial spirit. The
/
issue of state responsibility for a failure to inform about environmental danger was 
considered in the context of legal developments after the Chernobyl accident, and various 
forms of supervisory information exchanges were considered vis-à-vis the particular issue 
of waste trade and from a geographic perspective in order to discuss some of the numerous 
intricate dividing lines present in international environmental law today. The “context” or 
surrounding state of affairs for the Aarhus Convention is precisely the roles, the strengths 918
918 Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in 
Environmental Matters, Aarhus, 25.6.1998, in force 30.10.2001; See generally, Brady, K., 1998; Economic 
Commission for Europe: The Aarhus Convention. An Implementation Guide, New York/Geneva, 2000; ‘La 
Convention d’Aarhus’, Numéro special, Revue Juridique de l'environnement, 1999.
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and the weaknesses o f state information duties and the whole managerial a ttitude  tc  
information and environmental protection in international environmental law, as d iscu ssed  
in the chapters above, and the fact that new enforcement methods are still far away. T h u s  a s  
the discussion shifts to the public’s rights o f access to information, the perspective re m a in s  
context-specific in a geographic/cultural sense,919 but also moves on to some of the m o re  
aspirational themes present in a  “new ethic” or “culture of openness”.
II. Towards Rights o f Access to Information and Participation
II.I. Under the ECE Aarhus Convention
“The challenges related to the full implementation o f this Convention are so exciting and  
rewarding that we can envision this task as a historic mission.” So said one o f the fathers o f  
the Convention, Mr. Bârlund o f the Environment and Human Settlements Division o f  the 
ECE, when addressing an NGO session at Aarhus.920 921Furthermore, Kofi Annan, the U N  
Secretary General, has said that “[a]s such (the Aarhus Convention] is the most ambitious 
venture in the area o f ‘environmental democracy’ so far undertaken under the auspices o f  
the United Nations”. However, Mr. Barlund also foresaw problems such as administrative 
inertia and even resistance from those who find the Convention contrary to their interests. 
The Aarhus Convention surely has been met by strong reactions for and against, both 
among states and organizations. On the negative side, there are governments that see the 
Convention as a manifestation o f Northern interests against sustainable development and 
organizations that believe the Convention could seriously damage their interests, such as
■ •  921stopping investments.
919 Outside o f the Westem/European context the only examples of more strongly developed environmental 
openness are probably found on micro-level, that is, in small traditional communities with democratic 
traditions i.e. situations where everyone simply knows what is going on in their immediate environment.
920 **We are about to take a great leap in international cooperation for a better environment, for openness and 
democracy.'” Statement by Mr. Kaj Barlund, Director of the Environment and Human Settlements Division of 
the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, at the NGO session at the Ministerial Conference 
“Environment for Europe” in Aarhus, Denmark, 24.6.1998. http://www.unece.org/press/98env 14e.htm
921 As an example of a reaction against the Convention is the fear voiced by Metalliliitto, a Finnish union for 
metal industry workers, that the Convention’s complaints procedures might stop investments and that those 
organizations or individuals starting procedures on false grounds are not held responsible for economic losses 
due to such process, Helsingin Sanomat, 28.3.2001.
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The Aarhus Convention’s most remarkable achievement, even before its entry into force in 
late October 2001, was to have brought the idea o f an individual right o f access to 
environmental information to the mainstream rhetoric o f environmental policy and law. 
The Convention marries environmental rights to human rights and it links government 
accountability to environmental protection. Its second achievement stems from the 
membership o f the organization under whose auspices the Convention was elaborated and 
signed by 39 states and the EC: the Convention now covers not only western and central 
Europe but several former Soviet states in Central Asia, making for a situation where many 
different legal systems are confronted with the aims o f access to environmental information 
and public participation.
There was considerable plurality among the participants to the treaty development process: 
a coalition o f NGOs participated in the drafting of the text alongside the participating 
states. Not surprisingly, the role o f NGOs is as strong also in the treaty itself, with rights 
under Article 10 to participate as observers in the Meetings o f the Parties.922 Observer 
status is based on two criteria: first, the organization has to be qualified in the fields to 
which the Convention relates, that is access to information, public participation in decision­
making and/or access to justice in environmental matters; second, the organizations must 
notify the treaty Secretariat that it is seeking observer status. One third or more o f the 
parties present can raise objections and prevent observer status. The legal basis is broad, 
the process seems to have a low threshold, and it remains to be seen how the first criterion 
will be interpreted now as the Convention has entered into force. These developments 
inside the treaty are important for the continuous review o f state behaviour (“second stage” 
supervisory information exchanges and outside “control over the control”), and this open 
attitude towards NGOs continues the trend begun with CITES in 1973 to broaden 
participation inside environmental treaty systems.923
922 See Guidelines on Access to Environmental Information and Public Participation in Environmental 
Decision-Making, endorsed by the Third Ministerial Conference “Environment for Europe", 23-25 October 
1995, Sofia; and see Resolution on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and 
Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, submitted by the Ad Hoc Preparatory Working Group of Senior 
Officials, Aarhus, Denmark, 23 -25 June 1998 at the Fourth Ministerial Conference “Environment for 
Europe”. The Fifth Ministerial Conference will be held in Kiev, Ukraine in May 2003.
923 See especially Article 11(7) of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild 
Fauna and Flora (CITES), Washington, 3.3.1973, entry into force 1.7.1975; see also the Convention on the 
Conservation o f European Wildlife and Natural Habitats, Berne, 19.9.1979, entry into force 1.6.1982; the
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1The main provisions of the Convention are interesting contributions to international l a w .  
Firstly, the Convention mentions, in Article 1, the right of every person o f p resen t a n d  
future generations to live in an environment adequate to his or her health and w e ll-b e in g , 
and, in the Preamble, the duty, both individually and in association with others, to p r o te c t  
and improve the environment. In order to contribute to the protection o f this right, t h e  
parties shall guarantee the rights of access to information, public participation in d e c is io n ­
making, and access to justice in environmental matters (Article l) .924
The Convention is primarily aimed at influencing legal development on the national le v e l. 
In fact, the treaty text is somewhat unclear as to the transboundary aspects o f access a n d  
participation. It defines “public authorities” as a) “government at national, regional an d  
other level”; b) “natural and legal persons performing public administrative functions u n d e r  
national law, including specific duties, activities or services in relation to the environment” ; 
c) “natural and legal persons having public responsibilities or functions [...] under th e  
control o f a body or person falling within subparagraphs (a) or (b) above” . The definition 
further includes the institutions o f the EC and excludes bodies acting in a judicial o r  
legislative capacity. Article 2 goes on to define “the public” as natural or legal persons, 
and, in accordance with national legislation or practice, their associations, organizations o r 
groups”. This latter definition could presumably then entail members o f the public in  
another country, but only as defined first by national law. Article 2 states that “the public 
concerned” means the “public affected or likely to be affected by, or having and interest in, 
the environmental decision-making”. Article 2 also says that NGOs promoting 
environmental protection and "meeting any requirements under national law” shall be 
deemed to have “an interest” in the environmental decision-making and thus be part o f the 
“public concerned”. These definitions do not expressly exclude the public in another state 
or an international NGO. Perhaps oddly, the definitions do not expressly mention them
Vienna Convention for the Protection o f the Ozone Layer, 1985; the Basel Convention on Hazardous Wastes, 
1989; the Climate Change Convention, 1992.
924 See Ebbesson, J., 2002, p. 1, who writes that “the term ‘right’ is generally avoided” in the Convention, 
although “the objective, structure and context of the Aarhus Convention are rights-oriented. In part, the 
Convention draws on notions of international human rights law. It is intended to provide for participatory, 
informational and procedural rights in environmental matters, and a failure to do so implies a breach of the 
treaty”. Ebbesson argues that the Convention fails to establish a “firm basis” for an “environmental right to 
know”. It is not clear what he means by such a right to know, but he bases his argument on the weakness of 
states’ dissemination duties, particularly the vagueness of the practical obligation to establish a register for 
environmental data.
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either, but this must be taken as an indication o f the limits of how far the states parties were 
willing to go.
Article 4 deals with access to environmental information. It expressly uses the broad term 
“information”, and imposes upon the parties* public authorities to make information 
available on request, including copies o f the actual documentation containing or 
comprising such information. This very distinction between information and documents 
makes the Convention broad in scope. The practical implementation of the rule on access is 
to be done a) without an interest having to be stated; b) in the form requested (unless it is 
reasonable to make available in another form or the information is already publicly 
available in another form); and c) within one month after the request has been submitted 
(unless volume and complexity justify extension up to two months). A request may also be 
refused on formal or a number o f substantive grounds, but it expressly only “may”, not 
“shall”, be refused in the following cases: inter alia, if  the public authority does not hold 
the information requested (the applicant should then be informed and the request be 
transferred to another authority); if  the request is manifestly unreasonable or formulated in 
too general a manner; if  the request concerns internal communications o f public authorities 
where such an exemption is provided for in national law or customary practice; if 
disclosure would adversely affect the confidentiality of the proceedings o f public 
authorities, international relations, national defence, public security, the course o f  justice, 
trials, criminal enquiries, commercial or industrial information, intellectual property rights, 
the confidentiality of personal data, the interests of a third party, or the environment to 
which the information relates. The grounds for refusal must be interpreted in a restrictive 
way, taking into account the public interest served by disclosure, and, importantly, 
information on emissions that is relevant for environmental protection shall be disclosed.925 
According to Ebbesson, the provision on restrictiveness in refusals does not do away “with 
the risk for misused discretion in order to avoid disclosure”, because some of “the interests 
are so generally defined that the risk of self-serving auto-interpretation is apparent”.926 
Information should also be made available partially, if it can be done without prejudice to 
the confidentiality of the information covered by the exemptions. Refusals shall be in
925 Generally on incentives of secrecy, and how rules on transparency may lead to less documentation, and 
further on exceptions to openness, see Stiglitz, J., 1999.
926 Ebbesson, J., 2002, p. 2.
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writing if  the application was in writing or if the applicant so requests. The reasons fo r  
refusal shall be stated and information about the review procedure given. Also a  re fu sa l 
shall be given within one month, or within two months if the application ju s tif ie s  a n  
extension o f up to two months. Finally, parties may allow their public authorities to  m a k e  
reasonable charges for supplying information.
The Convention does not prevent in any way parties from having rules for broader a cc e ss  
or fewer restrictions to disclosure (Article 3(6». Under Article 5, parties shall ensure th a t 
there are “mandatory systems” o f information “flow” to public authorities on proposed an d  
existing activities that may significantly affect the environment. Article 5 also includes a  
provision on “first phase” environmental information:
In the event o f any imminent threat to human health or the environment, w hether 
caused by human activities or due to natural causes, all information which cou ld  
enable the public to take measures to prevent or mitigate harm arising from  the 
threat and is held by a public authority is disseminated immediately and w ithout 
delay to members of the public who may be affected.
This is a strong provision in the sense that it speaks o f threats, not only accidents that have 
already happened. It seems at first odd that such a “first phase” information duty should be 
needed within the Aarhus Convention, but, as the Convention’s extent unfolds, it is only 
natural that the most basic kind of information exchange requirement is mentioned, 
especially as a reminder for those states that are not yet parties to too many environmental 
treaties. Unfortunately, the Convention does not refer to the duty as part o f general 
international law. This is a chance missed, but it does not weaken the duty; to the contrary, 
the reiteration strengthens the argument that duty exists in general international law.
Article 5 further elaborates, in relatively soft language, upon the practical ways in which 
environmental information is to be disseminated to the public. It requires states to provide 
for information on how and from whom environmental information can be acquired, but it 
does not mention whether such arrangements should be centralized or whether there should 927
927 On unreasonable charges, e.g. a public debate arose in Finland in January 2002 over excessive charges (38 
000 FIM, 6 300 euro) by the Bank of Finland for photocopies requested by an investigative television 
programme o f notes over die Bank’s internal expenses, see e.g. Hufvudstadsbladet 16.1.2002, pp. 1,6. On the 
other hand, there are situations where the argument against all charges is valid; see Alston, P, 2001, pp. 351- 
358, about the UN Secretariat’s decision to charge other than the UN’s own, or governmental or diplomatic 
users for hefty fees for access to its official electronic database of treaty information.
be many parallel ways o f making this known. The environmental information itself should 
then be found in publicly accessible lists, registers and files; officials are required to 
support the public in seeking access to information; points of contact must be identified; 
and more and more information is required to be made available in electronic databases 
which are easily accessible. Electronically-accessible information should include, inter 
alia, reports on the state o f the environment (but it remains unclear what data such reports 
ought to include, e.g. in relation to what activities and processes, environmental media, 
substances and releases, etc.); texts of legislation on the environment; policies, plans and 
programmes on the environment; and environmental agreements. Parties shall also 
progressively establish pollution inventories, which are coherent, nationwide, computerized 
and publicly accessible (Article 5(9)), and they shall develop mechanisms for product 
information enabling informed environmental choices (Article 5(8)).
Interestingly, Article 5 also includes a requirement for states to publish and disseminate at 
regular intervals (not exceeding three or four years) a national report on the state of the 
environment. The report should include information on the quality of the environment and 
information on the pressures on the environment. This is either a basic “first stage” 
dissemination duty, or then it is a kind of “second stage” information requirement, but 
where the addressees are now the public, not the treaty body or other state parties. A new 
national reporting obligation is imposed by international law. It is “supervisory” in the 
sense that the public naturally becomes the reviewers o f  the contents. Here the Aarhus 
Convention is again true to its cause, to widen the accessibility to environmental 
information in order to provide a basis for larger participation, that is to activate, not just 
make noise. Again, this remains to be seen, as the parties start implementing and hopefully 
complying with the Convention, and one of the crucial tests will then be the extent of 
freedom of expression and freedom o f the press in a given country. A considerably weaker 
provision is found under Paragraph 6 where parties are to “encourage” operators whose 
activities have (not: may have) a significant impact (not: risk) on the environment to inform 
the public regularly of the environmental impact of the activities and products, for instance 
through voluntary eco-labelling or eco-auditing schemes. This is a somewhat surprising 
provision, considering the otherwise strong language o f the Convention, and also 
considering the duties imposed on operators under some other treaties, for instance in the 
area o f marine pollution.
249
In Article 6, the Aarhus Convention turns to public participation.928 It is based on an A n n e x  
listing specific activities, the permission o f which the Article is to be applied to. P a r tie s  
may also, in applying national law, decide to apply Article 6 to activities not fo u n d  in  
Annex I, and they may also decide not to apply Article 6 to activities serving n a tio n a l 
defence purposes. Annex I covers a wide range o f activities within the energy se c to r , 
production and processing o f metals, mineral industry, chemical industry, w a s te  
management, different industrial plants and several other activities. The public concerned  
shall be informed either by public notice (or “as appropriate” even individually) o f  a  
number o f circumstances besides the proposed activity itself: the nature o f possib le  
decisions or the draft decision; the public authority responsible for making the decision; 
and the envisaged procedure, including its commencement, the opportunities for the p u b lic  
to participate, the time and venue o f any envisaged public hearing, from which pu b lic  
authority information can be obtained, to which public authority comments or questions 
can be submitted and within what time, and what relevant environmental information is 
available. In addition, the public must be informed o f the fact that the activity is subject to  a 
national or transboundary environmental impact assessment procedure. All o f this is to take 
place within reasonable time-frames for the different phases and early participation shall be 
provided for when “all options are open” and effective public participation can take place 
(Article 6(3) and (4)). The Convention also mentions that the Parties should encourage 
prospective applicants to enter into discussions with the public concerned already before 
applying for a permit (Article 6(5)).
Without prejudice to the exceptions mentioned in Article 4, the public concerned shall also 
be informed of a number of technical issues relating to the proposed activity, including the 
site and the physical and technical characteristics o f the activity and an estimate o f the 
expected residues and emissions; the significant effects o f the activity on the environment; 
a description o f the measures envisaged to prevent and/or reduce the effects and emissions; 
a non-technical summary of all o f  the above; an outline o f alternatives by the applicant; and 
reports and advice issued to the public authority. The procedures for public participation 
shall allow the public to submit comments, information, analyses or opinions that it 
considers relevant to the proposed activity. This can be done in writing or at a public 
hearing or an inquiry.
928 See further Ebbesson, J., 1997; and ibid., 2002.
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Finally, Article 6(8) lays down that “[e]ach Party shall ensure that in the decision due 
account is taken o f the outcome o f the public participation”. This provision is not without 
an absurd element as it should be self-evident that not mere theatre is to be created. Only 
the long-term practice o f  the parties to the Convention will show what reality is developed 
for “due account”, and the extent o f political will in the countries concerned. At any rate, 
the public is also entitled to prompt information about the decision taken by the public 
authority, along with the reasons and considerations on which the decision is based (Article 
6(9)). The procedures o f public participation apply mutatis mutandis to situations when a 
public authority reconsiders or updates the operating conditions for an activity (Article 
6( 10) ) .
In addition to these provisions on public participation relating to proposed activities, the 
Aarhus Convention also provides for participation in relation to plans, programmes and 
policies relating to the environment (Article 7) and during the preparation of executive 
regulations and/or generally applicable legally-binding normative instruments (Article 8). 
Neither of these articles include the level of detail that Article 6 on proposed specific 
activities does, and both have some soft language, which weaken the provisions. Under 
both articles, the public must be allowed a sufficient time-frame for effective participation 
while options are still open, and the public must have been provided with the necessary 
information or draft rules. Under Article 7, however, public participation in relation to 
policies is phrased in hortatory language: “To the extent appropriate, each Party shall 
endeavour to provide opportunities for public participation in the preparation o f policies 
relating to the environment”. Furthermore, under Article 8, the result of the public 
participation will only be taken into account “as far as possible” .
The provisions under Article 9 on access to justice relate both specifically to the 
Convention’s provisions on access to environmental information and to public participation 
relating to proposed activities and generally to access to justice to challenge acts and 
omissions by private persons and public authorities which contravene national law relating 
to the environment (Article 9(3)). Article 9(1) lays down that:
Each Party shall, within the framework o f its national legislation, ensure that any 
person who considers that his or her request for information under Article 4 has 
been ignored, wrongfully refused, whether in part or in full, inadequately answered, 
or otherwise not dealt with in accordance with the provisions of that article, has
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access to a review procedure before a court o f law o f another independent a n d  
impartial body established by law.
In those countries which are to be most radically influenced by the Convention, it is l i k e l y  
that this paragraph on access to justice is at least as important as the primary p rov ision  o n  
access to environmental information; but also in countries whose legal systems a n d  
traditions have long since accepted wide rights o f access to information and docum ents, i t  
serves to strengthen the effective application of the rights.929 The same goes for A r t ic le  
9(2), which provides for access to a review procedure before a court or other in d ep en d en t 
and impartial body established by law in situations of public participation relating to  
proposed activities. Members o f  the public concerned who either have a sufficient in te re s t  
or, alternatively, who maintain impairment o f a right (if the administrative procedural la w  
of a party requires this as a precondition) under the Convention have a right to ch a llen g e  
the substantive and procedural legality of any decision, act or omission relating to A rtic le  
6. Under national law, the parties may also extend this right to other provisions o f  th e  
Convention, perhaps even Article 7, but more likely Article 5(1 )(c) on accident inform ation 
or general provisions on dissemination.
What constitutes a sufficient interest or impairment o f a right should, on the one hand, b e  
determined on the basis of national law, but, on the other hand, it should also be consistent 
with the objective of the Convention to give the public wide access to justice. U n d e r 
Article 9(2)(b), environmental NGOs would be deemed to have an interest and therefore 
access to justice as meant in the Convention,930 Interestingly, the definitions in Article 2  
state that NGOs promoting environmental protection and "meeting any requirements under 
national law” shall be deemed to have “an interest” in environmental decision-making and 
thus be part of the “public concerned”.931 This definition does not make any reference to 
other types of NGOs, for instance, industrial, agricultural other than “environmental” ,
929 For example, in Finland ratification o f the Convention does not require legislative amendments in relation 
to access to environmental information or public participation, but it will require greater access to justice in 
relation to a few Annex I activities such as certain projects related to power lines; gas, oil or chemical 
pipelines; certain railroad projects and nuclear power plants.
9j0 See further Handl, G., 2001, p. 52 on access to justice and government accountability in environmental 
matters.
931 For an example, see Finnish environmental legislation, which grants relatively w ide rights of access to 
justice for environmental NGOs; paragraphs 92 and 97, Environmental Protection Act 86/2000 and para. 61, 
Nature Conservation Act 1096/1996; and see Administrative Judicial Procedure Act 586/1996.
fisheries, transport or the like. Possibly, in situations other than observer status, the 
Convention puts environmental NGOs in a better position as compared to other NGOs. 
Another interpretation for this definition is simply the intention to guarantee that 
environmental NGOs get a role under the Convention. There remains the endless question 
that motives of “environmental NGOs” may be just as doubtful from the perspective of 
environmental protection than those of any other interest group,932 and that the entire issue 
is full of the risks of naïveté.
This last point is related to the fear among several interest groups that the Aarhus 
Convention’s provisions on access to justice might lead to situations where process is 
misused, for instance to prolong final decision-making, and therefore counter-productive to 
many interests such as investment and ultimately to justice. It is also not always self- 
evident that, say, prolongation o f a decision-making would be in the interest of 
environmental protection. The Convention mentions that the procedures shall provide 
adequate and effective remedies, including injunctive relief as appropriate, and be fair, 
equitable, timely and not prohibitively expensive. It does, however, not mention who 
should bear the costs of economic loss or other (for instance environmental) harm that 
arises in the course of process. This is a major problem, which has been voiced in 
opposition to the Convention by those who fear loss in investment,933 but not so much by 
environmental groups although environmental protection should also include the reparation 
of harm that may, in theory at least, have been caused due to process. The problems arising 
out o f processes initiated on false grounds or short-sighted motives may prove to become 
formidable, and the challenges to national courts that do not yet have practice in this area 
enormous unless great care is taken when implementing the Convention.
In conclusion, the Aarhus Convention contains reference to a reporting system to be 
reviewed at the Meetings o f the Parties, and, most interestingly, a provision for a future 
non-compliance procedure, which includes an element o f public participation:
932 Cf. to Kennedy, D., 2001, ‘The International...’, where he discusses the role of the international human 
rights movement as a force for good, but also as part of the problem, i.e. for legitimation of existing power 
structures, rather than seeking new methods o f furthering human rights and emancipation.
933 As an example of a reaction against the Convention is the fear voiced by Metalliliitto, a Finnish union for 
metal industry workers, that the Convention’s complaints procedures might stop investments and that those 
organizations or individuals starting procedures on false grounds are not held responsible for economic losses 
due to such process, Helsingin Sanomat, 28.3.2001.
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The Meeting of the Parties shall establish, on a consensus basis, o p tio n a l 
arrangements of a non-confrontational, non-judicial and consultative nature  fo r  
reviewing compliance with the provisions o f this Convention. These arrangem ents 
shall allow for appropriate public involvement and may include the op tio n  o f  
considering communications from members o f the public on matters related to  th is  
Convention.
This provision is, on the one hand, as clear an indication as any of the current lim its  o f  
NCPs in international environmental law. The envisaged procedures are phrased in  so ft 
terms, and if they ever materialize, their “success” may depend precisely on their re la tiv e  
modesty. On the other hand, the indication o f a future role for the public is a novelty. It is 
interesting not least for the possible transboundary aspect of such participation: a lthough  
the main thrust of the Convention is to develop access and participation at the national 
level, an NCP, as a treaty tool, per definition has an inter-state aspect. If “the public” can  be 
part o f this at any greater scale, the whole nature o f the NCP may become different from  
the predecessors under other environmental treaties. NGO proposals for the implementation 
of Article 15 already contain mechanisms, which resemble o f individual complaints 
systems, such as those under human rights treaties.934 This is an intriguing prospect, w hose 
final outcome may come to influence the development of this entire area of international 
law.
II.II. In European Community Law
The European Community “initiated a process o f openness”935 when the Directive on the 
freedom o f access to information on the environment was given by the Council in 1990.936 
Article 1 sets out the objective o f  the access to information Directive:
934 A Task Force (one of five on different issues under the Convention) to consider review of compliance 
under Article 15 has been established by the first Meeting o f the Signatories to the Aarhus Convention. NGOs 
have actively spoken for a strong mechanism, including NGO participation and direct public communications 
beside any exhaustion of national remedies in concrete legal conflicts, see e.g. www.eco-forum.org. On 
proposals for a “Compliance Committee” with independent members, and outside communications by 
members o f the public, see further Ebbesson, J., 2002, and see http://www.unece.org/env/pD/comDliance.htm.
935 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on public access to environmental 
information, COM(2000) 402 final, p. 2; Generally on the right to environmental information in EC law see 
Kiss, A. & D. Shelton, 1993, pp. 493-499; And on environmental case law of the European Court of Justice 
and access to the Commission’s documents, see Kunzlik, P., 1997, pp. 321-344, esp. World Wildlife Fund for  
Nature v. the Commission o f  the European Communities, 5.3. 1997, in relation to Commission Decision 
94/90 on public access to Commission documents.
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to ensure freedom o f access to, and dissemination of, information on the 
environment held by public authorities
According to the Commission, the experience gained through the Directive “was a catalyst 
for change in the way that public authorities approach the process o f openness and 
transparency”.936 37 Before it, only the 1982 Seveso Directive (discussed above) had dealt 
with environmental information, but in the considerably more restricted context o f accident 
hazards, and without any mention o f rights of access by the public. In 1991, one writer938 
used the word "revolutionary" to characterize this development in the EC, and he stressed 
the far-reaching possibilities o f various pressure groups to either facilitate or obstruct 
planned industrial undertakings. In the same vein, another writer939 pointed out that the 
legal development was also an interesting example of the transfer of sovereignty from the 
Member States to their citizens - rather than to Brussels, Strasbourg or Luxembourg. The 
experience gained in the implementation of the Directive proved to be a  valuable basis for 
discussions when the UN ECE started deliberations for the Aarhus Convention. Partly in 
order to correct some shortcomings in the Directive and modernize it to take account of 
developments in information technology, and partly to align EC legislation with the Aarhus 
Convention in order for the Community to be able to ratify it, the 1990 Directive is 
presently under consideration for complete replacement.940
936 Council Directive of 7 June 1990 on the Freedom of Access to Information on the Environment, 
90/313/EEC. The Directive's background is to be found in the environmental provisions presented to the 
Treaty o f Rome by the Single European Act of 17.2.1986, entry into force 1.7.1987, O.J. L169/1 (1987), see 
Articles 130r and 130s; and in the Fourth Environment Action Programme, Resolution of 19 October 1987 on 
the Continuation and Implementation of a European Community Policy and Action Programme on the 
Environment (1987-1992). On this development, see generally Geddes, A., 1988, pp. 826-828; Gurlit, E., 
1989, pp. 253-257; See also Council Directive of 5 July 1985 on the Assessment of the Effects o f Certain 
Public and Private Projects on the Environment, 85/337/EEC, O.J. L175 40 (1985). And see Van de 
Gehuchte, D. and D. Comelis, 1994, pp. 27-54. Further on national implementation of the 1990 Access 
Directive, see Scherzberg, A., 1994.; Schrader, Ch., 1994. Turiaux, A., 1994. See also Hughes, D., 1992; and 
Fluck, J. and A. Theuer, 1995.
937 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on public access to environmental 
information, COM(2000) 402 final, p. 2.
938 Gomy, D., 1991, p. 298. C f esp. assessments of progress made according to Deckmyn, V. & I. Thomson, 
eds. 1998. And generally on environmental rights in the EU, see Elefteriadis, P., 1999.
939 Alexander, D., 1990, p. 1316.
940 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on public access to environmental 
information, COM(2000) 402 final; Amended proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on public access to environmental information, COM(2001)303 final.
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The scope of the notion "public authority" is somewhat uncertain in the 1990 D irec tive. 
Firstly, it is defined as any public administration at national, regional or local lev e l w ith  
responsibilities and possessing environmental information and which is not a ju d ic ia l or 
legislative body. This has led to claims by authorities that only have indirect environm ental 
responsibilities, such as transport or energy, that they should not be covered b y  the 
Directive. Secondly, the 1990 Directive does not cover private bodies entrusted w ith  pub lic  
duties relevant to the environment. This would mean that, in sectors such as w ater, gas, 
transport, etc., the public in some Member States would have access to information while 
in some other Member States they would not. The new proposal seeks to am end this 
situation to cover different types of service providers who possess environm ental 
information or have environmental responsibilities. The scope o f the word inform ation is 
also clarified in the new proposal. Although the 1990 Directive broadly defines inform ation 
to relate to any written, visual, aural or data-base form of data on the state o f  w ater, air, 
soil, fauna, etc., it leaves the criteria of "adversely affecting" as an element o f discretion for 
the public authorities. Because o f restrictive interpretations of the old definition, the new 
proposal, just as in the Aarhus Convention, includes specifications such as m ention o f 
human health, and human safety insofar as it might be "affected” by the state o f  the 
environment.
What is, on the other hand, made clear by the 1990 Directive in Article 3, is that both 
natural and legal persons are free to make requests for environmental information without 
having to prove an interest. Since the adoption of a provision making discrimination on the 
basis o f nationality unlawful - Article 6 of the Maastricht Treaty on European Union941- it 
has become possible for any citizen within the EC to seek environmental information in 
any Member State. The applicant is to have a response within two months (Article 3(4)), 
and a person being denied information may have his case reviewed (Article 4). The new 
proposal intends to replace the word "prove” an interest with "state” an interest, and it also 
aims at removing the word “respond” (which has given rise to letters indicating that, at an 
unspecified future date, the information will be sent) and replacing it with “made 
available” . It has been proposed that the the two-month rule should become a one-month
941 Former Article 7 EEC, amended by Article G(8) Treaty on European Union, Maastricht, 11.12.1992, entry 
into force 1.11.1993; See also Treaty o f Amsterdam amending Treaty on European Union, 2.10.1997, OJ 
C 340,10.11.1997; and Treaty of Nice Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing the 
European Communities and Certain Related Acts, OJ C 8 0 ,10.3.2001.
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rule, except under special circumstances when the time limit may be extended to two 
months. The new proposal also makes the addition of an obligation on public authorities to 
make information available in the format requested, either as printed copies or in some 
specific electronic form. In accordance with the subsidiarity principle, it will be left up to 
the Member States to define and inform about the practical arrangements of environmental 
information access.
There are situations where information may be lawfully denied in order to protect some 
legitimate interests. According to Article 3(2) o f the 1990 Directive, such situations include 
the confidentiality of the proceedings o f public authorities, international relations and 
national defence, public security, matters sub judice, commercial and industrial 
confidentiality including intellectual property, the confidentiality of personal data, material 
supplied by a third party without that party being under a  legal obligation to do so, and 
material likely to harm the environment if  disclosed. The circumstances allowing denial of 
information are afflicted with some ambiguity,942 and the widely drafted exceptions have 
sometimes also been too widely interpreted by Member States. Access can be denied if one 
of the interests listed is “affected”, a wording which it is now proposed should become 
“adversely affected”. The new proposal clarifies the industrial secrecy clause so that it 
excludes the possibility to deny access to information on emissions or discharges into the 
environment on the basis o f the clause. Applicants must respect any intellectual property 
rights that the information they gain contains. The new proposal also includes some 
completely new provisions: 1) public authorities may refuse access to information which is 
not held by them or for them, but they must then transfer the request to another authority 
believed to possess the information and inform the applicant about the transfer; 2) public 
authorities may refuse access if applications are manifestly unreasonable or too general or 
if they entail disproportionate cost or effort or if they obstruct or significantly interfere with 
the work of the authority; 3) public authorities should have “space to think”, meaning that 
access to internal communications and work in progress may be denied; 4) public 
authorities must weigh the public interest of disclosure against the interests served by non­
disclosure.943
942 See Gomy, D., 1991, p. 296, on, e.g., the term "public security". Further on secrecy and confidentiality, see 
Knemeyer, F-L, 1993; John, E., 1995, p. 30.
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1The proposal also requires public authorities to make information available in part w h en  it  
is possible to separate the information requested from that falling under any o f  th e  
exceptions. Because o f differing standards in implementation in Member States, th e  
requirement to give the reasons for a refusal of access to information is proposed to n e e d  
clarification to mean that public authorities must, within the time limit, give w ritten  
notification to the applicant and state the reasons for refusal as well as include inform ation 
on the review procedure. It is proposed that the review procedure in turn be tw o-fold , 
consisting of both an administrative and a judicial procedure. Provisions on charges fo r 
access to information would be clarified so as to prevent unreasonable charges, to ensure  
that lists o f charges are made available to applicants, including circumstances for waiver o f  
charges, to prevent charges when access is denied, and to make sure that access or 
examination of information in situ is free of charge.
All of these proposals should bring the new directive in line with the Aarhus Convention. 
The proposed directive may go further than the Convention at least on the issue o f  the 
definition o f public authority. The greatest change in the proposed directive is however the 
new rights-language. Instead o f the “freedom” of access mentioned in the name and basic 
principles o f the old directive, the new directive would be a step towards the creation o f  a  
right o f access, along the same lines as the Aarhus Convention.
The proposed new directive contains one further feature o f interest: it calls for the proactive 
dissemination of environmental information to the public making use of periodic reporting 
on national, regional or local level and, above all, taking advantage of the means that new 
information technology offer. The explanatory memorandum to the proposal calls this 
“active supply of information”, whereas disclosure of information on request is called 
“passive supply o f information” .943 44 To the contrary, from the point o f view of the 
individual, a right to make a specific request is “active” and general information supplied 
by authorities is -  although both valuable and necessary - more “passive” in that it leaves it 
to the discretion of the authorities to decide what information is included. It seems like
943 Respecting the provisions of Directive 95/46/EC o f the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
protection o f individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and of the free movement of such 
data, O J L 281,23.11.1995, p. 31.
944 COM(2000)402 final, p 16.
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more than a semantic confusion when general dissemination requirements o f states are 
suddenly treated as novelties! For instance, the Seveso Directive and many of the 
international environmental treaties to which the EC is party are clearly much more 
advanced on general duties to inform than on access rights o f individuals. However, should 
the new dissemination requirements come to be taken very seriously by Member States 
they could prove to be the beginning of a strenghened culture of openness also within the 
Community. The public would have less of a need to resort to its active right o f  access to 
information if  the authorities would actively fu lfil its affirmative duties by automatically 
making that information available.
The final outcome of the process o f  replacing the Access Directive remains to be seen. In 
the meantime, the general (as opposed to the forerunning environment-related) debate on 
openness versus secrecy continues at full speed in the EU -  within its institutions and in its 
courts,945 as well as in at least some o f  its Member States. On the one hand, the debate and 
political struggles around it have come to highlight the relatively great differences in legal 
and administrative cultures related to openness between Member States,946 as well as the 
difficulties in introducing a largely Nordic conception of openness to a tradition o f official
945 Issues of openness were highlighted within the EU in the so-called van Buitenen Case where a 
Commission employee had leaked information about corruption within the Commission to the Parliament. 
The ensuing debate led to a relatively narrow vote of confidence by the Parliament for the Commission. In the 
vote on 14 January 1999, 42 % (232 against-293 for) of MEPs voted against continued confidence for the 
Commission, which was too little to change the Commission, but perhaps the most important outcome of the 
process was the attention that issues of secrecy vs. openness in the Union gained. See e.g. Hufvudstadsbladet, 
13.1.1999 p. 4; 14.1.1999, p. 16; 15.1.1999, p. 12; For case-law see esp. Judgment of the Court of First 
Instance, 19.10.1995, John Carvel and Guardian Newspaper Ltd. V. Council of the European Union, Case T- 
194/94, European Court Reports 1995, p. 11-2765; and Judgment of the Court of First Instance, 17.6.1998, 
Svenska Joumalistforbundet v. Council o f the European Union, Case T -l74/95, European Court Reports 
1998, p. II-2289; and see infra on Council v. Heidi Hautala Case; Further on relevant case-law see Second 
report on the implementation of Council Decision 93/731/EC on public access to Council documents, 19 June 
1998, pp. 108-109. And see also Deckmyn, V. & I. Thomson, 1998; and Bunyan, T., 1999, and see 
http://www.statewatch.org.
m  As a step in this debate, EU Ombudsman Jacob SSderman said in an interview for Finnish TV (27.12.2000 
YLE TV2/Punainen Lanka) that the EU is still trying to change from an old-fashioned hierarchical 
international organization based on a French model to an intergovernmental organization with real concern 
for real citizens, as introduced by the Maastricht Treaty. According to SSderman, it still does not know how 
to treat citizens and how to give them information. The Ombudsman went on to say that his role is to live 
with a certain state o f tension to the EU institutions, otherwise he would not really be doing his job as a 
watchdog properly. SOderman compared the EU to a castle, whose administration should no longer be 
reformed only from the inside, but it should be opened for the villagers to see and participate in the change. A 
closed administration fosters corruption and misuse, SOderman said, whereas openness sheds light on misuse, 
and therefore prevents it.
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secrets.947 On the other hand, the EU as a whole has taken substantive steps forw ard from  
the notion of “professional secrecy” in the Treaty o f Rome to new developments in its  ow n 
openness and access to its documents.948 The process of creating ”a Community c lo se  to  
its citizens” has included efforts to simplify and raise the quality of community leg isla tion  
as well as rhetoric on ”the principle of the citizens having the fullest possible access  to  
information”.949 The institutions have jointly declared their intention to enhance  
transparency, mentioning not only efforts by the Council but also by the Commission, such 
as wider consultations before presenting proposals, publication of work programmes and 
legislative programmes in the Official Journal and provision o f easier public access to 
documents.950
A major legal development took shape when the Amsterdam Treaty brought the principle 
of openness to Article 1 o f the Treaty on European Union, and it also added A rticle 255 
concerning the right o f access by citizens to Parliament, Council, and Com m ission 
documents to the Treaty o f the European Community. In so far as the Council is concerned, 
the aim of Article 255 (and 207(3) and Articles 6-8, Council Rules o f Procedure, 
31.5.1999) and subsequent Decisions951 was to bring greater access to documents w hen the
947 On incompatibility between the Swedish-Finnish model o f openness and the “standard European” model 
of secrecy, see esp. Ziller, J., 2001, pp. 102-119.
948 In want of a provision in the Treaty, the so-called Declaration No. 17 on the right o f access to information 
was annexed to the Final Act of the Maastricht Treaty on European Union in 1992: “The Conference 
considers that transparency of the decision-making process strengthens the democratic nature o f  the 
institutions and the public’s confidence in the administration. The Conference accordingly recommends that 
the Commission submit to the Council no later than 1993 a report on measures designed to improve public 
access to the information available to the institutions”; Declaration 17 was followed by the Birmingham 
Declaration (16.10.1992, Bulletin o f  the European Communities, No. 10-1992, p. 9), which included 
provisions on openness and access to information held by Community institutions, and by the Conclusions of 
the Edinburgh European Council on transparency and implementation of the Birmingham Declaration 
(12.12.1992, Bulletin o f the European Communities, No. 12-1992, pp. 18-20). This procedure o f ’’opening up 
the work of the Council” modestly included the introduction of ’’open debates” (’’Public access will be 
achieved by televising the debate for viewing in the press area of the Council building”), publication of voting 
records, access to archives, greater transparency of the Council’s work through better and faster publication 
o f summaries, background information, press releases, etc.
949 Council Resolution of 8 June 1993 on the quality o f drafting o f Community legislation, 93/C 166/01; And 
see Conclusions of the Copenhagen European Council on access to information, 21 and 22 June 1993, SN 
180/1/93; And see Declaration No 39 on the quality o f the drafting of Community legislation adopted on 2 
October 1997, annexed to Final Act o f the Treaty o f Amsterdam; and Interinstitutional Agreement on 
common guidelines for the quality o f drafting of Community legislation, 22 December 1998, 13284/1/98; 
Generally, see Thomson, I., 1998; Westlake, M., 1998.
950 Interinstitutional Agreement between the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on 
democracy, transparency and subsidiarity, 25 October 1993, Bulletin o f the European Communities, No. 10- 
1993, pp. 118-119.
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Council acts in its legislative role - as opposed to its decision-making role - but without 
compromising its effectiveness in decision-making,951 52 To this end the new public register 
of EU Council documents,953 including references to some classified documents (in order 
for the public to know that such documents exist, but still denying access to them), is now 
available also electronically. The internet pages include simple instructions on how to 
submit requests for access to Council documents. Compared to earlier efforts, this internet- 
availability is indeed a noteworthy development, and it truly enhances public access, as 
opposed to access between the institutions only. Hardly surprisingly, numbers of requests 
have increased dramatically, and, despite teething problems, the great majority o f requests 
are met.
The policy on public access to Council documents has been reviewed periodically,954 and 
problems of access to documents relating to the common foreign and security policy have 
been particularly topical,955 as well as the application o f national legislation versus 
Community legislation and loyalty to the latter.956 As part o f a political process that led to
951 See Code o f Conduct concerning public access to documents, approved by the Council and the 
Commission on 6 December 1993, OJ No L 340,31.12.1993, pp. 41-42; Council Decision 93/731/EC of 20 
December 1993 on public access to Council documents, amended by Council Decision 96/705/EC of 6 
December 1996, and amended by written procedure by Council Decision (the so-called Solana-decision) of 
14 August 2000; And see Decision of the Secretary-General of the Council of 27 February 1996 relating to 
fees in the context of public access to Council documents. For other related documents, see 
http://register.consilium.eu.int. The Council also publishes its Information Handbook o f  the Council o f  the 
European Union to guide the public as to what information/documents are available and through what 
procedures; Generally, see Bunyan, T. 1999.
952 E.g. opinions by the Council’s Legal Service are not disclosed; See also Council conclusions on 
transparency approved on 29 May 1995, 7481/95, pp. 4-5; Code of Conduct on public access to the minutes 
and statements in the minutes of die Council acting as legislator, 2 October 1995,10204/95, pp. 15-18.
933 Council Decision on establishing a public register of Council documents, 19 March 1998,6423/1/98.
954 See e.g. First report on the implementation o f Council Decision 93/731/EC on public access to Council 
documents, July 1996; and see subsequent reports.
95î See below on so-called “Solana Decision” of 14 August 2000 and on Council’s classification codes for 
access to documents, 19.3.2001; And see Judgment of the Court o f 6 December 2001, Council of the 
European Union v. Heidi Hautala, Case C-353/99 P; and Opinion of Advocate General Léger delivered on 10 
July 2001, Council of the European Union v. Heidi Hautala, Case C-353/99 P; and see Judgment o f the Court 
of First Instance (First Chamber) of 19 July 1999, Heidi Hautala v. Council of the European Union, Case T- 
14/98, European Court Reports 1999, p. 11-2489 for a dispute concerning Decision 93/731/EC and relating to 
refused access to a document under the common foreign and security policy.
956 See e.g. new Finnish legislation, which allows for greater openness and rights o f access to official 
documents and clearly enumerated restrictions and exceptions than does the Community legislation, Act on 
the Publicity of Official Documents, 1999 (Lag om allmânna handlingars offentlighet, 9.2.1951 83/1951, 
latest amendment 1.6.1999 526/1999; further see Fôrordning innefattande vissa undantag i frâga om allmânna 
handlingars offentlighet, 22.12.1951 650/1951, latest amendment 1.1.1995 1558/1994).
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the resignation of the Santer Commission in 1999, transparency and accountability w ere  
key issues when a group o f “Wise Men” at the European Parliament twice reported ab o u t 
mismanagement, and also fraud, cronyism and nepotism in the Commission. The S econd 
Report gave 90 detailed recommendations about diverse issues related to, inter a lia , 
financial undertakings and contracts, staff responsibility, audits, internal and external 
controls and improved information and transparency, especially to Parliament. T he 
Ombudsman and some Nordic parliamentarians have also raised the issue o f “w histle­
blowing” or a “freedom of the informer”, that is greater means for Commission and other 
civil servants to publicly discuss ongoing work in the institutions as a way o f enhancing the 
prevention of misuse and corruption.957 859 And finally, access by the Ombudsman to inter alia  
all Commission960 and Council documents961 have recently by Parliament been considered 
a necessary future improvement in internal openness.
Finally, after an intensive political process over the last few years and despite initiatives by 
the Council’s Secretary-General at circumscribing existing access rules and changing
0A7classification codes, the Regulation regarding public access to European Parliament,
957 See Ziller, J., 2001, p, 116 for an argument that the very establishment of this outside expert group is 
evidence that the Ombudsman institution “is not a key mechanism of accountability in the EU framework”, 
i.e. that it is an import that fits poorly into the mainstream European tradition.
958 Committee of Independent Experts, First Report on Allegations Regarding Fraud, Mismanagement and
Nepotism in the European Commission, 16 March 1999; and Committee of Independent Experts, Second 
Report on Reform of the Commission -Analysis of Current Practice and Proposals for Tackling 
Mismanagement, Irregularities and Fraud, 10 September 1999, both available at 
http://www.euroDarl.eu.int/experts/default/htm. Ironically, these reports themselves have not gone without 
criticism for lack of transparency at the time o f their drafting, see e.g. article by J. Carey at 
http://www.sourceuk.net/articles/a01119: Further on Commission practices, see K. Li at
http://www.bc.edu/bc org/avp/law/lwsch/iournals/bciclr/24 1/05
959 See Parliamentary reports: Astrid Thors’ report on the Special report by the European Ombudsman, A4- 
0157/98, July 1998; and Maj-Lis LQOw’s report On Openness, A4-0476/98, December 1998. Both reports 
preceded change of Commission; The issue of “whistleblowers” (applying the Swedish notion of 
“meddelarfrihet”, i.e. “the right of the informer” or “ freedom to impart information”; further on the notion, 
see Larsson, T., 1998, pp, 39-51) became debated only later in 1999; see also supra note on van Buitenen 
case.
960 Also, on environmental case law in relation to access to the Commission’s documents, see Kunzlik, P., 
1997, pp. 321-344.
961 There appears to be less support for the idea that the Ombudsman should gain the right to hear the 
Commissioners or even the civil servants of the Commission. Generally, on the role and impact of the 
Ombudsman on access to documents and the transparency of decision-making, see Soderman, J., 1998, pp. 
75-84.
Council and Commission documents is applicable from 3 December 2001.962 63 The preamble 
of the Regulation makes a few interesting statements of principle: inter alia, firstly, it states 
that “in principle, all documents o f the institutions should be accessible to the public”; 
secondly, “the right of access also applies to documents relating to the common foreign and 
security policy and to police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters”; thirdly, wider 
access should be granted to documents when the institutions are acting in their legislative 
capacity.
The general principle o f access is underlined by the inclusion of “any natural or legal 
person residing or having its registered office in a Member State”, and access may be 
granted by the institutions also to persons outside the Union. Access also applies to all 
documents held by an institution, that is, drawn up or received by it and in its possession. 
The Regulation makes detailed rules for the procedures o f accessing documents, including 
applications, written replies stating reasons for denial, confirmatory applications and 
information to the applicant on remedies. In order to make the rights o f access effective, 
Article 11 o f the Regulation imposes a duty on the institutions to have, by 3 June 2002, 
their own public registers on their documents and to, as far as possible, make documents 
directly accessible in electronic form. As mentioned above, the Council already has a 
reasonably well functioning electronic register, which appears to be in line with the 
Regulation.964 The crucial question for all the institutions will be what documents actually 
find their way into their registers, and what will not, and how widened rules on public 
accessibility -  given that incentives for secrecy will not disappear overnight - will reduce 
numbers of documents, or their contents.
962 For a rather comprehensive, and very critical, NGO-made exposé o f the development of openness in the 
EU, see Statewatch’s “Secret Europe” site at http://www.statewatch.org/secreteurope.html. See also the same 
organization’s views on the so-called Solana-decision of the EU Council on 14 August 2000 by written 
procedure amending the Code o f Conduct concerning public access to documents of 6 December 1993, and 
generally on other drafts and memoranda on openness prior to the adoption o f the Regulation, and further on 
the Council’s Decision of 19 March 2001 on classification codes (related to NATO classifications) for access 
to documents.
963 Regulation (EC) No. 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and o f the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding 
public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents, OJ LI45, 31.5.2001, pp. 43-48. 
See also Joint declaration relating to Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 o f the European Parliament and o f the 
Council o f 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission 
documents, OJ L I73, 27.6.2001, p. 5; And see Council Decision o f  adopting the Council’s security 
regulations, 28 February 2001,5775/01.
964 Council Decision of 29 November 2001 amending the Council’s Rules o f Procedure, 2001/840/EC, OJ 
L313/40, 30.11 2001, pp. 40-43.
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The exceptions to the rule on access to documents are widely phrased in th e  n e w  
Regulation. These are, under Article 4, (a) public interest as regards public secu rity ; 
defence and military matters; international relations; financial, monetary or eco n o m ic  
policy o f the Community or a Member State; and (b) privacy and the integrity o f  th e  
individual (in particular personal data).963 *65 Also, unless there is an overriding public in te re s t 
in the disclosure, access shall be refused if commercial interests o f natural or legal p ersons, 
including intellectual property, court proceedings and legal advice, or the purpose o f  
inspections, investigations and audits would be undermined. Internal documents for 
deliberations or where decisions have not yet been taken may also be excluded from access 
if disclosure would seriously undermine the institution’s decision-making process (A rt. 
4.3), and that seems to have become a crucial point in the list o f  exceptions: the 
Commission’s rules have extended this exception to include “opinions or individual 
positions” . Also, and without any such reference in the Regulation, the Commission’s and 
the Parliament’s new rules o f procedure allow for some discretion for the institutions w hen 
an application for access is “complex”.966 It remains to be seen how such additional 
restriction will be applied in practice.
However, to the contrary, access should be granted to parts of documents that do not fall 
under these exceptions, and access should, in principle, also be granted to documents 
received from third parties. Member States who receive an application for a document by 
an institution will, if  accessibility is not clear, either consult the institution or refer the 
application to the institution; but “consult” is not equivalent to absolute obedience with the 
view of the institution, and the Regulation text itself does not make any far-reaching points 
about loyalty. The Regulation does not explicitly restrict domestic access, it mentions only 
that “by virtue of the principle o f loyal cooperation which governs relations between the 
institutions and the Member States, Member States should take care not to hamper the
963 See also Directive on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on
the free movement of such data, of July 24 1995 and on the process leading to the Directive see COM(92)422
final; Further on the issue and a comparison to U.S. law see Maxeiner, J.R., 1995.
966 European Parliament Report on the adaptation o f the Rules of Procedure to the Regulation (EC) No 
1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council regarding public access to documents, 
(2001/2135(REG)), 15.10.2001; and see Bureau Decision on public access to European Parliament 
documents, OJ C374, 30.11 2001; Commission Decision of 5 December 2001 amending its Rules of 
Procedure, 2001/937/EC, ECSC, Euratom, OJ L345, 29.12.2001, pp. 94-98; And see also the European 
Commission’s publication Access to European Commission Documents -  A Citizen's Guide at 
http://www.europa.eu. in^cornm.secretari at eeneral/sge/acc docs/guide
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proper application of this Regulation and should respect the security rules of the 
institutions”.
All this -  including the new rules o f  procedure and security o f the institutions - adds up to a 
situation where there is still much room for interpretation. Considering the exceptions and 
Article 9 on how sensitive documents (Top Secret/Secret; Très Secret/Confidentiel), 
especially those relating to public security, defence and military matters, should be treated, 
it is difficult to see how the principle of access to documents on common foreign and 
security policy could or would become the norm. There is no definition of a  threshold 
(“overriding public interest”) for when exceptions could be disregarded when there is great 
risk to e.g. the environment. A third party sending information may also influence the 
status of a document, and it means that many future documents are likely to go unregistered 
and un-accessed. This will underline the role of Parliament as a verifier o f  registration and 
submission practice. Preserving “the effectiveness o f the decision-making process” has 
become the term o f choice for indicating that there are limits to how far openness can go. 
And indeed, access is not a black-and-white issue. Whether the interest to be protected is 
the environment or some other, there are situations where full access to 
information/documents could jeopardize that very interest.967 Short-term economic benefit; 
political gain; terrorism or other violence, which is not guided by any kind of compassion, 
are among possible reasons for the need to maintain restrictions.
Summing up, the system created within the European Union can be said, despite the 
widely-embracing rhetoric in documents agreed by its institutions, to stress access to 
documents rather than access to information, and thus, to make a fine nuance (and only one 
possible way o f using the terminology), transparency rather than openness.968 It may 
however be that the upcoming Directive on access to environmental information will be 
wider in scope, since the proposal only uses the term information. At any rate a system of 
genuine openness should guarantee both a wide and general right of access to information 
and a more narrow right of access to documents, the latter being fundamental for the ability
967 The classical example being thefts of eggs based on information about birds’ nesting sites and seasons.
968 For a different use of the concepts, see Bunyan, T., 1999, p. xi, where transparency is used in relation to 
the decision-making process and openness is understood to describe the citizen’s right of access to 
documents. Bunyan sometimes also equates freedom of information with access to documents, see 
http://www. statewatch.org/essavs. htm.
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of the public to verify any information received and act as watch-dog for the w h o le  
decision-making system. This is all to be weighed against the risk that, both in  th e  
particular context of the EU and more generally, too far-reaching openness could com e to  
mean that decision-making escapes to informal fo ra , a development which would m ean th a t 
openness were counter-productive vis-à-vis democracy, in terms o f participation o f  so m e  
Member States and the public alike. As Hegeland and Mattson put it, “[o]penness is c lo se ly  
associated with democracy, while secrecy can promote efficiency. This is especially tru e  
when decision making is made through bargaining, as the case is in the relationships am ong  
the member states in the EU”.969
Further, in order to align Community legislation with the Aarhus Convention so th a t its 
ratification is made possible, also some Directives containing provisions on pub lic  
participation are about to be amended. A Proposal exists to amend the Directives on  
environmental impact assessments (the EIA Directive) and on integrated pollution 
prevention and control (the IPPC Directive)970, so that their terminology and scope 
correlate with that of the Convention. This is done for instance by introducing the concept 
of a development consent procedure. The Proposal also makes provision for public 
participation procedures in respect of plans or programmes (but not “policies” as under 
Article 7 o f the Aarhus Convention, as that has been considered soft law not requiring 
Community legislation) required to be drawn up under a number of directives on issues 
ranging from waste to air quality assessment.971 Member States must ensure that 1) the 
public are informed about any proposals for plans and programmes or for their review and 
that relevant information about such proposals is made available to the public; 2) the public 
are entitled to express comments and opinions before decisions on the plans and 
programmes are made; and 3) in making those decisions, due account shall be taken o f the 
results o f the public participation. In order to achieve this, the Member States must 
“identify the public entitled to participate”, including relevant NGOs.
969 Hegeland, H. and I. Mattson, 1997, p. 88.
970 Council Directive 85/337/EEC on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on 
the environment, OJ L 175, 5.7.1984, p. 40; amended by Council Directive 97/11/EC, O JL  73, 14.3.1997, p. 
5; and Council Directive 96/61/EC on integrated pollution prevention and control, OJ L 257, 10.10.1996, p. 
26.
971 Proposal for a Directive o f the European Parliament and of the Council providing for public participation 
in respect o f the drawing up of certain plans and programmes relating to the environment and amending 
Council Directives 85/337/EEC and 96/61/EC, 18.1.2001, Document 500PC0839.
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III. Functions and Problems
III.I. A New T rend  in Internationa] Law?
The ILC has recently been ’’inspired by new trends in international law, in general, and 
environmental law, in particular” in dealing with the issue o f information to the public.972 
In its final adoption in 2001 of Draft Articles on prevention under the liability topic, the 
ILC endorsed the following view in Article 13:
States concerned shall, by such means as are appropriate, provide the public likely 
to be affected by an activity within the scope of the present articles with relevant 
information relating to that activity, the risk involved and the harm which might 
result and ascertain their views.973
Since the Draft Articles apply (Article 1) to ’’activities not prohibited by international law 
which involve a risk of causing significant transboundary harm through their physical 
consequences”, the article includes information both to a state’s own public and that of 
other states. The contents o f information to the public consist both of data on the activity 
itself and the scope of risk and harm that it includes. In the commentary to the Draft 
Articles these contents are linked, inter alia, to the contents of the inter-state notification 
and information duties o f Article 8 discussed in detail above in Chapter 2. The duty is 
circumscribed by the wording ”by such means as are appropriate”, which leaves the choice 
of method to the domestic law and policy of the state concerned.
Perhaps the most noteworthy development is however the second requirement, that of 
ascertaining the view of the public. As the Commentary to the article states, ”[w]ithout that 
second step, the purpose o f the article would be defeated”. It seeks to involve in the 
decision-making process individuals whose lives, health, property and environment might 
be affected by ’’providing them with a chance to present their views and be heard by those 
responsible for making the ultimate decisions”, and the commentary further enumerates
972 Report o f  the International Law Commission on the Work o f  Its Fiftieth Session, 1998, GAOR A/53/10, pp. 
11-69, see p. 48, and subsequent reports.
973 Report of the International Law Commission, Fifty-third session, 23 April-1 June and 2 July-10 August,
2001, GAOR, Fifty-sixth, Suppl. No 10, A/56/10, ch. V, pp. 366- 436, at
http://www.un.Org/law/iIc/reports/2001/2001report.htm. see Commentary at pp. 422-425.
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administrative tribunals, courts, and groups o f concerned citizens as opportunities to  
confirm or challenge the accuracy of facts and ways o f participation in decision-m aking. 
Without further argumentation, the commentary states as the Commission’s v iew  th a t 
’’public involvement enhances the efforts to prevent transboundary and environm ental 
harm”.974 It remains unclear what such a conviction o f a preventive function is based on, 
except that it is said to be a ’’trend” in international law.
The ILC does seem to be interpreting the signs correctly; but although one can speak o f  a 
trend in international law to develop rules meant to bind states to develop national 
provisions for their public’s access to environmental information, the actual rights-based 
language is still very much a regional European or Western affair. It would be difficult to 
argue for the existence in general international law o f an individual right o f access to 
environmental information (a right to obtain environmental information). If  such an 
argument were made, it would have to be based on the other side of the same coin, the 
corresponding duty of the state to provide environmental information.975 But this could 
only be a partial argument. Another possibility might be to base an argument on other 
human rights, such as those to life and health, or general rights to receive information, and 
evidence of practice and opinio juris on a connection between those rights and 
environmental information could probably be drawn from some national constitutions and 
national practice, or, finally, perhaps even from an argument on the necessity o f 
environmental information.976 Also, the argument might be based on the idea that the 
public has already paid for the information, and that officials who keep it secret engage in
974 Commentary, p. 424; Cf. on conviction o f a compliance enhancing function for public participation see 
Ebbesson, J., 2002, p. 5: “One of the rationales for involving the public is that it may improve the 
implementation o f environmental laws. In different ways, public involvement may also affect the degree of 
compliance with international environmental agreements.”
975 See Handl, G., 2001, p. 48: “The present trends in legal decisions and intensifying expressions of public 
support point towards the gradual emergence of, first, a general legal obligation incumbent upon states and, 
second, of a corresponding entitlement on the parts of the members of the public”, Vice versa, the regional 
legal development, along with arguments derived from constitutional laws, towards rights of access to 
environmental information could in its turn be taken as yet another important element in the already strong 
development of the state’s duty to inform other states on environmental matters, both accidents and 
information on planned activities.
976 See further infra, Ch. 4.3.III.V. for references to e.g. Indian constitutional law and the practice of its 
Supreme Court in interpreting the right to life and other rights in favour of environmental rights, see 
Ramakrishna, K., 1985, pp. 907- 913; Baxi, U,, 1987, pp. 32-60; Craig, P.P. & S.L. Deshpande, 1989, pp. 
356-373; and see Desai, B., 1993; Anderson, M., 1996, pp. 199-225; Ranjan, S., 2001; and on Nigerian law, 
see Okonmah, P.D., 1997.
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appropriation or theft o f public property. However, all these arguments considered, 
again, at best, there could be a right in a regional context, depending especially on what 
weight one gives to the Aarhus Convention. Now as the Convention has entered into force, 
its application among the Parties shall start shaping a future answer to the question whether 
it is creating regional customary law, but it hardly represents codification o f existing 
custom (except sub-regionally, especially the Nordic countries). Globally, state practice is 
only beginning to develop, and some o f the most recent global treaties clearly indicate that 
most o f the world is not yet ready to accept very far-reaching provisions. For instance, the 
Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs)97 78 does not use any rights 
language, but only states that the Parties shall, “within their capabilities”, “ensure that the 
public has access to public information” on POPs and related issues (emphasis added). 
Perhaps the most interesting issue in the future development of the public's access to 
environmental information will be to see whether access will become an active or a passive 
right. The present rule for instance in the EC system, that persons seeking information do 
not have to prove an interest, is a good point o f comparison for future international 
provisions.
III.II. Awareness Raising
Many o f the international legal documents and provisions on access to environmental 
information make some interesting claims as to the possible functions and benefits of 
public access. The most frequently referred to, and perhaps the most plausible, claim is that 
access contributes to awareness raising. For instance, the Memorandum to the proposed 
new EC Directive on access to environmental information says, vis-à-vis environmental 
objectives to be achieved, that “[g]iving public access to environmental information is 
essential to achieve these aims; it contributes to a  raising o f public awareness o f  and 
interest in environmental matters and so to a more efficient public participation in the 
making o f environmental decisions which affect their lives. A better informed public is 
able to carry out a more efficient control of public authorities as they carry out their duties
977 Stiglitz, J-, 1999.
978 Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, Stockholm, 22.5.2001, not in force.
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in the environmental field, thus securing full and effective enforcement o f  E C  
environmental law”.979
The text refers to efficiency (efficient participation; efficient control and e ffec tiv e  
enforcement) no less than three times, reflecting some conviction about the contribution o f  
more environmental information. It is however questionable how individual access w o u ld  
greatly enhance general public awareness, other than in principle. The role o f the m ed ia , 
the freedom of the press, is the crucial link in an “Open Society” in achieving g rea te r 
awareness o f environmental problems, and this task is perhaps more pressing in so m e  
countries than others.980 Another facet o f the same issue is the extent o f freedom  o f  
expression in any given country. A third, and most fundamental, link is education, bo th  
general and specifically environmental.
III.III. Democracy, Legitimacy and Accountability
The claims go considerably beyond awareness raising, however. Some far-reaching hopes 
relate to enhanced democracy and legitimacy, primarily on the national level. W ithout 
going into the extensive and long-running debate on a “democratic deficit” in the European 
Union,981 it may be interesting to note that the Preamble to the EC Regulation on access to 
documents states that
Openness enables citizens to participate more closely in the decision-making 
process and guarantees that the administration enjoys greater legitimacy and is more 
effective and more accountable to the citizen in a democratic system. Openness 
contributes to strengthening the principles of democracy and respect for 
fundamental rights [...]
979 COM(2000)402 final, p. 4.
980 Further on the role of the freedom o f the press, especially for accountability, in Swedish-style systems of 
open government, see Ziller, J., 2001.
981 Generally, see e.g. Lodge, J., 1994; Andersen, S. & K. Eliassen, 1996; Lord, C., & D. Beetham, 2001. See 
esp. Joerges, C. & E. Vos, eds., 1999, on EU comitology and transparency and accountability. And see e.g. 
issue 2(1) European Union Politics 2001 for a range o f discussions on institutional change, democracy etc. in 
the EU; Further Ziller, J., 2001.
The Preamble fails to explain just how openness can guarantee legitimacy, effectiveness 
and accountability. The text already presupposes “a democratic system”, making 
openness an enhancing (“more”, “greater”, “more”) device, not a prerequisite. A link of 
action is needed somewhere between openness and the decision-making process. Perhaps 
the key to understanding the aspiration presented in the Regulation lies in the word process: 
the Preamble does not clearly enumerate new means by which citizens could concretely 
participate in decision-making, but by presenting decision-making as a process, it implies a 
continuum where gaining information becomes one part. And the next step after 
information, participation, attracts considerably greater expectations: for instance, the 
proposed EC Directive on public participation982 83 9845is phrased to reflect great confidence in 
the benefits o f  participation. It says that:
Effective public participation in the taking of decisions enables the public to 
express, and the decision-maker to take account of, opinions and concerns which 
may be relevant to those decisions, thereby increasing accountability and 
transparency of the decision-making process and contributing to public awareness 
of environmental issues.
The Preamble to the Aarhus Convention states that the implementation o f the Convention 
“will contribute to strengthening democracy” in the ECE region. It goes on:
Aiming thereby to further the accountability o f and transparency in decision­
making and to strengthen public support for decisions on the environment.
These and most other related paragraphs maintain a basic lack o f clarity as to the nature of
ArtJ OQC
public participation. The public is only meant to be able to “express its concerns” so
982 At least one writer goes further to say, without supporting argument, that access to information “ensures 
the participation of citizens in national decision-making processes” (emphasis added), Sands, P., 1995, p. 596.
983 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council providing for public participation 
in respect of the drawing up of certain plans and programmes relating to the environment and amending 
Council Directives 85/337/EEC and 96/61/EC, 18.1.2001, Document 500PC0839.
984 Cf. Art. 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, New Yorkl6.12.1966, in force 
23.3.1976; Art, 23 of the American Convention on Human Rights, San José, 22.11.1969, in force 18.7.1978; 
and Art. 13 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Banjul, 27.6.1981, entry into force 
21.10,1986; Compare also to Articles 6-7 and 11 of ILO Convention No. 169 Concerning Indigenous and 
Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, Geneva, 27.6.1989, not in force.
985 Primary devices for public participation include hearings and views submitted to licensing or permit 
procedures, or reviews of environmental impact assessments, see Kiss, A. & D. Shelton, 1993, p. 499.
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that authorities can “take due account” of them. But no one knows what “due accoun t 
means, is meant to mean or could mean. It is also unclear who the ’’public” may ac tu a lly  
be,986 and again, “transparency” means looking through a glass at what is going on , n o t 
being on the same side and participating. On the other hand, mere “looking through a  
glass” may well strengthen public support for decisions, thus enhancing “legitimacy” , ju s t  
in that sense of the word.987 98
The greatest contribution o f better rules on access to environmental information and the  
kind o f limited understanding o f public participation that has been developed recently is 
perhaps, on the one hand, the “watch-dog” tools that they may offer, and on the other hand, 
also concrete participation in environmental impact assessments (EIAs). Because m ere 
information/knowledge/transparency does not imply acceptance of decisions made, and 
“taking due account” o f “views presented” is not participation in a proper sense, they do 
not automatically enhance, for instance, democracy and perhaps thereby legitimacy. B ut i f  
access and limited individual participation are seen as part of a process o f shared views, 
pressure, and control, then decisions affecting the environment could become better 
anchored among the “public”. And finally, on the same tone, public participation may be, 
as done by Boyle, presented as a central element o f sustainable development, given that 
sustainable development means reconciling by “a complex balancing process” the 
competing claims of human beings and nature.989 This would not have to be done through a 
“reconceptualization o f international environmental law into the international law o f 
environmental rights”,990 but through the “empowerment” of individuals and groups to 
influence decision on their environment.
986 Further on “international civil society”, whether it comes from “below” and whether it represents any real 
“démocratisation” of international law, see Anderson, K., 2000.
987 For references to the vast literature on the notion of legitimacy, and for a general discussion on its meaning 
(as the justification o f authority; on popular and normative legitimacy; persuasion, etc.), see e.g. Sadeniemi, 
P., 1995, on legitimacy in international relations; and see Bodansky, 1999, pp. 601-603.
988 Handl, G., 2001, p. 153: “ ... public participation is essential for environmental impact assessment (ElA). 
In sum, it is probably correct that as a normative concept, ‘public participation’ extends beyond the narrow 
context o f EIA and in this wider sense reflects an international obligation”; ibid., pp. 153-157 further for 
extensive references to both legally binding and soft law documents in relation to public participation.
989 Boyle, A., 1996, p. 64; and cf. Boyle, A. & D. Freestone, 1999.
990 Ibid., p. 63.
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Still on the national level, the elaboration o f international law instruments on openness and 
participation may prove to be o f some help in the “démocratisation” of some states.991 This 
would be as noteworthy a development as any one can imagine for the role of international 
law,992 and particularly for the role o f environmental problem-solving as a vehicle of other 
social change, but it is also a prospect that must not be overstated.993 The ECE process has 
influenced the EU, and vice versa: it has been a two-way street where the EC 1990 
Directive first influenced the ECE994 and where the Aarhus Convention then led to 
substantial proposals for changes in EC law.995 But more importantly, the Aarhus 
Convention could influence societies with even weaker democratic traditions.996 Also the 
ECE Protocol on Water and Health997 is interesting in that it is a concrete example of 
broader efforts to support the countries o f Eastern Europe in their efforts to solve serious 
water and health related problems. For instance governmental background material related
991 Ibid., p. 64: *‘[T]he role of human rights law in democratizing national decision-making processes and 
making them more rational, open, and legitimate will become more and not less significant. Public 
participation, as foreseen in Agenda 21, is thus a central element in sustainable development”.
992 On the question whether at all international law should promote democracy, and if it should, what kind of 
conception of democracy, see Marks, S., 1998, pp. 73*79. But also, cf. Koskenniemi, M., 1996, p. 231- for a 
discussion on a “right to democracy” and its implications as legitimising Western neo-imperialist values; 
Generally, see Franck, T.M., 1992; And further, see panel discussion Implementing Democratization: What 
Role fo r International Organizations? at American Society of International Law, Annual Meeting, 
Washington D.C., April 1997 (meeting theme: “Implementation, Compliance and Effectiveness”).
993 See Alston, P., 2000, p. 523 on démocratisation and human rights treaty bodies: “Démocratisation is 
certainly a key factor, but it is not a result which is ever likely to be brought about solely by measures taken 
within a human rights treaty system, Condemnation by a treaty body can contribute to pressures towards 
démocratisation by reinforcing and legitimising opposition demands and even by helping to call into question, 
both internally and externally, the legitimacy o f the government. At the end of the day, it remains the case 
that no set of concluding observations, no matter how trenchant or incisive, can bring about a transition to 
democracy, But neither will expulsion from the treaty system.”
994 And it also influenced the Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North East 
Atlantic, Paris, 22.9.1992, entry into force 25.3.1998.
993 On this process see Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on public 
access to environmental information, COM(2000) 402 final, p. 2.
996 See statement by Mr. Kaj Bârlund, Director of the Environment and Human Settlements Division of the 
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, at the NGO session at the Ministerial Conference 
“Environment for Europe” in Aarhus, Denmark, 24.6.1998. http://www.unece.org/Dress/98envl4e.htm: By 
way of an example o f practical efforts to broaden knowledge about the Aarhus Convention, the Finnish 
government sponsored participation by some thirty environmental activists from the former Soviet states to 
participate in the Aarhus Fourth Ministerial Conference in 1998; See also Ebbesson, J., 2002: “ several 
countries that previously formed part of the Soviet Union were among the first to ratify the Convention. Some 
NGOs from Eastern Europe saw the Convention as a general vehicle for furthering democracy and making 
their society more transparent”.
997 Protocol on Water and Health to the Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary 
Watercourses and International Lakes, London, 17.6.1999, not in force.
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to the Finnish signature o f the Protocol explicitly write that the treaty itself does not b rin g  
much new for Finland, but that the country, just as many other EU countries, supported th e  
elaboration of the Protocol precisely in order to encourage some other states to resolve th e ir  
water problems.998 This is an argument that has also been made more generally for m a n y  
ECE environmental treaties.999 The ECE, which covers countries from France to  
Kazakhstan, and includes many different political systems and levels o f development, h as 
despite many challenges and differing views not stagnated in its efforts to reach  
international environmental agreements. Instead, several treaties developed under E C E  
auspices are seen as positive efforts to help countries with economies in transition to m eet 
new demands. Support is also not merely moral, but has included practical help, such  as 
guidance on legal and administrative development and these incentives are perhaps to  be 
understood as at least some explanation to why the ECE treaties have been joined by such 
relatively high numbers of member states.
At the international level, the democracy, legitimacy and accountability o f  environmental 
decision-making gain additional facets. Could greater openness and participation be m eant 
also to bring 1) better public control/supervision o f international environmental decision­
making? Or is it envisaged to mean 2) broadened, even individual participation and 
’’démocratisation” of international" environmental decision-making? Acting as watch­
dog/supervisor over international environmental decision-making must be more difficult 
for the general public and NGOs than on the national level, but not impossible, even given 
that participation is more indirect than on the national level. Typically, this dilemma has 
often been met by calls for one new international environmental organization, where, in the 
view or Ayling, “[o]nly participatory and transparent structures that recognize and utilise 
the multiple skills and talents available amongst interested actors will ensure further 
progress towards effective international environmental norms and institutions, and confer 
legitimacy on the organization in the wider world community”,1000
998 Muistio Nro 51, UlkoasiainministeriQ, oikeudellinen osasto, 27.5.1999 (Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 
Memorandum attached to presentation to the President of the Republic, 11.6.1999).
999 And more generally for international law; But cf. Danilenko, G.M., 1999, pp. 51-69, who also expresses 
some doubts about whether former CIS states take their constitutional clauses on international law seriously.
1000 Ayling, J., 1997, p. 269; Cf. to earlier pre-Rio hopes for one organization by Palmer, G., 1992.
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Bringing more legitimacy into global environmental protection1001 is a confusing challenge, 
which has recently been voiced also within the anti-globalisation movement. In that 
movement, as effectively conveyed by the media, most are also utter pessimists as to the 
current state o f environmental protection.1002 Ironically, the called for “legitimisation” 
should be enhanced by the same fora whose information is to be continuously questioned. 
Continuous questioning is part of public control and supervision, the watch-dog function, 
which is crucial in democracy. In such a function the power o f informal as well as formal 
(and publicly accessed) environmental information exchange could become part of an 
international legitimising movement. This is not to say that democracy would be the only 
conceivable basis for legitimacy,1003 nor does it imply that democracy on the international 
plane1004 would have to be constructed in the same fashion as it, among all its forms, 
mostly is on the national level in the West.
But realizing any high hopes for “legitimising” results o f access to environmental 
information is challenged by several conflicts. The first relates to the effectiveness of 
decision-making. Negotiations may be jeopardized if  news is known ahead of time, and the 
work o f civil servants may be obstructed if ideas they elaborate upon are tom apart before 
they can be well presented.1005 Thus the classical dilemma is to “reconcile the conflicting 
demands of openness and secrecy”, when secrecy can be a much more efficient tool than 
openness for international decision-making and democracy.1006 Another conflict lies in the
1001 For a seminal piece, and references, on legitimacy in international environmental law and decision­
making, see Bodansky, D., 1999; And generally on legitimacy in international law see, Franck, T.M., 19S8, 
pp. 705-; and further on his discussion on legitimacy as “right process”, pulling states towards compliance, 
and on legitimacy as a matter of degree, ibid., 1990, p. 24 et seq.\ Alvarez, J.E., 1991, pp. 242-243; Chayes, 
A. & A.H. Chayes, 1995, esp. pp. 106-108, 127-134; in international relations see e.g. Victor, D.G., 1998; 
and in international organizations, see Coicaud, J-M & V. Heiskanen, eds., 2001.
1002 Outside this movement some others, the proponents, see great possibilities for ’’good governance” and 
"global governance”. And yet others, a small group, engage in critical discussion. E.g. see Giddens, A. and L. 
Sklair, ‘The Globalization Debate’ at the Fathom site at www.fathom.com/lse.
1003 See further e.g. Franck, T.M., 1990, on his view of component parts o f legitimacy: determinacy, symbolic 
validation, coherence, and adherence, and on the correlation of legitimacy, not coercion, to state compliance; 
Bodansky, D., 1999, discusses popular and participatory legitimacy, legal legitimacy and expert legitimacy as 
well as the notion of democracy in international decision-making.
1004 On democracy and global governance, and esp. in the UN, see Marks, S., 1998, pp. 74-76.
1005 On “space to think” for civil servants, see Proposal for a Directive o f the European Parliament and of the 
Council on public access to environmental information, COM(2000) 402 final.
1006 Hegeland, H. and 1. Mattson, 1997, p. 88.
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accessibility of politicians, civil servants and other decision-makers. On the one hand th ey  
should be able to meet openly and easily with the public, but with the security risks th e re  
are today, meetings are increasingly held behind not only locked doors, but behind po lice  
fences, protected by tear-gas and other safety devices.1007 Also, there is a challenge related  
to speed: the more information, the quicker and the easier it is available, the greater the  
public pressures for change. Instant decision-making without sufficient time for reflection 
and deepened knowledge may create situations where the quality o f decisions diminishes, 
quite in contrast to the hopes presented in the Aarhus Convention. This could be 
particularly dangerous in the environmental field, where “extinct is forever”, or in the  
humanitarian field, where costs in human suffering may be high. This is not to say that tim e 
is abundant in environmental protection. But also, the volume and speed o f  information 
may lead to the opposite, less demands for change, because the torrent o f data creates an 
illusion o f effort. This again is the challenge of overflow, and as such one which should not 
be used as an argument against the provision o f relevant, sufficient and better quality 
environmental information.
Bodansky’s argument, that the increasing authority o f  international environmental law 
prompts concerns about its legitimacy, builds partly on an analogy to the European Union 
and the debate on the democratic deficit in its institutions.1008 But there are still plenty o f  
arguments that keep international environmental law clearly in the traditional confines o f  
public international law: the lack o f  one or few global organizations with broad decision­
making powers; still relatively few examples o f majority or other less-than-consensus 
voting under treaties (a handful among hundreds o f multilateral treaties);1009 and weak or
1007 One way of interpreting this situation is that those who arrange violent demonstrations (e.g. for more 
openness, public participation etc.) work against the democracy they set out to defend. In the end this paradox 
between openness and democracy must be met by deliberate “listening” on both sides of the fence.
1008 Bodansky, D., 1999. The argument turns i.a. to examples o f international standard setting outside 
traditional state consent-based negotiations, the Codex Alimentarius Commission (government experts and 
industry advisors) and the International Organizations for Standardization (ISO) (business representatives), 
and to how international environmental law is increasingly becoming intertwined with national environmental 
law. Bodansky discusses popular and participatory legitimacy, legal legitimacy and expert legitimacy as well 
as the notion of democracy in international decision-making.
1009 The already classical examples are CITES (Art. XVII; 2/3 majority), the Biodiversity Convention (Art. 
29(3): first consensus, then 2/3 majority), the Vienna Ozone Convention (Art. 9(3); first consensus, then V* 
majority), the Montreal Protocol, the Basel Convention (Art. 17(3); first consensus, then % majority), and the 
Climate Change Convention (Art. 15(3); first consensus, then J/< majority); See Lavranos, N., 2002 for a 
discussion on decision-making in some COPs and MOPs under environmental treaties, especially as regards 
amendments and adjustments to annexes, and the questions it raises on who actually makes the binding
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non-existing enforcement structures under treaties. But on the other hand, the trend that has 
been bom out o f these “weaknesses”, that is “proceduralization” and “management”, could 
mean that decision-making power moves to some other level than the state, e.g, treaty 
secretariats, international civil servants, expert bodies, scientists, or various NGOs, and this 
involves either a shift in legitimacy or a legitimacy-void. What is striking about 
environmental law is perhaps its volume, the hundreds of treaties all over the world, 
bilateral and multilateral, and on a very wide range o f issues. On a rhetoric level, though 
not so much on a binding legal level, environmental questions increasingly become knit 
into other international issues. A rather intricate web o f international legal rules on states’ 
environmental behaviour has been created, and certainly that web creates situations where 
there may be lack o f  clarity as to who the decision-makers are,1010 how they reach 
agreement,1011 and who controls them. If international environmental law develops more in 
a direction where traditional state consent becomes less and less legitimising from the point 
of view o f non-state actors, and if  there will be greater needs for more flexible decision­
making which do not require state consent, then the area of law has, according to 
Bodansky, a legitimacy problem.1012 Chayes and Chayes would argue that the legitimacy of 
a “management approach” is dependent, i.a. on “procedural fairness”, including 
transparency, reporting and data collection, verification and monitoring.1013 In contrast, 
Bodansky’s conclusion, i.a., that “principles o f procedural fairness -  transparency, public 
access, and so forth -  are important, but do not answer the crucial question o f who should 
make decisions and how they should do so” seems a compelling point, where bases of 
legitimacy, for instance, democracy, public participation, expertise1014 and transnational
decisions: Parties, majorities of Parties, NGOs, scientists, etc. According to Lavranos, COPs/MOPs have 
“genuine law-making powers through the adoption of binding decisions. Although most MEAs prefer to use 
consensus as a basis for binding decisions o f the COPs/MOPs, formally decisions can be taken by two thirds 
or three quarters majority voting”, p. 46.
10,0 See further Lavranos, N., 2002.
1011 Related also to the legitimacy of the original treaty negotiating forum. Global Climate Change process 
was example of a complex situation: from a very narrow body o f experts working out elements for a treaty to 
a GA created Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee to ensure wider participation.
1012 The ifs are the crux of the matter: Bodansky’s argument about a growing legitimacy problem is based on 
these assumptions, although there are relatively limited examples found so far.
1013 Chayes, A. & A.H. Chayes, 1995. Their “management model” is contrasted to an “enforcement model”, 
where compliance is induced through management as a cooperative, interactive approach o f justification, 
discourse and persuasion; See book review by Koh, H.H., 1997, pp. 389-391.
1014 On the interesting topic o f epistemic communities, epistemic influence and expert control, see for a 
seminal piece, Haas, P.M., 1989, pp. 377-; and see Haas, P.M., Saving the Mediterranean..., 1990; Haas,
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elites1015 become the more important objects of study. He goes on to say that “transparency  
and public participation confer a relatively weak form of legitimacy since they do n o t  
affirmatively justify the decisions made by international regimes”. Again, this is a n  
indication o f the importance, as well as the limitations -  the indirect value - of the ro le  o f  
rules on environmental information sharing and access, and a useful reminder not to in f la te  
their independent meaning for legitimacy.1016 All in all, the role o f openness and p u b lic  
participation is paradoxical from the point of view of legitimacy: since transparency, 
openness and public participation are part o f a managerial trend, they are also part o f  a  
legitimacy problem as control and decision-making may be slowly drifting away from  th e  
state, but on the other hand, they are part o f the “solution” in that they offer tools to ch eck  
on other fundamentally managerial procedures in the hands of experts, scientists, 
international civil servants, and so on.
The second question relating to more formal public participation in international 
environmental decision-making is much more difficult. It challenges the very foundations 
of public international law as we have traditionally known it: as a state consent based 
system o f self-interest and reciprocity. Broad participation by all states, especially 
developing ones, is called for, but at the same time precisely such a system of broad 
participation and consent is criticized for lack of efficiency, for producing too few tangible 
results. Furhermore with decision-making based on something less than consensus, there 
would still be questions raised about the legitimacy o f such decision-making, because good 
models/new institutions have not yet been sufficiently developed. The question of the role 
of the individual remains, but no answers are to be found.
P.M., 'Obtaining International...’, 1990, pp. 347-363; Sand, P.H., 1990, p. 29; Haas, P.M., ’Introduction: 
Epistemic...’, 1992, pp. 1-35; Haas, P.M , ’Banning 1992, pp. 187-224; Adler, E. & P.M. Haas, 
'Conclusion: Epistemic... 1992, pp. 367-390; Haas, P.M., From Theory..., No. 92-2; Milner, H., 1992, esp. 
pp. 478-480; and further on the role of e.g. expertise, see Stem, P.C., O.R. Young & D. Druckman, eds., 
1992, pp. 116-121, 152-155; and on the relatively limited influence of the epistemic community in whaling 
management, see Peterson, M.J., 1992, pp. 147-186; Marton-Lefevre, J., 1994, pp. 171-180; Boehmer- 
Christiansen, S., 1994, pp. 181-198; on the relationship between expertise and democracy, see Bodansky, D.,
1999, pp. 619-623; On diversity of expertise needed under e.g. human rights treaty bodies, see Scott, C.,
2000.
1015 Related to epistemic communities; In relation to NGOs see esp. Anderson, K., 2000; and on legitimacy of 
international organizations, see further esp. Coicaud, J-M & V. Heiskanen, eds., 2001.
1016 But in contrast the weight of, for instance, the precautionary principle could perhaps be given more 
weight, see supra chapter 1.1; and on precaution and scientific/expert assessments of risk, see e.g. Bodansky, 
D. 1999, p. 622. For a short comment on “self-corrective processes”, or lack thereof, in epistemic 
communities, see Schachter, O., in ASIL Proceedings, 1993, p. 395.
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In the Commentary to its Draft Principles on prevention, the ILC has stated that “[ajpart 
from the desirability o f encouraging public participation in national decision-making on 
vital issues regarding development and the tolerance levels of harm in order to enhance the 
legitimacy o f and compliance with the decisions taken, it is suggested that, given the 
development of human rights law, public participation could also be viewed as a growing 
right under national as well as international /aw”.1017 However, hardly any o f the above- 
discussed treaties suggest moving the individual to the forefront o f international 
environmental decision-making, but in contrast they frequently -  in rather general wording 
- underline the importance o f NGOs,1018 without addressing the crucial questions whom 
they represent, i.e. who elects them. It is hardly surprising that the protesters at Seattle, 
Prague, Gothenburg, Genoa, etc., are so clear in questioning the legitimacy of, say, the G8 
for, for instance, global environmental decision-making, and at the same time so vague as 
to alternative methods, except perhaps in considering themselves as the voices of the 
“people”. In the view of many within the anti-globalisation debate, the role and 
responsibility of large companies in the wake of ever greater free movement o f capital is 
crucial.1019 It is an interesting paradox that some of the NGOs speaking for an “Open 
Society” and greater access to information (and hoping for greater participatory rights for 
themselves) may themselves be relatively secretive.1020
Finally, then, the question o f who is the “public” that should participate in the protection of 
the environment,1021 particularly the global commons? Everyone? Those closest to or
10,7 Emphasis added; Report o f the International Law Commission, Fifty-third session, 23 April-1 June and 2 
July-10 August, 2001, GAOR, Fifty-sixth, Suppl. No 10, A/56/10, ch. V, pp. 366 - 436, at 
http://www.un.org/law/ilc/reports/2001/2001 report.htm. see Commentary at p. 425.
1018 But further on NGO participation and legitimacy in international governance, see Schweitz, M.L., 1995, 
pp. 415-420; generally see Raustiala, K., 1997; and Cameron, J., 1997; and see esp. Anderson, K., 2000 on 
the role of NGOs for the negotiation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production 
and Transfer o f Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, Ottawa, 4.12.1997, in force 1.3.1999.
10,9 Seminal for the discussion and for anti-corporate activism is Klein, N., 2000.
1020 The prime example of an organization that has been criticized for lack of transparency (and democracy 
within the organization) is Greenpeace. By way of an example, recent calls in Finland for information about 
its funding have been met by reference to legislation preventing the disclosure o f the names o f donors. 
Although legally correct in relation to the protection of personal data, this raises the interesting issue of the 
role and responsibility of environmental NGOs in the current debate for more openness.
1021 The creation o f greater openness and more participation is problematic also in terms of the identification 
of relevant or interested participants at the national level. By way o f an example, when the Aarhus 
Convention’s ratification was prepared in Finland, the procedure was afterwards criticized by employee
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1possibly affected by decisions made vis-a-vis the commons? This question le a d s  t o  
philosophical and ethical choices, and it points to some absurdity in the issue of ( c h a n g e d  
bases for) democracy and democracy-based legitimacy in global environmental p ro te c t io n . 
Firstly, the right “people” or “public”, the demos in democracy, cannot be identified, a n d  
the question of “environmental democracy” therefore rendered odd. A crucial p o in t i n  
democracy is the reasons for and the extent to which some individuals do not participate. I n  
“environmental democracy” the interesting question would be who the p o te n tia lly  
marginalized, non-participating groups would be (e.g. indigenous peoples). In any e v e n t ,  
there is no system where the environment itself would function as demos. Secondly, e v e n  i f  
more actors, not objects o f protection (the environment itself), may be gaining a say, th e re  
are no guarantees that this will actually improve environmental protection o f the co m m o n s 
or shared resources or any other parts o f the environment. Even if a broader (or s im p ly  
different) basis of decision-makers was identified, or new international institutions 
created,1022 the question remains how they should act in order to formulate b e tte r  
environmental protection: how  in the sense o f what ethical and other choices they shou ld  
make, and how in the sense o f  what procedure they should apply to be more “legitimate” 
than present state decision-makers. Because procedure is related to power and legitimacy, 
there is often the argument that in order to ensure some qualitative changes there is want o f  
a “true pluralism” of competing interests,1023 much beyond traditional models (such as th a t 
of the ILO), embracing industry, landowners, shipping interests, producers, consumer 
groups, environmental NGOs, experts, academics, administrators, and so on and so forth.
organizations for the fact that they had not been properly heard about how and whether at all they welcomed 
the Convention. Among several points o f  critique raised, Metalliliitto, a Finnish union for metal industry 
workers, objected to the possible stops to investments that the Convention’s wide provisions for access to 
justice may lead to, see Helsingin Sanomat, 28.3.2001. Thus already a discussion on the very incorporation in 
national law of the Convention’s provisions gave rise to a situation where not all possible interested parties 
were identified, at least not from their own point of view. And this is a problem built into the Convention: it is 
so broad that the sheer volume of its objects may become unbearable. All cannot be informed. On the other 
hand this struggle for access and participation is the essence o f democracy. It also takes activity and active 
choice to participate; See generally Dahl, R.A., 1994.
1022 See calls for such by Palmer, G., 1992, pp. 259-283; and, again, see Bodansky, D., 1999, for renewed 
calls for new institutions: “In the long run, this [decision-making] deficit will require stronger international 
institutions and decision-making mechanisms”, p. 623; and Chayes, A. & A.H. Chayes, 1995, p. 284: “It 
should not be beyond the abilities of the international community to create new organizational arrangements 
that are lean, effective, and politically responsive” and “ effort is needed now to provide the institutional 
capacity to manage compliance with the most demanding regulatory problems the international system has 
yet addressed”, p. 285.
1023 The term pluralist is meant not in a philosophical sense, but simply to mean that different views taken 
together may ensure some quality.
280
This fight between different interests could then create some legitimacy, although the 
aggregation o f different interests still may not amount to legitimate democracy in any 
traditional sense, but be instrumentalizations where poor and unpredictable decisions are 
still possible. Access opens doors for new ethics, but gives few ready answers as to the 
value judgments that have to be made. In that sense access and participation may offer the 
potential for, but not a promise of, better choices and decisions, better environmental 
protection, whether through managerial models or along new lines.
One paragraph in the Aarhus Convention creates a completely new kind o f argument. 
Article 3(7) says that:
Each Party shall promote the application of the principles of this Convention in 
international environmental decision-making processes and within the framework 
o f international organizations in matters relating to the environment.(emphasis 
added)
It remains to be seen how, if at all, the Aarhus Convention’s somewhat awkward provision 
on access and participation (and access to justice) in international environmental decision­
making will influence other treaties’ COPs to invite more active NGO participation. Given 
the question marks over representation attached already to NGO participation, it would 
seem very tenuous to argue for proper individual participation in any meaningful sense, but 
in contrast, individual rights o f  access to environmental information from treaty 
secretariats, COPs and expert bodies may come to be influenced by the Aarhus Convention.
III.IV. Technology-belief
The Preamble to the Aarhus Convention notes the “importance o f making use o f  the media 
and o f electronic or other, future forms of communication”. Needless to say, the entire 
issue of new forms of communication is “hot”. An exhausting number o f workshops, 
seminars, conferences and the like are currently being arranged by different organizations 
on such issues as “electronic democracy”1024 and electronic tools for the implementation of
1024 See e.g. Ferdinand, P., 2000.
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public participation.1025 Also under the Aarhus Convention a Task Force has b e e n  
convened to consider the possibilities to make use o f electronic tools, mainly the in te rn e t, 
to achieve the goals o f the Convention.1026 The exceptional optimism connected to th e  n e w  
technology is well illustrated by the topic o f a seminar given at a Task Force meeting: i t  is  
titled “The Challenge of Unlimited Possibilities”.1027 The pathos is striking, especially  in  
light o f arguments that the new information technology might be leading to new so c ia l  
divisions.1028 Marginalization would then be dependent on the extent to which an ind iv idual 
or a group of individuals is able to access, understand and utilize information technology. 
This could have many negative effects for elderly people and other groups who are a lre ad y  
disadvantaged, not to mention whole countries where infrastructure is lagging behind th e  
current development.1029 If  such fears materialize it could have great repercussions fo r 
democratic participation also in environmental matters, which is dependent on, i.a., access 
to information, which, in turn, increasingly seems to become dependent on electronic 
means o f communication. If new technology functions as a marginalizing factor, th en  
environmental issues dependent on that technology might become a luxury o f the few. B u t 
again, the other side of the coin is the momentum for less developed countries and  
marginalized groups to “catch up” right now while the technology is still taking shape. This 
is the junction where international legal efforts such as the Aarhus Convention have one o f  
their greatest roles, especially if  financial mechanisms and technology transfers w ould 
follow suit. Another challenge is related to international regulation o f internet code, an 
issue argued to be connected to larger questions of whose systems and values (e.g. private 
actors, rich states or all states) will become prevalent in the future.1030
1025 See e.g. OECD, Public Management Service (PUMA), http://www.oecd.org/puma/citizens: UNESCO, 3rd 
World Symposium of Information Technology, 2-4 May 2001; The International Institute for Democracy and 
Electoral Assistance (IDEA), www.idea.int: and see http://www.globalforum.it on Third Global Forum on 
“Fostering democracy and development through e-govemment”, arranged by Italian Government in co­
operation with OECD, UN and the World Bank, Naples, 15-17 March 2001.
1026 See e.g. UNEP/GRID: “Electronic Tools for the Aarhus Convention”, Task Force Workshop, 8-9 March 
2001, Arendal, Norway, http://www.grida.no/enrin/aarhus.
1027 Ibid., Dr. J. Bing, Norwegian Research Center for Computers and Law, 
http://www. grida.no/enrin/aarhus/.
1028 For extensive discussions on new communications divides, digital poverty and related subjects, see 
Norris, P., 2000; and Norris, P., 2001; Interestingly, at grassroots level protests against new social divides, 
such as those feared to come as results of globalization, do not all happen on the internet, but protests are 
back on the streets. On the other hand the internet must be assumed to be a vehicle for the gathering of 
opinions and people alike.
1029 See Kehitys-Utveckling 4/2001 for several discussions on this and related topics.
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III.V. Anthropocentricity and Rights
In 1972, Principle 1 o f the Stockholm Declaration proclaimed that:
Man has the fundamental right to freedom, equality and adequate conditions of life, 
in an environment of a quality that permits a life o f dignity and well-being, and he 
bears a solemn responsibility to protect and improve the environment for present 
and future generations.
The equivalent Principle I of the Rio Declaration states that:
Human beings are at the centre of concerns for sustainable development. They are 
entitled to a healthy and productive life in harmony with nature.
Both of these declarations take a clearly anthropocentric approach to environmental 
protection. Classically, reference to these Declarations and their central principles act as 
arguments for the legal bases o f both sustainable development and a human right to a clean 
environment. This stresses the obvious, that the concepts are intimately related, and that 
they are both challenging from any non-anthropocentric perspective to environmental 
protection. Thus, at one end of the debate, Handl has noted that:
[t]he notion that a generic environmental human right -  as against narrowly 
defined, sectoral individual rights -  could be used as a lever by which to accelerate 
the international environmental legal agenda is misleading. It grossly 
underestimates the difficulties involved in operationalizing such a normative 
concept. [...] diverting attention away from the pursuit of more promising avenues 
of solving pressing environmental problems. In short, it is unlikely to promote 
realistic environmental or human rights objectives.103 031
Nonetheless, a general debate on a right1032 to a clean /healthy /sound/ decent /adequate 
/viable /satisfactory environment blossomed at the beginning of the 1990s (despite or 
because of the lack o f actual rights language in the Rio Declaration),1033 when a few
1030 Lessig, L., 1999; And see further Mayer, F.C., 2001.
1031 Handl, G., ‘Human Rights a n d 1992, p. 142.
1032 Generally on the relationship between ’’rights” and "duties”, see Steiner, H. & P. Alston, 1996, ch. 4.
1033 See Gormley, P., 1976; Kromarek, P., ed., 1987; Gormley, P., 1990, pp. 85-; Alfredson, G. & A. Ovsiouk, 
1991, pp. 19-27; Weber, S., 1991, pp. 177-185; Shelton, D., 1991; Kiss, A-C, 1992, p. 13; Bimie, P. & A. 
Boyle, 1992, pp. 188-214; Shelton, D., 1992, pp. 91-; Cancado Trindade, A., ed., 1992; Handl, G., ‘Human 
Rights and 1992, pp. 117-142; Roderick, P., ed., Conference Report: Human Rights Approaches to
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regional human rights treaties1034 and many countries’ constitutions had em braced  th e  
notion.1035 Earlier constitutions had often only referred to the right to life or h ea lth , a n d  
they had then in a few states’ legal practice been interpreted as implying a right to a  h e a l th y  
environment.1036 But in the last decade there have been loud arguments to the e ffec t t h a t  
environmental degradation can adversely affect an individual’s well-being w i th o u t  
affecting his or her “life” or “health”.1037 Despite no pronouncements o f an e x p lic i t  
substantive right to a clean environment in either human rights or env ironm ental 
treaties,1038 some writers1039 as well as the representatives of some in ternational
Environmental Protection in the Commonwealth and Beyond, 1993; Kiss, A. & D. Shelton, 1993, p. 4 9 3 ; 
Kane, M.J., 1993, pp. 389-411; Desgagnd, R., 1995; Tomasevski, K., 1995; Sands, P., 1995, pp. 220-230 ; 
Boyle, A. & M. Anderson, eds., 1996; Okonmah, P.D., 1997.
1034 African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, Banjul, 27.6 1981, in force 21.10.1986, Art. 24: “all 
peoples shall have the right to a general satisfactory environment favourable to their development” ; and  
Additional Protocol on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights to the American Convention on Human R ights, 
San Salvador, 17.11.1988, not in force, Art. 11: “Everyone shall have the right to live in a healthy  
environment. The State Parties shall promote the protection, preservation and improvement o f  the 
environment” .
1035 See e.g. Constitution of Burkina Faso, 1991, Art. 30, which recognizes a “right to a healthy environment”
along with an individual and a collective right to action; Constitution of Namibia, 1990, Chapter II; On South 
African Constitution, see Glazewski, J., 1993; and see Philippine Constitution, 1987, Section 16, Art. II: “The 
State shall protect and advance the right o f  the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the 
rhythm and harmony of nature”; and on this right and its interpretation by the Philippine Supreme Court in 
the landmark Minors Oposa v. Factoran case, 1993 (33 ILM 173 (1994), see further La Vifla, A., 1994, pp. 
246-252; the Colombian Constitution, 1991, Art. 79 and further on Latin American Constitutions see Aguilar, 
A.F., 1994; The Constitution of Finland, 11.6.1999, 731/1999 (available at
http://www.om.fi/constitution/3340.htm1. Section 20, para, 2, recognizes that ”The public authorities shall 
endeavour to guarantee for everyone the right to a healthy environment and for everyone the possibility to 
influence the decisions that concern their own living environment”. Most constitutions that include a right to 
a clean environment declare both a state duty and an individual duty to protect the environment, but seldom 
include provisions for individual enforcement; Further on constitutional provisions, see Human Rights and  
the Environment: The Legal Basis fo r  a Human Right to the Environment. Report to the UN Sub-Commission 
on the Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities, Sierra Club Legal Defence Fund, April 
1992; see Tomasevski, K., 1995, pp. 258-259; and see national case studies in Anderson, M. & A. Boyle, 
1996, pp. 153-302.
1036 See esp. Indian Constitution, Arts. 21 and 47; on public interest litigation and the Indian Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of the right to life, see Ramakrishna, K., 1985, pp. 907- 913; Baxi, U., 1987, pp. 32-60; Craig, 
P.P. & S.L. Deshpande, 1989, pp. 356-373; and see Desai, B., 1993; Anderson, M., 1996, pp. 199-225; 
Ranjan, S., 2001; and on the possibilities for this under Nigerian law, see Okonmah, P.D., 1997.
1037 See Lopez Ostra v. Spain, European Court of Human Rights, Judgment of 9 December 1994, Series A 
No. 303-C; and see Special Rapporteur, Ms. Fatma Zohra Ouhachi-Ksentini, Human Rights and the 
Environment, Final Report of the Special Rapporteur, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/9, 6.7. 1994, and see at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/: But contra for earlier formulations see Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
Resolution 217 A (III), 10.12.1948, Art. 25; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
New York, 16.12,1966, entry into force 3.1.1976, Art. 11(1); and see UN GA: Resolution 45/94 of 1990, 
which states that “all individuals are entitled to live in an environment adequate for their health and well- 
being”.
1038 For a thorough overview, see Shelton, D., 2002, http://.unhchr.ch/environment/bp 1 .html. For an example 
of one further environmental treaty referring to several types o f rights short of an explicit right to a clean
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organizations1039 040 have argued that a generic human right to a clean environment exists in 
international law, others that no such right exists, or that it does not exist independently, 
but that it can be derived from other treaty rights, such as life, health and property.1041 In 
both cases, most arguments about the existence of a right to a clean environment seem to 
build on the conviction that the implementation of such a right is dependent, in one way or 
another, on “education, information and action”,1042 or “standing, access to information and 
due process o f  law”,1043 that is on other individual and often procedural rights.1044 In 
contrast, one writer, apparently hopeful of some development of an explicit right to a clean 
environment, notes that “ [o]ne should not be so naïve as to assume that public participation 
solves all environmental problems. Participatory instruments cannot replace norms 
providing for certain fundamental substantive entitlements”.1045 In addition, some still hope 
for the development o f  a collective right to a clean environment, despite the problems of 
quality-definitions and inadequate supervision by existing human rights institutions that
environment, see Convention to Combat Desertification in Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and/or 
Desertification, Particularly in Africa, Paris, 14.10.1994, in force 26.12.1996, Articles 10(2)(e), 13(1 )(b), 
14(2X19), 25. C f  also the ECHR (esp. Article 6(1)) and the Aarhus Convention: neither mention an explicit 
right to a clean environment, but ECHR is open to interpretation in relation to other related rights (see supra 
Ch. 4.2.A. para, a.), and Aarhus is explicit on information and public participation. The Aarhus Convention’s 
provisions in Article 9 on access to justice, and especially the widely phrased basis for sufficient interest, are 
also especially noteworthy in this respect.
1039 On the aspiration, see e.g. Shelton, D., 1991, p. 133; and cf. Okonmah, P.D., 1997, p. 61.
1040 Fabra, A., 2002, p. 4, writes that “no 10 or UN agency whose competence is not related to the field of 
human rights recognizes or expressly addresses the right to a healthy environment. However, when 
commenting on the work of the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and the Environment or responding 
to the Secretary-General’s call for comments on progress achieved since UNCED in promoting and protecting 
human rights in relation to environmental questions and in the framework of Agenda 2], several of them 
(Division for Sustainable Development, Division for the Advancement of Women, Economic Commission 
for Europe, UNEP and WHO) acknowledged the existence of a right to a safe and healthy environment; 
http://.unhchr.ch/environment/bp3,html.
1041 See Bimie, P. & A. Boyle, 1992, pp. 192; and see ibid. 2002. See also Tomasevski, K., 1995, p.258 et 
seq.
1042 Kiss, A. & D. Shelton, 1993, p. 493. “Guarantees o f information and participation are basic to the concept 
of environmental rights and have been incorporated into many national, Community and international laws”, 
p. 493; Information, public interest litigation, environmental justice, and international organizations are 
among mechanisms which have been discussed in connection to implementing a right to a clean environment, 
see Roderick, P., ed., 1993, p. 11; And see Bakkenist, G., 1993 who discusses access to environmental 
information in the EC and Agenda 21 as means to implement a right, that she argues exists, to a clean and 
healthy environment.
1943 Tomasevski, K., 1995, p. 261.
1044 See further Kiss, A-C, 1992, p. 13; Boyle, A., 1993; and Bimie, P. & A. Boyle, 1992, pp. 190-196; and 
see Handl, G., ‘Human Rights and...’, 1992.
1045 Ebbesson, J., 2002, p. 6.
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such a right would create. Some would also argue that a collective right might b e  bett< 
suited than an individual right to deal with the inevitable clash between human needs o n  th  
one hand, and the needs o f future generations, the global commons, ecosystems and s in g l  
species on the other hand.1046 Thus, one writer notes, that “the right to a clean env ironm ent 
currently regarded as ‘soft’ law at the international level, can only be fully rea lized  ir  
public law, against the backdrop o f sustainable development”.1047
Cowen, in arguing against court-enforced rights1048 to an adequate environment, w rites th a t  
such rights would probably be challenged by priorities given to “sustainable developm ent 
or economic well-being over and above the integrity o f the environment”. Therefore, h e  
suggests, a balance between these two has to be achieved, not via courts, but b y  th e  
interplay o f political, economic, scientific and ethical processes, and that the role o f  la w  
should be to ensure that such interplay can happen “openly, honestly and without arb itra ry  
power being entrusted to any person, institution or agency of government” .1049 O f cou rse , 
the argument that stands out is the emphasis on openness as a tool for environmental 
protection and the balancing o f  interests that it involves. In contrast to a  general right to  a  
clean environment, rights that are traditionally perceived as civil and political rights, su ch  
as the rights to information or participation, could more easily be enforceable, and, again , 
the Rio Declaration and other instruments o f international law emphasize their meaning as 
tools o f environmental protection.1050 Indeed, the right to information on the environment is 
different from a general right to a healthy environment:1051 the latter is “substantive” and 
considerably more difficult to define, realize, and supervise. Above all, the latter brings in 
the issue o f whether there are drawbacks in a human rights approach. The right to
1046 See esp. Bimie, P. & A. Boyle, 1992, p. 194.
1047 Okonmah, P.D., 1997, p. 43.
1048 See also Tomasevski, K., 1995, p. 257.
1049 Cowen, D.V., 1989, p, 24. (a discussion at the time of the drafting of the new South African Constitution 
on problems related to rights, and other, approaches to environmental protection).
1050 Kiss, A-C, 1992, p. 13 argues that the emergence o f a customary law rule on the right to environment is 
reinforced by the Rio Declaration throught its provisions on access to information, participation and access to 
judicial procedures; Further on political rights and environmental protection, see Kane, M.J., 1993, pp. 389- 
411.
1051 Cf. on “right to know” in relation to the traditionally very secretive area of regulation o f pharmaceuticals, 
see *t Hoen, E., 1998, pp. 61-72, and other articles in 1 Development Dialogue 1998, as well as for the 
Statement o f the International Working Group on Transparency and Accountability in Drug Regulation, p. 98.
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information, on the other hand, does not quite seem to bring in those same fears: the fact 
that it is “procedural” makes it appear less o f a challenge for states.1052 This is the crux of 
the matter. What appears weak does not have to be so if  it is put to use: rules on rights of 
access to environmental information and participation can be given meaning by 
individuals’ making use of those rules through all conceivable methods, in the end also in 
courts. In this sense a right o f access to environmental information is also clearly connected 
to rules on equal access,1053 and procedural rules may not only be implementations of a 
“right to a clean environment”, but its actual content Finally, the view that developments 
in international law o f procedures to make environment and development-related decisions 
(through i.a. information access, participation and equal access), does not imply that some 
substantive notions o f generic environmental rights could not, or should not, develop 
within national legal systems.1054
It has been argued above that there is an element o f absurdity in efforts to bring more 
democracy into international environmental protection, that is, if democracy is understood 
to refer to people/individuals, as opposed to some notion o f consent and 
faimess/equality/inclusiveness/etc. in inter-state decision-making.1055 But apart from 
individuals and states the environment itself, or parts thereof, is not heard, it has no say,1056 
and it has for a few decades -  at least since Stone’s seminal article1057 -  been asked
1052 But contra some would use the term “the right to know” to denote a stronger, more empowering right, see 
e.g. Bakkenist, G., 1993.
1053 This is of particular value between countries o f similar legal development in environmental protection and 
citizens’ rights to participate, to seek redress, etc. (e.g. the Nordic countries, see Nordic Convention on the 
Protection of the Environment, Stockholm, 19.2.1974, entry into force 5.10 1976; and see supra ch. 4.2.(c) on 
the Convention; and generally, Phillips, Ch. 1986, p. 155-; Broms, B., 1986, p. 141-; Brunnie, J., 1988, pp. 
171-174); On OECD efforts to develop equal access, see Council Recommendation on Principles concerning 
Transfrontier Pollution, 14.11 1974. C(74)224(1974); and Council Recommendation for the Implementation 
of a Regime o f Equal Right o f Access and Non-discrimination in Relation to Transfrontier Pollution, 
17.5.1977. C(77)28(Final); Further see Bimie, P. & A. Boyle, 1992, p. 197-201; And see e.g. the ECE 1992 
Industrial Accidents Convention, Article 9(3).
1054 See further Boyle, A., 1996, p. 64.
1055 On the absence of a demos among states, see Bodansky, D., 1999, pp. 616-617.
1056 Of course, this is not an exceptional situation: children enjoy legal protection in many national systems, 
but their own views on their treatment are not necessarily ascertained, although the argument exists that 
younger and younger children ought to be listened to. Does it have to be demeaning that an infant who does 
not yet speak cannot be heard? See further on the use of the child example in rights debates, Cowen, D.V., 
1989, p. 21.
1037 Stone, C.D., 1972; See also Stone, C.D., 1985.
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whether nature itself should not enjoy more “rights”.1058 A challenge to the human c e n tre d  
approach has developed in parallel with it. It involves a stress on species and co m m o n s, 
and more recently, on ecosystems and biodiversity1059 in several treaties and soft la w  
documents, and only in the most extreme writers’ arguments, claims for “rights” o f  n a tu re . 
The challenge is also concerned with forward-looking principles such as precaution and  th e  
rights o f future generations, both of which would be very difficult to realize from  a  
traditional human rights perspective. Added to these are developments to w ard s  
compensation and especially restoration schemes for ecological damage.1060
This parallel development could easily look like a balance between two competing and  
equally compelling pursuits within international law: human needs and nature’s needs; bu t 
it is hardly a balance. Considering the Rio process and its strong focus on sustainable 
development the tilt is clearly towards anthropocentric concerns, and now the A arhus 
Convention has come to reinforce that impression. The Aarhus Convention is a hum an 
rights treaty, not an “environmental treaty” . It is certainly a far cry from the discussions in  
recent years on rights o f nature and animal rights1061 and the Convention does so little to  
underline the environment as an aspect of more open societies1062 that the argument can
1058 As an anti-anthropocentric stance this is interesting, because it shows just how even that discussion is 
bound to use the same language/legal language that the human rights discussion would. Indeed the 
“inherently” human nature of legal rights (hominum causa omne ius constitutum) is one of the most 
frequently used arguments against any “rights” of nature. But many other arguments pro et contra exist, see 
Cowen, D.V., 1989, who argues that no “significant advantage is achieved by attributing legal rights to trees, 
animals and buildings which cannot more naturally be achieved by using other legal concepts and another 
legal terminology”, p. 22. Further on rights of nature, see Stutzin, G., 1976; Nash, R.F, 1989; and for an 
overview esp. Redgwell, C., 1996;
1059 See esp. the 1992 Biodiversity Convention; and generally, see Boyle, A., 'The Convention on Biological 
Diversity', 1994, pp. 111-127; On earlier conservation treaties and wildlife law, see esp. Lyster, S.( 1985.
1060 See e.g. reference to “property o f states” in Art. 1(a) of the Convention on International Liability for 
Damage caused by Space Objects, Geneva, 29.3.1972, entry into force 1.9.1972; and see Canadian claims in 
Cosmos 954 case, 23.1.1979, 18 I.L.M. (1979), pp. 899-908; see also Art. 139 and 235 of the 1982 UNCLOS; 
and Art 8 of the 1988 CRAMRA; But contra note the failure of the 1LC to include environmental damage in 
its work on crimes against the peace and security of mankind. The first reading of the Draft Code included 
wilful and severe damage to the environment (Art. 26) as crimes against the peace and security of mankind, 
see ‘Report o f the International Law Commission on its 43rt Session’, 1991, 30 I.L.M. (1991), p. 1584; but 
for the later development see e.g. Special Rapporteur Doudou Thiam, Thirteenth Report on the Draft Code o f  
Crimes Against the Peace and Security o f Mankind, 1995, A/CN.4/466; and finally see Report o f the 
International Law Commission on the Work o f its Forty-eighth Session, 1996, GAOR Supp. No, 10 
(A/51/10), pp. 9-120; and see Jacqmotte, B., 1998.
1061 Further on the main criticisms o f anthropocentric ity from the deep ecology/env iron mental ism, animal 
rights, and some other sub-debates, see esp. Redgwell, C., 1996, pp. 71-87; see also Shelton, D., 1991.
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rightly be made that the Convention is “environmentally” weak. This is also at the heart of 
criticisms against the Convention and the entire rights-based development. It highlights 
differences in ethical points o f departure and the heterogeneity of environmental interests. 
At the same time there appears to be two parallel trends in public reactions to 
environmental problems: a slump, despite Agenda 21 and other efforts, among the great 
majority, perhaps because environmental issues have become so ordinary and “everyday”, 
versus a radicalisation among smaller groups o f environmental activists, both locally and in 
international networks and gatherings.1062 063
Although news coverage would easily give the impression that the more radical trend in 
international environmental protection is that which speaks for nature’s and animals’ rights, 
the more dominating feature is related to the human rights discourse. From a strictly 
environmental point o f departure the ’’threat” o f anthropocentricity is akin to the “threat” of 
the developmental aspect in sustainable development (as discussed above in Chapter 1). 
But Porras writes that ”[t]he apparent ability of developing countries to influence 
international environmental norms in the context of the Rio Declaration may serve to create 
a real opportunity for creation o f  the new globalism. If it is capable of responding to and 
embrace development, the environment motif may yet serve as a force to progress beyond 
the rhetoric and logic o f binary oppositions towards a new way of understanding 
international relations".1064 This could mean that if sustainable development is taken with 
real commitment given to both sides of the concept, it could have some potential apart from 
mere eloquence also for environmental protection, and it could thus be more realistic and 
attractive - for developing countries - than an aggressive stressing of "only" environmental 
law. Perhaps the same kind o f hope could exist in the relationship between human rights 
and environmental protection: that i f  taken seriously, in both cases fears may be turned 
around to strengths, the strengths of diverse approaches, and in the realization that
1062 But, on the other hand, in the ECE precisely (and perhaps only?) the environment is a subject compelling 
enough that it might be a carrier of democratic principles to several Member States; see above on 
democratization.
1063 Critical social movements are often classified as either reactive or proactive: Reactive movements would 
be those objecting to changes or developments in society and defending the values of past times, for instance 
the skinhead movement. Most environmental movements are proactive, they argue for social change. The 
1990s animal rights movement is an exceptional version of a proactive movement in that it is very radical and 
has an anarchic structure, it does not respect e.g. private property, and it is difficult to classify in traditional 
social terms of political, social or economic character.
1064 Porras, I.M., 1993, p. 33.
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ultimately needs are interconnected. This seems to be the case for developing p ro ced u ra l 
rather than any substantive environmental rights, as procedural rights may a v o id  
“anthropocentricity to the extent that such rights can be exercised on behalf o f  th e  
environment or o f its non-human components” . 06 *I065Such a balancing act1066 in v o lv es  
epistemological change, a whole new mindset.1067 It remains a challenge for the advoca tes 
of a new, balancing kind of human rights approach, that, just as many national constitutions 
declare, there will be responsibilities attached to rights, and that individuals are bearers o f  
that responsibility, too.
III.VI. Restrictions to the Open Society
Quite in contrast to all the developments discussed above, there have recently also been  
calls for less openness, and less information, either in the name of preventing public  
fear,1068 but especially in the name o f safety.1069 These calls have not been the traditional
l06i Bimie, P. & A. Boyle, 1992, p. 194-195; and for the argument that “[t]he enforcement o f individual rights
requires empowerement of the individuals to whom the right is owed and who can also enforce the rights on
behalf of the environment itself’, see Bakkenist, G., 1993.
1066 See further Lador, Y., 1993 on an “ecological rights” concept; On balancing or reconciling different
interests, see Boyle, A., 1996, p. 64; and cf. Boyle, A. & D. Freestone, 1999; See also Conable, B.B, 1990;
Shelton, D., 1991, p. 117; and Redgewell, C., 1996, p. 87.
1067 Medvedev, G, 1991, p. 265, talks about the need for a “New Culture for the Nuclear Age”. He quotes A.I. 
Vorobyov, a Russian specialist on leukaemia, who writes that ’’accidents are never accidental. Everyone must 
now understand that life in the nuclear age demands the same kind of painstaking attention to detail as one 
finds in the calculation of a missile trajectory. The nuclear age, cannot be nuclear in one area only, and 
nonnuclear everywhere else. [...] Anyone who wants to live in the nuclear era has got to create a new culture, 
a whole new mindset”.
1068 Here the role of the mass media is crucial. It can create fear and hysteria through false or exaggerated 
reporting (as seen in some, though not all, U.S. newspapers during the first cases of Anthrax in 
September/October 2001).
1069 The recent Agreement on the Exchange o f Radiation Monitoring Data concluded by the Council of the 
Baltic Sea States provides for an interesting aspect to restrictions to environmental information to the public: 
Firstly, unverified radiation data shall be declared as such and, secondly, unverified data shall not be made 
publicly available or available to a third Party without the consent o f the originator. This may at first glance 
seem like an unnecessary restriction, but it may also fulfil the function of preventing “false alarms” or 
incorrect information from causing confusing situations both nationally and internationally. See Agreement 
on the Exchange o f Radiation Monitoring Data, Hamburg, 7.6.2001, not in force; See further CBSS web­
pages; Russia is not a Party to the Agreement, but has concentrated on establishing bilateral environmental 
protection treaties, such as the modest framework established under the Agreement on Environmental 
Cooperation between the Government of the Republic of Finland and the Government of the Russian 
Federation, Moscow, 29.4.1992, in force. See also Finland-Soviet Union: Agreement on Early Notification of 
Nuclear Accidents and Exchange of Information concerning Nuclear Installations, Helsinki, 7.1.1987, in 
force 18.7.1987.
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reluctance of secretive administrations to permit insight, but prompted by concern with 
public safety. Could this mean a step back from an Open Society, just as it is beginning to 
gain momentum?1070 Is it failing just as it is starting? Neither openness and transparency 
nor access to environmental information can be unrestricted, there are always 
considerations for where to draw the line, be it for reasons o f defence or industrial secrecy 
or for the protection o f personal data.1071 With the September 11, 2001 suicide attacks in 
the United States fresh in mind, it seems that the threat o f terrorism is perhaps one of the 
main challenges to openness. Building an Open Society becomes impossible if  access to 
information entails the risk o f loss of basic security, but with terrorism the distinction 
between information to citizens and to non-citizens is often irrelevant, as threats may come 
from the outside as well as from the inside of a state. Citizens need to know that there are 
safety procedures and contingency plans and so on, but i f  all plans are public they may be 
misused or destroyed, or terrorists could use the information to hinder mitigating efforts. 
This could entail both humanitarian and environmental catastrophes, especially in the case 
of use of biological or chemical weapons.
The threat o f eco-terrorism may be a different case. It may well be that better information 
about particular industrial undertakings or working methods can reduce the risk o f attacks 
against them. On the other hand, there is no clear pattern as to what form attacks “in favour 
of nature” may take or what the underlying rationale may be, and therefore any assessment 
of the role o f public information is very difficult to make.1072 In any case, there is the 
argument that no industrial or other activities with potentially damaging effects to the 
environment should be allowed to go on without public knowledge thereof, and that public 
scrutiny of the primary activity is more important as a means of environmental protection 
than are any efforts to reduce the risks of negative actions based on too much information.
1070 Further on the question how open a government can be, esp. on Swedish government, see Larsson, T., 
1998; and Ziller, J., 2001.
1071 Further see e.g. Stiglitz, J., 1999.
1072 One initial ground for hesitation in Germany to join the Aarhus Convention related to the safety of 
nuclear waste transports, which have repeatedly been met by potentially dangerous protests.
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IV. Potential for a New Ethic?
Besides being a new -  and mostly regional - “trend” in international law, the d e v e lo p m e n t 
towards rights o f access to environmental information and participation seems to  c o n ta i n  
some ingredients for a challenge to the current “managerial” way of e n v iro n m e n ta l  
protection. For instance, the EU Commission’s Explanatory Memorandum to the p r o p o s e d  
EC Directive on public participation1073 is very optimistic as it states that “[w]ider p u b l i c  
participation in environmental decision-making contributes to an increase in  p u b l ic  
awareness of environmental issues and thus improves the protection and the quality o f  th e  
environment throughout the Community It also says that public participation “h e lp s  to  
achieve” the aims o f the Community’s environmental policy, which include p rese rv in g , 
protecting and improving the quality of the environment, protecting human health, p ru d e n t 
and rational utilisation o f  natural resources, and promoting measures at international le v e l 
to deal with regional and world-wide environmental problems.1074 The Preamble to  th e  
Aarhus Convention connects information to the quality1075 of decisions:
in the field o f the environment, improved access to information and pu b lic  
participation in decision-making enhance the quality and the implementation o f  
decisions, contribute to public awareness o f environmental issues, give the public  
the opportunity to express its concerns and enable public authorities to take due 
account of such concerns.
Thus at least a rhetorical chain o f reasoning is established whereby not only do information 
lead to awareness-raising, and public participation to accountability, but these are together 
believed even to improve the quality o f the environment But what it is that the public, or 
indeed states or other actors, could do that is different to the present stress on management 
and that would lead to better protection of the environment remains an open question. It
1073 Proposal for a Directive o f the European Parliament and o f the Council providing for public participation 
in respect o f the drawing up of certain plans and programmes relating to the environment and amending 
Council Directives 85/337/EEC and 96/61/EC, 18.1.2001, Document 500PC0839; And see COM(2000)402 
final, p. 16.
1074 Document 500PC0839, p. 2 and 3.
1075 Cf. IISD/UNEP: Environment and Trade: A Handbook, 2000, at http://iisd.ca/trade/handbook/. which 
writes that “[o]penness is widely recognized as being valuable to government, since it makes bureaucracies 
more responsive and accountable, and can bring more and better information to the decision-making process. 
The result o f open practice is better decisions, particularly in areas with widespread impacts such as trade, 
environment and development policies” .
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may of course be that the “better informed” and more “participating” public would consider 
the present managerial model just fine, and that there is no immediate replacement for it, 
but at most amelioration o f the procedures and mechanisms involved. A look at some 
developments besides the treaties and regional development discussed above may give 
some indications:
First, there are noteworthy developments in some key institutions. After years o f lending 
activity based on little or no disclosure of relevant information to the affected local public, 
to donor countries, or even to Bank officials, and subsequent heavy criticism against the 
practice,1076 the World Bank in 1993 approved a new Information Policy.1077 The practice 
of the Bank has developed considerably vis-a-vis openness, participation and 
accountability, both due to internal demands and external public pressure through various 
international NGO efforts and governmental pressures. Its initially internal Operational 
Standards have evolved to become the crucial norms against which Bank projects are 
assessed, and the performance o f which can be challenged by individuals and groups whose 
interests may have been adversely affected through a Bank project, e.g. non-fulfilment of 
the Operational Standards.1078 Complaints are handled in the Bank’s own, but at least 
partially independent,1079 non-compliance procedure, the Inspection Panel, established in 
1993.1080 Apart from the complaints procedure, the role of the individual is noteworthy in
1076 See esp. Udall, L., 1998, pp. 391-427.
1077 Draft Review of World Bank Policy on Information Disclosure, 1994, see The World Bank Group, 
Information Disclosure Consultation Home Page (as it was accessible at least until September 2000) at 
http://www.worldbank.org/html/pic/disclosure/index.htm: And see Foreword by L.T. Preston, President, 
stating that sharing information stimulates debate, broadens understanding of development issues, facilitates 
cooperation among the parties involved, and serves to strengthen public support for efforts to improve the 
lives of people in developing countries; Ibid., Para. 3: “The Bank recognizes and endorses the fundamental 
importance o f accountability and transparency in the development process. Accordingly, it is the Bank’s 
policy to be open about its activities and to welcome and seek out opportunities to explain its work to the 
widest possible audience”(emphasis added). This could be criticized to mean that an explanation is a one­
sided action, a possibility to defend ones position, but that it does not automatically include an element of 
debate or listening to alternative views; But the Bank also stated that “[¡Information is not withheld solely 
because it is negative; the Bank, as an open, technically competent institution which learns from its mistakes, 
seeks to provide balanced information, reporting the failures or disappointments in its operations as well as 
successes.”
1078 See further esp. Boisson de Chazoumes, L., 2000, pp. 281-303.
1079 Partially, because the Board decides which claims the Panel may investigate. On “tests” of the Inspection 
Panel’s independence from the Bank’s board of executive directors, e.g. through Arun III case, see Udall, L., 
1998, pp. 408-427. And, ibid. cf. on independence of Operation Evaluations Department and Office of 
General Counsel.
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one crucial respect: mainly through local NGOs in Bank funded project communities, t h e y  
may influence Bank projects through various consultation and assessment processes, a n d  
therefore also come to give some input into the development o f  the O pera tional 
Standards.108 081 Resent years, the Information Policy has been put to test by NGO sc ru tin y , 
revised and updated (latest in effect in early 2002),1082 but it is still criticised for m a jo r  
weaknesses. The Bank’s old statement that “ [tjhere is a presumption in favor o f  
disclosure”1083 has been unsystematically implemented, the quality of released docum ents 
may have been so low as to rendering them useless for the public, the policy does n o t  
function retroactively, and the Operational Policies and Bank Procedures have been re v ised  
and shortened while merely advisory Good Practices have been inflated, giving the p u b lic  
less norms against which to try Bank actions.1084 All in all, as Udall notes, there is a “c lo se  
link between information disclosure, policy violations, and the Inspection Panel process”  
where “the success or failure o f  either the information policy or the Inspection Panel w ill 
influence the other” and public and donor government support will “depend on progress” in  
accountability and transparency.1085
The impact o f these, albeit criticized, developments towards openness are not only practical 
-  the World Bank lends over $ 22 billion a year -  but it has symbolic and trend-setting 
value for other institutions as well. Is this not after all, along with related efforts in o ther 
global and regional institutions,1086 evidence of something new, an evolving culture o f
1080 Resolution No. 93-10, Resolution No, IDA 93-6; 22.9 1993; And see Operating Procedures, 1994; 
Generally, see Bradlow, D. & S. Schlemmer-Schulte, 1994; Bissell, R.E., 1997.
1081 For several detailed examples, see Fox, J.A. & L.D. Brown, ed s ., 1998.
1082 See revised WB Disclosure Policy o f September 2001, effective in early 2002, at same address: 
http://www.worldbank.org/html/pic/disclosure/index.htm
1083 Directive on Disclosure of Information, July 1989; This citation also appears e.g. in the Draft Review o f 
World Bank Policy on Information Disclosure, 1994, Para. 4.; and see Para. 56; and in subsequent 
documents.
1084 Udall, L., 1998, pp. 406-408,426.
1085 Ibid, pp. 426-427.
1086 See further Shihata, I.F.I., 1994; Dana, L., 1999; The World Bank: World Bank-Civil Society
Collaboration -  Progress Report for Fiscal Years 2000 and 2002; Generally Wirth, D., 1994, pp. 769-802; 
and on GEF, generally, Boisson de Chazoumes, L., 1995, pp. 612-632; On several multilateral development 
banks and funds and their environmentally relevant activities, see esp. Handl, G., 2001. And further on 
“accountability mechanisms” in the Asian Development Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank, 
and information disclosure policies in the EBRD, IDB, and in the OECD (esp. on the OECD Council 
Recommendation on Environmental Information, 1998), see Fabra, A., 2002,
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openness? Sand writes that it is “no coincidence that the recent institutional reforms for this 
purpose [public access and accountability] which are now spreading to most multilateral 
development agencies -  the new procedures for information disclosure, NGO participation, 
and the establishment of ‘inspection panels’ for compliance control -  were spearheaded by 
the environmental movement”. The general development within large institutions 
towards greater transparency and openness, even with limited public participation attached, 
is congruent with the idea, presented e.g. by Stiglitz, that ”the less directly accountable a 
governmental agency is to the public, the more important is it that its actions be open and 
transparent”.* 1088 O f course, the fact that global institutions such as the World Bank are not, 
a priori, accountable to the public, but to their member states, makes this proposition even 
more valid, and the success and independence of various compliance and control 
mechanisms more pressing.
And secondly, in addition to the great number o f environmental treaties discussed above in 
relation to access rights, some newer agreements bring in further evidence of a change in 
thinking. The Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs)1089 does not 
use any rights language, but it brings in one novel aspect o f information dissemination. The 
treaty text says that the Parties shall, within their capabilities, encourage industry and 
professional users to promote and facilitate the provision of information on POPs at the 
national level, and as appropriate, subregional, regional or global levels. This is a step in a 
new direction, and it underlines, albeit in weak language, the responsibilities of actors other 
than states.
http://.unhchr.ch/environment/bp3.html: But contra see Fabra, A., 2002, p. 13, comment that “[a] number of 
IOs, such as the EBRD, IDB and the WB, have developed information disclosure policies, but this practice is 
not generalized among IOs”. For earlier comment on need for transparency in the WTO, see Makuch, Z., 
1996, p. 113; and on WTO document derestriction policy, esp. since Seattle Ministerial Conference, see 
IISD/UNEP: Environment and Trade: A Handbook, 2000, at httpV/iisd.ca^trade/handbook/. Despite 
considerable advances in transparency since its 1996 decision on derestriction, the WTO still restricts any 
document submitted by a member who requests that it be restricted; all working documents, until adopted or 
until six months after circulation; minutes o f WTO bodies (except for the Trade Policy Review Mechanism) 
may be derestricted after six months; arguments that members submit to dispute resolution panels; and reports 
of dispute resolution panels, except party demands for a delay, which are derestricted ten days after 
circulation. For all derestricted WTO documents, look at http://www.wto.org.
1087 Sand, P.H., 1999, pp. 347-348.
1088 Stiglitz, J., 1999.
1089 Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, Stockholm, 22.5.2001, not in force.
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A third example of more voluntary and/or private initiative in environmental p ro tec tio n  is  
provided by the Eco-Management and Audit Scheme (EMAS) in the European U n io n , 
which aims to promote continuous environmental performance improvements by in d u s try  
and, now, all sectors o f economic activity, including local authorities, and verification o f  
these performances.1090 This is expressly a “managerial” method in that it is based o n  a  
standardized environmental management system (ISO 14001) and incremental change, b u t  
on the other hand it functions on a voluntary basis in addition to the full com pliance b y  
participating companies o f national and Community-based legal obligations. The E M A S  
encourages information from the private sector to the public on matters relating to  th e  
environmental effects o f economic activities: thus an example o f voluntary, an d  
“managerial”, information.
These three examples, along with all the treaty developments described in this and previous 
chapters,1091 could be taken as evidence that a change in “culture”, where openness is 
central, is taking place. 1092And the two latter examples o f openness also point towards one 
further question, namely that o f  the role o f private responsibility for environmental 
protection, now using the term responsibility broadly, also beyond the constraints o f  a  
traditional legal rights-responsibilities discussion. Do growing rights o f access to  
environmental information imply growing individual responsibilities as well? If you can  
find out what is going on, do you have an obligation to participate?1093 Does this question 
extend itself to transnational companies, whose power, despite some legal constraints, to 
influence activities relating to the environment may be enormous? Public international law
1090 Council Regulation (EC) No 751/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council o f  19 March 2001 
allowing voluntary participation by organisations in a Community eco-management and audit scheme 
(EMAS); and see old Regulation: Council Regulation (EEC) No 1836/93 of 29 June 1993; See also 
http://europa.eu.mt/comm/environment/emas/: And generally on both EMAS and the ISO 14000 standards 
system established by the International Organization for Standardization, for, i.a, establishing environmental 
management systems, see Handl, G., 2001, pp. 98-101.
1091 In this context the additional question exists of the openness versus the secrecy of environmental treaty 
bodies’ documents. E.g. the compliance committee under the Climate Change Convention may receive 
submissions o f information from NGOs. Information from Parties is public unless the enforcement branch 
upon its own or a Party’s initiative decides that the information becomes public only after a decision has been 
taken. Likewise, the branch, not a Party, may decide whether a hearing is close; See FCCC/CP/2001/L.21, at 
COP7 at Marrakech, 5.11.2001.
1092 On the role of NGOs, e.g. Amnesty International, for creating a “culture o f openness”, see Stiglitz, J-, 
1999.
1093 Classical parallel questions are e.g. whether a right to vote should entail an obligation to use that right, or 
whether a right to health-care involves a duty to seek medical help in illness.
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has, with the Aarhus Convention, taken a step towards influencing individual rights on the 
national level. The next, and equally dramatic, step in international public law would be to 
underline responsibilities beyond mere information sharing, and superficial participation, 
and especially then for companies and individuals.
Duties attached to individuals, not only states, to protect the environment exist in many 
national constitutions.1094 For instance, the Constitution o f India, in Article 51 A(g) makes it 
a fundamental duty of every citizen to “protect and improve the natural environment 
including forests, lakes, rivers and wild life, and to have compassion for living 
creatures”.1095 Environmental protection is also viewed as a responsibility under the new 
Finnish Constitution.1096 Section 20 on Responsibility for the environment states that:
Nature and its biodiversity, the environment and the national heritage are the 
responsibility o f everyone.
The public authorities shall endeavour to guarantee for everyone the right to a 
healthy environment and for everyone the possibility to influence the decisions that 
concern their own living environment.
In international treaty law, the Aarhus Convention Preamble includes the duty, both 
individually and in association with others, to protect and improve the environment. It
1094 See supra on functions and problems in relation to rights: III.V. Anthropocentricity and Rights, for 
references to national constitutions that include explicit rights to a clean environment; and see Human Rights 
and the Environment: The Legal Basis fo r  a Human Right to the Environment. Report to the UN Sub- 
Commission on the Prevention o f Discrimination and the Protection o f Minorities, Sierra Club Legal Defence 
Fund, April 1992; and see national case studies in Anderson, M. & A. Boyle, 1996, pp. 153-302.
1095 The Constitution of India, 1976 Amendment; See also Art. 48A, the Directive Principle of State Policy on 
environmental protection, and Article 51 A(h) which further states that the Indian citizen should “develop the 
scientific temper, humanism and the spirit o f inquiry and reform”.
1096 The Constitution of Finland, 11.6.1999,731/1999, Section 20: Responsibility for the environment; look at 
http://www.om.fi/constitution/3340.htm. See also Section 12 - Freedom of expression and right of access to 
information:
Everyone has the freedom of expression. Freedom of expression entails the right to express, 
disseminate and receive information, opinions and other communications without prior prevention 
by anyone. More detailed provisions on the exercise of the freedom of expression are laid down by 
an Act. Provisions on restrictions relating to pictorial programmes that are necessary for the 
protection of children may be laid down by an Act.
Documents and recordings in the possession of the authorities are public, unless their publication has 
for compelling reasons been specifically restricted by an Act. Everyone has the right of access to 
public documents and recordings.
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remains to be seen whether wording such as that under the new POPs Convention, an d  
stronger, will flourish in coming global legal documents, and whether b ro ad e r 
pronouncements of responsibilities could change the way international environmental law  
is constructed.
As shown in the above examples brought from the ECE and EC contexts, pu b lic  
participation, that is, a broadened basis for decision-making, is widely beginning to  be  
thought to be beneficial for environmental policy and law, especially on the national 
level.1097 O f course, the general public may be just as wise or unwise, just as farsighted or 
narrow-minded as its leaders and decision-makers. Therefore, the argument goes, pluralism  
and wide participation are needed to guarantee good decisions. Pluralism brings m inority 
views and challenges to mainstream thinking. NGOs, activist citizens and a multitude o f  
ideas and ideals are to make sure that sustainable environmental decisions are taken.1098 
Functioning democracy, where everyone has a chance to be heard and where openness and 
access to information are guaranteed in all directions are the best means of ensuring 
farsighted results. In principle, this may well be; but no degree o f openness and access to 
information and no extent o f pluralism in well-functioning democracy can as such 
guarantee wisdom. Despite their attractiveness, it remains that access and public  
participation offer potential, not promise, o f  better environmental protection.
4.4. An Assessment
The international legal development on rights o f access to environmental information has 
followed a track which seems parallel to that o f state-based dissemination o f environmental 
information: the “first phase” o f  states’ information duties came about in the 1980s and 
were mostly concerned with accidents and their mitigation; the “second phase” was the *09
1097 E.g, Handl, G., 2001, p. 47, writes that participation is a precondition for a country being able to “pursue 
a course of sustainable development”.
I09S See Ranjan, S., 2001, p. 94, who writes that “[t]he NGOs have, by raising the issue of transboundary 
movements o f hazardous wastes into India and ship-breaking, played a key role in monitoring the situation 
and alerting the public. Their vigilant role, not only in this context but also on other matters pertaining to 
environment in general, has brought about much needed transparency also within the governmental decision­
making apparatus”.
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supervisory treaty-based information boom that started to blossom in the 1990s. The 
equivalent phases in access have been, first, a focus on states’ “public information 
dissemination” of accident information and mitigation plans in the nearby community, 
embracing the idea that the effect o f accurate and timely accident information will be 
limited unless citizens are aware o f emergency response possibilities (provided such exist); 
second, broadened and more general access -  transparency into - many kinds of 
environmental data, which implies an aspect of social and political control post facto  by the 
public; third, regionally developed explicit rights of access to environmental information 
have been linked to public participation in decision-making at the national level (as 
opposed to political or judicial control afterwards). This links the issue to the future: it is 
participatory, anticipatory and aiming at influencing politics and law alike; Finally, the 
whole of this development towards individual rights of access to environmental 
information can be seen as a “third phase” in the entirety of international norms on 
environmental information.
There is now a trend in international law to develop access to environmental information 
and participation, mostly meant for the national level, but also opening up international 
treaties to greater transparency for NGOs (if not actual individual participation). The trend 
is reinforced by efforts in key international institutions to give some transparency into their 
activities. This trend is strong enough that one can begin to call it a “new culture of 
openness”; but the question whether it is beginning to be more than a political, 
psychological, social or other trend, a consolidation of the principles and aspirations into 
binding law, inevitably keeps an answer only at the regional level. The recent Johannesburg 
Plan o f Implementation is a clear indication that many states are not yet willing to commit 
themselves to too much openness. On the ECE level the treaty development is crucial, but 
even considering somewhat widened notions on the formation of customary international 
law, it would seem strained to argue that an individual right of access to environmental 
information was yet more than on its way towards regional general international law. An 
explicit rights development is however not the only conceivable way to develop law and 
practice on access to environmental information: access can be enhanced through more 
active dissemination by states and through more voluntary information from industry and 
other actors. Here, the Johannesburg text offers some fresh emphasis on the role o f private 
industry for transparency. In any case, the quality o f any environmental information, rather
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than necessarily its source or the basis of the original legal obligation, is crucial i f  
institutions that are not directly accountable to the public are to become so.
There are also, and there is likely to continue to be, several restrictions to public access to  
environmental information and public participation: issues of national and environm ental 
security, or industrial secrecy, and intellectual property rights along with the protection o f  
personal data continue to play the most important roles. Public knowledge of safe ty  
measures could in itself be a safety risk, and future acts of sabotage or terrorism cou ld  
come to influence, even jeopardize, current developments towards greater public access to  
environmental information, and therefore the whole development towards an ’’O pen 
Society”, this in addition to general incentives for secrecy and opposition to reform based  
on arguments that openness conflicts with administrative or legal traditions, which it m ay  
well do. On the other hand one can assume that it is difficult to stop a train already in  
motion. Neither first-stage nor second-stage state-centred information duties have satisfied 
the needs o f the public, but public pressure for more open government continues in m any 
countries, and new information technology presumably continues to raise expectations o f  
more and better information access.
On the basis of the discussions in Chapters 2 and 3 above, it may be seductive to think that 
the state duty-based information sharing systems are hopelessly outdated, technological or 
bureaucratic in nature, and therefore, as by default, a rights-based development would seem 
more fresh, more promising. Yet this warrants caution. It may be that it is precisely the 
rights-based access that is unforgivably insufficient. Sometimes the information shared by 
states is the most accurate there is to be found. Accident-situations, whether local or in 
another country, can definitely not be handled by the random possibility that an 
individual/group would happen to request information. Also much general data on planned 
activities with potential transboundary effects would go unnoticed if  strictly access rights- 
based. Any notions of rights also bring in the often conflicting notions o f  human needs 
versus nature’s needs, and the anthropocentric development reinforces the paradox brought 
in by sustainable development, that ’’international environmental law” is not all about 
environment, but more about reconciling conflicting interests.
Environmental information can always be better: more accurate, more up-to-date, better 
presented, better put into its context, more holistic, more comprehensive and so on. In a
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“new ethic” based on a culture o f openness there would perhaps be less room for the mere 
’’motions” o f  informing and more potential for enhanced quality control, which is all the 
more imperative in a time of over-load: with simplified accessibility greater quality 
information is increasingly on the demand, not least in the internet. Environmental 
information can therefore go beyond what is presented under the current managerial state- 
to-state model. This is the case for a more explicit individual right o f  access to 
environmental information. Legal arrangements, both national and international, can 
perhaps be ameliorated by diversified access to environmental information and the 
broadened understanding, knowledge or conviction generated by new information. A right 
of access to environmental information is an ’’empowerment right” :1099 it strengthens 
individual autonomy and competence to participate in decision-making,1100 and it is 
therefore related to democracy as it is construed in the West today, and, at best, to the 
legitimacy o f  the national decision-making process. At best, it can escape the criticism of 
anthropocentricity, if used in favour of nature. A great deal o f research effort has been put 
into the role o f NGOs for international environmental law and policy,1101 and some of it is 
characterized by strong idealism. Unfortunately, too often the research has concentrated 
only on environmental NGOs and forgotten the industry-based NGOs and the very 
diversity and pluralism it speaks of. On the international level, treaties and other 
cooperation arrangements concluded between states are checked on by peers, but precisely 
because the actors are states there needs to be a double check on the information presented. 
Treaty systems need outside - just as national governments need public1102 - verification of 
many kinds, and NGOs and individuals alike can, especially through the media, be assumed
1099 Note the “empowerment” language used in a publication by the NGO Friends of the Earth: “Arming 
NGOs with Knowledge: A Guide to the International Monetary Fund”, at
http ://www. foe .org/intemation al/im f/.
1100 For this argument in relation to a general human right of access to information, see Suksi, M., 1997, p. 3.
1101 See e.g. Taylor, P., 1984; Sands, P. & A. Bedecarré, 1990, pp. 799-822; Sands, P„ 1991, pp. 61-68; 
Tolbert, D., 1991, pp. 95-108; Livemash, R., 1992, pp. 12-43; Kiss, A., 1992, pp. 14-15; Doherty, A., 1994, 
pp. 199-218; Sjôstedt, G., B.I. Spector & W. Zartman, 1994, pp. 233-249; ibid., pp. 3-19; Princen, T. & M. 
Finger, 1994; Schweitz, M.L., 1995, pp. 415-420; Sikkink, K., 1995, pp. 413-415; Ponce-Nava, D., 1995, pp. 
131-140; Burhenne, W.E., 1995, pp. 207-219; Werksman, J., 1996; French, H, 1996, pp. 251-258; Cameron, 
J., 1997; Raustiala, K., 1997.
1,02 “Access to environmental information is a prerequisite to public participation in decision-making and to 
monitoring governmental and private sector activities”, Kiss, A. & D. Shelton, 1993, p. 493; “Public 
participation is the key and without information this cannot be real. Information enables the public to make 
accountable those whose actions impact on the environment and those whose task it is to regulate them”, 
Bakkeniste, G., 1993.
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to have some constructive ’’supervising” role if  they have rights of access to p a r t ic u la r  
information.1103 This does not mean that their legitimizing role would be more than l im ite d :  
outside verification does not necessarily justify states’ international decisions. On the o th e r  
hand, broader participation in international environmental decision-making, if  it d e v e lo p s  
further, could come to have normative implications.1104
Recent regional legal pronunciations have created a rhetoric chain o f reasoning w h e r e  
information leads to awareness-raising, and public participation to accountability, and th e s e  
two together are argued to be able to improve the quality o f  the environment. S u c h  
pronunciations do not make that assumption true, future developments followed b y  
extensive cross- and interdisciplinary research -  as complex, or even impossible, a s  
measuring treaty ’’effectiveness” is - can tell if  they have materialized. When speaking o f  
the amelioration of environmental protection through enhanced individual access or r ig h ts  
to information, this is by definition an outlook which does not do away with the cu rren t 
managerial and anthropocentric way of international environmental law, but which ra th e r 
recognizes a momentum for its development. The development must essentially happen  
through the national level, given the awkwardness o f transplanting notions of individual 
participation, as opposed to some relatively limited forms o f NGO participation, in  
international environmental decision-making. State-disseminated environmental 
information and individuals’ rights o f access to environmental information can therefore be  
seen as complementary rather than rivals.1105 Where one is weak, the other can, and needs 
to, fill in. This is an interesting prospect for the future of international environmental 
protection and law, but it contains no guarantees. The exciting prospect is that a “new  
ethic” based on a culture of openness and individual rights to information could also 
develop further to imply broader, even individual, responsibilities for environmental 
protection at the local level. International law could be a vehicle towards such 
developments.
1103 “Information is recognized as a  prerequisite to effective national and international environmental 
management, protection, and co-operation”, Sands, P., 1995, p. 596.
1.04 See generally polemic by Alvarez, J.E., 2001, e.g. on pluralist alternatives in norm-making and their 
relevance for the entire domain of international law, as against Slaughter’s liberal theory and regulation via 
“transnational networks” and “transjudicial communication”.
1.05 Further for a discussion on the necessity of political rights (and dignity of life and the rule of law) for 
environmental protection, and on complementary goals between the two fields o f law, see Kane, M.J., 1993, 
pp. 389-411.
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5. FINAL REM ARKS
A Major Strategy
Few norms are so elementary in the structure o f current international environmental law as 
those on information. Hardly any environmental treaties are concluded without them, the 
sheer number o f relevant articles is massive, and hence an expectation o f their importance 
arises. In the view of many writers, they are however hardly worthy o f  serious attention. 
The task set forth in this study has been to challenge that dismissal, to trace the 
development o f norms on environmental information in public international law and to 
evaluate their role, their strengths and limits, in the evolution of international law on the 
environment. As the issue has unfolded, a development has come to be discussed that 
implies:
Firstly, a major strategy. Information exchange provisions -  as manifestations of 
cooperation - have become a distinguishing feature of international environmental law. The 
development o f environmental information provisions have been instrumental to the 
development of the whole area of international environmental law, first, in that the 
minimum contribution o f earlier environmental information provisions have been as 
procedural steps on the way to stronger substantive norms, and second, in that they have 
become a major structural element or even strategy of the entire procedure-based structure 
of this area o f law. Information provisions have transcended from the earliest enterprise of 
substantive international environmental law-making into a procedural effort to construct 
international law on the environment in terms o f risk, uncertainty and ambiguity and in 
spite of many conflicting values. Information provisions have gone from being safe and 
simple bulk-material of older environmental treaties to procedures for risk-management 
when substantive norms have been too difficult to agree on, and on into the human rights 
arena and participative rights.
Secondly, the information topic is a good mirror of the state of the whole of international 
environmental law: information provisions are procedural, and their contents are often 
technical, rather than initially intended to be politicized. This applies especially to accident 
notifications, and various communications between national bureaucracies, but also to 
reports between treaty parties, which, as they are developed under most NCPs, are non-
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confrontational and low-key. The procedural information schemes embody th e  
contradictions and ambiguities present in international efforts to protect the g lo b a l 
environment. This procedural and technical, i,e. cautious and flexible, construction is  
paradoxical, given what seeds o f conflict environmental information could sow b e tw een  
states. Indeed it has been challenged in a few contexts, for instance in the form o f  th e  
Bamako Convention, which w ith its total ban against hazardous waste imports into A frican  
fits poorly into the main structure of international environmental law, it breaks th e  
managerial trend, and functions as an argument against procedure.
The more recent trend o f developing individual rights of access to environm ental 
information is e in some sense just an other facet o f a procedural trend, but if contains a 
prospect where:
Thirdly, a chain of reasoning has developed in some international and regional legal 
documents where the rhetorically intended question o f this study -  More Information , 
Better Environment? -  receives an affirmative answer. The chain links first information to  
awareness raising, which is then related to public participation and accountability, which is 
then said to lead to better decisions and even a better environment.
Fourthly, despite its modesty, the “information strategy” of international environmental 
law has come to play a role in the larger process o f creating an Open Society. Although the 
enormous numbers of treaty provisions on information may well be proof o f their total 
harmlessness for the states that first agreed on them, their aggregate effect is as building- 
blocks for a more Open Society. As states are increasingly pressured to provide more and 
better information, the role o f the older provisions may be changing.
Fifthly, some rather serious doubts remain, however, and an evolving culture o f  openness 
must be followed by a renewed ethic o f  responsibility for all actors. There is plenty of room 
for quality environmental information, and it can only be hoped to make a difference for 
future environmental protection, as a constructive part in the process o f  international 
environmental protection and law. Doubts relate i.a. to anthropocentricity, problems of 
changing legitimacy, continued reluctance by many states and legal systems to promote 
openness, and actual access, especially in developing countries, to information technology. 
At any rate, openness is not a black-and-white issue: there are situations when precisely the
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cause of the environment requires secrecy rather than access. Many restrictions to both 
information sharing and access exist and need to exist, inter alia for environmental reasons.
A Development in Three Phases
Greater environmental openness has, as argued here, developed in three different phases. 
The phases are not so much chronological as “psychological” steps o f development. The 
first phase began symbolically with the Corfu Channel case and a very traditional 
international law approach to environmental issues, and fully matured in the wake o f the 
drama around the Chernobyl accident and subsequent treaty developments. The duty of 
states to inform on accidents and other imminent dangers to the environment of other states 
is a strong rule o f customary international law and it can also more fundamentally be 
argued to represent a general principle o f law. The information requirement comes with 
criteria, such as timeliness and comprehensiveness and often with some exceptions of, for 
instance, defence and national or industrial security. The duty’s main function is to mitigate 
environmental harm that is about to happen or already happening. Despite, or perhaps 
precisely because of, the fear that accident notifications only have a very modest role or 
marginal effect on actual environmental protection, this initial phase is well anchored in 
state practice: hence also raised expectations and public outcry when Russian authorities 
were reluctant to give timely and relevant information on the sinking of the Kursk, an 
accident that first seemed to have also environmental risks attached to it. Likewise, states 
owe each other a duty to inform on planned and ongoing activities with potential risk of 
transboundary environmental damage, and this entails some element of precaution, as 
opposed to the mostly mitigating approach o f accident notifications. The strongest 
argument for the continued relevance o f these information duties, particularly when 
considering the role of media and different forms of private tele-communication, is the 
relative “strength” o f the state for effective dissemination o f crucial information: usually 
still only the state may at best possess the means to monitor a whole country and all its 
activities, not the media or let alone individuals. These rules are thus a  necessity, but this 
does not imply that centralized state-based environmental information dissemination is 
sufficient -  far from it.
The accident information duties are manifestations o f a managerial attitude to 
environmental protection: they are technology-centred and pragmatic, and do not deal with
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the actual causes o f pollution. They are on the one hand relics o f an early s tag e  o f  
developing “international environmental law”, when there was optimism as to  the  
possibilities of creating legal ways of controlling environmental degradation and even  
ameliorate the environment, on the other hand their continuing development are ev idence  
of some kind of “realism” in relation to risks which will not disappear. They o ffe r 
psychological action against public fear, they provide an impression that even great r isk  is 
under control, but hardly lead to any far-reaching prevention and not necessarily ev en  
mitigation of potential pollution. A failure to inform should lead to state responsibility fo r 
breach o f an international legal obligation, but states are still reluctant to resort to  such  
demands. This was evident after the Chernobyl accident, and equally in lack o f  
development of responsibility and liability schemes under environmental treaties during  
recent decades, the latter being another issue that points towards the marginal weight — or 
problematic nature at the very least - of international law for environmental protection. 
This reluctance has been a “breaking-point” also for the development o f rules on  
environmental information, which have hence thrived in a different context, namely that o f  
various supervisory verification and peer-review arrangements under environmental 
treaties.
The second phase: In contrast to the reluctance to resort to state responsibility in  
environmental matters, states have been active in developing softer, non-intrusive and non­
judicial methods of dealing with the accountability o f states in relation to treaty norms. The 
second phase o f development o f environmental information came with non-compliance 
procedures, NCPs, where different reporting requirements are the most commonly used 
method for gathering information on states’ implementation o f and compliance with 
particular environmental treaty obligations. Reports contents are usually dealt with in peer 
review organs, they accumulate great amounts o f environmental data on varying levels o f  
accuracy, and they may lead to some dialogue between treaty parties as to their successes 
and problems o f implementation and compliance. Reports may have other functions as 
well, in relation to assessing and re-assessing state behaviour, and, although cause and 
effects are difficult to prove, perhaps in repressing non-compliance and in preventing 
environmental degradation if  the report compilation at the national level is open and 
inclusive. Active efforts by treaty bodies and secretariats have in the last decade 
ameliorated the reporting systems under many treaties, and different funding and technical
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aid schemes have helped especially developing countries in their reporting, but many 
problems also persist, not least in relation to un-submitted and low-quality information.
Increasingly, the contents o f state reports are made public, and it is a new approach in this 
study to deal with reporting and other control methods not so much as “supervision proper” 
but rather as part of the larger trend o f environmental information accumulation, and even 
as evidence o f an emerging culture o f openness. When looked at through these glasses, the 
cumbersome, old-fashioned and hopelessly bureaucratic reports may appear more 
interesting, because they add to the bulk of available environmental information. If  reports 
are made public, it is then up not only to other states, but also to the public to react. Thus 
part o f the responsibility o f  what to do with the information is left to those who read, or fail 
to read it. Supervision could therefore get a dimension beyond peer review: outside bodies, 
active NGOs, the media, and individuals, could gain a role o f “verifying the verification” 
and news about state behaviour could spread and raise environmental consciousness, even 
where no formal access o f individuals and NGOs exist to treaty bodies’ review sessions. 
This could serve the cause of environmental protection.
However, much information can be left outside of state reports and many go unnoticed, 
unless first digested, simplified, by the media and/or active NGOs. To anyone concerned 
with the global environment, international cooperation through state information duties and 
reporting procedures may still seem to be the most painfully misconceived strategies. 
Reporting procedures are the epitome o f a “managerial ethic”, they hardly represent the 
cutting edge o f prevention, and they add little to precaution. At worst, supervisory 
procedures merely create an illusion o f relevant information, knowledge and "progress" and 
the value o f going through the motions of supervision may be mostly symbolic. The 
example of the rather strong move among African states to ban hazardous waste trade 
altogether in the Bamako Convention can be seen as an example of a disapproval o f too 
flexible information-exchange based managerial methods as means of ensuring 
environmental protection. But the waste trade example o f the Basel Convention also points 
to the function o f information procedures as first steps towards substantive rules, a function 
that, i f  an incremental development is accepted, is welcome in the further development of 
international legal constraints on environmental behaviour. This raises the question whether 
control mechanisms can ever be thought to "develop" an area o f law as they are perhaps per 
definition confined to the pre-existing limits o f the area. When control comes before
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substantive rules development is truly pragmatic, and this is perhaps a dead-end, o r a  s ign  
of crisis in that particular area o f law. The abundance of norms on supervisory inform ation  
exchange, together with the risk that the information produced is rather vacuous, m ay ag a in  
be an indication of a marginalized role of international law for environmental protection. 
Luckily, a great deal o f information is produced and disseminated by different ac to rs  
outside o f all legal and institutional arrangements. There is -  hopefully - independent 
environmental information, and it has a valuable role in challenging the information th a t 
states produce.
Above all, however, the tremendous quantity of material produced under environmental 
treaties highlights a central dilemma in international law: if the norms that are be ing  
reported on are “good” (be it precise enough, general enough, up to date, etc.), then the 
information may be relevant as well, but if  the substantive norms are “bad” (too precise, 
too general, out of date, ridiculously low targets, etc.), then information about compliance 
with them does not necessarily produce knowledge that is relevant for environmental 
protection, it could be outright misguiding. This classical dilemma functions to attract 
attention to the norms, not the information-gathering. A pendulum movement is bom  - 
questioning one (supervision) always means reviewing the other (norms) - and this dualist 
choice again acts as a “breaking-point”, or a dead-end, on the road towards greater 
openness.
What is this dead-end, other than fatigue with environmental issues? Is there some w ay 
out? Although seemingly vigorously standing up for changes in states' environmental 
behaviour, the whole managerial trend may be more a sign of utter lack o f  imagination for 
issues environmental. Where then should such inspiration be found again? From 
catastrophes, hopefully not, from a new interest - well past the relative failures at Rio and 
Johannesburg - in norm-creation and the battles necessary for it, perhaps better? Or better 
yet, from something completely different, a ”new ethic” o f some kind? And how could any 
hopes for a ”new ethic” possibly ’’break out o f ’ and go beyond the traditional idealist 
challenge to realist choices? And is there no value in the present managerial attitude? The 
latter question can perhaps be answered by drawing a parallel to “technology belief’ as it is 
often questioned in the same fashion: we are stuck with technology, modem society is 
dependent on it, and we cannot (and do not want to?) totally “go back to nature”. Therefore 
the hope is that technology will develop even further, that it will be less raw-material and
308
energy consuming, and part o f a  solution to the problems it has created. Likewise, 
environmental information -  part o f a managerial ethic - can be assumed to have the 
potential to become a powerful tool in itself. Information takes many forms and comes 
from many sources, and the challenge for international legal information exchange 
arrangements between states is to live up to the standards o f “independent” information 
sources. But in order for this to happen, it is vital to question the prospects. This is the case 
for greater access to environmental information and the watch-dog potential which it offers.
The third phase , which we are now entering alongside the continuing use of the first two 
methods, has some potential for the quality of environmental information. Openness and 
transparency are separate by a fine nuance: When there is transparency you can stand 
behind a window and watch what the others are deciding, but when there is openness, you 
can take the step over the threshold and join in. Openness thus involves a positive 
connotation, something to strive for, and it is at first easy to be sympathetic to the subject 
of greater public access to environmental information. International legal norms on 
individual access to environmental information are valuable firstly, because they may 
influence national legal systems in the direction of greater openness. Secondly, they may 
also have importance for international environmental protection through individuals’ 
influencing and controlling national preparations for international decisions, and, when it is 
provided for under treaties, through greater access to information directly from treaty 
secretariats, expert bodies and Meetings of Parties. Above all, however, the development of 
access is a step towards a new culture of openness, a new mindset that, if  opportunities are 
used and new ones created, could come to mean better environmental protection both 
locally and globally.
Rules on access to environmental information have developed both in national law and in 
international treaties, and an explicit individual right to environmental information is taking 
shape not only in the EU but also in the ECE region, not least because of the Aarhus 
Convention. Far from the existence o f an explicit right in general international law, a train 
has nonetheless been put in motion - continuous demand in “ Information Society” for more 
and better environmental information - and that train can probably not easily be stopped. 
One threat o f  stopping it comes from terrorism and the fears that it generates of 
vulnerability in an Open Society. Another threat may present itself if  public access to 
contingency plans and environmental accident information is used to sabotage rather than
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mitigate a particular situation. And indeed the regional rules on public access that are 
developing are by no means unrestricted. Precisely concerns for public security, defence, 
industrial secrecy and safety and intellectual property along with respect for the integrity o f  
personal data are among the foremost limitations to access. The limitations may also  
function to diminish the fear that has been voiced in some contexts, that too much openness 
entails the risk that decision-making will flee to fora other than those intended. And, o f  
course, the limitations may yet prove that not much has been achieved, all depending o n  
how restrictively they will be applied.
The whole o f this trend towards better access to environmental information is a breaking- 
point in the development of international law on the environment. It changes again (after 
the introduction of species, ecosystems and biodiversity, and then to the “opposite” , 
sustainable development) the way the optimist notion o f  “international environmental law ” 
is constructed. The Aarhus Convention and several other treaties have definitively moved 
environmental issues into the human rights arena. There is now more reason than ever to 
keep “international environmental law” in quotation marks as the area is even more 
fragmented between different irreconcilable needs. Or taking it further, the rights approach, 
together with sustainable development as it has been developed at Rio and Johannesburg, 
imply perhaps such fundamental consolidation o f anthropocentric perspective that they 
result in a disappearance o f “international environmental law” just shortly after there had 
been an impression that such a coherent notion was taking shape.
But the development is a breaking-point also because it is essentially a process o f  
empowering individuals to challenge the present state o f law and policy, action and 
inaction alike. Generating knowledge and understanding it is also a basis for public 
participation in decision-making, especially through EIAs, and one element o f an emerging 
legitimacy in national environmental law-making, but perhaps through that also indicative 
of a shift in international environmental law-making. All in all, the role o f openness and 
public participation is paradoxical from the point of view o f  the legitimacy o f international 
environmental protection: since transparency, openness and public participation are part of 
a managerial trend, they are also part o f a legitimacy problem as control and decision­
making may be slowly drifting away from the state, but on the other hand, they are part of 
the “solution” in that they offer tools to check on other fundamentally managerial 
procedures in the hands o f experts, scientists, international civil servants, and so on. While
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information and access as such cannot create more than very weak legitimacy, any ensuing 
fights between different competing interests could create some narrowly understood 
aggregate legitimacy. Still, openness and rights of access and participation confer no 
legitimacy from nature’s point o f view, unless they are actually exercised on behalf of 
nature, which again presupposes a change of mind-set and a renewed sense of 
responsibility.
M ore Inform ation  - B etter Environm ent?
Unfortunately, despite the chain of thought where more information is thought to lead to a 
better environment, there is still the fear that a stress on openness, and especially on rights 
of access to information, is euphoria and therefore premature or even utterly naïve. A “new 
ethic” or culture of openness is challenged by some cruel questions related not only to the 
wisdom o f the public, as suggested above, but also to a western value-poverty in 
technology belief, to the risks o f instant decisions, to the false impression that mere 
information equals action, and to the built-in logic restrictions that an anthropocentric 
approach imply for environmental questions. It is difficult to imagine, and perhaps even 
unwise to attempt, that individuals would gain that much more direct influence in or rights 
under international (as opposed to national) environmental decision-making, and, at any 
rate, there are threats to a more open society in the form o f terrorism, and not least, in the 
form of reluctance by many, many governments still to agree with greater openness. 
Finally, therefore some concluding observations on information as a main strategy of 
international environmental law: as a co-operational-legal strategy, and part of a larger 
trend of proceduralization and management, the development of information systems to a 
bearing structure of international environmental law is faced with several continuous 
challenges:
Firstly, to actually contribute to environmental protection. A construction for conduct, it 
needs to lead to results, to overcome or deal with the many contradictory goals and 
conflicting values that environmental law is made of, but it is mostly doubtful whether it 
might actually do so.The effect o f information on environmental quality is often difficult to 
assess, from within any discipline. Information certainly could be preventive (as in 
information on planned activities, which gives opportunity to conduct EIAs), and 
sometimes at least mitigative (as in accident information), and sometimes but more seldom 
precautionary, except in one crucial sense: it is mere knowledge/information o f a risk rather
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than scientific evidence about it that should activate precautionary measures. Inform ation 
or lack thereof could have a clear relationship to state responsibility or civil liability, and in 
a moral sense, to the individual’s responsibility when he has rights o f access to 
environmental information.
Secondly, by its own technological “inevitability”. Technology often equals information, 
that is, it is meant to be information-bearing, such as satellites and monitoring equipment. 
This technology has come to stay, and investments are powerful evidence o f state (an d  
private) practice in accruing information. On the other hand, the actual accessibility 
problem (not to mention literacy or other fundamental needs) is crucial, and needs o f  
technology transfer remain, especially to many developing countries, to enhance global 
access to enabling technology. Failing this, the “information-strategy” , which can probably 
no longer be separated from the technological aspect o f  it, could become a new separating 
line between developed and developing countries.
Thirdly, by political expectations o f  an open society: Information as a “strategy” was first, 
without any pronunciation o f strategy, introduced as providing for soft steps towards 
substantive undertakings. Provisions were easy to agree on, there was will to develop them, 
as opposed to many substantive rules. But the information strategy has changed character, 
and that may still be met by opposition by many states, cultures and legal systems. While 
on the one hand a train for greater openness has been set in motion, one which is ultimately 
related to or part o f globalization and the rising expectations of openness that it may entail, 
many are still reluctant - for various reasons for preferring continued secrecy - to jump that 
train. On the other hand, there are many legal exceptions and substantial limitations to 
states’ environmental information duties and, where such exist, to individuals’ rights o f 
access, making the strategy weaker in some sense, but perhaps more realistic and 
acceptable.
Fourthly, to inspire to more voluntary information. First o f all, the development towards 
greater rights o f access for the individual is about to strengthen also the corresponding state 
duties to provide information. Access rights are complementary, not rivals, to state duties, 
they cannot fully substitute but only verify and pressure states. When states no longer have 
monopoly to environmental information, it is possible to imagine that the threshold for 
states being in breach of an information obligation will be lower. Again, this should
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activate the law o f state responsibility for failures to inform, but there are no convincing 
signs o f  such a development. Secondly, and more importantly, states will now not only 
have to fulfil all their legal duties vis-à-vis providing environmental information, they will 
also have to live up to the challenge of disseminating more voluntary information. This 
may be the most important outcome o f the development of access rights through 
international law. Just as in human rights, change must come from within, but at best 
international law can sometimes help in the process of changing state, or international 
organizations’, attitudes. The main incentives o f states for openness, just as for secrecy, 
still have little to do directly with international law.
And finally, to embrace individual responsibility? If individuals gain more rights of access 
to information and then better means of participation in decision-making -  if they are 
empowered - they also have new moral responsibility. Ignorance will be no defence, if all 
is served or available. The challenge will be to look actively for relevant information, to 
find out about what is going on, and then to make use, if possible, o f any means of 
participation in decision-making. Also international law could be influenced through 
proactive individuals in their respective national political systems. This opens up an 
interesting scenario where the traditional practitioners o f international law - the diplomats, 
the civil servants, the judges, scholars, and so on -  could come to loose some of their role 
in interpreting and formulating the priorities, in “legitimising”, legal development. The 
general “public” could also challenge the role of experts and scientists in the formulation 
and re-formulation o f  environmental goals and norms. There are o f course no guarantees 
that the “general public” will act wisely, that it will question its own values, and, in any 
event, it may actually take state machinery or experts to sort out the “relevant” in 
information overload. The public could do away with the current managerial and 
anthropocentric way of international environmental law, or it could just recognize a 
momentum for its further development. In the end, greater access to environmental 
information could however come to have normative, and not only institutional, 
repercussions. The argument is thus that with genuine effort, information access, at both 
the national and international levels, could, if  it generates new ethical choices, a renewed 
sense o f  responsibility and activism, offer some deeper qualitative change to environmental 
protection. It could help in giving meaning to and further develop many o f  the weak and 
contradictory basic principles o f international environmental law. But it is an important 
point that a qualitative shift is a prospect, not a promise. This prospect means that a
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strengthened focus on the public's access to information and consequent participation in 
decision-making and control (rather than only compulsory mantras about the importance 
o f NGOs), enhanced pluralism o f  influences (rather than only state or expert control), and 
a new stress on legitimacy are likely to stay on the (Western liberal) political-legal agenda 
for some time to come.
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